3. The relief sought by the applicants from the Recorder was:

Declaration of no resolution > > A declaration by the Recorder that a resolution was made by the Body Corporate a meeting on Friday 9 August 2024 in response to a "proposal" specified in item 4 of the minutes to the meeting was not a unanimous resolution. > > Amendments to the Minutes > > An order that the minutes in regard to item 4 be amended from: > > "(JS) mooted that the LBC Lot owners vote on the acceptance of 'the Proposal' and the vote was unanimously carried by Lot 1, Lot 2, and Lot 4. (Lot 3 is part of Lot 2). > > To > > "(JS) mooted that the LBC Lot owners vote on the acceptance of 'the Proposal'. The acceptance of 'the Proposal' required an unanimous resolution of the body corporate per S.12(1) of the Strata Titles Act. Poll:I Lot 2 and Lot 4 (Lot 3 is part of Lot 2) being in favour. Lot 1 was absent. The resolution did not reach a unanimous resolution and has not passed." > > Rejection of dealing E410596 > > A declaration that, because no unanimous resolution was achieved, the body corporate's action to lodge dealing E410596 is ultra vires. > > Rejection of dealing E410596.

4. In the supporting submissions for the application for dismissal of the appeal filed by the Lovetts filed on 25 February 2026 it was submitted:

9. This appeal is an application for review under s 144 of the Strata Titles Act 1998. It concerns the decision of the Recorder made on 14 August 2025 in application number E418390. Application E418390 concerned a resolution by the Lerunna Body Corporate (properly Strata Corporation No 59515, 556 Sandy Bay Road Sandy Bay) to dispose of part of the common property to one of the lot owners, being Dell and Christopher Lovett (the parties joined). > > 10. By s12 of the Strata Titles Act 1998 that resolution is required to be by unanimous resolution. > > 11. The Recorder's decision was that: (a) the Recorder dismissed an application for a declaration that a resolution of the Body Corporate made on 9 August 2024 was not a unanimous resolution; (b) the Recorder dismissed an application for an order that the minutes of that meeting be amended; and (c) the Recorder dismissed an application for a declaration that because no unanimous resolution was achieved, the body corporate's action to lodge dealing E410596 was ultra vires. > > 12. In his reasons for decision the Recorder noted that the crux of the application was that a proposal put to resolution at a meeting of the members of the body corporate was not passed unanimously and consequently the minutes of the meeting of the body corporate should be amended. > > 13. Section 123 of the Strata Titles Act 1998 provides that if on an application for relief under Part 9, the Recorder is satisfied that the provisions of the Strata Titles Act 1998 or by-laws have not been complied with in relation to the conduct of a meeting of the members of the body corporate, the Recorder may, by order, invalidate a resolution of the persons present at the meeting. That is precisely the relief that application E418390 seeks. It cannot rationally be contended that section 123 does not apply.

5. The Tribunal agrees with the submissions filed by the joined parties. The relief sought would be granted by the exercise of power under s 123 of the Act.
6. The time limit imposed by s 123(3) has been considered by the Tribunal in several decisions referenced by the Lovetts in their submissions of 25 February:

17. In W M Flach v Recorder of Titles [2000] TASRMPAT 155, the Tribunal was considering a resolution to increase the body corporate members' maintenance levy. It was contended that the increase in the levy was unlawful. The Tribunal observed: > > '[8.4] Assuming in favour of the appellant for present purposes, that the motion for the increase in the maintenance levy was invalid for the above or other reasons, the opportunity for challenging the validity of such a motion is afforded by Section 123 of the Act... > > [8.5] ...The effect of Sections 123 and 129 [this section has since been repealed and referred to a 28 day time period] respectively is that an application seeking relief by way of invalidating a resolution at a relevant meeting, is to be brought respectively within the periods of 30 or 28 days after the date of the resolution to which it relates. The application made to the Recorder was made on the 22nd May 2000. That was well after the expiry of the periods of 30 or 28 days. There is no power set out in the Act to enlarge the time for an application, and it is clearly the intention of the Act that proceedings of a Body Corporate should be regarded as valid unless they are challenged within the specified period. The Recorder of Titles was therefore not entitled to entertain the application for orders invalidating the November 1998 meeting of the Body Corporate, and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the Recorder in that respect...' [emphasis added]. > > 18. More recently, in T Dzelalija v Strata Corporation No 153146 [2022] TASCAT 57, the Tribunal considered a motion at a meeting of the body corporate concerning the exclusive use of carparking on part of the common property. It observed: > > '[14] Specifically, the Respondent submits that the Tribunal is unable to make the order sought by the Appellant without an order that the Motions were invalid. In making this submission the Appellant relies upon [Flach] as authority for the proposition that proceedings of a Body Corporate should be regarded as valid unless they are challenged within the period prescribed by section 123 (3) of the Act, being 30 days after the date of the meeting... > > [16] In this case the Tribunal accepts the Respondents submission that in substance the Appellant is seeking orders which in effect, if made, would invalidate the Motions. Further, the Tribunal considers that the procedure associated with the putting and passing of motions at body corporate meetings is an integral part of the 'conduct of the meeting'... > > [17] Therefore, it is the Tribunal's view that the Applicant's application was one which ought properly to have been made pursuant to section 123 of the Act. Not section 113, as is the case. Therefore, the Tribunal's first finding is that it has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal and, on this basis alone, the Appeal is dismissed...

7. I concur with the previous determinations cited above. There is no power to extend the time required under s 123(3) by the Recorder. The application for relief needed to be brought within 30 days after the date of the meeting. It was not brought within that timeframe and therefore was not validly lodged.
8. Accordingly, the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

1. The Tribunal invited submissions from the parties as to the consequences of Dealing E410596 being registered on 4 November 2025 and the Strata Plan being formally amended.
2. The Lovetts filed submissions on 3 March 2026. Each party was afforded the opportunity to file response submissions by 16 March 2026. No response submissions were received.
3. The General Review Form filed by the appellant on 3 September 2025 requested "That Dealing E410596 be deferred until this appeal has been determined". The General Review Form requires that submissions be made in support of an order in these terms. RPS Practice Direction 2 issued by the Tribunal sets out the requirements for the making of an application. No application was made by the applicant conforming with the requirements of the general review form or the practice directions of the Tribunal and the request was not pursued at the preliminary conference. In these circumstances, no order was made by the Tribunal.
4. The relevant title documents confirm Dealing E410596 were registered on 4 November 2025.
5. The Lovetts made the following submissions as to the final disposition of the proceedings given the registration of Dealing E410596:

11. No order had been made by TASCAT in this appeal staying the determination of dealing E410596 following the Recorder's decision on 14 August 2025. > > 12. No action was taken by the Body Corporate, or by Dell or Christopher Lovett or anyone on their behalf, concerning dealing E410596 between the date it was lodged and 4 November 2025 when it was registered on title. > > 13. Indefeasibility of title is a central and essential feature of the Torrens system of land titles. The Torrens system, of which the Land Titles Act 1980 is a form, is not a system of registration of title but a system of title by registration. (Olympus Superannuation Fund (Tas) Pty Ltd v Recorder of Titles [2023] TASFC 6 at [89].) > > 14. An examination of the Register will identify the nature and extent of the proprietary interest held by the registered proprietor and by those taking an estate or interest in land, and further will protect the title of the registered proprietor against any claims by others not notified on the Register. Section 39 of the Land Titles Act 1980 provides for the conclusive nature of the estate or interest in land recorded in favour of the registered proprietor. (Olympus at [93]). > > 15. The conclusive estate of Dell and Christopher Lovett includes the lot boundaries as shown on sheet 5 of 7 in Plan 59515, dated 1 November 2024, and approved by Council on 28 February 2025. That conclusive estate was created by registration on 4 November 2025. > > 16. TASCAT has no jurisdiction to review or vary that conclusive estate. > > 17. The application E410596 having been finally determined by the Recorder, this appeal P/2025/90 is futile. No order that the Tribunal could lawfully make in this appeal can alter the conclusive estate of Dell and Christopher Lovett. > > 18. This appeal should be dismissed.

6. I agree with the submissions of the Lovetts. The relief sought by the appellant is declaratory in nature seeking to set aside the resolution of the body corporate of 9 August 2024 so in turn, Dealing E410596 would be unable to proceed to registration. That registration has taken effect on 4 November 2025. As submitted by the Lovetts, the Tribunal has no power or jurisdiction to vary the conclusive estate that has now been created. Any declaratory powers exercised by the Tribunal under s 123 would be of no effect and not capable of altering the conclusive estate.
7. Section 89 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 relevantly provides:

89. Frivolous or vexatious proceedings > > (1) This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding or a part of a proceeding - > > (a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or > > (b) is otherwise an abuse of process. > > (2) If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceedings, or the part of a proceeding, be dismissed or struck out and may make any related or ancillary order. > > (3) The Tribunal's power to make an order under subsection (2) is exercisable only by - > > (a) a legally qualified member of the Tribunal; or > > (b) a registrar who is authorised in writing by the President to make such an order, whether generally or in relation to particular classes of matters or otherwise. > > (4) The Tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of a party to the proceedings or on its own initiative. > > (5) If a proceeding, or a part of a proceeding, is dismissed or struck out under this section, another proceeding of the same kind in relation to the same matter cannot be commenced before the Tribunal without the leave of the President or a Deputy President.

8. In In E Allan v Strata Corporation No 180683 [2022] TASCAT 29, the Tribunal said at [10]:

Section 89 of the TASCAT Act provides that the Tribunal may order that proceedings be dismissed where it believes that they are frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance or are otherwise an abuse of process. What might be frivolous, vexatious, misconceived, lacking in substance or an abuse of process can be protean, and the natural meaning of those words has somewhat contumelious overtones. However, their broad meaning in law is that the proceeding lacks a legal foundation to provide relief.

9. The description of the proceedings as 'frivolous' or 'vexatious' is not intended as a pejorative in this instance. The provision is the mechanism by which the Tribunal may dismiss proceedings that have no prosect of success. If I am incorrect with respect to dismissal on the basis set out in paragraph [23] and [24], then in the alternative, the appeal is dismissed pursuant to s 89 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020 as the Tribunal lacks a legal foundation to provide the relief sought by the appellant which is to set aside Dealing E410596.

1. I make the following determinations:
   1. That appeal P/2025/90 is dismissed as the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
   2. In the alternative, the appeal is dismissed pursuant to s 89 of the Tasmanian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2020.