Section 5 applies Part 1.4 of the Radiocommunications Act 1992 to a 1983 Act, yet section 2 ties commencement to the Radiocommunications Act 1983. The 1992 Act did not exist when this Act was conceived or originally commenced, creating a temporal absurdity in the statute's internal logic.
The mandatory election in subsection (4) only applies when a licence is not covered by a determination under subsection (1B) or (1D), but there is no mechanism ensuring ACMA determinations cannot overlap or leave a licence simultaneously covered and uncovered, potentially trapping applicants in an undefined election obligation.
The trigger condition in subsection (5)(b) contains a potentially impossible compliance window: the licensee must notify ACMA at least 21 days before 'the next anniversary... that is more than 12 months before the end of the period the licence is in force.' For shorter long-term licences, this anniversary may not exist, making compliance literally impossible.
7 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The exclusion for radiation apparatus that 'is a laser but is not a laser apparatus' creates a logically incoherent category. The regulation requires removal of radiation warning signs for 'a radiation apparatus, other than a radiation apparatus that is a laser but is not a laser apparatus.' This double negative exclusion means the section applies to lasers that ARE laser apparatus, but the phrasing creates a class of things that are simultaneously a laser and not a laser apparatus — a distinction that is defined nowhere in the visible text and produces a confusing double-negative that may be impossible to apply in practice.
Section 8(1)(d) prescribes a 3-year certificate period for radiation apparatus 'other than' apparatus mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (e), but paragraph (e) is the only paragraph that deals with a 10-year period for apparatus subject to an approved quality assurance program. The cross-reference to paragraph (e) in paragraph (d) creates a structural dependency: paragraph (d) cannot be understood without knowing whether paragraph (e) applies, but paragraph (e)'s operation depends on an approval that may not yet exist at the time the apparatus is first used. This means an apparatus could shift between the 3-year and 10-year categories based on a post-commencement administrative...
The Act purports to bind the State but simultaneously exempts the State from prosecution. This creates a situation where the State has legal obligations under the Act but faces no legal consequence for breaching them, rendering the binding effect largely meaningless against the most powerful actor.
Section 20(8) requires the accredited person to report to the chief executive if 'none of the requirements are complied with within 30 days.' However, if only some requirements are complied with, section 22 governs. There is a gap: if some but not all requirements are complied with, section 20(8) does not trigger (because it is not 'none'), yet the accredited person still cannot issue a certificate of compliance. Section 22 requires reporting after the 30-day period, but section 20(8)'s penalty provision only applies where none are complied with, creating an asymmetric enforcement gap.
The document states it is 'current from 28 December 2016 to date (accessed 5 April 2026 at 17:43)' while simultaneously stating 'File last modified 22 June 2018'. If the file was last modified in 2018, it cannot logically be 'current to date' in 2026 without any subsequent amendments, raising questions about whether the consolidation is genuinely up to date.
The published instrument contains no substantive operative provisions, schedules, or fee tables whatsoever. An Amendment (Fees) Regulation with no discernible fee amounts, fee items, or operative clauses is logically incapable of achieving its stated purpose of amending fees.
The prescribed amount for the financial year starting 1 July 2023 is fixed at $20.4m, but the regulation only commences on 1 September 2023, meaning the prescribed amount for a financial year that is already two months old at commencement is set retrospectively.
The obligation to include a summary of an out-of-scope audit issue in 'the program for the next financial year' creates a bootstrapping problem: the program for the next financial year must already exist and be finalised (as part of the operational plan) before or at the same time the current year's audit results would typically be known, making timely compliance structurally difficult.
The obligation to report an out-of-focus audit issue is deferred to the 'next financial year' plan, meaning there is no mechanism to address a discovered suitability issue within the current audit cycle. A serious licensing suitability concern could sit unaddressed for up to 12 months before even being summarised.
The program for the next financial year must 'state whether the issue is addressed by the program' — but there is no obligation that it actually be addressed. The regulation is satisfied by a declaration that the issue is *not* addressed, rendering the disclosure requirement largely toothless.
The board is declared to not be a body corporate, yet sec.43(2) states that civil liability that cannot attach to members or the CEO 'attaches instead to the board'. A non-body-corporate entity cannot hold legal liability at law — only legal persons (natural or corporate) can be defendants in civil proceedings.
The board is declared 'not a body corporate' (sec.9) yet is simultaneously declared a 'statutory body' under the Financial Accountability Act 2009 and the Statutory Bodies Financial Arrangements Act 1982 (sec.8). The term 'statutory body' in those Acts typically presupposes a body with distinct legal identity capable of financial accountability obligations. The combination creates an entity that must comply with financial legislation designed for bodies with legal personality while lacking that personality.
Commencement contingent on Convention entering into force for Australia, but s7 (approving ratification) comes into force on Royal Assent. The Act cannot logically approve ratification of a Convention before the Convention has entered into force for Australia, yet the commencement of most operative provisions depends on that entry into force — creating a bootstrapping problem where the Act purports to approve something whose legal precondition it cannot itself satisfy.
Retroactive deemed-never-to-have-been-entitled provision: a person who makes a complaint under a State/Territory law is deemed 'never to have been' entitled to make a federal complaint. This retroactively extinguishes a right that, at the time it was exercised, may have been legally valid, creating an impossible retroactive legal fiction.
The by-law is stated to be made under the Sydney Turf Club Act 1943, which is itself listed as a repealed Act, yet the by-law remains in force under a deemed re-enactment mechanism. The instrument therefore derives its ongoing authority from a parent Act that no longer exists.
The editorial note records that the by-law as originally notified contained the word 'quest badge' rather than 'guest badge', and that this has been corrected in the electronic version. However, the correction was made during electronic capture, not by formal amendment, raising a question about whether the 'corrected' version is the legally operative text or a silent administrative substitution.
The Act binds the State, yet simultaneously exempts the State from prosecution for offences under the Act. This creates a meaningless obligation: the State is 'bound' by the Act but faces no criminal consequence for breaching it, rendering the binding of the State largely symbolic for enforcement purposes.
The 'casino agreement' is defined circularly as 'the agreement ratified under section 10, as amended from time to time under section 11.' Section 10 is not reproduced in the provided text, meaning the definition depends entirely on an external provision for its content, and the agreement derives its legal force from being enacted as law (sec.3(b)) while simultaneously being a pre-existing private agreement. This creates a circularity: the agreement is law because it is ratified, but it is defined by reference to the ratification section rather than by its own content.
The council simultaneously is a body corporate (sec.6) capable of suing and being sued in its own name, yet also 'represents the State' and holds 'the status, privileges and immunities of the State' (sec.7). State immunity typically protects against being sued, yet sec.6 explicitly contemplates the council being sued. These two propositions are in direct tension.
Section 13(2) requires that 4 of the 6 appointed members be nominated by the Minister, and section 13(3) requires only that the Minister's nominees have relevant qualifications or experience. Section 13(2A) requires at least 4 of the 6 appointed members to be veterans or members of the veterans' community. These requirements can potentially conflict: if the 2 veterans'-organisation nominees are veterans and the 4 Ministerial nominees are not, the sec.13(2A) threshold cannot be met unless the Minister's nominees are also veterans. The Act provides no mechanism to resolve this conflict.
The council is 'properly constituted' with only 8 members, yet the full complement is up to 15 members (2-3 official + 3 appointed + 5 elected + 4 additional). A council operating at roughly half its intended membership is deemed properly constituted, with no floor on which categories must be present.
Removing a member from office requires 'at least 10 members' to be satisfied, but the council is deemed properly constituted at only 8 members (sec.17). If the council has exactly 8 members, removal is mathematically impossible because 10 satisfied members can never be achieved.
The definition of 'mineral substance' in sec.4(2) contains an internal inconsistency: it includes 'a mineral, other than a mineral situated within the boundaries of land the subject of a mining lease, mineral development licence or exploration permit.' This means that the same physical mineral substance changes its legal classification depending purely on whether a mining lease exists over the land where it is located. A substance that is a 'mineral substance' (with its more permissive 10x concentration multiplier) can cease to be one — and thus become subject to the standard concentration thresholds — simply by virtue of a mining lease being granted or surrendered, with no change to the...
Sections 9(3) and 9(4) create an unusual regulatory structure: subsection (3) states that subsection (4) applies to wastewater from reverse osmosis at a water treatment facility, and subsection (4) then prescribes a measurement point 'immediately outside the point at which the wastewater is released into the environment.' However, subsection (2) states that subsection (1) does not apply to disposal into a sewerage system — but the measurement point prescribed in subsection (4) could, for a water treatment facility that discharges into a sewerage system, produce a contradiction as to which regime applies. The regulation does not address this overlap.
6 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The 'Limitation' principle is defined identically under both the ionising radiation framework (s5(a)) and the non-ionising radiation framework (s5(b)): 'Limitation involves setting radiation dose limits, or imposing other measures, so that the health risks to any person exposed to radiation are below levels considered unacceptable.' Non-ionising radiation does not use 'dose limits' in the same way as ionising radiation, making the identical definition scientifically inapt and potentially leading to inconsistent application.
If the chief executive fails to decide a licensee's application to change their radiation safety and protection plan within 90 days, the failure is deemed a refusal. This means bureaucratic inaction is treated as an active decision to refuse, potentially penalising applicants for the regulator's own administrative failures and creating perverse incentives.
7 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Every heading and section title in the document is duplicated verbatim (e.g., 'Status Information Status Information', 'Currency of version Currency of version', 'Authorisation Authorisation'). While likely a rendering artefact, if this were treated as the authoritative version, it would create ambiguity about which instance of each heading is operative.
The currency statement asserts the version is current up to the access date of 5 April 2026, implying ongoing maintenance and currency. The file modification date of 22 June 2018 contradicts this by indicating no updates have been made to the file for approximately 8 years, creating a tension between claimed currency and demonstrated maintenance activity.
Section 5(4) requires the program for the next financial year to 'state whether the issue is addressed by the program' — but this is a tautology: if the program includes the issue, it is by definition addressed by the program. The provision adds no meaningful obligation beyond mere acknowledgment.
The definition of 'relevant wagering operator' excludes New Zealand from the category of foreign countries triggering the enhanced scrutiny provisions. This means a licensed wagering operator holding a New Zealand foreign licence is treated more favourably than one holding a licence from any other foreign country, without any stated rationale, creating an arbitrary distinction.
4 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The regulation permanently fixes 'Tattersall's Club Rooms at 215 Queen Street, Brisbane' as the approved place for paying and settling certain bets. If the premises close, relocate, or are demolished, compliance with the Act becomes physically impossible without amending subordinate legislation.
Section 3 duplicates its own substantive content verbatim. Each subsection is stated once in narrative form and then repeated identically with explicit subsection labels (sec.3-ssec.1 through sec.3-ssec.4), and the list items are then repeated a third time as dot points. This structural redundancy creates interpretive risk: if the duplicated text ever diverges (e.g., through selective amendment), the section would be internally self-contradicting.
5 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The board, declared not to be a body corporate (sec.9), is granted 'the powers of an individual', including the power to acquire and hold property, enter contracts, employ staff, and appoint attorneys. These powers are inherently powers of a legal person, not a non-corporate entity.
The chief executive officer's function is described as ensuring 'the all-codes board is managed in accordance with the priorities of the board'. The term 'all-codes board' appears to be a remnant drafting error — no such entity is defined in the provisions provided. The board's defined name is 'Racing Queensland Board'.
14 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 5 purports to give the Act 'the effect it would have if' hypothetical words were inserted into other sections. This creates a textual phantom — the Act operates as though words exist that do not actually appear in the text, producing a two-tiered legislative reality that creates interpretive confusion about what the Act actually says versus what it legally means.
Section 8(1) exempts Part II from applying to special measures under Article 1(4) of the Convention, EXCEPT measures to which s10(1) applies by virtue of s10(3). Section 10(3) then deems certain property management provisions to be subject to s10(1). This creates a circular exception-to-exception structure: the general exception (s8) is itself excepted by reference to a deeming provision (s10(3)) that creates a deemed application of s10(1). The result is that the very provisions designed to protect Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander property rights are carved out of the special measures exemption and made subject to the equality guarantee — which could paradoxically undermine protective...
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The document states it was 'accessed 5 April 2026 at 15:12', yet the file was last modified on 16 January 2024 and the current in-force version dates from 7 February 2011. The access timestamp implies a future date relative to the file modification date, which is internally inconsistent with the document's own currency statement.
The by-law is simultaneously described as having been made under the Sydney Turf Club Act 1943 and as being, from 7 February 2011, taken to be made under the Australian Jockey and Sydney Turf Clubs Merger Act 2010. A single instrument cannot in strict logic have been 'made under' two different Acts, one of which did not exist at the time of making.
Section 4(1) declares this Act prevails over inconsistent provisions in other Acts. Section 4(2) then carves out provisions that 'expressly deal with the interaction between this Act and the other Act.' However, sec.4(2) does not specify whether such express interaction provisions in the other Act prevail over this Act or vice versa, leaving the priority rule entirely unclear for that category, undermining the very certainty sec.4 is meant to provide.
The voting power thresholds in sec.20(2) are expressed as mutually exclusive bands: (a) 'more than 5% but not more than 10%', (b) 'more than 10% but not more than 20%', (c) 'more than 20%'. Each band requires separate approval, but the provision does not address whether obtaining approval for a lower band (e.g. 5-10%) automatically permits movement to a higher band, or whether each threshold crossing requires fresh approval. A person lawfully approved at 8% who reaches 11% may technically be in breach of (b) even though they were approved under (a), creating a compliance trap.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
A person is disqualified from becoming or continuing as an appointed member if they do not consent to the Minister requesting a criminal history report. This effectively makes the right to privacy in one's criminal history a disqualifying factor, penalising a person for exercising a lawful choice to withhold consent. The Act simultaneously requires consent (sec.23(2)) yet treats the absence of consent as a substantive disqualification rather than merely a procedural obstacle.
Section 25(4) requires criminal history documents to be destroyed 'as soon as practicable after [they are] no longer needed,' yet sec.25(3)(a) permits their use 'in the performance of a function or exercise of a power under this Act.' If the Minister retains the document to verify ongoing eligibility of a sitting member, it is perpetually 'needed,' potentially indefinitely deferring destruction. The destruction obligation may therefore be practically unenforceable for sitting members.
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Removing the chancellor, vice-chancellor or chairperson also requires 'at least 10 members' to be satisfied, suffering the same impossibility as sec.26B when the council operates at the minimum 8-member quorum.
An elected member's term starts 'the day after the day when the term of office of the member's predecessor ends', but for the very first election there is no predecessor, creating an undefined commencement date for inaugural elected members.
13 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.