The document submitted for analysis is not legislation at all — it is a 404-style error page from the Western Australian Parliamentary Counsel's Office website, indicating the requested legislation page is no longer available.

The document is titled 'Rail Safety National Law Application Act 2024' but contains zero provisions relating to rail safety, national law application, or any legislative subject matter whatsoever.

The heading 'Western Australian Legislation' and 'Unknown URL' are each duplicated as both H2 and H1 headings, suggesting structural or rendering corruption in the source document.

The document simultaneously purports to be a binding piece of Western Australian legislation and expressly states that the page containing that legislation no longer exists, making it self-defeating as a legal instrument.

The document states it was 'accessed 5 April 2026 at 13:18' but also states 'Version current from 1 July 2025 to date'. If the access date of 5 April 2026 is genuine, the legislation purports to have been accessed from a future date relative to any reasonable drafting timeline, raising questions about the authenticity of the version information.

The title and heading blocks are duplicated multiple times verbatim (e.g., 'Rail Safety National Law (Tasm Rail Safety National Law (Tasmania) Act 2012' appears repeatedly, and 'Status Information Status Information', 'Currency of version Currency of version', 'Authorisation Authorisation' all appear as doubled headings). This creates ambiguity about which heading is authoritative and suggests a structural/formatting defect in the consolidated version.

Tasmania's legislation incorporates the South Australian Rail Safety National Law 'as in force from time to time', meaning the substantive content of Tasmanian law is defined by whatever South Australia happens to legislate at any given moment, without any independent Tasmanian parliamentary act.

The version is stated to be 'current from 20 January 2013 to date (accessed 1 April 2026 at 23:13)', yet the file was 'last modified 5 July 2017'. If the underlying South Australian law changes 'from time to time', the Tasmanian version is substantively updated without the file being modified, rendering the 'last modified' date meaningless as an indicator of currency.

Contradictory evidentiary standards within the same section: sec.9(4) states a specimen certificate is 'conclusive evidence' of matters stated in it (unless contrary proved), but sec.9(5) creates a conclusive presumption that no alcohol/ether was used UNLESS the health care professional gives evidence on oath that they did use it. The phrase 'unless the contrary is proved' in sec.9(4) undermines the word 'conclusive', rendering the certificate neither truly conclusive nor merely prima facie evidence.

A cascade of conclusive presumptions that produces an unfalsifiable evidentiary chain. Sec.9(5) conclusively presumes no alcohol/ether was used unless the health professional swears on oath they used it. Sec.9(6) then conclusively presumes that even if they did use it, the result was unaffected unless the contrary is proved. The net effect is that contamination can never practically invalidate a test result: if the professional says nothing, it is conclusively presumed no contamination occurred; if they admit contamination under oath, it is conclusively presumed it had no effect. A defendant cannot rebut the first presumption without triggering the second.

Circular definition: 'national law' is defined as the 'Rail Safety National Law (Queensland)', and 'Rail Safety National Law (Queensland)' is defined as the provisions applying because of section 4. Section 4 then applies the 'Rail Safety National Law' (the SA version). The term 'national law' is used extensively throughout Part 3 to make directions, impose duties and create offences, yet it is defined by reference to itself via the Queensland application, which is in turn defined by reference to the South Australian schedule. A reader cannot determine the content of 'national law' without consulting external SA legislation.

Section 5 defines 'State entity' to include 'a public service employee under the Public Sector Act 2022, section 13'. A single employee is not a 'State entity' in any conventional legal or administrative sense; an entity is an organisation or body, not a natural person. Section 6(3) then applies financial accountability and ombudsman legislation to a 'State entity exercising functions', which is incoherent when the entity is a single employee. Section 6(4) separately declares ONRSR employees are not public service employees, creating an asymmetry: individual employees of other bodies can be 'State entities' subject to whole-of-government legislation, but ONRSR employees are carved out...

The document states it was accessed on '5 April 2026' but was last modified on '29 January 2025'. The access date of 5 April 2026 is presented as a future date relative to any realistic drafting or publication date, yet is treated as a current historical fact within the document itself.

The instrument states legislation is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation' but the Table of Amending Instruments link implies amendments exist, yet the file was last modified 29 January 2025 and is described as current 'to date'. If amendments exist in the table, the file modification date should reflect those amendments, creating a potential inconsistency between the claimed currency and the static modification date.

The instrument states it has been current 'from 5 February 2021 to date', yet the file is recorded as last modified on 28 January 2021 — eight days before the instrument purportedly came into force. A file cannot logically be last modified before the version it describes became current, unless the commencement date was backdated or the modification timestamp is erroneous.

The legislation states it is 'current from 30 November 2009 to date' while simultaneously stating 'File last modified 17 January 2025', creating an implicit internal inconsistency about the instrument's static or dynamic nature.

A Revocation Order that has itself apparently been subject to amending instruments (per the Table of Amending Instruments link) is logically absurd. A revocation order has a single operative act — revoking a prior instrument. There is no substantive content capable of being amended.

The document states it is 'current from 27 March 2020 to date' but also states the file was 'last modified 18 March 2020', meaning the file was last modified approximately 9 days before the version is stated to have come into current effect. This creates a temporal inconsistency where the authoritative file predates its own currency commencement date.

The Act commences on the date fixed under subsection 2(1) of the Radiocommunications Act 1983, but section 3 incorporates the Radiocommunications Act 1992 — a different Act that did not exist when this Act commenced. The commencement anchor references a 1983 Act while the operative body of the legislation depends on a 1992 replacement Act.

Subsections 7(2) and 7(3) appear to impose tax at exactly the same time on the same event — the anniversary of the day an instrument came into force — but purport to be separate tax obligations (one 'on the anniversary' and one 'on the holding on the anniversary'). The payment date is identical, creating a risk of double taxation for what may be the same taxable event.

Circular definition of 'tax'

Mandatory election at application stage is structurally impossible for licences later exempted

Deemed election applied to a scenario where no election is required

The ACMA is empowered to set an initial holding date for a class of spectrum licences, but there is no obligation on the ACMA to ever make such a determination. Without a determination, no initial holding date exists, and by section 6(1)-(2), no tax can ever be imposed. The entire taxing mechanism is contingent on a discretionary administrative act that need never occur.

The amount of tax is ascertained by a written ACMA determination, and in making that determination the ACMA must take into account matters 'specified in the regulations'. However, section 8 limits the regulation-making power to regulations 'for the purposes of section 7'. If no regulations are ever made specifying those matters, the ACMA has no mandatory considerations to take into account, yet still purports to impose a valid tax amount. The compliance obligation in s7(2) is therefore vacuous until regulations exist, creating a circular dependency between the tax amount and subordinate instruments that may never be made.