Both subsections criminalise identical conduct (creating a certificate when not entitled to) but impose different penalties: subsection (1) imposes 1 penalty unit as a strict liability offence, while subsection (3) imposes 5 penalty units as a fault-based offence. A person commits both offences simultaneously with every improper creation, creating a double jeopardy scenario from a single act under the same provision.
Section 4 states the Act applies from 1 January 2001 and that 'no certificates can be created, and no liability arises, in respect of electricity generated on or after 1 January 2031.' However, section 3 states the Act contributes to 'Australia's greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets' which under the definition in section 5 include targets set under the Paris Agreement and Climate Change Act 2022 that extend well beyond 2031. The scheme therefore structurally undermines its own stated object by design.
The Regulator 'must refuse' a registration application if the applicant has 'previously been a registered person.' This creates a permanent, irrebuttable bar on re-registration for anyone who was ever previously registered, regardless of why they were deregistered, how long ago it was, or whether any misconduct was involved. A person whose registration lapsed due to administrative oversight can never re-register.
'Any person may be registered under this Act' (s9(1)) is directly contradicted by the mandatory refusal in s11(3) for any person who has previously been registered. These provisions cannot both be true simultaneously.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The Act binds the Crown in right of States and Territories but explicitly does not bind the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, yet the charge is imposed under a Commonwealth Act and administered by a Commonwealth regulator (the Clean Energy Regulator). The entity responsible for enforcement is the one entity exempt from the charge.
The rate of charge is fixed at $65 per MWh in primary legislation, meaning any adjustment to reflect market conditions, inflation, or policy recalibration requires an Act of Parliament rather than delegated legislation or regulatory determination.
The Solicitor-General's salary is defined circularly by reference to 'the salary and allowances payable to a Judge of the Federal Court of Australia', which is itself specified in Schedule 1 Part 2. However, Part 2 only specifies historical rates from 1990-1991, creating a situation where the Solicitor-General's salary is pegged to rates that no longer reflect actual Federal Court Judge salaries (which are now determined by Remuneration Tribunal), making the reference practically meaningless or indeterminate.
The clause provides an additional $750 per annum to a Judge who also holds certain offices including 'President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal', 'President of the Law Reform Commission', and 'President of the Australian Competition Tribunal'. However, Schedule 1 Part 3 already sets out specific salary rates for those very same presidents. This creates an absurdity where a person who is both a Judge and a President receives both the Judge's base salary plus $750, but the Schedule also separately lists the President salary — it is unclear which base applies and whether the $750 is additional to the judicial salary or the presidential salary.
Executive education offices (Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the Australian National University) are included in the definition of 'public office' under s.3(4)(fb), but s.3(4)(q) expressly excludes 'an office or appointment in the service or employment of a higher education institution' from the definition of public office. The ANU is a higher education institution, so the Vice-Chancellor and Deputy Vice-Chancellor should be excluded by (q), yet (fb) includes them. This creates an internal definitional contradiction within the same subsection.
A Tribunal member cannot be 'the holder of a public office' (s.4(4)(c)), yet a Tribunal member is arguably the holder of a public office themselves. Section 3(4)(a) defines public office to include any office established by a law of the Commonwealth (other than this Act). The Tribunal is established by this Act, so the carve-out '(other than this Act)' saves members from that specific limb. However, this reliance on the parenthetical is structurally awkward and the self-referential tension remains latent.
Section 9A states a matter is subject to monitoring under 'this Act' rather than 'this Part', creating an inconsistency with sections 8 and 9 which correctly refer to 'this Part'. This means the triggering mechanism for matter-monitoring operates at a different (broader) level than provision-monitoring and information-monitoring, potentially allowing matter-monitoring to be activated without the Part 2 machinery being properly engaged.
Section 34(3) grants an issuing officer exercising powers under Part 2 'the same protection and immunity as if the issuing officer were exercising the power as the court of which the issuing officer is a member'. However, section 34(1) simultaneously provides the power is conferred 'not as a court or a member of a court'. The officer is thus protected as if acting as a court while explicitly not acting as a court - a logical contradiction built into the same section.
The version is stated as 'current from 1 April 2025 to date (accessed 5 April 2026 at 11:42)' yet the file was last modified on 24 December 2024, which is before the stated commencement date of 1 April 2025.
The access timestamp records the document as accessed on '5 April 2026' yet the Amendment Regulations are dated 2024, creating a temporal gap where the regulatory instrument has apparently remained unamended and current for over 12 months post-commencement with no further legislative activity recorded.
The legislation states it is 'current from 27 November 2025 to date (accessed 1 April 2026 at 23:12)' yet the file was 'last modified 1 December 2025'. This creates a temporal anomaly where a version described as current from 27 November 2025 was not finalised until 1 December 2025, meaning the stated commencement date precedes the date the file was actually completed.
The legislation states it is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation', yet the version is described as current from 27 November 2025 with a file modification date of 1 December 2025 — a gap of 4 calendar days. Depending on working day count, this may itself breach the site's own stated update standard.
The document states it is 'current from 23 November 2016 to date' while simultaneously showing an access date of '8 April 2026', yet the file was last modified on '5 July 2017'. This creates a temporal absurdity: the document purports to be current and up-to-date as of 2026 but has not been substantively modified since 2017.
Every heading and section title in the document is duplicated verbatim (e.g., 'Registration to Work with Vuln Registration to Work with Vulnerable People', 'Status Information Status Information', 'Currency of version Currency of version', 'Authorisation Authorisation'). This systematic duplication appears throughout the entire instrument.
Required outcome 3 for strategic cropping land applies to activities that 'do not meet required outcome 1 OR are being carried out on 2 or more properties'. The use of 'or' means an activity that meets required outcome 1 (no impact on strategic cropping land) but happens to span two properties is still caught by required outcome 3. This creates the absurd situation where an activity with zero impact on strategic cropping land must still demonstrate it manages impacts on strategic cropping land at a regional scale.
The second prescribed solution for required outcome 1 requires demonstration that 'the activity cannot be carried out on other land that is not used for a priority agricultural land use'. This is an impossible compliance burden — an applicant must prove a negative about all conceivable alternative locations, including land elsewhere on the property, adjacent properties, or 'another nearby location'. The phrase 'another nearby location' is undefined and potentially infinite in scope, making it logically impossible to fully demonstrate compliance.
The Act purports to bind the Commonwealth and other States, then immediately immunises them from prosecution for offences. This creates an obligation without any enforcement mechanism — a legal duty with no legal consequence.
Circular definition: a 'priority agricultural area' is defined partly by reference to 'priority agricultural land use', which is defined as highly productive agriculture 'of a type identified in a regional plan for an area of regional interest'. An 'area of regional interest' includes a 'priority agricultural area'. The definition thus partially depends on itself.
The Regional Investment Corporation Act 2018 incorporates by reference a definition from the Future Drought Fund Act 2019, a statute that did not exist at the time of the RIC Act's enactment. A 2018 Act defines a term by reference to a 2019 Act, creating a bootstrapping problem: at commencement, 'drought resilience' had no operative meaning under this Act.
The definition of 'start day' refers to 'a day specified in an instrument made under paragraph 8(4)(b)', but paragraph 8(4)(b) authorises the responsible Ministers to specify a day before 1 July 2018 from which the Corporation is to perform the function in paragraph 8(1)(b). The 'start day' definition thus ties a general temporal anchor to an instrument designed for a specific operational function, not for general use as a commencement date across the Act.
Section 3 incorporates definitions entirely by reference to the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000, meaning this Act contains no operative definitions of its own. If the parent Act is amended, repealed, or its definitions altered, the meaning of terms in this Act changes automatically and potentially retroactively without any amendment to this Act.
Section 7(1) declares the Act does not impose a tax on property of a State, while section 4 declares the Act binds the Crown in right of each State. These two provisions operate in direct tension: the Act purports to bind State Crowns to pay a charge while simultaneously disclaiming that it imposes a tax on State property.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The High Court Canberra Allowance is stated to be payable 'from 5 December 1989', which predates both the Act's Royal Assent commencement date and the 1 July 1990 commencement of Part 3. The Act purports to create an entitlement that arose before the Act existed, raising a retroactive impossibility — the Act cannot have created an obligation to pay an allowance for a period before it was enacted.
Clause 6 of Schedule 1 provides that salary rates 'are to be adjusted in accordance with safety net review decisions relating to allowances made by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission after the commencement of this Act.' The Australian Industrial Relations Commission was abolished in 2009 and replaced by Fair Work Australia (now the Fair Work Commission). The Act provides no fallback mechanism if the specified adjustment body ceases to exist, making compliance with clause 6 literally impossible.
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The quorum is two members out of a three-member Tribunal. If only two members are present and voting, a 'majority' under s.10(4)(c) requires at least two votes. If both members disagree (1-1), the casting vote under s.10(4)(d) resolves the deadlock. However, with only two members present, the presiding member would cast both a deliberative vote and a casting vote, meaning a single person effectively decides the outcome — directly undermining the collegiate decision-making rationale of a three-member tribunal.
Section 4(7) provides that the Tribunal's functions are not affected by a vacancy in its membership. Combined with the two-member quorum in s.10(4)(b), this means that a Tribunal of one (with two vacancies) can still purport to function. A single member cannot constitute a quorum of two, yet the Act says vacancies do not affect functions — these provisions are irreconcilable when there are two vacancies simultaneously.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Identical to the absurdity in section 34(3): issuing officers under Part 3 (investigation) are simultaneously told their powers are conferred 'not as a court or a member of a court' (s75(1)) but are given protection 'as if' they were exercising the power as the court of which they are a member (s75(3)).
Section 35(6) requires an authorised person to carry their identity card 'at all times when exercising powers under this Part'. Section 35(3) makes it an offence for a former authorised person to fail to return the card within 14 days of ceasing to be authorised. Together, these create a situation where a person who has lost their card (excused from returning it by s35(5)) must nonetheless have carried it while authorised - but having lost it, they cannot return it. More critically, the strict liability offence in s35(3)-(4) for non-return sits uneasily with the 14-day window: a person who ceases to be authorised while actively executing powers (and thus lawfully carrying the card) has the...
11 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The authorised file modification date of 24 December 2024 contradicts the stated currency commencement date of 1 April 2025. A file modified before its own commencement date cannot, in the ordinary sense, reflect the version that came into force on that later date unless no changes occurred between modification and commencement — yet the metadata implies the version is defined by its 1 April 2025 commencement, not its December 2024 drafting.
The stated commencement of the current version (27 November 2025) contradicts the file modification date (1 December 2025). The authoritative consolidated text cannot logically have been in its current form before it was last modified, creating an internal inconsistency in the status metadata.
The instrument is titled an 'Amendment Order' but contains no operative amendment provisions whatsoever. The entire substantive content of the document as presented consists solely of metadata, status information, and administrative details, with no actual amendments to the principal instrument visible.
The instrument claims to be the current version as of April 2026, implying it accurately reflects the law up to that date, yet the underlying file has not been modified since July 2017. These two claims are mutually contradictory: if the file has not changed since 2017, it cannot simultaneously be reliably 'current' to 2026 unless no amendments have occurred, which itself contradicts the existence of a 'Table of Amending Instruments'.
1 more generated issue for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Net replenishment of a regionally significant water source is defined as replacing 'all water that is no longer available for a priority agricultural land use' due to producing CSG or associated water. However, the requirement must be demonstrated in the assessment application before the activity commences, meaning the applicant must have a strategy in place to replenish water losses that have not yet occurred and whose magnitude is inherently uncertain at application stage.
Section 15(2)(c) declares petroleum resource activities an unacceptable use in the Channel Country strategic environmental area designated precincts. Section 15(2A) then carves out exceptions for pre-existing leases and certain transitional applications. However, the exception in 15(2A)(b) applies to leases that 'have been amended, renewed or transferred on or after 22 December 2023' — meaning the exception paradoxically applies to leases that have been changed after the cutoff date, while the stricter rule applies to those unchanged. This rewards parties who amended/renewed their leases over those who complied with existing terms.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Circular definition: 'strategic environmental area' requires the area to contain 'environmental attributes', which are defined as attributes 'identified as an environmental attribute for the area under a regional plan or regulation'. The existence of the area as a strategic environmental area is thus contingent on a prior designation that itself presupposes the area is a strategic environmental area.
A 'regulated activity' is defined as an activity (a) likely to have a widespread and irreversible impact AND (b) prescribed under a regulation. The Act at section 19 then requires approval before carrying out such an activity. However, since irreversibility is a defining characteristic, any approval granted necessarily approves an activity whose impact cannot be undone — making conditions requiring restoration of impact (see s.21(c)(i)) logically inapplicable to any activity that qualifies as a regulated activity by definition.
12 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Sections 3-54 (including s8) did not commence until 8 March 2018, yet s8(3) and s8(4) authorise the responsible Ministers to specify a day before 1 July 2018 from which the Corporation is to perform its functions, potentially even before the Act itself commenced. This creates a retroactive impossibility: the Corporation cannot lawfully have performed functions before its enabling legislation was in force.
Section 20(3) creates a legal fiction that there are exactly 4 Board member offices in addition to the Chair, for the purposes of vacancy references. However, s16 provides for 'at least 2, and no more than 4' other members. The fiction of exactly 4 offices is inconsistent with the minimum composition of 3 total members (Chair + 2), potentially meaning there are always deemed to be 4 vacancies even when the Board is validly constituted at minimum.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.