The legislation states it is 'current from 1 October 2020 to date' yet the file was last modified on 24 September 2020, predating its own currency commencement date by approximately 7 days.

The instrument is titled '(No. 2) 2020', logically implying the existence of a preceding '(No. 1) 2020' instrument extending the emergency period. However, no reference, cross-reference, or savings provision is made to that prior instrument within the text provided, creating a structural gap: it is impossible to determine the cumulative emergency period duration, the baseline from which this extension operates, or whether this instrument is consistent with or contradicts its predecessor.

The instrument as reproduced contains no operative provisions whatsoever — no definitions, no extension period specified, no conditions, no commencement clause, and no substantive legal effect is discernible from the text. An instrument with no operative clauses cannot logically achieve compliance, impose obligations, or extend anything.

The instrument's file modification date (24 September 2020) precedes the date from which the version is stated to be current (1 October 2020), creating a temporal contradiction. A version cannot be current from a date that postdates the last recorded modification of that version's file, unless intervening modifications went unrecorded — which itself contradicts the stated update policy of within 3 working days.

The Order purports to declare the 'End of the Emergency Period' yet its version is stated as current 'from 31 January 2021 to date', implying the instrument itself has ongoing operative effect despite its sole purpose being to terminate a period. An order ending a period should be a spent instrument with no continuing currency.

The file is stated to have been 'last modified 28 January 2021', yet the version is described as 'current from 31 January 2021'. This creates a three-day gap where the authorised file predates its own commencement, meaning the instrument as authorised never existed in its operative form prior to coming into force.

The application form requires disclosure of the 'number and type of any pets intended to be kept at the premises if approved by the lessor'. The approval condition is logically inverted — at the application stage, lessor approval has not yet been given, making it impossible to disclose approved pets. The prospective tenant cannot know which pets will be approved before submitting the application that triggers the approval process.

The water efficiency requirements for dual flush toilets set a maximum of 6.5L full flush and 3.5L half flush, and an average flush volume of not more than 4L. Using the prescribed formula (FF + (2 x HF)) / 3 with maximum values of 6.5L and 3.5L yields an average of (6.5 + 7.0) / 3 = 4.5L, which exceeds the 4L average flush limit. A toilet at the maximum permitted individual flush volumes would automatically fail the average flush volume requirement, making simultaneous compliance with all three numerical standards mathematically impossible in many cases.

The Act declares it binds all persons including the State and Commonwealth, but then states nothing in the Act makes the Commonwealth or State liable to be prosecuted for an offence. Binding someone to an Act while immunising them from prosecution for breaching it renders the binding obligation largely meaningless for enforcement purposes.

Section 4 preserves pre-existing rights and remedies 'apart from this Act', but then defines those pre-existing rights and remedies as only those 'not inconsistent with this Act'. This is circular: the scope of preserved external rights is defined by reference to the very Act they exist apart from, making it impossible to independently determine what rights are preserved without first knowing what the Act requires.

The exclusion for employee accommodation carves out 'employees employed in the service by the service provider' — meaning that if the service provider houses their own staff, THAT portion IS a residential service, but if they house third-party employees it is NOT. This creates the perverse outcome that a service provider who accommodates their own workers attracts full regulatory burden, while one providing identical accommodation to workers employed by others faces none.

The food and nutrition standard for level 2 accreditation requires compliance with 'the best practice guide for healthy eating in supported accommodation published by the health department on the website of the Metro South Hospital and Health Service.' This anchors a legally binding compliance obligation to an informal administrative publication hosted on a specific hospital and health service website that can be altered, removed or relocated at any time without legislative process, making the standard of compliance indeterminate and potentially impossible to verify.

Section 4(1) requires residents to share rooms/facilities with other residents as a condition of being a 'residential service', yet section 4(2)(a) extends the definition to cover services where residents do NOT share facilities (e.g. self-contained units with food/personal care service). The example given in s4(2) explicitly mentions residents in self-contained units, directly contradicting the shared-facilities requirement in s4(1)(c)(iv).

The deemed refusal provision treats administrative inaction as a substantive decision against the applicant. If the chief executive fails to decide within the due day, the application is 'taken to have been refused' — yet the chief executive is also required under s11(1) to decide 'as soon as practicable'. The inaction that triggers the deemed refusal is itself a breach of duty, yet the remedy for that breach is adverse to the innocent applicant rather than the delinquent decision-maker.

The legislation text provided is entirely absent — the page returns a 404-style error message indicating the content is 'no longer available'. There is no actual legislative text to analyse.

The document headers repeat themselves recursively and nonsensically — 'Western Australian Legislation' appears as both an H2 and H1 under itself, and 'Unknown URL' similarly nests under itself — suggesting a broken metadata or scraping loop rather than a coherent document.

The definition of 'human embryo clone' as a genetic copy explicitly states it is NOT necessary to establish that the copy is an identical genetic copy. A non-identical genetic copy is by definition not a clone in any scientifically meaningful sense, rendering the concept of 'genetic copy' internally incoherent.

The Act binds all persons including the State but then immediately declares the State cannot be prosecuted for an offence. This creates a situation where the State is 'bound' by obligations it can never be held to account for through the primary enforcement mechanism (prosecution).

Section 2 is duplicated verbatim in its own body: the section states its two subsections as prose, then immediately restates them again as labelled subsections (sec.2-ssec.1) and (sec.2-ssec.2), producing a legislative provision that says the same thing twice within itself.

Section 8 prohibits editorial changes that would change the effect of a provision, but section 9 deems that editorial changes made under section 7 have effect 'as if the changes had been made expressly by another law'. If an editorial change cannot change effect (s.8), why does s.9 need to deem it to have been made by a separate amending law — a legal fiction ordinarily reserved for changes that do alter legal effect?

Senators are 'chosen for a term of 6 years' but their places are explicitly made to become vacant before 6 years have elapsed — s5(3) senators hold from the day in s5(1) but vacate at 30 June 1991, and s5(4) senator vacates at 30 June 1988, both of which may be less than 6 years depending on when the triggering election occurs.

Section 5(2) mandates that 7 senators shall be chosen at the first post-commencement election, but s5(8) overrides this to 12 if the election follows a Senate dissolution — yet the heading and structure of s5 presents the 7-senator rule as the substantive transitional provision, creating an internal rule that can be entirely displaced by a contingency that renders the entire detailed transitional machinery in ss(3)–(7) inoperative.

Section 107vn(2) allows the President to constitute the Tribunal with the President, a Deputy President, and a Services member (three members) for important matters under s107vc. However, s107vn(3) mandates that for proceedings under s107vd or s107ve, the third member (under s107vn(1)(c)) must be a medical member. The alternative constitution under s107vn(2) has no medical member requirement and no mechanism to add a medical member, meaning the most important proceedings (elevated by the President) would paradoxically lack the medical expertise mandated for ordinary assessment proceedings.

Section 107vr(2) allows a proceeding to continue before only 2 members if the applicant consents. Section 107vw(2) provides that where a 2-member Tribunal cannot agree, the Tribunal must adjourn and refer the matter to the President. This creates a potential infinite loop: applicant consents to 2-member Tribunal; the 2 members deadlock; the matter is referred to the President under s107vr; the President reconstitutes, but if the applicant again consents to 2 members and they again deadlock, the cycle repeats with no statutory endpoint.

Section 5 amends section 8 of the Principal Act by adding sub-section (8) regarding majority vote decisions, but the closing quotation mark and section number are missing — section 6 begins immediately without closing section 5, creating an ambiguity as to whether the text of proposed section 8a is part of the amendment in section 5 or a standalone insertion.

Section 8(2) deems the appropriation under section 51 of the Principal Act (as amended) to have taken effect on 1 July 1974, but the amending Act received Royal Assent after that date. This creates a retroactive appropriation of public funds — expenditure that had already occurred between 1 July 1974 and Royal Assent would retrospectively be authorised, meaning the Crown had already spent money without lawful parliamentary appropriation at the time of spending.