Good faith is defined to include negligent conduct. A person who negligently but honestly does something is deemed to act in 'good faith'. This conflates honesty with care, allowing a negligent party to claim the protections afforded to good faith actors throughout the Act.
The Act requires a person who 'by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to contract' to pay a reasonable price for necessaries. This creates an obligation to pay on a person who, by statutory definition, lacks the legal capacity to enter into the very payment obligation being imposed.
The definition of 'deliverable state' is circular. Goods are in a deliverable state when 'the buyer would under the contract be bound to take delivery of them', but whether the buyer is bound to take delivery depends on whether the goods are in a deliverable state — a question Rule 1 of sec.21 makes determinative for when property passes.
Two subsections of sec.46 produce an irresolvable conflict regarding transit status when goods are rejected. Subsection (4) states that if the buyer rejects the goods and the carrier retains them, transit is NOT at an end. Subsection (6) states that if the carrier wrongfully refuses to deliver to the buyer, transit IS at an end. If a buyer rejects goods and then demands re-delivery (changing position) and the carrier refuses, both provisions could simultaneously apply, yielding contradictory results.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The legislation is described as 'Current version for 27 November 1986 to date (accessed 3 April 2026 at 14:30)' yet the file is noted as 'last modified 23 November 1992'. If no amendments have been made since 1992 but the Act purports to be current to 2026, this creates a metadata inconsistency suggesting the Act has remained entirely static for over 33 years while still being described as actively 'current'.
Circular definition of 'injury': Section 4(8) states that a reference to 'an injury suffered by an employee' means an injury 'in respect of which compensation is payable under this Act'. But whether compensation is payable depends on whether there is a compensable 'injury'. The definition thus requires you to know the conclusion (compensation is payable) before you can establish the premise (that an injury exists for Act purposes).
The definitions of 'child' and 'parent' are mutually circular. 'Child' is defined partly by reference to the Family Law Act 1975, but the Act's own definition of 'parent' states someone is a parent if 'the person is his or her child because of the definition of child in this section'. Each definition depends entirely on the other for the extended meaning the Act adds beyond the Family Law Act.
The medical declaration requirement for entry-level certificate dives requires the declaration to indicate the person does NOT require medical evaluation before diving. But sec.11 then contemplates a scenario where the declaration DOES indicate medical evaluation is required. The two sections together cover both scenarios, but sec.10(1)(c) effectively bars persons who declare they need a medical evaluation from satisfying sec.10 at all — they must instead satisfy sec.11. The logical structure creates a situation where sec.10 applies only to persons who self-certify they don't need a doctor, while sec.11 covers those who do — meaning the safer (medically evaluated) group is governed by a...
The duty to advise snorkellers to tell 'a worker aboard the boat' of medical conditions assumes all recreational snorkelling activities involve a boat. Recreational snorkelling is defined in sec.6 to include free diving and snorkelling with a mask/snorkel, and sec.6(4) only excludes swimming pools. Snorkelling can be conducted from a beach or shore without any boat, making the boat-specific advisory requirement impossible to comply with in shore-based activities.
The object clause demands the 'highest level of protection as is reasonably practicable', but 'reasonably practicable' by definition under sec.15 allows cost-benefit trade-offs that inherently preclude the 'highest level' of protection. The highest level and the reasonably practicable level are mutually exclusive concepts.
Section 4(3) states both Acts must be complied with. Section 4(5)(a) states that where it is impossible to comply with both, comply only with the WHS Act. This creates a duty to comply with both Acts simultaneously and a duty not to comply with one of them in the same factual scenario, which is logically incoherent as a general command.
The threshold for paralysing Safe Work Australia is mathematically ambiguous given the fixed membership structure. There are 14 voting members (1 Chair + 1 Commonwealth + 8 State/Territory + 2 workers + 2 employers). One-third of 14 is 4.67, meaning more than 4.67 vacancies (i.e., 5 or more) would trigger the prohibition. However, the Act nowhere specifies how to resolve the fractional threshold, creating potential disputes about whether 4 or 5 vacancies constitutes 'more than one-third'.
The information-gathering power is drafted as purely permissive ('a person may comply') with no corresponding duty to comply, rendering it functionally useless as an enforcement mechanism. A request that creates no legal obligation is not a power in any meaningful sense.
The 'service level agreement' is defined as the agreement published on the authority's website 'on the day this section commences', but explicitly excludes any variation, novation, ratification or replacement of that agreement. This means the authority is legally required to administer the scheme according to a frozen snapshot of a document, even if that document is subsequently updated, corrected, or replaced by all parties to address errors or changed circumstances. The law therefore mandates administration under potentially obsolete or incorrect terms indefinitely.
Section 33 retrospectively deems that provisions in multiple schedules referred to the Minister administering the Queensland Reconstruction Authority Act 2011 (instead of the Minister for Disaster Management) from 31 October 2023 until commencement. This purports to alter the legal meaning of provisions 'despite the provision as it was in force before the commencement', effectively rewriting history. Any decisions made under those provisions between 31 October 2023 and commencement that relied on the Minister responsible for administering the Disaster Management Act 2003 are retroactively invalidated or altered.
The authority is mandated to conduct a rural debt survey 'for the period starting on 1 January 2012 and ending on 31 December 2017', but this obligation was inserted by 2017 No. 7, meaning the authority is retrospectively required to conduct a survey covering a period that had already mostly or entirely elapsed before the obligation was created.
The authority's rural debt survey report 'must compare the results of the rural debt survey to the results of previous rural debt surveys', but for the very first survey mandated under the Act there are no previous rural debt surveys conducted under the Act to compare against, making compliance with this obligation impossible for the inaugural survey.
The legislation states it is 'usually updated within 3 working days after a change to the legislation,' yet the file was last modified 14 October 2025 while the version currency date is stated as 20 June 2013. This implies either no amendments have occurred in over 12 years (plausible but notable for a publication rules instrument), or the update guarantee is meaningless as applied to this instrument.
The file is stated to have been last modified on 14 October 2025, yet the version is described as 'current from 20 June 2013 to date.' If the file was modified in October 2025 but the legal currency date remains 2013, the modification either introduced no substantive legal change (raising the question of why it was modified) or the currency date is inaccurate.
The Governor-General is granted powers 'with respect to' acts done by the Sovereign that are equivalent to powers the Governor-General has over their own acts — but no such self-referential review or revocation powers are explicitly defined elsewhere, making the scope of this provision functionally indeterminate.
Section 2(4) requires that references to the Sovereign be read as the Sovereign 'acting with the advice of the Federal Executive Council', but the Federal Executive Council advises the Governor-General, not the Sovereign directly. The constitutional mechanism for the Sovereign to receive Executive Council advice does not formally exist under the Australian constitutional framework when the Sovereign is physically present.
The Association's objects are defined circularly as 'its objects in force immediately before the commencement of this section'. This definition provides no substantive content — the objects are whatever they were, defined only by reference to a prior state that is not recorded or accessible in the Act itself.
The Association's rules are defined as 'its rules in force immediately before the commencement of this section' — the same circular non-definition used for objects in s7(1). The Act then governs amendment of rules (s8(2)) that it never identifies.
A parent is required to have been 'dependent on the former member' at the time of the member's appointment or enlistment. This creates a temporal impossibility: a parent being financially dependent on their own child at the time that child joins the Air Force is plausible but extremely rare, and the condition must be assessed retrospectively at the point of application — which may be decades after enlistment — making verification practically impossible.
Paragraph (f) uses 'or' between its subclauses (i) and (ii), meaning a parent qualifies under (f) if EITHER the former member is deceased without a surviving spouse/de facto partner, OR the parent has an incapacitated spouse/de facto partner. This means a parent whose former member child is still alive can qualify under (f)(ii) alone. This appears to be an unintended drafting error creating an absurdly broad category of eligibility independent of the child's death.
The file modification date of 23 November 1992 contradicts the ongoing certification claim that this is the correct current version as accessed on 3 April 2026. A file unmodified since 1992 cannot credibly reflect a living certification of currency extending to 2026 without a logical explanation of how currency is maintained absent any modification.
The temporal condition 'before the MRCA commencement date, but not before and on or after, the MRCA commencement date' is logically incoherent. The phrase 'not before and on or after' the commencement date is a double negative that negates itself: something cannot simultaneously be 'not before' and 'on or after' when those describe the same event. The drafting appears to attempt to exclude employment spanning the boundary but achieves a tautological or nonsensical result.
Section 3A(1) empowers the Secretary to arrange computer programs for any purpose the MRCC 'may, or must' exercise under the Act, but s3A(1A) excludes negative determinations (e.g., that a disease was NOT contributed to by employment). This means computers can grant claims automatically but cannot deny them—creating a structurally one-sided automated decision-making regime that can never produce a computer-generated refusal.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Where there is only 1 nominated crew member, the crew member must count persons twice using either (a) 2 different active-participation methods, or (b) a head count plus 1 active-participation method. Option (b) is less rigorous than option (a) because a head count is passive. Yet the regulation treats both options as equivalent compliance pathways. This creates a lower safety standard available as an alternative without any risk-assessment gateway, contradicting the regulation's general risk-based approach.
Section 20(3) requires a lookout to be 'solely engaged in being the lookout' and positioned out of the water. Section 20(4) suspends this requirement while the lookout is rescuing or providing first aid. However, if the sole lookout enters the water to rescue a distressed diver, there is no longer any lookout covering the remaining participants. The regulation provides no requirement to replace the lookout or cease the activity in this scenario, creating a gap where all remaining divers/snorkellers are unsupervised.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 5 provides that compliance with this Act is no defence to a WHS Act offence. Combined with sec.4(3) requiring compliance with both Acts, this creates a situation where a person can fully comply with both Acts and still be convicted under the WHS Act - meaning perfect legal compliance affords no protection from criminal liability.
Section 9(2) states that 'The State, the Commonwealth and other States are liable for an offence against this Act.' However, sec.9(1) qualifies Commonwealth and other State binding 'so far as the legislative power of the Parliament permits'. A Queensland State Parliament almost certainly lacks the legislative power to make the Commonwealth criminally liable, making the unqualified statement in sec.9(2) constitutionally incoherent.
13 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Safe Work Australia is required to perform its functions in accordance with its corporate plan and operational plan, but when first established no such plans yet exist. The Act creates no transitional mechanism or exemption allowing Safe Work Australia to operate before its first plans are approved, creating a chicken-and-egg paralysis at establishment.
Section 28(2) directs the CEO to give the altered draft corporate plan 'to the Council' within the specified period. No body called 'the Council' is defined or referenced anywhere else in this Act. This appears to be a drafting error — the reference should presumably be to 'the WHS Ministers' — but as drafted it requires delivery to a legally non-existent entity.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Both sec.26 and sec.26A apply to identical trigger circumstances: an application for assistance under schedule 15 made but not decided before commencement. Section 26 applies amended schedule 15 (part 2) to such applications, while sec.26A simultaneously requires that schedule 15 as in force immediately before commencement continues to apply to the same applications as if amendment regulation part 3 had not commenced. For applications falling in both sections, it is logically impossible to apply both the pre-commencement version and the amended version simultaneously.
Section 14(2) provides an example of when the authority may vary the 50% equity requirement: 'An applicant has limited equity in the primary production enterprise but has a stable wage, salary or other off-farm income.' This example is internally inconsistent with the eligibility criteria in section 14(1)(b), which requires that the applicant must 'not own, or have disposed of, a viable primary production enterprise', and section 14(1)(h), which requires demonstrating 'sound prospects for commercial viability... and the capacity to service proposed debt from the enterprise and other forms of income.' The example normalises having off-farm income as a substitute for enterprise viability,...
7 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
Section 8(2)(f)(i) lists as a function of the authority 'to partner with commercial lenders and financial advisors to perform another function under this subsection'. This is partially self-referential: the partnering function exists to perform other functions including itself, creating a circular or at minimum vacuous sub-function.
Section 8(2)(h) grants the authority a function 'to perform functions incidental to a function under another paragraph of this subsection'. This is an incidental powers clause drafted as a substantive function, creating a logical oddity where the authority has a function whose entire content is defined by reference to other functions, including potentially itself.
10 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
An Act governing the publication of rules is itself presented in a format with massively duplicated headings and metadata blocks (every heading appears at least twice, some three or four times). An Act designed to regulate how rules are published is internally presented in a chaotic, redundant manner, undermining the very principle of clear publication it ostensibly promotes.
The version currency date of 20 June 2013 implies no legislative change since that date, but the file modification date of 14 October 2025 implies something changed in the document over 12 years later. These two statements cannot both be fully accurate without explanation of what was modified and why it did not alter the currency date.
The Act enables the Sovereign to exercise Governor-General powers only when 'personally present in Australia', but does not define 'personally present' — creating ambiguity about whether the Sovereign in Australian territorial waters, an Australian external territory, or an Australian aircraft or vessel would qualify.
Section 2(1) grants the Sovereign the power to exercise any Governor-General power when present in Australia, while section 2(3) preserves the Governor-General's concurrent power to do the same thing simultaneously. This creates a situation where two separate constitutional actors can simultaneously exercise the same statutory power over the same subject matter with no priority rule or conflict-resolution mechanism.
2 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The rules may be amended 'in the way mentioned in the rules', but the amended rules do not have effect until approved by the Minister. This means the internal amendment procedure is followed, creating amended rules, which are then submitted — but those rules have no legal effect until Ministerial approval. The Association is therefore required to submit rules that have no legal status, and the pre-amendment rules remain operative in a legal limbo during the approval period.
Section 7(3) requires the Association to send a copy of its 'amended objects' to the chief executive within 14 days 'after the objects are amended', but s7(4) states the resolution does not have effect until approved by the Minister. If the resolution has no effect until Ministerial approval, the objects have not technically been amended at the time of the 14-day deadline, making compliance with the 14-day requirement triggered by a non-event.
9 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.
The third member must be a person with substantial business and financial experience who is 'at the date of his appointment, a member of the Returned Services League of Australia.' There is no requirement that this RSL membership be maintained during the term. A member could immediately resign from the RSL upon appointment with no consequence under the Act, rendering the qualification meaningless as an ongoing safeguard.
The Trust has unrestricted discretion to set 'the conditions under which eligible persons and their dependants are eligible to receive accommodation or support' and 'the charges (if any)'. Read literally, the Trust could set conditions so restrictive or charges so high that no eligible person in necessitous circumstances could ever qualify or afford residence, completely defeating the Fund's purpose under section 4.
8 more generated issues for this Act are cached, but not expanded on the catalogue page.