Requires certain organisations to prepare and lodge an annual "modern slavery statement" with the Commonwealth Minister, and makes those statements publicly available online on a Minister‑maintained register (see sections 13, 18, 19).
The mandatory reporting threshold is consolidated revenue of at least A$100 million for the reporting period. That threshold applies to Australian entities and to entities that "carry on business in Australia"; the Commonwealth itself must also report (see sections 3, 5).
Statements must meet mandatory content criteria: identify the reporting entity; describe its structure, operations and supply chains; describe modern slavery risks and actions taken (due diligence, remediation); explain how effectiveness is assessed; and describe consultation processes (see section 16). Statements must be approved by the entity’s principal governing body and signed by an authorised individual (see sections 13(2)(c)-(d), 16(2)).
Entities may submit a joint statement covering multiple reporting entities if the joint statement meets special preparation, approval and signature rules (see section 14).
The Minister keeps a public Modern Slavery Statements Register and must make it freely accessible on the internet (see sections 18–19). The Minister may register revised statements in specified circumstances (see section 20).
If the Minister reasonably believes an entity has failed to comply with the reporting requirement, the Minister may request an explanation or remedial action; if the entity fails to respond or remediate, the Minister may publish information about that failure (including the entity’s identity) on the register or elsewhere. Decisions to publish are reviewable by the Administrative Review Tribunal (see section 16A).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
The Act creates an Australian Anti‑Slavery Commissioner to promote compliance, provide guidance, support victims with information, engage with governments and stakeholders, collect and publish information, and advocate for policy improvement (see sections 20B–20C). The Commissioner is not empowered to investigate or resolve individual cases of suspected modern slavery (see section 20C(2)).
Administrative arrangements govern appointment, term (max 5 years), remuneration, staff, contractors, disclosure and reporting by the Commissioner. The Commissioner has operational independence within the Act’s terms (see sections 20L, 20N, 20J, 20F, 20Q–20Y).
The Minister may make rules by legislative instrument to prescribe matters necessary to implement the Act, subject to limits (the rules cannot create new offences or civil penalties, impose taxes, grant powers of arrest/search/detention, or directly amend the Act) (see section 25).
The Act applies extra‑territorially (it extends to acts and omissions outside Australia) and binds the Commonwealth (see sections 8–10).
Who is affected
Large businesses and groups: any entity with consolidated revenue of at least A$100 million in a reporting period that is an Australian entity or carries on business in Australia (s5(1)(a)). That includes corporate Commonwealth entities and Commonwealth companies over the threshold (s5(1)(c)). Because "consolidated revenue" uses accounting standards and includes controlled entities, it will typically capture multinational groups when consolidated accounts meet the threshold (definition in s4).
The Commonwealth and non‑corporate Commonwealth entities: the Minister must prepare a statement on behalf of non‑corporate Commonwealth entities (s15).
Smaller entities may participate voluntarily by giving written notice to the Minister (s6).
Boards and senior officers: principal governing bodies must approve statements and a responsible member must sign them, so boards/trustees carry approval and accountability duties (s13(2)(c)-(d), s4 definition of principal governing body/responsible member).
Supply‑chain partners and controlled entities: the required statement must describe risks in operations and supply chains and actions taken in entities the reporting entity owns or controls—so upstream and downstream suppliers and controlled entities are indirectly affected through the reporting entity’s due diligence (s16(1)(c)-(d)).
Why it matters (stated purpose and how it changes incentives)
The Act’s stated purpose is transparency: to require public reporting by large entities about the risks of modern slavery in their operations and supply chains and the actions they take to address those risks (s3, s11). The public register makes company disclosures auditable by investors, customers, NGOs and the public (s18–19).
Mechanically, the law shifts information costs onto reporting entities: they must identify, assess and disclose modern slavery risks, design and implement due diligence and remediation processes, and document and certify those activities for annual public reporting (s16).
That shift creates ongoing compliance costs (internal staff time, external advisers, auditing of supply chains), and creates reputational incentives: entities will face public scrutiny of their disclosures and of any Ministerial publication about non‑compliance (s16A(4)).
Testing the stated purposes against costs, trade‑offs and incentives
Who pays: the direct cost falls on reporting entities (boards, management) that must gather, assess and publish information, and on their suppliers where tracing and due diligence extend into supply chains (s16). Indirectly, costs can cascade to suppliers required to provide information or change practices to stay on buyers’ supply lists.
Behavioural effects and substitution: the main private‑sector response options are improved supply‑chain due diligence, contractual changes with suppliers, supplier audits, or substituting suppliers/countries to reduce perceived risk. Companies may also opt to report voluntarily (s6) to signal compliance ahead of competitors.
Competition and market effects: large entities bear compliance costs that are proportionate to the $100m threshold and consolidated accounting rules. Smaller competitors below the threshold are not required to report, producing asymmetric compliance burdens. Because the threshold is revenue‑based and consolidated, multinational groups are likely captured; that reduces the risk of regulatory avoidance by splitting operations into subsidiaries but may encourage restructuring if entities try to avoid consolidation rules.
Speech and reputational effects: public statements are not criminal penalties — the Act relies on disclosure and reputational pressure rather than fines. The Minister can publish non‑compliance information (s16A(4)), which is a reputational enforcement mechanism rather than a civil or criminal penalty.
Implementation risk and compliance burden: the Act leaves design details to entities (the mandatory criteria are descriptive rather than prescriptive — s16) and permits rules by the Minister to fill gaps (s25). That creates uncertainty about detailed expectations, and entities may need to invest in external guidance or consultants (the Commissioner is statutorily required to produce guidance material — s20X(2)(c)).
Bureaucratic discretion and limits: the Minister has discretion about registration of statements and revised statements (s19(2), s20(4)), and to publish non‑compliance. The rules cannot create offences or civil penalties (s25(2)), but the Act specifically requires a three‑year review to consider whether additional measures such as civil penalties are necessary or desirable (s24(1)(ab)). That means future enforcement strength could change after the review.
Concentrated benefits and diffuse costs: any significant compliance burden is concentrated on large entities and their supply chains. Benefits from increased transparency accrue to investors, civil society, and consumers (diffuse), while the Commissioner and those who provide guidance/training may see concentrated demand (s20C, s20G–20H).
Capture and rent‑seeking risks: the Act principally mandates disclosure and creates an advisory Commissioner. It does not establish new procurement controls or sanctions that could immediately generate transfers. However, rule‑making and Ministerial discretion over registration/publication could create avenues for lobbying over administrative detail (s25, s19, s16A).
Practical implementation points for affected entities
Determine whether consolidated revenue meets the A$100m threshold for the relevant reporting period and whether the entity is an "Australian entity" or "carries on business in Australia" (s4, s5).
If captured, assemble a modern slavery statement that addresses each mandatory criterion in section 16, obtain board approval, and ensure an authorised signatory signs and lodges the statement within six months after the end of the reporting period (s13(2), s16).
Expect to use the Commissioner’s guidance material and the public register as reference points (s20X, s18).
Limitations and legal constraints in the Act
The Commissioner cannot investigate or resolve individual suspected instances of modern slavery (s20C(2)).
Rules made by the Minister cannot create offences or civil penalties (s25(2)), but the three‑year review explicitly contemplates whether civil penalties should be considered (s24(1)(ab)).