This Act has been repealed and is no longer in force. It is retained for historical reference.
Jurisdiction
Commonwealth
Act Number
79 of 2013
Collection
act
Plain English Summary
6/10 complexity
What this law does (mechanics)
Creates the Australian Aged Care Quality Agency (the Quality Agency) and gives it no separate legal identity from the Commonwealth (establishment and constitution: ss 7–9, 8 note). The Quality Agency is a “listed entity” for Commonwealth finance law and the CEO is its accountable authority (s 7(2)).
Creates the office of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Quality Agency and sets out the CEO’s appointment, term, powers and duties (ss 11, 16–18, 19–25). The CEO can be directed by the Minister by legislative instrument about performance of functions (general directions) and must comply with such directions (s 14).
Assigns core functions to the CEO: accredit residential care services, from 1 July 2014 review home care services, register quality assessors, advise the Secretary about services that do not meet standards, promote quality and continuous improvement, and provide education and training to approved providers (s 12).
Gives the CEO broad operational powers to do what is necessary or convenient to perform those functions and allows the CEO to charge fees for services (ss 13, 15). Fees must not be taxation (s 15(2)).
Provides that the CEO and the Quality Agency may be supported by staff engaged under the Public Service Act, by people seconded from other Commonwealth/State agencies (with possible reimbursement), and by consultants engaged by the CEO (ss 26–28).
Establishes an Aged Care Quality Advisory Council to advise the CEO and, on request, the Minister (ss 29–31). The Minister appoints the Chair and members, sets eligibility criteria for members, prescribes terms and conditions (including Remuneration Tribunal determinations), and may issue written directions about the Council’s procedures (ss 32, 33, 36).
Sourced from the Federal Register of Legislation (legislation.gov.au), CC BY 4.0.
Requires corporate and annual operational planning and reporting: the CEO must consult Minister and Advisory Council on the corporate plan, deliver an annual operational plan to the Minister, and include specific content and performance indicators; the Minister can require reports and publish them (ss 43–45, 44(2), 47).
Creates strict secrecy rules for “protected information” (information acquired by the CEO or Advisory Council that is personal information or relates to an approved provider). Unauthorised use or disclosure is a criminal offence with a penalty of up to 2 years’ imprisonment (ss 48, 50). The Act lists explicit circumstances in which the CEO may disclose protected information (s 49) and limits downstream use to the purpose for which it was disclosed (s 50). Courts may compel disclosure only in limited cases (s 51).
Permits the CEO to publish non‑personal information about an aged care service (name, address, places, services, facilities, approved provider, accreditation status, performance information etc.) subject to the rule that personal information must not be included (s 52).
Allows the Minister to make Quality Agency Principles (a legislative instrument) detailing matters required or permitted by the Act, and permits the CEO to delegate functions in writing to Quality Agency staff (ss 53, 54). Regulations may be made by Governor‑General for matters required or convenient to give effect to the Act (s 55).
Who the Act affects (directly stated in the text)
The Commonwealth (the Quality Agency acts as part of the Commonwealth; it has Crown privileges and immunities and the Act binds the Crown) (ss 5, 10, 8 note).
The CEO and the staff of the Quality Agency (appointments, duties, delegation, Public Service Act arrangements) (ss 11, 26, 54).
Approved providers of aged care and aged care services: they are the subjects of accreditation, reviews, registration of assessors, and possible disclosure/publication of service information (ss 12(a)–(c), 12(d), 52).
The Minister (powers to appoint, direct, require reports, make Principles) (ss 14, 16, 29–33, 43–45, 53).
Advisory Council members (appointments, fees, disclosure of interests, procedures) (ss 29–42).
Other Commonwealth, State or Territory agencies that may be given protected information or may provide staff to assist the CEO (ss 27, 49(g)).
Why it matters (official purpose-claims and mechanical testing of incentives and costs)
The Act explicitly frames part of the purpose as promoting high quality care, innovation in quality management and continuous improvement among approved providers, and providing information, education and training (s 12(e)–(f)). Those are the official purpose-claims.
Testing those purpose-claims against mechanisms in the Act (what the Act actually creates that produces incentives and costs):
Who decides and exercises discretion: the CEO is the principal decision‑maker for accreditation, review, assessor registration, disclosure of protected information in many cases, and fees (ss 12, 15, 49). The Minister can give general directions to the CEO and set Principles (ss 14, 53). That centralises operational control in an appointed CEO subject to Ministerial oversight.
Who pays: the Commonwealth pays staff and consultants engaged under the Public Service arrangements (ss 26–28). The CEO may charge fees for services provided in performing the CEO’s functions (s 15), and arrangements to reimburse States for seconded staff are permitted (s 27(3)). Remuneration for the CEO and Advisory Council members is set by the Remuneration Tribunal or regulations (ss 19, 36).
Compliance burdens on private providers: the Act sets accreditation and review duties (s 12(a)–(b)) and requires approved providers to cooperate with the CEO’s functions (implicitly through the accreditation/review framework and the publication of service information s 52). The Act also creates criminal limits on misuse of protected information that could affect how providers and their staff handle information supplied to the Quality Agency (ss 48–50).
Information and transparency mechanisms: the CEO may publish non‑personal service information (s 52), and the Minister may publish reports required under s 45. Publication of accreditation status and provider performance is built into the Act as a public-facing tool (s 52(g)–(h)).
Discretion and legal risk: the CEO’s power to disclose protected information relies in many instances on the CEO’s belief on reasonable grounds (s 49(d), (e), (g)–(i)). The Act also criminalises unauthorised secondary use of that information (s 50). Those provisions create both discretion for the CEO and legal risk (for unauthorised actors) where boundaries are breached.
Trade-offs and opportunity costs implied by the mechanics: the Act establishes a central regulatory agency with powers to set and enforce accreditation standards and publish provider information. That creates administrative costs (staff, consultants, planning and reporting, enforcement) and compliance costs for providers (accreditation and reviews). The Act permits fee recovery for some services (s 15), which shifts some cost onto users of particular Quality Agency services, but does not authorise taxation.
Implementation risks and compliance burden: the Act requires annual operational plans and reporting with specified content (s 44, 47). Implementation therefore needs systems for performance measurement, risk management and data handling (s 44(2)(d)–(e)). Handling of protected information is tightly constrained by criminal penalties (ss 48, 50), so robust information governance procedures are necessary.
Concrete levers that affect market/firm behaviour (mechanisms, not conclusions):
Accreditation and reviews (s 12(a)–(b)) create licensing‑style checks on providers.
Public publication of service-level information (s 52) creates reputational incentives for providers.
Registration of quality assessors (s 12(c)) controls who may perform assessments, affecting the supply of assessor services.
CEO discretion to disclose protected information in specified circumstances (s 49) enables information sharing with enforcement, complaints, payment, and professional bodies (e.g. Medicare, Aged Care Complaints Commissioner, Aged Care Pricing Commissioner) (s 49(c), (h), (i), (g)).
Limitations on what the text shows
The Act states objectives and designs the institutional tools to pursue them (see s 12). It does not set specific accreditation criteria in the body of the Act (those are in the Quality of Care Principles under the Aged Care Act 1997 and in the Quality Agency Principles made under s 53). The Act therefore creates the institution and the administrative architecture but leaves technical detail to instruments and interlinked legislation.
Key sections cited: establishment and finance identity (s 7); CEO functions (s 12); CEO powers and fees (ss 13, 15); Ministerial directions (s 14); staff, consultants, secondments (ss 26–28); Advisory Council (ss 29–42); annual plans and reporting (ss 43–47); protected information and disclosure (ss 48–52); Principles, delegation and regulations (ss 53–55).