Zonia Holdings Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Limited
[2018] FCA 659
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2018-05-11
Before
Yates J
Catchwords
- PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - pleadings - application to strike out paragraph of statement of claim
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Catchwords
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
- Paragraph 46 of the statement of claim filed on 9 October 2017 be struck out.
- Leave be granted to the applicant to replead the allegations in respect of the alleged ML/TF Risk Systems Deficiency Information referred to therein.
- The applicant pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the interlocutory application filed on 23 February 2018. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Introduction 1 This proceeding is a representative proceeding commenced under Part IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) by the applicant on its own behalf and on behalf of all persons (save for certain exceptions) which or who acquired an interest in CBA shares during the period between 1 July 2015 and 1.00 pm on 3 August 2017 (referred to in the statement of claim as the Relevant Period) and suffered loss or damage by reason of the conduct pleaded in the statement of claim. 2 By an interlocutory application filed on 23 February 2018, the respondent, Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd (CBA), moves to strike out para 46 of the statement of claim under r 16.21(1) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (the Rules), which provides: (1) A party may apply to the Court for an order that all or part of a pleading be struck out on the ground that the pleading: (a) contains scandalous material; or (b) contains frivolous or vexatious material; or (c) is evasive or ambiguous; or (d) is likely to cause prejudice, embarrassment or delay in the proceeding; or (e) fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action or defence or other case appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (f) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. 3 CBA relies on paras (c)-(f) above, although its oral submissions focused on para 46 of the statement of claim as causing "embarrassment" in the technical sense in which that word is understood and used in the context of rules such as r 16.21(1): Bartlett v Swan Television & Radio Broadcaster Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 638; (1995) ATPR 41-434 at 12; Shelton v National Roads and Motorists' Association Ltd [2004] FCA 1393; (2004) 51 ACSR 278 at [18]; Spiteri v Nine Network Australia Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 905 at [22]. Alternatively, CBA says that, under r 16.45 of the Rules (which I will not set out) the applicant should be required to provide further particulars of para 46 of the statement of claim. This alternative is not at the forefront of CBA's application. 4 The allegations pleaded in the statement of claim stem from CBA's alleged failure to comply with certain of its obligations under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (the AML/CTF Act) and the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Rules Instrument 2007 (No. 1) (Cth) (the AML/CTF Rules), as well as its own anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing program (the AML/CTF program). 5 On 3 August 2017, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), established under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) (and continued in force by s 209(1) of the AML/CTF Act) commenced a civil penalty proceeding in this Court in relation to the alleged non-compliance. CBA has admitted a number of the allegations made in that proceeding. 6 On the same day, AUSTRAC published a statement which announced that it had commenced the civil penalty proceeding. The published statement contained a link to the Concise Statement filed in that proceeding. In the present proceeding, the applicant places reliance on the Concise Statement and has pleaded relevant parts of it in the statement of claim, as follows: 32. The 3 August AUSTRAC Statement contained a link to a Concise Statement filed in the Federal Court in the AUSTRAC Proceeding, which inter alia stated: (a) In May 2012, CBA had rolled out IDMs, a type of ATM that accepts deposits by both cash and cheque, which are automatically counted and credited instantly to the nominated recipient account, the funds then being available for immediate transfer to other accounts both domestically and internationally: [1]; (b) CBA's IDMS could accept up to 200 notes per deposit (that is, up to $20,000 per cash transaction), and CBA did not limit the number of IDM transactions a customer can make a day: [2]; (c) IDMs facilitate anonymous cash deposits. Although a card must be entered to activate and make a deposit through an IDM, the card could be from any financial institution and if it was not a CBA card, the cardholder details were not known to CBA: [3]; (d) There was significant growth in CBA IDM use since their roll-out; in the six months from January to June 2016, cash deposits through IDMs grew to about $5.81 billion, and in May and June 2016 over $1 billion in cash was deposited each month through CBA IDMs: [4]; (e) CBA had not complied with a number of the procedures in CBA's AML/CTF Program on and from May 2012: [5]; (f) CBA did not carry out a ML/TF Risk assessment: (i) prior to rolling out IDMs; (ii) in response to the exponential rise in cash deposits through IDMs; (iii) in response to alerts raised by internal transaction monitoring systems: (iv) in response to identification by law enforcement of significant instances of money laundering through IDMs; (v) until mid-2015, three years after IDMs were introduced (and after about $8.91 billion in cash had been deposited through CBA IDMs), [6]; (g) CBA had not, at any stage and even after mid-2015, introduced appropriate risk-based systems and controls to mitigate and manage the higher ML/TF Risks it reasonable faced by providing designated services through IDMS: [7]; (h) CBA did not comply with the requirements of its transaction monitoring program (part of CBA's AML/CTF Program) at various times between about 20 October 2012 to 27 September 2016 with respect to 778,370 accounts, none of which were subject to transaction monitoring at the "account level" at various times, and some were not subject to "customer level" transaction monitoring: [8]; (i) CBA was required to report to AUSTRAC "threshold transactions" (being transactions involving the transfer of physical currency in the amount of $10,000 or more) within 10 business days after the transaction occurred: [9]; (j) CBA failed to give TTRs on time for 53,506 cash transactions of $10,000 or more processed through IDMs from 5 November 2012 to 1 September 2015 (Late TTRs): [10] (k) In respect of the Late TTRs: (i) the Late TTRs represented 95% of threshold transactions that occurred through IDMs; and (ii) the Late TTRs had a total value of $624.7 million; (iii) 1,640 of the Late TTRs (totalling about $17.3 million) related to transactions with money laundering syndicates being investigated by the Australian Federal Police or accounts connected with those investigations; (iv) 6 of the Late TTRs related to 5 customers who CBA had assessed as posing a potential risk of terrorism or terrorism financing, [10]; (l) CBA lodged 2 of the Late TTRs with AUSTRAC on 24 August 2015, and the remaining 53,504 late TTRs on 24 September 2015: [10]; (m) CBA repeatedly failed to give suspicious matter reports (SMRs) to AUSTRAC either at all, or within the time required by s 41 of the AML/CTF Act, in some cases because it had adopted a policy of not submitting SMRs if the same type of suspicious behaviour had been reported any time within the 3 months prior and in some cases because no transaction monitoring alert had been raised, alerts had not been reviewed, CBA only partially notified its suspicious, or notifications by law enforcement of unlawful activity were ignored: [12] (n) CBA failed to monitor its customers with a view to identifying, mitigating and managing ML/TF Risk, including: (i) because in some instances no transaction monitoring alerts were raised for suspicious activity, and when alerts were raised they were not reviewed in a timely manner having regard to ML/TF risk (in many instances, not being reviewed for months after they were raised): [13]; (ii) because even after suspected money laundering or structuring on CBA accounts had been brought to CBA's attention (by law enforcement or through internal analysis), CBA often looked no further than whether or not to submit an SMR, and did not carry out mandatory enhanced due diligence as required (including terminating accounts), and when accounts were terminated customers were given 30 days' notice and permitted to transact on the accounts in the meantime: [14]; (o) CBA's failure to file TTRs and SMRs on time, or at all, had deprived AUSTRAC and other law enforcement and designated agencies of information, which delays and hinders law enforcement efforts, resulting in lost intelligence and evidence, further money laundering and lost proceeds of crime: [43]; (p) It was essential to the integrity of the Australian financial system that a major bank such as CBA had compliant and appropriate risk-based systems and controls in place to deter money laundering and terrorism financing, and the effect of CBA's conduct had exposed the Australian community to serious and ongoing financial crime: [44] 7 The events described in this paragraph of the statement of claim set the background for the present proceeding. The reference to ML/TF Risk is a reference to the risk that a reporting entity, such as CBA, may reasonably face that the provision by it of designated services might (whether inadvertently or otherwise) involve or facilitate money laundering or the financing of terrorism.