MacarthurCook's Position
52MacarthurCook contends that under cl 2.4, the second defendant was obliged to use the funds it received as a result of accepted applications under the Offer Documents (totalling $12,347,079) to redeem at issue price:
(a)5 million units subscribed for under FAT 3 by 31 October 2008; and
(b)7,347,079 units subscribed for under FAT 4 and FAT 5 by 2 December 2008;
and that in breach of this contractual obligation, it failed to do so.
53MacarthurCook claims as damages $10,809,868, which is the amount it would have received on redemption ($12,347,079) less $1,537,211, being the value of the units it still holds. It is not in dispute that each unit is now worth $0.1245.
54The second defendant proffers two answers to the redemption claim.
55Its primary answer is that there has been no breach of cl 2.4 because:
(a)redemption pursuant to cl 2.4 would constitute the second defendant (as responsible entity) allowing MacarthurCook (as a member) to withdraw from the scheme;
(b)under Pt 5C.6 of the Act, the second defendant must not allow MacarthurCook to withdraw from the scheme otherwise than in accordance with ss 601KB-601KE and the Constitution;
(c)the Constitution and those sections (in particular s 601KB(1)) require the responsible entity to make a withdrawal offer and the member to accept it;
(d)the Act and the Constitution require the responsible entity to have an unfettered discretion whether to redeem or not;
(e)it has chosen not to exercise its discretion to make a withdrawal offer;
(f)the obligation to redeem under cl 2.4 is expressly subject to compliance with any requirements under the Act and the Constitution;
(g)the requirements under those instruments for redemption (being a withdrawal offer and acceptance) have not been met; and
(h)it follows there has been no breach of cl 2.4.
56Its secondary and fallback position (which is a partial answer only) is that on the proper construction of cl 2.4, it is only obliged to redeem MacarthurCook's units using funds received during the period commencing six months from the Subscription Date, the total of which was $665,416.
57I will deal with each in turn.
58The second defendant puts that under s 601KA(3)(b) of the Act, a responsible entity may not allow a member to withdraw from the scheme otherwise than in accordance with the scheme's constitution and ss 601KB-601KE. It puts that, s 601KB(1) permits a member to withdraw only if the responsible entity makes a written withdrawal offer to members and that under cl 7.8(a) of the Constitution, a unit holder has no right to withdraw unless there is a withdrawal offer currently open for acceptance.
59It puts that by cl 7.8(b) of the Constitution, the Trustee is not at any time obliged to make a withdrawal offer and that s 601KB gives the Trustee the option, in its absolute discretion, whether or not to make one. Hence, it puts, whether the Trustee wishes to make a withdrawal offer is, under both the Act and the Constitution, a matter entirely for it and that it cannot be obliged to make one. Put another way, it says that this is a statutory discretion which is incapable of being fettered.
60It follows, it puts, that if it were to redeem MacarthurCook's units without having made a written withdrawal offer, it would, as responsible entity, be allowing MacarthurCook, as a member, to withdraw from the scheme otherwise than in compliance with the Act and the Constitution and that cl 2.4 does not and cannot require it to do so.
61In response, MacarthurCook puts three matters.
62First, it submits that Pt 5C.6 of the Act (which comprises ss 601KA-601KE) has no application to redemption under cl 2.4. It puts that the procedures contemplated in the Part and the Constitution for withdrawal offers and acceptances, have no role to play. It puts that Pt 5C.6 contemplates the situation only where the responsible entity offers a member the "opportunity" to withdraw and the member, at its option, accepts, whereas cl 2.4 entails compulsory redemption by the responsible entity, which is effected by unilateral redemption, as contemplated by cl 7.4 of the Constitution. Thus, it puts, MacarthurCook is not being given, nor is it required to be given, any opportunity as contemplated by s 601KB(1).
63Second, it submits that if a withdrawal offer and a withdrawal request were required, cl 2.4 itself sufficiently meets those requirements.
64Third, it submits that if cl 2.4 is not itself sufficient, the responsible entity bound itself to make a withdrawal offer, which obligation it breached, and that MacarthurCook would inevitably have accepted such an offer.
65MacarthurCook's first submission is unsustainable.
66Clause 4.2 of the Constitution gives the Trustee the power to issue units in different classes subject to rights, obligations and restrictions the Trustee determines and provides that the rights of unit holders are subject to the rights, obligations and restrictions attaching to a unit of a class which they hold.
67Section 601KA(3)(b) applies if a responsible entity allows a member to withdraw from a scheme which is not liquid.
68Clause 7 of the Constitution contains provisions of the type contemplated by ss 601GA(4) and 601KB, giving members a right to withdraw. This right depends on the responsible entity making a withdrawal offer which the member may, at its option, accept by way of a withdrawal request.
69Albeit that the terms of issue of MacarthurCook's units contemplate redemption as an inevitability in the event of, and to the extent of, receipt of funds as a result of accepted applications under the Offer Documents, the responsible entity's agreement to those provisions is no less to allow a member to withdraw from the scheme than would be to make a binding withdrawal offer. Receipt of funds via the Offer Documents is not a certainty. Moreover, the responsible entity may be obliged to give MacarthurCook an opportunity to withdraw by making an offer which MacarthurCook may be obliged to accept, but this remains an opportunity to withdraw. The words of cl 2.4 themselves acknowledge the possibility that redemption must be subject to the applicable requirements of the Act and the Constitution.
70The submission that cl 7.4 of the Constitution provides for a member to withdraw by compulsory redemption in the absence of a withdrawal offer cannot be accepted. Clause 7.4 of the Constitution allows the Trustee to redeem units without the need for a withdrawal request, that is, without the need for acceptance of a withdrawal offer. It clearly contemplates the making of a withdrawal offer. It merely dispenses with the requirement for acceptance if the Trustee so determines.
71Accordingly, in my view Pt 5C.6 of the Act applies.
72MacarthurCook's second submission has more substance.
73Section 601GA(4) provides that if members are to have a right to withdraw from the scheme, the scheme's constitution must specify the right and if the right may be exercised while the scheme is not liquid, provide for the right to be exercised in accordance with Pt 5C.6 and set out any other adequate procedures that are to apply to making and dealing with withdrawal requests.
74Section 601KD provides that the responsible entity must satisfy withdrawal requests within 21 days after the offer closes and that if an insufficient amount of money is available, requests are to be satisfied proportionately.
75Section 601KB(1) permits a responsible entity to offer members an opportunity to withdraw to the extent that particular assets are available and able to be converted to money in time to satisfy withdrawal requirements that members may make in response to the offer.
76The requirements for such an offer are specified in ss 601KB(2) and (3).
77Section 601KB(2)(b) requires the withdrawal offer to be in writing and be made, relevantly, to all members of a particular class. Section 601KB(3) provides that the withdrawal offer must specify the period during which the offer will remain open, it must specify the assets that will be used to satisfy withdrawal requests, it must specify the amount of money that is expected to be available when those assets are converted to money, and it must specify the method for dealing with withdrawal requests if the money available is insufficient to satisfy all requests.
78The Recitals in FAT 3, FAT 4 and FAT 5 record that the responsible entity has requested MacarthurCook to subscribe and that MacarthurCook has agreed to do so, subject to the terms and conditions set out in the agreements. This satisfies the requirement for writing and, on conventional contractual principles, undoubtedly suffices as a written offer and acceptance of redemption on the terms of cl 2.4.
79The offer, and for that matter the acceptance, identifies the particular assets available to satisfy the withdrawal. Redemption is to occur using only funds received by the Trust as a result of accepted applications under the Offer Documents. The requirement to specify the amount of money expected to be available when specified assets are converted to money cannot apply here because the asset concerned is itself money. The requirement to specify the method for dealing with withdrawal requests if the money available is insufficient to satisfy all requests also does not apply or is satisfied given that cl 2.4 specifies that redemption is to be made exclusively out of funds received pursuant to the Offer Documents.
80MacarthurCook plainly had copies of the agreements and it is not suggested that any other person held Subscription Units.
81Whilst cl 2.4 does not literally comply with the requirement to specify the period the offer would remain open (which must be for at least 21 days as required by s 601KB(3)), it was to operate for well in excess of that period. Non-compliance with this requirement, such as it is, is not sufficient to render the contract effected by the making of the withdrawal offer void. The non-compliance is immaterial. The provision requiring the offer to remain open is in the interests of the offeree. The responsible entity commits an offence under s 601KA(3A) if it allows a member to withdraw from the scheme otherwise than in accordance with the Part. This is an important indication that the statute does not intend to visit invalidity on the transaction.
82I consider it unlikely that the legislature intended to visit invalidity of the contract as the consequence of a non-compliance such as this: see Yango Pastoral Company Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Limited (1978) 139 CLR 410 and Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Limited (1990) 2 ACSR 138.
83In my view, if a withdrawal offer and acceptance was required, that requirement was met by the execution of cl 2.4 itself.
84MacarthurCook's third submission also has force. If, contrary to what I have said above, cl 2.4 was itself not sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Act and the Constitution, the responsible entity undertook the obligation to comply with whatever requirements were required, including the making of any necessary withdrawal offer.
85The words of cl 2.4 are clear and not susceptible to more than one meaning. Subject to complying with the Act and the Constitution, the obligation on the responsible entity to redeem is conditional only upon receipt of funds by the Trust as a result of accepted applications under the Offer Documents and the passage of time.
86The inclusion of the words "Subject to compliance with any requirements under the Corporations Act and the Constitution" reflects an express obligation on the part of the responsible entity to comply with any applicable requirement under those instruments to facilitate redemption. To the extent that a withdrawal offer was needed, the responsible entity expressly undertook the obligation to make it.
87However, if I am wrong, and the responsible entity did not undertake that obligation expressly, it undertook it by implication.
88It is a general rule applicable to every contract that each party agrees by implication to do all such things as are necessary on its part to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract. This is particularly so where the thing to be done is fundamental to the contract and is essential to the performance of that party's obligations under the contract: Secured Income Real Estate Australia (Ltd) v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 596 at 607; Mackay v Dick (1880-81) 6 App Cas 251 at 263; Butt v McDonald (1896) 7 QLJ 68 at 70-1.
89It is also an accepted rule of construction that unless expressly permitted to do so, a party will not be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong: see Alghussein Establishment v Eton College [1991] 1 All ER 267 at 270 and following; Brothers v Park [2004] ANZ Conv R 451 at [82]; TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd v Hayden Enterprises Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 130 at 147.
90The obligation to redeem is a fundamental one. If the making of a withdrawal offer was necessary to enable the responsible entity to redeem, whether under the Act or the Constitution, it was essential to its performance. Making a withdrawal offer was entirely within its power.
91Moreover, to allow the responsible entity to escape the obligation to redeem because it failed to make a withdrawal offer would allow it, contrary to principle, to take advantage of its own wrong.
92It may be observed that both under the Act and the Constitution the responsible entity is given the discretion to make a withdrawal offer. Clause 7.8 of the Constitution provides that the Trustee is not at any time obliged to make a withdrawal offer.
93The second defendant put that these were discretions which the responsible entity could not, even by its own agreement, bind itself to exercise.
94It is well established that persons or public bodies entrusted by the legislature with powers and duties for public purposes cannot divest themselves of those powers and duties and cannot contract to take any action incompatible with the due exercise of their powers: see Upper Hunter Timbers Pty Ltd v Forestry Commission of New South Wales [1999] NSWCA 125 at [37]-[38] per Sheller JA; Upper Hunter Timbers Pty Ltd v Forestry Commission of New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 64 at [58] per Giles JA. However, in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54 at 77, Mason J said:
Where statutory approval for the making of the contract exists and the contract contains an undertaking that the statutory power will be exercised in a particular way, there is no room for the notion that the undertaking is invalid on the ground that it is an anticipatory fetter on the exercise of a statutory discretion. The contract, assuming it to be within constitutional power, is valid and the undertaking is free from attack. There is in such a case the initial question: does the statute which approves the making of the contract expressly or impliedly amend, for the purposes of the contract, the pre-existing law providing for the exercise of the discretion? The statute may impose on the repository of the discretion a duty to exercise it in conformity with the undertaking or it may leave him with a discretion to arrive at some other result. If it be the former, then the contracting party may be able to compel the government and the person in whom the discretion is vested, though it has been relevantly converted into a duty, to comply with the undertaking. If it be the latter, then the undertaking if it is enforceable, will be enforceable by an action for damages only.
95In City of Camberwell v Camberwell Shopping Centre Pty Ltd [1994] 1 VR 163 at 184 Marks and Gobbo JJ, after referring to the decision of the High Court in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 54, said:
The judgments in Ansett make it clear that a self imposed contractual fetter on the exercise of discretionary power is only unlawful where it is alone without power. Where the contract, which is said to have the effect of fettering the exercise of the statutory power or discretion in the future, is itself authorised by a power, it is lawful.
96Nothing suggests that a responsible entity cannot give a binding undertaking to make a withdrawal offer, and in my opinion, it can. Under cl 11.4 of the Constitution, the Trustee may, in its absolute discretion, decide how and when to exercise its powers. This includes the power to enter into an agreement binding itself to make a withdrawal offer.
97I observe that under s 601KE(1)(b), the responsible entity of a registered scheme that is not liquid must cancel a withdrawal offer before it closes if it is in the best interests of members to do so. It may be accepted that notwithstanding any contractual obligations which a responsible entity may have undertaken to make a withdrawal offer, if, before it closes, it is in the best interests of members to cancel it, the responsible entity is nevertheless under a statutory duty to cancel it, and that this duty cannot be fettered by contract. It may also be accepted that if a responsible entity has contracted to make a withdrawal offer, but before making it circumstances are such that to make it would not be in the best interests of members, it could not be contractually obliged to go ahead and make the offer. It is not necessary to deal with these hypotheses because neither occurred. The last of the subscription moneys came in on 5 September 2008. Assuming an offer had been made then, and was open for 21 days for acceptance in accordance with s 601KB(3)(a), the offer would have closed on 27 September 2008, which was before the 29 September 2008 circular.
98It was not suggested that redemption was not, or that the responsible entity had come to the view that redemption was not, in the interests of members. It was not put that the responsible entity was incapable of, or prohibited from, redeeming under cl 2.4. During the hearing, the defendants formally admitted that the scheme had other particular assets available and able to be converted to use to satisfy any obligation to redeem MacarthurCook's units. These assets could no doubt have been used to do what the responsible entity did with the funds received under the Offer Documents.
99In my view, MacarthurCook could force the responsible entity to comply with its undertaking to make a withdrawal offer, its pre-existing discretion to make an offer having been converted into a duty by its agreement under cl 2.4. But even if it be the case that MacarthurCook could not compel it to exercise its discretion, the responsible entity's covenant is enforceable by an action for damages. That is all MacarthurCook seeks.
100It was not suggested that if the responsible entity had made a withdrawal offer to MacarthurCook, MacarthurCook would not have accepted it (which obviously it would have). It was also not suggested that the damages sustained by MacarthurCook as a consequence of the responsible entity's breach of cl 2.4 would be any different if redemption was to have been preceded by a withdrawal offer. If the failure to obtain a withdrawal offer was a loss of opportunity, MacarthurCook is entitled to its full value.
101I now turn to the second defendant's secondary answer to the redemption claim.
102The meaning of the words used in cl 2.4 is to be determined by what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. This requires consideration of the language used, the surrounding circumstances known to the parties, the purpose of the transaction and the objects which it was intended to secure. If the words used are unambiguous, the Court must give effect to them. If the language is open to two constructions, that will be preferred which will avoid consequences which appear to be capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust: Australian Broadcasting Commission v Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd (1973) 129 CLR 99 at 109; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 at 179; Wilkie v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2005) 221 CLR 522.
103The plain meaning of the words in cl 2.4 conveys no requirement that only funds received after the six month period are to be used to redeem MacarthurCook's units. The only restriction with respect to the funds to be used are that they must have been received by the Trust as a result of accepted applications under the Offer Documents.
104Redemptions are to commence six months from the Subscription Date and funds received by the Trust as a result of accepted applications under the Offer Documents must be used to effect them. No time limit is specified with respect to when the funds are received. Indeed, they could have been received prior to the execution of FAT 3 and still qualify under the clause.
105It may be observed that the PDS contemplated the first $28.11 M raised being applied to reduce the Trust's borrowings. It might be thought that there is some commercial tension between that expectation and using the funds to redeem MacarthurCook's units under cl 2.4. It must be remembered, however, that FAT 3, FAT 4 and FAT 5 were all entered into some two years after the PDS. Anyway, there is no scope for the Court to attribute a meaning to words other than their plain meaning, even if this would give the contract a more commercial and business like operation: Jireh International Pty Ltd v Western Export Services Inc [2011] NSWCA 137 at [55]; Western Export Services Inc v Jireh International Pty Ltd (2011) 86 ALJR 1.
106It follows that the redemption claim succeeds.