40 The other cases referred to were decisions in the District Court, viz. R v Mordaunt [2009] NSWDC 301 and R v Duc Phan [2009] NSWDC 181. However, for reasons that will become apparent I do not find it necessary to refer further to these cases.
41 Certainly by comparison with the sentences imposed in Pham v R and Stojkov v R the sentence imposed on the Applicant seems unduly high. However, these and the District Court cases referred to are but 4 of dozens if not hundreds of cases to which reference could be made. Of more significance are cases in this Court where there has been a considered review of a number of decisions. Included in that group are R v Sciberras [2006] NSWCCA 268 and R v Wang [2009] NSWCCA 223. I had occasion to review these last mentioned cases recently in R v Mahmud [2010] NSWCCA 219 where this Court increased to 9 years including a non-parole period of 6 years and 6 months the sentence imposed for an offence of the deemed supply of almost double the large commercial quantity of low purity methylamphetamine. In R v Sciberras the Court increased to 8 years including a non-parole period of 6 years a sentence imposed for the supply of almost double the minimum quantity of methylamphetamine and increased to 8 years including a non-parole period of 5 years a sentence for the supply of 1.4 times the minimum commercial quantity of ecstasy. The offender was a professional drug dealer motivated by the need to feed his and his partner's addiction and the sentences reflected the leniency then usual in Crown appeals.
42 The Applicant's offence the subject of the first count involved a quantity about 25% above the minimum commercial quantity. The offence the subject of the second count involved a quantity about 37% above the minimum large commercial quantity. The precise quantity the subject of the third count is unknown but one might reasonably conclude to the requisite standard that it was not less than 1000 tablets. Proportioned to the weight of the 600 tablets found in the Applicant's possession, the weight of 1000 tablets would be over 220 grams but even if significantly over, it is clear that in terms of quantity, each of the Applicant's offences fell towards the bottom of the range of offences within their respective classes. As his Honour remarked the Applicant's reward was small compared with that derived by many offenders who come before the Courts. On the other hand, the Applicant's role and his motivation both argue for his offences being judged to be higher rather than lower on the scale of objective seriousness.
43 His Honour's only finding in this regard was that:-
"In the absence of evidence about the drug's prevalence, its nature and its effects, I am not prepared to find that these offences fall within a mid range of objective seriousness having regard to what the court said in Way's case and how that is to be assessed.
44 Such a finding does not include anything like the guidance that this Court has said on many occasions is required of sentencing judges - see R v Knight and Biuvanua [2007] NSWCCA 283 at [4], [39]; R v Mitchell; R v Gallagher [2007] NSWCCA 296; (2007) 177 A Crim R 94 at [25], [39]; R v Woods [2009] NSWCCA 55 at [35]; R v McEvoy [2010] NSWCCA 110 at [75]; R v Sellars [2010] NSWCCA 133 at [8], [11] - but be that as it may, his Honour's conclusion was not challenged in the appeal and may be accepted.
45 What were not correct however were his Honour's reasons expressed in the passage just quoted and in another where he remarked:-
The maximum penalty for the amount of drugs in question is in my view out of all proportion to their value and there is no other evidence determinative as to the seriousness of his offending. That being said, I have regard to the guide provided by the standard non-parole period in question as indicative of the seriousness of the offending as well as the issues of general and specific deterrence.
46 The decision of the High Court in Adams v The Queen [2008] 234 CLR 143 and of this Court in R v Nai Poon (2003) 56 NSWLR 284 at 286, 293-295 make clear that the seriousness of any particular drug is to be judged by the quantities specified by Parliament in Schedule 1 to the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act and not by some judicial assessment of it. His Honour's remarks are quite inconsistent with these authorities by which he was bound.
47 Given particularly the Applicant's youth, the sentences imposed on him were severe. However, when compared with those to which I have referred in R v Sciberras and R v Mahmud and those discussed in R v Wang [2009], it is not possible to conclude that the individual sentences were manifestly excessive. Subject to the matter mentioned in the following paragraph, the fact of accumulation by only one year means that the total sentence also was not manifestly excessive. In this connection it must also be borne in mind that the Applicant's offending was while he was on conditional liberty, a fact that necessarily required promises by him to be of good behaviour and the breach of which is regarded as a seriously aggravating feature.
48 The qualification referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph concerns the relativity between the non-parole periods and the head sentences. Neither in the case of the individual sentences nor in the total effective sentence did this relationship comply with the requirement of s 44(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which provides that a balance of term must not exceed one-third of the non-parole period unless the Court decides that there are special circumstances and makes a record of its reasons for that decision. His Honour made no such finding and seems not to have adverted to the topic at all. The transcript of proceedings before him does not indicate that either party raised the matter although counsel for the Applicant did point out that this would be the Applicant's first time in custody, a matter which commonly is regarded as amounting to special circumstances justifying departure from the s 44(2) ratio.
49 The effective sentence imposed on the Applicant of 10 years including a non-parole period of 7 years is consistent with his Honour having taken the view that the relativity in s 44(2) should be departed from although if so, his departure was minimal. But whatever be the situation in this regard, his Honour erred in not referring to the matter in his remarks. In its submissions the Crown recognised that there were grounds for a finding of special circumstances but, picking up the terms of s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912, submitted that no lesser sentence was warranted in law.
50 In my view, because of the Applicant's youth and the fact that this is his first time in custody a lesser effective non-parole period was warranted. In these circumstances there should be a finding of special circumstances and the non-parole period for the offences I have numbered (ii) and (iii) reduced to 5 years. Thus I would propose the following orders:-
(i) Grant leave to appeal;
(ii) Allow the appeal;
(iii) Confirm the sentence imposed by Williams DCJ on the charge of, on 21 December 2007, supplying a commercial quantity of 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine;
(iv) Quash the sentences imposed on counts (ii) and (iii);
(v) In respect of the offence of, on 21 December 2007, supplying a large commercial quantity of 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine, sentence the Applicant to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 5 years commencing on 21 December 2008 and a further term of 4 years commencing on 21 December 2013;
(vi) In respect of the offence of, between 13 November and 21 December 2007, supplying a large commercial quantity of 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine, sentence the Applicant to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 5 years commencing on 21 December 2008 and a further term of 4 years commencing on 21 December 2013;
(vii) Record as the date upon which it appears to the Court that the Applicant shall become eligible for parole, 21 December 2013.
51 DAVIES J: I agree with RS Hulme J.