[42] In all the circumstances, there is no evidence the defendant is able to rely on, of any actions on his part such as to establish a defence under s 26(1)(b) of the Act.
18 While I accept the principle of general deterrence is relevant in my considerations, I am not persuaded specific deterrence is as significant a factor. If I accept the evidence of Mr Walker and Mr Lindsay in their proceedings, which I do, Mr Akerman has no intention of returning to operate a business in New South Wales. Again, I refer to my judgment on penalty in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Belley) v Akerman Apache (Joint Venture) Pty Limited and ors at [67] where I said:
[67] I consider general deterrence to be relevant to all three defendants. Specific deterrence brings with it somewhat different considerations. The joint venture company is no longer operating. According to both Mr Walker and Mr Herbert, Mr Akerman advised, in or about mid 2005, that he no longer wished to operate in Australia. The fact that Mr Akerman has made no appearance in his own proceedings and is currently residing in America would support that assertion. Counsel for the prosecutor contended that specific deterrence was a relevant consideration in relation to the corporate defendant in that, while currently dormant, it was still registered and could commence to operate again in the construction industry.
19 There is no evidence to suggest Mr Akerman intends to ever return to New South Wales to operate any business. If anything, the evidence points to the contrary. While it cannot be said he will never do so, I consider, in all the circumstances, it is highly unlikely. Overall, while it cannot be dismissed, I consider specific deterrence to be of limited weight in my ultimate considerations.
20 Given the non-appearance of Mr Akerman I have little, if any, evidence going to subjective factors that may be relevant in mitigation to my considerations on penalty except to note that as Project Manager for the site, he did cooperate with Mr Barker on behalf of PSPAT in relation to workplace safety. That much is identified in my earlier judgment in relation to Akerman-Apache and ors and the extract that appears in para [16] above.
21 Likewise, in relation to Mr Akerman's financial circumstances.
22 In proceeding to impose penalty, the prosecution have sought an order as to conviction and costs. In order to do so, having regard to the provisions of s 253 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (now repealed) but which is applicable to these proceedings, it is necessary for costs to be assessed. On that point, I refer to my judgment in Stephen Finlay McMartin v Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company Pty Limited & others [2005] NSWIRComm 31 as follows: