5.01 The Sub-contractor will carry out the work required of it under this agreement in a proper and professional manner and in conformity with the applicable standards and any other requirements of the Company made known to the Sub-contractor from time to time ("the Standards").
...
18.01 The Sub-contractor undertakes to work in accordance with the applicable provisions contained in the applicable Company Policy and Procedures Manual as it relates to the works undertaken by the Sub-contractor.
47 When taken together with the requirements as to safety, the above-mentioned contractual conditions between Chubb and ATS places significant obligations on Chubb, let alone ATS. That is, Chubb had an obligation to make ATS fully aware of all 'applicable standards' requiring conformity by ATS and Chubb had to provide ATS with it's 'company policy and procedure manual' in order to ensure ATS undertook it's work in accordance with those provisions, as the agreement required.
48 Mr Yarrow deposed that companies engaged to provide security services are provided with copies of Chubb's Security Officer Standing Instructions and that in 1997, Chubb had in place a policy relating to Cash Escort/Banking Procedure. There is no evidence to confirm that Mr Ghafoor, on behalf of ATS, received any such documentation from Chubb. Nor is it evident he was provided with Chubb's Procedures in Case of Robbery during Cash Handling, apparently developed following the Macquarie University hold-up in March 2001.
49 Chubb did have a system in place, apparently intended to ensure that the services agreed to be provided by Chubb, or any sub-contractor on its behalf, were provided in accordance with their directions and policies. There was a management hierarchy designed to ensure that was done. On the ground, the defendant employed Patrol Inspectors or Mobile Service Inspectors, as they became known. The duties of those employees included conducting audits and checks of the cash in transit services provided by it's sub-contractors. The Patrol Inspectors duties also included ensuring the compliance by sub-contractors with Chubb's operational requirements relating to such matters as forms and log sheets to be completed as well as client specifications and service times as directed by Chubb.
50 It would appear that one of the additional matters Patrol Inspector/Mobile Service Inspectors were required to have regard to was safety. The 1997 Job Description for Patrol Inspectors simply identifies one of the duties and responsibilities of the position as being:
Oversee all aspects of shifts regarding safety and image.
51 Exactly what was the extent of that work responsibility was never elaborated upon. However, it cannot be suggested, in my view, given all of the policies, procedures, directions and control as well as the contractual obligations insisted upon by Chubb, that Chubb's responsibilities did not extend to ensuring, at the very least, compliance by ATS as a sub-contractor, to provide a system of work free of risks to safety. Given Chubb's critical role in designating the fundamentals of that system of work, Chubb had a clear obligation to undertake it's own risk assessment of a job that it well knew was inherently dangerous.
52 In 2001, Chubb was well aware of the inherent risks to safety in cash in transit work, particularly using soft skin vehicles. In sub-contracting that work to companies such as ATS, Chubb had an obligation to ensure such a sub-contractor performed that work, as the sub-contract agreement insisted, in compliance 'with all relevant legislative requirements relating to workplace health and safety'.
53 Given all of the above, Chubb clearly had an obligation to do more than accept at face value that ATS and Mr Ghafoor were, in July 2001, holding themselves out as able to do cash in transit work. Chubb had an obligation, evidenced by it's Sub-Contract Agreement with ATS together with its own operational systems in place at the time to ensure all sub-contractors performed their work in a safe manner. Clearly, in 2001, Chubb failed to do that with respect to ATS and Mr Ghafoor. The robbery of the security guard at the Punchbowl RSL that had occurred in May 2001 should have ensured Chubb did it's own risk assessment of the task, told ATS of that when ATS agreed to take over the work in August 2001 and insisted ATS do it's own risk assessment prior to commencing the work. In failing to do those things, Chubb heightened the risks to safety for Mr Rashid and rendered the events that transpired on 3 September 2001 as clearly foreseeable.
54 It is relevant to the objective seriousness of an offence to consider if there were readily and easily available remediation steps which could have been undertaken by the defendant before the accident to prevent injury occurring. To put it another way, one should have regard to remediation or the extent of remediation that is done post the accident, as an indication of the extent to which foreseeability of injury was readily identifiable.
55 The most obvious remedial step available to the defendant that was capable of being implemented before the accident was for the defendant to cease cash in transit work using soft skin vehicles. The defendant did cease such work immediately following Mr Rashid's death and now does such work using armoured vehicles.
56 Even if the defendant had not decided to cease cash in transit services using soft skin vehicles, there were other remedial steps under their control that would have significantly obviated risks to safety in such work. For example:
(a) the use of a second guard when performing the cash in transit work;
(b) variation in the times and procedures adopted in the picking up of the cash;
(c) the undertaking of a risk assessment; and
(d) the introduction of proper training of contractors and their employees.
57 On behalf of the defendant, Mr Yarrow deposed that on 28 July 2001, some five weeks prior to the incident involving Mr Rashid, Chubb conducted a training programme for contractors in relation to cash in transit work. This was just before ATS took over the cash in transit work at the Punchbowl RSL from State Security and Crime Prevention Pty Limited. Mr Ghafoor stated that he had been told by Chubb that training would be provided. Given the programme conducted by Chubb in July 2001, if the incident involving Mr Rashid on 3 September 2001 had not occurred, a further programme may have been undertaken by Chubb at some future time. I simply cannot be sure. What I can be sure about is that despite assurances given by Chubb as to training to be provided to his employees, Mr Ghafoor did not pursue the issue with Chubb prior to commencing the cash pick up services in August 2001. While Mr Ghafoor may have inherited some employees from State Security and Crime Prevention Pty Limited who had some prior experience and training in relation to cash in transit work, Mr Rashid was not one of them.
58 Other matters that the defendant has done since the incident involving Mr Rashid, specifically in relation to the use of contractors, including cash in transit matters, was identified by Mr Yarrow as follows:
(i) the requirement for a risk assessment to be conducted for all cash in transit customer sites;
(ii) in 2002, the defendant developed an Induction Handbook for Contractors.
59 As well, since 2002, as evidenced by the material produced by Mr Yarrow, Chubb has taken a much more assertive role in developing handbooks and policies specifically directed at sub-contractors which, amongst other things, reinforces the importance of workplace safety, including matters such as risk assessments. As Mr Yarrow deposed, that has been done by:
Chubb Australasia placing tighter controls on the engagement and management of contract labour within the organisation, which includes the requirement for a risk assessment to be conducted for all cash in transit customer sites. Further, there has been the development of a Contractor Management Program budgeted to cost $30,000.
60 There is no doubt that much of what has been done by the defendant in the period following Mr Rashid's fatal shooting up to the present are matters that could have been done prior to that incident. Nevertheless, the steps that have been taken are to be commended.
61 Having regard to all of the above considerations, I consider the offence a very serious one and I propose to determine sentence on that basis.
62 The decision of the Full Bench in Capral clearly indicates that general and specific deterrence are factors that should be given weight in all but exceptional circumstances. The Full Bench said at 643-644 that:
We consider that the extract from the judgment of Hungerford J in Fisher v Samaras Industries Pty Limited accurately states the approach that members of this Court should take in relation to the question of deterrence, both general and personal or specific, when sentencing an offender in relation to a serious breach of the legislation. It follows that those aspects of deterrence are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process.
63 In respect of specific deterrence, the Full Bench held in Capral at 644-645:
In sentencing, a court may disregard the element of specific deterrence if satisfied that the risk of re-offending is low or non-existent. The court may form such a view as a result of the rehabilitation of the offender: R v Corner (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 19 December 1997) or because the offender will not have the opportunity to commit a similar offence in the future: R v Macdonell (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 December 1995). However, we think it unlikely that the weight to be attached to specific deterrence could be reduced to zero in cases of offences under the Act.
64 The defendant did not demur that general deterrence is relevant in my sentencing considerations. Specific deterrence however, it was submitted, should be accorded less weight for a number of reasons, they being:
(i) there is evidence of rehabilitation of the defendant of a far reaching nature;
(ii) there are new safety programmes and the commitment of the defendant to following them through;
(iii) the defendant no longer undertakes soft skin cash in transit work so the possibility of an incident, as that which occurred in relation to Mr Rashid, was unlikely.
65 I accept that the defendant has done much to address what, by it's own admission, was a generally 'unsatisfactory' position in relation to occupational health and safety existing at the time of the incident involving Mr Rashid. Some explanation is required.
66 The defendant has undergone a change of ownership since 2001. In August 2003, Chubb Limited was acquired by United Technologies Corporation (UTC). Mr Yarrow deposed to the current corporate structure, relevantly as follows:
[6] At the material time, Chubb Limited was a global provider of security services and was the parent company of the defendant entity, Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd (Chubb). Chubb currently employs approximately 3600 permanent staff throughout Australia.
[7] In Chubb Australasia there are currently 27 Australian companies and three New Zealand companies. Chubb Australasia is operated through six business units which provide a range of security services in every capital city and throughout regional and country Australia and New Zealand. It employs in excess of 10,600 permanent and casual employees and its business activities include security patrolling and response, cash logistics, fire protection and suppression, security personnel, electronic security and monitoring, installation and monitoring of home alarms.
The five current Chubb Australasia business units are:
· Chubb Protective Services;
· Chubb Cash in Transit (CCT);
· Chubb Electronic Services (CES);
· Chubb Fire and Safety (CFS); and
· Chubb New Zealand (CNZ).
[8] At the time of the incident the business units under the control of Chubb were:
· Chubb Electronic Security;
· Chubb Protective Services;
· Chubb Health; and
· Chubb Traffic Management.
Chubb no longer conducts the business relating to Chubb Health or Chubb Traffic Management.
[9] Chubb Mobile Services (CMS) forms part of Chubb Protective Services. At the time of the incident CMS conducted the following services:
· Mobile security patrol services
· First Line Response for Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) services, and
· Cash pick up services
Cash pick up services included the collection of funds from client's premises and depositing these funds at the Client's direction usually at a nominated financial institution.
67 Included with the material filed by the defendant was a video presentation made, as best as I can determine, in or about 2003, by Mr Tony Chamberlain, the President of Chubb Australasia.
68 In that video, Mr Chamberlain candidly acknowledged that the defendant's safety performance at that time was generally 'unsatisfactory'. At the same time, Mr Chamberlain, on behalf of the new ownership, made it clear that increased and considerable emphasis was to be placed on workplace safety, encompassing all matters including education and training as well as an auditing and a fundamental review of workplace safety procedures and policies. The evidence provided in support of that assertion is considerable and commendable. Overall, as was contended on behalf of the defendant:
... that the UTC takeover of Chubb and the injection into Chubb of a culture of safety conscious performance, safety awareness, and a sophisticated yet workable OH & S system which had been adapted from many years ... is a significant and relevant step in the assessment which the Court must make of what is an appropriate fine to apply in this case ...
69 I accept that submission. Nevertheless, I consider specific deterrence is relevant in my sentencing considerations but that such consideration should be properly tempered by those factors I have identified.
70 In my concurrent judgment relating to the co-defendants in these proceedings, I considered the question of parity: see WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Wilson) v Safdar Ghafoor and anor [2005] NSWIRComm 430 paras [60] to [63].
71 As reference to those paragraphs will confirm, I have assessed the relative culpability of the co-defendants in the overall factual matrix of their respective offences as being equal. Having said that, Chubb's culpability has to be considered in a somewhat different context to that of ATS and Mr Ghafoor. Ultimately, as I said in relation to ATS and Mr Ghafoor, their non-delegable responsibility to ensure a workplace free of risks to safety could not be laid at the feet of Chubb. Chubb's culpability, however, is just as significant. While ATS (and Mr Ghafoor) held itself out as able to do cash in transit work, Chubb had significant first hand knowledge of the dangers that such work represented. They had known that for some time prior to September 2001 and had specifically evidenced it in May 2001, at the Punchbowl RSL Club - the very place ATS took over on behalf of Chubb in August 2001. Knowing all of that, Chubb put in place a system of work for ATS to follow that included criteria that only heightened the risks to safety for Mr Rashid and of which Chubb was only too well aware. That is, the cash pick up at Punchbowl was directed to be a one person operation and the soft skin cash pick up was to be done between the same time window every Monday, Wednesday and Friday. Chubb knew factors such as that, inter alia, enhanced Mr Rashid's vulnerability and increased the risks to safety. For example, in the Security Officer Standing Instructions issued by Chubb in 2000 it states, inter alia, that one of the procedures to be observed when undertaking Banking and Escort duties was to 'avoid set routines, vary activities, times routes, parking spots etc as much as possible'. (at 49)
72 Further, Chubb conducted no risk assessment of its own and took no steps to ensure such a risk assessment was undertaken by ATS or undertook any compliance checks generally in relation to workplace safety. In all the circumstances, I consider the culpability of Chubb to be equal to that of ATS and Mr Ghafoor.
73 There are factors that should properly be taken into account as mitigating factors in favour of the defendant. While there is no discount available to the defendant in relation to the entry of an early plea, the prosecution conceded that 'there was some considerable saving in court time by the defendant confining it's plea of not guilty to one issue - that being the place of work'.
74 The offences involving all three co-defendants were initially listed for ten days as fully defended matters. By narrowing it's defence to the one issue, there has been a utilitarian benefit in the saving of court time as far as Chubb is concerned. That is a factor to be taken into account in my ultimate considerations on penalty.
75 The prosecutor did not concede that the defendant fully cooperated with WorkCover in the investigative stage of the proceedings. However, in relation to the hearing time and agreement as to a statement of facts, it was accepted by the prosecutor the defendant did cooperate.
76 The defendant has expressed sincere regret for the events that occurred at the Punchbowl RSL on 3 August 2001. As Mr Yarrow stated:
[30] Chubb operates in a high risk industry and is acutely aware of the OHS risks to its employees and contractors. Chubb takes its OHS responsibility very seriously. What occurred at the Punchbowl RSL was, and remains a matter of profound regret to Chubb. On behalf of Chubb, I would like to express Chubb's sincere regret to the family of Ahmed Rashid for their loss.
77 Taking into account my considerations on all matters identified, I determine the penalty in this matter to be $246,000.
78 Accordingly, I make the following orders:
(1) The defendant is guilty of the offence as charged.
(2) I impose a penalty in this matter of $246,000.
(3) I allocate a moiety to the prosecutor on the usual terms.
(4) I order the defendant to pay the costs of the prosecutor as agreed or assessed. Failing agreement, the matter may be referred to the Registrar for assessment.