13 Notwithstanding the authorities to which I have been referred, what is the employer's 'place of work' is a matter of fact to be determined by the circumstances of the case: see WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Farrell) v Schrader [2002] 112 IR 284 at [63] and WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Keenan) v Technical and Further Education Commission (1992) 92 IR 251 at 263.
14 I agree with counsel for the defendant that many authorities of this Court that have had cause to consider the question of an employer's 'place of work' have done so within the context as to whether or not the immediate environs of a 'place of work' were within the application of that expression as it is used in the Act. See, for example, Inspector Clark v W L Meinhardt & Partners Pty Limited (Unreported) Matter No's IRC 1212 and 1213 of 1990: 30 June 1992 at 12 where Fisher CJ, in considering 'place of work' in the circumstances then before him, said:
With respect to the duty under s 16(1) I consider the employer's conduct of his undertaking includes here the design of the facade retention structures, the safe retention of the facade and residual maintenance and inspection as discussed above. I consider the place of work includes every area which may be affected by the work being done which would include in this case the hoarding, the external scaffolding above the hoarding and the area of the street beneath the hoarding and site upon which the facade collapsed.
15 The broad approach of Fisher CJ in Meinhardt was adopted by Peterson J in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Page) v Woolworths Ltd (Unreported) NSWIR Comm 95: 9 September 1994. That broad approach, in my view, is encapsulated by the words of Fisher CJ in Meinhardt that a defendant's place of work 'includes every area which may be affected by the work being done'.
16 In Mainbrace Constructions Pty Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2000] 102 IR 84 at 96 the Full Bench of the Court affirmed the broad construction of 'place of work' as determined by Fisher CJ and Peterson J in Meinhardt and Woolworths respectively. As they said at [51]:
While each case will indeed be a question of fact, we consider that a broad construction of the term 'place of work' in s 16(1), consistent with the approach of Fisher CJ and Peterson J in the cases cited, is also appropriate in this case.
17 Further, in Mainbrace the Full Bench quoted with approval the judgment of Hungerford J in Kirkby v A & M I Hanson Pty Ltd (1994) 55 IR 40. In that judgment, Hungerford J dealt with the proper approach to the construction of s 16 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 (the statutory predecessor to s 8(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000). In doing so, his Honour referred to Butler v Fife Coal Co [1912] AC 149 at 178-179 where Lord Shaw said:
The commanding principle in the construction of a statute passed to remedy the evils and to protect against the dangers which confront or threaten persons or classes of His Majesty's subjects is that, consistent with the actual language employed, the Act shall be interpreted in the sense favourable to making the remedy effective and the protection secure. This principle is sound and undeniable.
18 An analogous approach was taken by Isaacs J in Rice v Henley (1914) 19 CLR 19 at 22 where his Honour said:
In interpreting an Act which is directed to guarding against accidents and to the preservation of human life I think one should endeavour to carry out the objects of the legislature as far as the language and the Act will reasonably permit.
19 Of more recent times in this Court, the meaning and application of 'place of work' has been considered in diverse factual circumstances. See, for example, WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Webb) v Nowra Truck & Farm Equipment (Holdings) Pty Limited and ors [2003] NSWIRComm 340 where Boland J concluded that employees of the defendants were at a place of work when they were driving up a hill in the defendant's paddock counting cattle.
20 See also WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Jorgenson) v Christopher John O'Keeffe and C J & S J O'Keeffe Building Pty Ltd (2004) NSWIRComm 397 where Haylen J, after considering all relevant authorities, determined that the footpath outside the relevant driveway and the roadway around it by which access was gained to the worksite was a place of work.
21 Finally, in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Campbell) v James Gordon Hitchcock [2004] NSWIRComm 87 Walton J, Vice-President found that the defendant's articulated lorry was a 'place of work'. In his judgment, Walton J, Vice-President considered the decision of Peterson J in WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Hughes) v Boral Montoro Pty Limited (Unreported) CT 1218 of 1996: 19 December 1996 where his Honour dealt with the issue of place of work. In that case, the defendant Boral Montoro had contracted with A V Jennings Limited to supply and fix roof tiles on a new residence under construction. Boral Montoro sub-contracted the work to one of its regular sub-contractors G C & Meyne Roofing Pty Limited. The work was carried out without incident but without any fall restraint being provided. Boral Montoro was charged with an offence under s 16(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1983 to which it pleaded not guilty.
22 In defence of its position, counsel for Boral Montoro submitted, inter alia, that the mere existence of a contractual arrangement whereby persons are sub-contracted to undertake work would not demonstrate an undertaking or place of work of the defendant Boral Montoro.
23 In his judgment, Peterson J found against Boral Montoro. He found that the building site of A V Jennings Limited was the defendant's undertaking and place of work while the roof tiling work was being performed. In coming to that view, his Honour said:
It seems to me this case is somewhat analogous to the elevator situation dealt with by Maidment J in the Boral Johns Perry Case . His Honour held that an elevator, in respect of which the defendant had a maintenance contract, was not the defendant's place of work while no maintenance work was being done thereon. In the same way the building site of Jennings would not be the place of work/undertaking of Boral Montoro except when the defendant is engaged in roof tiling work. I would so conclude.
24 What is clear from the judgment of Peterson J is that he considered both the concept of 'undertaking' and 'place of work' in his considerations. On one view, a reading of the judgment as to submissions made as well as his Honour's view is that the two expressions were used synonymously. In any event, his Honour determined, notwithstanding that Boral Montoro or its employees played no part in fixing the roof tiles, the work undertaken in that task by its sub-contractors was Boral's 'place of work/undertaking'.
25 The facts and circumstances of the matter before me are somewhat analogous with the circumstances confronting Peterson J in Boral. In the present factual circumstances, the defendant Chubb had a written agreement with the Punchbowl RSL. That agreement, known as a Patrols Agreement signed on behalf of Chubb on 17 April 2001, obliged the defendant to provide security services at Punchbowl RSL 'by its representatives'. As its representative, Chubb sub-contracted that work, initially to State Security and Crime Prevention Pty Limited and, from about the end of July 2001, to ATS.
26 Counsel for the defendant submitted, on the day of the incident involving Mr Rashid, the Punchbowl RSL and its environs was not a 'place of work' for Chubb or any of its employees in any respect. The defendant submitted that the car park of the Punchbowl RSL, or indeed the Punchbowl RSL Club itself, could not be the place of work of Chubb because:
(i) it was not a place where Chubb's employees work;
(ii) it was not a place adjacent to where Chubb's employees work;
(iii) it was not a place which was affected by work done by Chubb's employees.
27 As well, it was submitted, it was important to distinguish between 'place of work' and 'undertaking' for the purposes of an offence under s 8(2). On that distinction, Walton J, Vice-President in Hitchcock said at [310]:
Although there are obvious connections (indeed, an employer's place of work will always be part of its undertaking), the two concepts do not always overlap. An employer's undertaking may be present at a place which is not the employer's place of work and the key to the distinction lies in the examination of performance of work in the circumstances of a particular case.
28 As earlier stated, Chubb has conceded that the work being performed by Mr Rashid on 3 September 2001 was part of its undertaking.
29 In relation to offences under s 8(2) of the Act, it is necessary, in the first instance, to consider the aspects of 'undertaking' and 'place of work' separately: see WorkCover Authority of New South Wales v TAFE (1999) 92 IR 251 at 262.
30 In the first instance, counsel for the defendant pointed to the occupational health and safety legislation of other states which, it was submitted, in relation to similar legislative provisions as expressed in s 8(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW), had no geographical limitation to the expression 'place of work' that s 8(2) allegedly gave rise to.
31 In my view, such a submission is irrelevant. If I am to construe 'place of work' for the purposes of the matter before me, I must do so in accordance with the relevant provisions of the New South Wales legislation and no other.
32 Counsel for the defendant contended that an artificial construction should not be placed on the words 'place of work' as they appear in s 8(2) of the Act. To that end, he submitted, it was not to the point that ATS is an employer and performed work as a subcontractor to Chubb. That background certainly points to Mr Rashid's activities at Punchbowl RSL being part of Chubb's undertaking but, he submitted, it cannot go to establishing the geographic question of Chubb's place of work. To suggest that it did would be excessively straining the construction of a penal statute. Reliance for that proposition was placed on the principle espoused by Jordan CJ in Ex parte Fitzgerald; Re Gordon (1945) 45 SR (NSW) 182 at 186 as follows:
If conduct of a particular kind stands outside the language of a penal section, the fact that a court takes the view that it is through inadvertence of the Legislature that it has not been included does not authorise it to assume to remedy the omission by giving a penal provision wider scope than its language admits.
33 That principle was relied upon by McHugh J in his judgment in Krakouer v R (1998) 155 ALR 586 at 600 relating to the application of ss 11 and 33 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA) in the proceedings then under appeal.
34 At the outset, the approach to adopt in relation to the construction of a statute is provided in s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) that provides:
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or statutory rule or, in the case of a statutory rule, in the Act under which the rule was made) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.
35 The underlying purpose and object of the provisions of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 is to secure the health, safety and welfare of persons at work. That clear objective, which is essentially beneficial in nature, requires that an employer must ensure the health, safety and welfare at work of his (or its) employees (and non-employees as the case may be). Associated penal provisions apply where an employer is shown to fail in relation to his or its statutory duty.
36 The meaning of the words 'must ensure' has long been settled and affirmed at appellate level as that expressed by Watson J in Carrington Slipways Pty Limited v Callaghan (1985) 11 IR 467 at 470 as 'guaranteeing, securing or making certain'. It has been described as an absolute duty.
37 It has long been recognised that there can be conflict in interpreting beneficial legislation broadly in order to achieve its purpose while at the same time not extending the penal provisions of the same legislation beyond its strict words. This issue was addressed by Gibbs J in Beckwith v R (1976) 12 ALR 333 at 339 as follows:
The rule formerly accepted, that statutes creating offences are to be strictly construed, has lost much of its importance in modern times. In determining the meaning of a penal statute the ordinary rules of construction must be applied, but if the language of the statute remains ambiguous or doubtful the ambiguity or doubt may be resolved in favour of the subject by refusing to extend the category of criminal offences... The rule is perhaps one of last resort.
That statement was endorsed by the High Court in Waugh v Kippen (1986) 64 ALR 195. In doing so, the High Court addressed the issue at 200-201 as follows:
In the course of argument, the question arose whether the two principles of interpretation to which we have referred come into conflict in the present case and if so, how the conflict is to be resolved. If such a conflict was to arise, the court must proceed with its primary task of extracting the intention of the legislature from the fair meaning of words by which it has expressed that intention, remembering that it is a remedial measure passed for the protection of the worker. It should not be construed so strictly as to deprive the worker of the protection which Parliament intended that he should have:
38 The legislature clearly intended to afford protection to Mr Rashid by placing that primary responsibility on his employer ATS. The legislature also has extended that obligation to an employer of non-employees at the employer's place of work. On that latter point, counsel for the defendant contended that there was 'no intention revealed that the legislature intended to extend the operation of the Act to 'principal contractors simpliciter'. It was not made clear what was intended by the addition of the word 'simpliciter' to a principal contractor's obligations under the Act but if it is being used to somehow limit a principal contractor's responsibilities under the Act, it does not, without more, do so. The overriding objective of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000, like its predecessor, is accident prevention. Pursuant to the provisions of s 8(2), the duty to provide a workplace free of risks to safety applies equally to principal contractors. Section 8(2) cannot be read down to in some way limit the proper application of the words 'risks to the health and safety arising from the conduct of the employers undertaking'. Ultimately, it is necessary to look at the 'intention of the legislature from a fair meaning of the words ... it should not be construed so strictly as to deprive the worker of the protection which Parliament intended that he should have' (Waugh v Kippen).
39 In the facts and circumstances before me, the contractual and associated arrangements as between Chubb and ATS and its employees tied Chubb inextricably and on an ongoing basis to the work being performed on its behalf at the Punchbowl RSL by employees of ATS. For example:
(i) The work and the system of work were determined by the defendant. The defendant determined which of its subcontractors would perform certain runs. As well, the work to be carried out by the defendant's sub-contractors was in accordance with the defendant's instructions and job specifications.