VDAU v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs

15 At first instance, the contest between the parties was as to whether the information about a second or subsequent child conceived by overseas students was "just about a class of persons" to which the appellant or her parents belonged. However, before ruling on that issue, the primary Judge found that any failure by the Tribunal to provide the relevant information to the appellant and invite comment upon it, in writing, was "at best a technical one only." Applying the reasoning of Mansfield J in SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 577, his Honour concluded that; '……the applicant has not been denied the degree of procedural fairness which the legislature intended in the present case and, were it necessary to consider whether to grant relief under s 39B, I would decline to do so in the exercise of my discretion.' 16 Out of deference to the submissions addressed to him, the learned primary Judge, after accepting that the information in the 1992 Statement was not "specifically about the applicant or another person", went on to consider whether the information was "just about a class of persons of which the applicant or [another] person is a member." Although prepared to construe s 424A(3)(a) purposively and to take a narrow, rather than a broad, view of its reach, his Honour still acknowledged some difficulty in discerning the proper scope of the second limb of that paragraph. Several authorities in this Court were then reviewed, including Applicant in V346 of 2000 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 111 FCR 536 and VAAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 573. 17 After noting that the 1992 Statement had been accepted on both sides as "not specifically about the applicant or another person", his Honour proceeded to consider what he called "the more difficult question". That was whether the information in the 1992 Statement was "just about a class of persons of which the applicant or other person [was] a member." It was contended at first instance on behalf of the appellant that the 1992 Statement was about overseas students who contravened the "one-child policy", and not about the class of persons of which the appellant was a member, namely, children conceived in contravention of the policy. To overcome the difficulty presented by the presence in s 424A(3)(a) of the phrase "or another person" it was contended that the phrase should be construed as confined to other persons in the same category as the applicant, ie members of the same postulated class. 18 The learned primary Judge acknowledged that, of the decided cases which had touched on the issue, none was directly in point. He then concluded; 'It seems to me that, contrary to the submission of counsel for the applicant, the information regarding overseas students was "just about a class of persons" of which "another person" was a member. The expression "other person" in s 424A(3)(a) is obviously not intended to be read literally. It would otherwise render the section meaningless, since any country information which included a reference to any other person, as a member of a class, would destroy the effect of the exception formulated in that paragraph. On the other hand, the expression cannot be defined so narrowly as to limit its scope to persons who are in essentially the same position as the applicant. If it were construed in that way, it would render the expression largely tautologous. The true position seems to me to be that the meaning of the expression lies somewhere between the competing contentions of the parties. The "other person" to which reference is made is a person whose position "might be of relevance", in a direct sense, to the applicant's claims. There is some support for this interpretation of the expression in the approach taken by von Doussa J in Singh to which I have earlier referred. The applicant's parents are members of a class (overseas students who have more than one child) which is plainly of direct relevance to the applicant's claims. The information in question is "just" about that class. It follows that it satisfies both elements of s 424A(3)(a) and falls within the exception contained therein. Accordingly, there was no obligation on the part of the Tribunal to invite comment upon that information, although of course it did so.'

(i) The concept of persecution. 19 By her amended notice of appeal filed at the outset of the hearing of the appeal, the appellant contended, first, that the Tribunal had misconstrued and misapplied the definition of "persecution" in Art. 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1968 (collectively called "the Convention"). In fact, the Convention does not, in terms, define "persecution". Rather, the relevant part of Art. 1A provides; '... the term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who: ... (2) Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.' 20 The concept of "being persecuted" in that context has been explained in these terms by McHugh J in Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 at 258; 'Persecution for a Convention reason may take an infinite variety of forms from death or torture to the deprivation of opportunities to compete on equal terms with other members of the relevant society. Whether or not conduct constitutes persecution in the Convention sense does not depend on the nature of the conduct. It depends on whether it discriminates against a person because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a social group. Ordinarily, the persecution will be manifested by a series of discriminatory acts directed at members of a race, religion, nationality or particular social group or at those who hold certain political opinions in a way that shows that, as a class, they are being selectively harassed. In some cases, however, the applicant may be the only person who is subjected to discriminatory conduct. Nevertheless, as long as the discrimination constitutes persecution and is inflicted for a Convention reason, the person will qualify as a refugee. Conduct will not constitute persecution, however, if it is appropriate and adapted to achieving some legitimate object of the country of the refugee. A legitimate object will ordinarily be an object whose pursuit is required in order to protect or promote the general welfare of the State and its citizens. The enforcement of a generally applicable criminal law does not ordinarily constitute persecution. Nor is the enforcement of laws designed to protect the general welfare of the State ordinarily persecutory even though the laws may place additional burdens on the members of a particular race, religion or nationality or social group. Thus, a law providing for the detention of the members of a particular race engaged in a civil war may not amount to persecution even though that law affects only members of that race.' [footnotes omitted] 21 As the Tribunal noted in relation to the present appellant, the application of Art.1A(2) for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958 ("the Act") is governed by s 91R of the Act, subss (1) and (2) of which provide: 'Persecution (1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, Article 1A(2) of the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol does not apply in relation to persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in that Article unless: (a) that reason is the essential and significant reason, or those reasons are the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and (b) the persecution involves serious harm to the person; and (c) the persecution involves systematic and discriminatory conduct. (2) Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph: (a) a threat to the person's life or liberty; (b) significant physical harassment of the person; (c) significant physical ill-treatment of the person; (d) significant economic hardship that threatens the person's capacity to subsist; (e) denial of access to basic services, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist; (f) denial of capacity to earn a livelihood of any kind, where the denial threatens the person's capacity to subsist.' 22 The Tribunal was prepared to assume that the appellant, if returned to the PRC, would encounter "social discrimination" similar to that suffered by illegitimate children in that country. However, it went on to observe; 'There is no material, however, to support a finding that she would encounter consequences amounting to persecution.' (There then followed the passage set out at [4] above.) 23 It is significant that this ground of attack on the Tribunal's conclusion was not pressed at the hearing before the learned primary Judge. There is, therefore, much force in the respondent's contention that the appellant should not be permitted to raise the point on appeal; see H v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 63 ALD 43, where Branson and Katz JJ observed, at 45; 'As Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ observed in Coulton v Holcombe at 7: "It is fundamental to the due administration of justice that the substantial issues between the parties are ordinarily settled at the trial. If it were not so the main arena for the settlement of disputes would move from the court of first instance to the appellate court, tending to reduce the proceedings in the former court to little more than a preliminary skirmish." In our view, the readiness with which appeal courts have in the past been satisfied that it is expedient in the interests of justice to allow a fresh point to be argued and determined on appeal is unlikely to continue into the future. The volume and complexity of the cases presently required to be heard and determined by the intermediate appellate courts of Australia is such that it is increasingly important that such courts are able to devote their time to the genuine review of first instance decisions. It is becoming increasingly difficult, in our view, to establish that it is expedient in the interests of justice that the time of three or more judges should be spent giving original consideration to issues that ought to have been raised before the primary judge. The interests of justice in this sense extend beyond the interests of the parties to the appeal to encompass the interests of other litigants whose appeals require hearing and determination, and the broad public interest in efficient judicial administration.' 24 However, we have been unable to discern in the Tribunal's reasons any misunderstanding of what is capable, as a matter of law, of amounting to "being persecuted" within Art. 1A(2) as qualified by s 91R of the Act. Whether particular conduct of which an applicant is shown to have a well-founded fear would constitute persecution properly understood is a question of fact. As is shown by its reference to the treatment of third or fourth "black children" in the PRC, as well as to the special position of Chinese students overseas and the 1992 Statement, the Tribunal understood that different answers might be given to that question according to the circumstances of different cases. We can detect no error of law in its assessment of how, on its finding, the appellant was likely to be treated if returned to the PRC. Accordingly, this first, new, ground on which the appellant seeks to set aside the Tribunal's decision must be rejected.

(ii) No material to support a finding of limited detriment. 25 The second, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal are related to the first. They raise the contention in various forms that the learned primary Judge should have held that it was not open to the Tribunal to find that children born in breach of the one-child policy would suffer no other detriment than denial of a "nursery subsidy" or some other medical or educational disadvantage up to their attaining the age of seven years. 26 What the Tribunal said in this context was; 'The Tribunal indicated at the hearing that it had some recollection of having read that those children who are born in breach of the one-child policy might be denied pre-school education. Information cited in the submission of 6 December 2000 indicates, however, that the penalty is in fact a denial of a "nursery subsidy" and some other benefits. It has been unable to find any material indicating any other detriment in relation to education.' 27 The submission of 6 December 2000 was made on behalf of the appellant to the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and quoted extensively from an unreported judgment of French J in Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) FCA 622 (5 June 1997). In that judgment his Honour noted that in the case before him (which concerned a child who was both the third child of its parents and illegitimate) the Tribunal had: "… also mentioned Article 31 of the Guangzi Zhuang Autonomous Region 'Family Planning Regulations of August 1991 stating in part: Any child born beyond the planned limit shall not be entitled to any benefits including nursery subsidy, family comprehensive medical care, or medical care covered by any labour insurance, until the age of seven.' 28 In the light of that passage and the Tribunal's lack of knowledge of any continuing detriment inflicted, as a matter of policy, on second children after attaining the age of seven years, it was open to the Tribunal to infer that the extent of any likely detriment to the applicant was limited in the way the Tribunal indicated. It cannot avail the appellant that members of this Court or other individual judges, if required to decide the matter for themselves, might have declined to draw that inference. The second, fourth and fifth grounds of appeal therefore cannot be sustained.

(iii) Was it open to the Tribunal to find that the appellant could be registered with the appropriate Chinese authorities? 29 The third ground in the amended notice of appeal contends that the primary Judge should have answered this question in the negative. Like the first ground discussed above, this ground raises a point which was not taken at first instance. The reason for that is obvious as the second criticism alleging denial of procedural fairness identified by his Honour in the passage quoted at [7] above, was that particulars of the 1992 Statement had not been provided to the appellant's advisers who were not invited to comment on it. The relevant effect of the 1992 Statement, which is quoted at [13] above, was that if the appellant's parents were to apply for, and obtain from, the Chinese Embassy in Australia, a certificate related to the birth of the appellant, they would be entitled to apply for residence registration of the appellant after their return to the PRC. Accordingly, this ground of appeal cannot be pursued consistently with the complaint made at first instance which is discussed at [36] to [42] of these reasons.

(iv) Failure to consider cumulatively the chance of persecution for parents' adherence to Falun Gong and by reason of their application for protection visas. 30 This is yet another ground of attack on the Tribunal's reasoning which was not mounted at first instance. However, it manifestly fails irrespective of the policy considerations to which Branson an Katz JJ adverted in H v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (supra). That is because the passage from the Tribunal's reasons quoted at [6] above makes clear that the Tribunal expressly found that there was no well-founded fear of persecution for all or any of the reasons identified in that passage including the two reasons identified in Ground 2.6 of the amended notice of appeal. In our view, the Tribunal considered, but declined to find, a real chance that the adherence by the appellant's parents to Falun Gong and their application for protection visas would operate cumulatively on the minds of the Chinese authorities so as to attract persecutory attention to them and the appellant.

(v) Was it open to the Tribunal to find that there was not a real chance of the appellant's suffering discrimination beyond what might normally be encountered by children born in contravention of the one-child policy? 31 This finding, which is described in par 2.7 of the amended grounds of appeal as "the major conclusion of the Tribunal" is quoted at [6] above. As we have just noted in relation to ground 2.6, that paragraph of the Tribunal's reasons "rolls up" its consideration of three reasons for which it was proposed the appellant might suffer persecution if she returned to the PRC. The particular form of persecution identified by the Tribunal was "discriminatory treatment beyond that which might normally apply" to second or subsequent children. It was submitted in the course of oral argument on the appeal that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether a second or subsequent child born in the PRC to parents who had not been overseas students could, or would, suffer discrimination. However, the Tribunal, before articulating the reason quoted at [6] above, referred to evidence of great variations between local areas and wide local discretions in the enforcement of the one-child policy and a suggestion that "rigid enforcement" of the policy was confined to "employees of the government and state enterprises." The Tribunal also noted correspondence from the Deputy Regional UNHCR Representative in Australia advising that the Birth Control Policy regulations of each province in the PRC "do not mention 'refusals to register a child' as a sanction for having breached the family planning policy", and that the Representative had no information that the authorities would actually refuse registration. 32 In the light of that evidence, as we have already observed, it was open to the Tribunal to find, as it did, that generally a second child would suffer, in the PRC, no more than social discrimination of the kind attracted by illegitimate children in that country. Moreover, the evidence recounted by the Tribunal supports the conclusion that a second or subsequent child born to overseas students would be treated, if anything, more favourably than a similar child born to parents who had remained in the PRC. That policy was explained by the Principal Migration Officer at the Australian Embassy in Beijing as being designed "to avert a brain drain of badly needed skills in China." 33 That evidence, we consider, provides ample support for the conclusion impugned by par 2.7 of the amended notice of appeal.

(vi) Was it open to the Tribunal to take account of the 1992 Statement in assessing whether the appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution? 34 The effect of the 1992 Statement, set out in full at [13] of these reasons, is that the one-child policy could be relaxed in its application to a second or subsequent child born to Chinese nationals while they were studying overseas. Although there was evidence that the appellant's father's three year student visa had expired in March 1999, it was, we consider, open to the Tribunal to conclude that the Chinese Embassy in Australia would regard both the appellant's parents as overseas students for the purposes of the 1992 Statement. That conclusion was capable of being reinforced by the absence of evidence that the parents had applied for a certificate under the 1992 Statement but had been refused. That being the state of the evidence, the Tribunal was entitled to conclude that it was still open to the appellant's parents to invoke the 1992 Statement to protect the appellant and themselves from discrimination or persecution by reason of the contravention of the one-child policy . 35 Ground 2.8 of the amended notice of appeal raised a further or alternative contention that the Tribunal had erred in not considering whether the 1992 Statement applied to the appellant. However, the Statement was framed expressly to accommodate Chinese students who conceived or produced a child or children overseas. Apart from the fact that the appellant's father had not actually been a student for some three years before the Tribunal hearing, there is nothing to suggest that the 1992 Statement did not apply, prima facie, to the appellant. In our view, the Tribunal was correct in assuming that it did.

(vii) Was the primary Judge entitled to conclude that the Tribunal's failure to refer the appellant's advisers in writing to the 1992 Statement was only a technical non-compliance with the Act without enquiring whether the contents of the Statement had been accurately represented to the appellant's advisers? 36 The learned primary Judge's explanation for concluding that any failure by the Tribunal to comply with ss 424A and 441A of the Act in respect of the 1992 Statement was merely technical was set out in this passage from his reasons; 'The transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal on 15 April 2003 was annexed to the supplementary submissions filed on behalf of the respondent. That transcript demonstrates that there was specific reference made to the Statement by the Tribunal, and that it was clearly indicated that overseas students could apply for registration of their children simply by obtaining a certificate from local consular officials. There was also reference to the fact that such students were not punished or charged fees for extra births after their return to China, and it was said that there was no question of their being discriminated against. The Tribunal then specifically invited comment upon the Statement. The applicant's representative responded to that invitation by submitting that the Statement might "not reflect the reality on the ground". He also pointed to country information which suggested that there was at least the possibility of social discrimination against a child born in breach of the policy but took the matter no further. In these circumstances, it is clear that even assuming that the respondent's primary submission regarding s 424A(3)(a) was rejected, and that there was a failure to provide the relevant information to the applicant and invite comment upon it, in writing, as required by s 441A, that failure was at best a technical one only. There is no difference in substance between handing a copy of the Statement to the applicant's representative, and reading its contents aloud, albeit in summary form, which is what occurred in this case.' 37 Reference was then made to SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 577 where Mansfield J regarded a non-compliance with ss 424A and 441A as merely technical because the applicant had been given notice of the adverse information, albeit not in the manner prescribed. Accordingly, it was held that the applicant had not been deprived of any benefit which she was entitled to receive. 38 The substance of the criticism of his Honour's reasoning made on behalf of the appellant, as we understood it, was that it was not made clear to the appellant's advisers that the 1992 Statement was solely concerned with providing a measure of relief from the one-child policy for Chinese students who were overseas when the second or subsequent child was conceived or born. The appellant's submission on this point implies that, had her advisers been apprised of the limited ambit of the 1992 Statement, they would have demonstrated that it had no application to the present case because the appellant's father, at least, had not been a student for some time. 39 However, that implication flies in the face of the clear acceptance by Counsel for the appellant at first instance in this Court that the 1992 Statement drew a distinction favourable to overseas Chinese students between them and other parents of second or subsequent children who had remained in the PRC. That acceptance is made clear by this exchange between Counsel (who did not appear on the appeal) and his Honour; HIS HONOUR: …. 'So you say this document issued by the relevant department in China draws a clear distinction between Chinese citizens in China and Chinese citizens who are overseas students. Does the material disclose whether the parents were overseas students?' MR GIBSON 'Had earlier been students, on my instructions, your Honour, and then applied for a protection visa.' HIS HONOUR: 'They're quite mature people, aren't they?' MR GIBSON: 'Yes.' HIS HONOUR: 'So when were they overseas students?' MR GIBSON: 'Immediately prior to their application for protection visas and going on to a bridging visa, so I'm instructed.' HIS HONOUR: 'So the parents were overseas students and here's an extract in which the Tribunal has regard to Chinese policy which says: "Overseas students are not subjected to the kinds of discrimination, punishment … provided they go through this process of obtaining certifying material" - et cetera.'

40 The stance on behalf of the appellant at first instance was consistent with the way in which her application for a protection visa had been considered initially by the delegate of the respondent Minister. The delegate had regard to country information furnished by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in response to, amongst others, the following questions; 'IF RETURNING TO CHINA TODAY, WOULD BLACK CHILDREN BORN OVERSEAS EXPERIENCE THE SAME STATUS AND TREATMENT AS BLACK CHILDREN BORN IN CHINA? WILL IT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE WHETHER THEY ARE BORN TO CHINESE NATIONALS WHO HAVE GONE ABROAD TO STUDY, OR TO CHINESE NATIONALS WHO HAVE LEFT CHINA ILLEGALLY AND/OR ARE FAILED ASYLUM SEEKERS?' 41 Although the description given by the Tribunal of the 1992 Statement in the exchange quoted at [14] above did not explicitly indicate that it was confined to overseas students, it did make clear that it applied to Chinese residents overseas because the Tribunal expressly said, "They can get a certificate from the Chinese embassy or consulate in the country where they're residing before they return to China." It is significant that, at the time of that exchange, Mr Lucas, an experienced Legal Aid solicitor who then appeared for the present appellant, did not ask to see a copy of the 1992 Statement but merely asked for the date on which it had been issued. Nor was any attempt made then or at first instance in this Court to demonstrate that the 1992 Statement did not apply to the appellant because either or both of her parents had not been, or would not be regarded, as overseas students; cf Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex parte "A" (2001) 185 ALR 489 where Kirby J observed, at 501 [54]; 'Thirdly, the applicant has not placed before this court a clear indication of the type of evidence or material that he would have placed before the tribunal if he had known of the country information made available to it. In default of some indication of the nature of the opportunity which the applicant says he was denied (and the presentation of evidence or material that would constitute an arguable case that might result in a different outcome) any omission by the tribunal to disclose the country information to the applicant (assuming such disclosure to be obligatory) was not shown to be material in this case.' 42 For all of these reasons, we consider that the learned primary Judge was correct in regarding as merely technical any non-compliance by the Tribunal with a statutory requirement in respect of its use of the 1992 Statement. This conclusion does not signify that in all cases there is no difference in substance between compliance with ss 424A and 441A on the one hand and reading a document's contents aloud. Nor do we read the final sentence of his Honour's set out at [36] above as lending support to such a general proposition. All the circumstances of the particular case must be taken into account, including the length of the document, whether the applicant is represented, and the discussion of the matter between the Tribunal and the applicant or the applicant's representative.

(viii) Should the primary Judge have held that the exception embodied in s 424A(3)(a) of the Act was rendered inoperative by the Convention or was inconsistent with the requirement to act fairly imposed by s 420 of the Act? 43 As we understand it from the written submissions filed on behalf of the appellant, the first part of par 2.10 of the amended grounds of appeal was intended to support a construction of s 424A(3)(a) which gives effect to the obligations assumed by Australia when it ratified the Convention. In support of that proposition, reference was made to Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 where Gleeson CJ observed, at [29] (footnotes omitted); 'First, where legislation has been enacted pursuant to, or in contemplation of, the assumption of international obligations under a treaty or international convention, in cases of ambiguity a court should favour a construction which accords with Australia's obligations.' 44 The appellant's argument in support of this last ground of appeal accepts the correctness of the learned primary Judge's conclusion that the 1992 Statement was "just about a class of persons" of which the appellant or other person (her parents) is a member. However, it is said that s 424A, and, in particular, the exception in subs (3)(a) should not be regarded as an exhaustive code governing the Tribunal's treatment of the 1992 Statement. Rather, so the argument went, the Court has to consider also whether the Tribunal had observed the residual requirements attending its common law duty to accord procedural fairness to the appellant; see Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Ex parte "A" (supra) where Kirby J speculated, at 499 [48]; 'One possible argument available to the applicant is that s 424A is not a code, as the Minister claimed, excluding the fundamental principle of procedural fairness but a provision enacted to make clear a procedure for affording relevant information to a person affected by information supplied to the tribunal. On this footing, the exemptions in s 424A (3) would apply only in respect of the explicit statutory duty. They would not qualify the residual common law requirements that remain in the background to the Act and are assumed to supplement its provisions. Another argument might be that the restriction in s 424A (3) (a) of the Act would be strictly construed and confined to information about a "class of persons" and not extended to information which, as such, referred to the social and political conditions of the country concerned, including any alleged change in the conditions in that country said to disentitle an applicant for refugee status.' 45 Assuming that the "possible argument" to which his Honour there adverted can be invoked in some cases where information is caught by s 424A(3)(a), we are not persuaded that it can avail the present appellant. The reasons explained under sub-heading (vii) above for holding that it was open to the primary Judge to regard any non-compliance with s 424A as merely technical apply with equal force to the non-observance imputed to the Tribunal of some residual common law requirement of procedural fairness. We doubt that any such requirement obliged the Tribunal to make clear to the appellant's advisers that the 1992 Statement applied only to overseas Chinese who were students. However, if there was any such requirement, for the reasons given by the learned primary Judge as amplified above, we consider that it would be a proper exercise of the Court's discretion not to set aside the Tribunal's decision in the course of granting statutory review or prerogative relief. We are also satisfied that the information contained in the 1992 Statement was "just about a class of persons." It did not refer generally to social or political conditions in the PRC which were susceptible of change so as to make available the second possible argument to which Kirby J adverted in the passage quoted at [44] of these reasons.

Conclusion 46 It will be apparent from the examination undertaken above of each of the grounds in the amended notice of appeal as illuminated by Counsel's written outline of submissions and oral argument, that none of those grounds has succeeded. Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed. We see no reason for making any different order as to costs from that made below. Accordingly, we shall order that the appellant's next friend should pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Court.

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr J R Hamilton (pro bono)

Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor