the applicants have failed to establish a relatively strong case
64 I consider that the Applicants have not, on the evidence, established their case to entitle them to interlocutory relief for the reasons that follow.
65 As the interlocutory relief which the Applicants seek is tantamount to final relief, I must be satisfied that the Applicants' case is "relatively strong": Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; FCAFC 156 at [87]; Martin & Pleasance Pty Ltd v A Nelson & Co Ltd [2021] FCAFC 80 at [48].
66 Having regard to the above standard, the Applicants have not positively satisfied me that they have standing to bring these claims. Section 232 of the Act provides as follows:
The Court may make an order under section 233 if:
(a) the conduct of a company's affairs; or
(b) an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or
(c) a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company;
is either:
(d) contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or
(e) oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.
67 Section 233 of the Act provides:
(1) The Court can make any order under this section that it considers appropriate in relation to the company, including an order:
…
(h) appointing a receiver or a receiver and manager of any or all of the company's property;
(i) restraining a person from engaging in specified conduct or from doing a specified act;
(j) requiring a person to do a specified act.
68 Section 234 of the Act sets out the persons who are entitled to make an application under s 233. Those persons include, relevantly, only current or former members of "the company".
69 The Applicants allege that Ms Morris's conduct constitutes oppressive conduct in the "affairs of Tasman, under s 232 of the Act. An application can only be brought by relevantly a current or former member of the company whose affairs are concerned. While the Applicants contend that they seek relief in respect of the affairs of Tasman, of which they are members, I am not persuaded that this is the case, nor is it sufficiently strong to support the interlocutory relief they seek. It seems to me that there is a good case that the Applicants seek relief in respect of Ms Morris's personal conduct in the affairs of CMA, of which they are not members.
70 Further, on the Applicants' case, s 232 of the Act will only be engaged where the conduct of the company's affairs is "contrary to the interests of the members as a whole", or "oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity". I am not satisfied that there is a sufficiently strong case that the mere failure of CMA to pass a resolution, upon which reasonable minds may differ, can properly be characterised as "contrary to the interests of the members [of Tasman] as a whole" or "oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members [of Tasman] whether in that capacity or in any other capacity".
71 The orders the Court can make under s 233 of the Act are "in relation to the company", that is the company whose "affairs" give rise to the claim of oppressive conduct under s 232 of the Act. Here, the relief sought by the Applicants is injunctive relief to restrain Ms Morris from voting against, alternatively voting at, the general meeting of CMA upon the Financial Assistance Resolution. It was accepted by the Applicants during the hearing that Tasman is the Company whose "affairs" give rise to their claim of oppressive conduct. The Applicants' position is that, as the interlocutory relief they seek concerns CMA's vote on the Financial Assistance Resolution, and the Financial Assistance Resolution concerns the financial assistance to be provided to Tasman, their claim for interlocutory relief is "in relation to" Tasman (and the Court is therefore empowered to grant them interlocutory relief under s 233 of the Act). Again, I am not persuaded that this case is sufficiently strong to support the interlocutory relief sought by the Applicants. In reality, it seems to me that the true complaint which the Applicants have, and in respect of which they seek relief, concerns only conduct engaged in by Ms Morris in the affairs of CMA, and this cannot give rise to relief in favour of the Applicants as minority shareholders of Tasman under the oppression provisions in ss 232, 233 and 234 of the Act.
72 Even if the Applicants were able to establish a relatively strong case that they have standing to seek relief under s 233 of the Act, which I have found they do not, there is still a strong case that Ms Morris's decision not to vote in favour of the Financial Assistance Resolution at the general meeting of CMA would not fall within the terms of either s 232(d) or s 232(e) of the Act.
73 Section 232(d) empowers the Court to make an order under s 233 where relevantly the conduct of a company's affairs is "contrary to the interests of the members as a whole".
74 The learned authors of Ford's Principles of Corporations Law state:
As to the meaning in s 232(d) of "contrary to the interests of members as a whole", the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales has equated this to the phrase "benefit of the company as a whole": New South Wales Rugby League Ltd v Wayde (1985) 1 NSWLR 86 at 96; … . The phrase "benefit of the company as a whole" when used in the context of fraud on the minority is discussed at [10.100]. Conduct or a decision by a board of directors will be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole if no board, acting reasonably, could have engaged in that conduct or made that decision: Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corp RNTBC (No 4) (2018) 126 ACSR 370; [2018] WASC 124 at [102]-[103].
75 In Sandy v Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corp RNTBC (No 4) (2018) 126 ACSR 370, Pritchard J stated:
[99] The meaning of the phrase 'contrary to the interests of the members as a whole' in the corporations legislation has been equated with 'the benefit of the company as a whole'.
[100] The interests of the members, considered as a whole, are 'circumscribed by, and found within, the constituting documents of the company'. So, for example, to exclude a member from membership of a corporation, contrary to its articles, may be contrary to the interests of the members of the company as a whole.
[101] The requirement that an exercise of a corporation's powers be for the benefit of the members as a whole is to exclude their exercise for 'ulterior special and particular advantages'. The provision is directed to 'purposes foreign to the association's operations, affairs and organizations'.
[102] Conduct by a board of directors will be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole if no board, acting reasonably, could have engaged in that conduct. It is not necessary to show bad faith on the part of the directors. In other words, conduct may be contrary to the interests of the members as a whole even though the board of directors does not act in bad faith.
[103] In considering an allegation that conduct was contrary to the interests of the members as a whole, the courts will not assume the management of corporations, so as to substitute their decisions and assessments (about the merits of particular management decisions) for those of the directors. Consequently, in order to show that a decision was not in the overall interests of the members as a whole, it has to be shown that the decision of the board of directors was such that no board acting reasonably could have made it.
76 The mere fact that Ms Morris disagrees with the Applicants (and Mr Morris), concerning the commercial merit and risk of entering into the Acquisition Transaction is not oppressive conduct. The mere fact that there are irreconcilable differences between the parties is not sufficient to establish oppressive conduct: Ubertini v Saeco International Group Spa (No 4) (2014) 98 ACSR 138 at [497]; Tomanovic v Global Mortgage Equity Corp Pty Ltd (2011) 288 ALR 310 at [331(b)] (Young JA); Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 672. There is a strong case that, in this case, there is simply a difference between the Applicants' (and Mr Morris's) and Ms Morris's respective appetites for risk. Given the financial character of the proposed transaction, in my view, it cannot be said that Ms Morris's decision not to consent to it is such that no shareholder acting reasonably could have made it.
77 Section 232(e) of the Act empowers the Court to make an order under s 233 where relevantly the conduct of a company's affairs is "oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity". In a commercial company, whether certain conduct is oppressive is decided by asking if there has been commercial unfairness judged objectively as by a commercial bystander: Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692 at 704; Pellarini v Bicher & Son Pty Ltd (2020) 147 ACSR 108 at [76]. In a non-commercial company, the test is from the viewpoint of a hypothetical reasonable person associated with the type of company in question: Ananda Marga Pracaraka Samgha Ltd v Tomas (No 6) (2013) 300 ALR 492 at [418].
78 CMA is the corporate trustee of a family trust - The Morris Family Trust. It is a non-commercial company. The family structure is closely held. The directors of CMA are Mr Morris and Ms Morris, and the beneficiaries of the Morris Family Trust are themselves and their children along with one corporate beneficiary Jaybrooke Pty Ltd: Morris Affidavit at [9].
79 Ms Morris in her affidavit has deposed to her view that the Acquisition Transaction is not in the best interests of CMA because the necessary debt levels would pose an unacceptable risk to its assets. As a director and shareholder of CMA, Ms Morris is entitled to form that view. The Applicants and Mr Morris may have a different view but it cannot be said on the state of the evidence at present, and in particular in the absence of cross-examination, that Ms Morris's view is plainly wrong or illogical. Ms Morris's view may be more conservative than the Applicants and Mr Morris. That is readily understandable in circumstances where the shares in Tasman are a major asset of CMA and a major asset of the family trust. I am far from persuaded on the evidence before me that a hypothetical reasonable person associated with CMA would consider Ms Morris's conduct to be commercially unfair.