Did Blue Ridge or Mr Mackenzie engage in unconscionable conduct?
240 This issue is at the heart of the applicants' case.
241 Section 21 of the ACL proscribes unconscionable conduct in connection with goods or services in the following terms:
21 Unconscionable conduct in connection with goods or services
(1) A person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with:
(a) the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person (other than a listed public company); or
(b) the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a person (other than a listed public company);
engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.
(2) This section does not apply to conduct that is engaged in only because the person engaging in the conduct:
(a) institutes legal proceedings in relation to the supply or possible supply, or in relation to the acquisition or possible acquisition; or
(b) refers to arbitration a dispute or claim in relation to the supply or possible supply, or in relation to the acquisition or possible acquisition.
(3) For the purpose of determining whether a person has contravened subsection (1):
(a) the court must not have regard to any circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the alleged contravention; and
(b) the court may have regard to conduct engaged in, or circumstances existing, before the commencement of this section.
(4) It is the intention of the Parliament that:
(a) this section is not limited by the unwritten law relating to unconscionable conduct; and
(b) this section is capable of applying to a system of conduct or pattern of behaviour, whether or not a particular individual is identified as having been disadvantaged by the conduct or behaviour; and
(c) in considering whether conduct to which a contract relates is unconscionable, a court's consideration of the contract may include consideration of:
(i) the terms of the contract; and
(ii) the manner in which and the extent to which the contract is carried out;
and is not limited to consideration of the circumstances relating to formation of the contract.
242 Section 22 assists in understanding what "unconscionable" means for the purposes of s 21, in that it identifies matters the Court may have regard to for the purposes of s 21. Section 22(1) identifies relevant matters in determining whether a "supplier" has contravened s 21. Section 22(2) identifies relevant matters in determining whether the "acquirer" has contravened s 21. The matters are similar. For present purposes, matters listed in s 22(2) might be noted:
(2) Without limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purpose of determining whether a person (the acquirer) has contravened section 21 in connection with the acquisition or possible acquisition of goods or services from a person (the supplier), the court may have regard to:
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the acquirer and the supplier; and
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the acquirer, the supplier was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the acquirer; and
(c) whether the supplier was able to understand any documents relating to the acquisition or possible acquisition of the goods or services; and
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used against, the supplier or a person acting on behalf of the supplier by the acquirer or a person acting on behalf of the acquirer in relation to the acquisition or possible acquisition of the goods or services; and
(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances in which, the supplier could have supplied identical or equivalent goods or services to a person other than the acquirer; and
(f) the extent to which the acquirer's conduct towards the supplier was consistent with the acquirer's conduct in similar transactions between the acquirer and other like suppliers; and
(g) the requirements of any applicable industry code; and
(h) the requirements of any other industry code, if the supplier acted on the reasonable belief that the acquirer would comply with that code; and
(i) the extent to which the acquirer unreasonably failed to disclose to the supplier:
(i) any intended conduct of the acquirer that might affect the interests of the supplier; and
(ii) any risks to the supplier arising from the acquirer's intended conduct (being risks that the acquirer should have foreseen would not be apparent to the supplier); and
(j) if there is a contract between the acquirer and the supplier for the acquisition of the goods or services:
(i) the extent to which the acquirer was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of the contract with the supplier; and
(ii) the terms and conditions of the contract; and
(iii) the conduct of the acquirer and the supplier in complying with the terms and conditions of the contract; and
(iv) any conduct that the acquirer or the supplier engaged in, in connection with their commercial relationship, after they entered into the contract; and
(k) without limiting paragraph (j), whether the acquirer has a contractual right to vary unilaterally a term or condition of a contract between the acquirer and the supplier for the acquisition of the goods or services; and
(l) the extent to which the acquirer and the supplier acted in good faith.
243 It is plain enough that these statutory provisions are not to be construed in some limited way by reference to the "unwritten law", that is to say, principles of equity: see Body Bronze International Pty Ltd v Fehcorp Pty Ltd (2011) 34 VR 536 at [87]-[89]; [2011] VSCA 196 (Macaulay AJA); Tonta Home Loans Australia Pty Ltd v Tavares (2011) 15 BPR 29,699 at [291]; [2011] NSWCA 389 (Allsop P); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v National Exchange Pty Ltd (2005) 148 FCR 132 at [30]; [2005] FCAFC 226.
244 Further, the factors listed in s 22 plainly are not exhaustive and are intended to be an aid to the Court rather than control it: see Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Keshow [2005] ASAL 55-142 at [97]; [2005] FCA 558; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Simply No-Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 253; [2000] FCA 1365.
245 More generally, it has been observed that unconscionable conduct, on its ordinary and natural interpretation, means "doing what should not be done in good conscience": see National Exchange at [33].
246 In Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v Scully (2013) 303 ALR 168; [2013] VSCA 292, the Victorian Court of Appeal, at [48] and [49], following a review of authorities dealing with various statutory provisions corresponding to s 21, considered that a distinctive quality of unconscionable conduct is that it is unethical.
247 In Henderson v McSharer [2015] FCA 396, Gilmour J, at [847], recently considered that it was clear from a number of the authorities cited above, including Scully, that the applicants in that proceeding were required to establish some "serious misconduct, clear unfairness or unethical conduct" in order to make out their claim.
248 Traditionally, four classes of unconscionable conduct are recognised:
(1) exploitation of vulnerability or weakness;
(2) abuse of a position of trust or confidence;
(3) insistence upon rights in circumstances which make the conduct harsh or oppressive; and
(4) inequitable denial of legal obligations.
See Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Samton Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 117 FCR 301 at [47]; [2002] FCAFC 4.
249 Unconscionable conduct may also comprise the exercise of a legal right in a way that amounts to unconscionable conduct: see Samton at [46]; Legione v Hateley (1983) 152 CLR 406 at 444; [1983] HCA 11 (Mason and Deane JJ).
250 In this case the applicants contend that Mr Mackenzie engaged in or was involved in the following specific unconscionable conduct either personally or on behalf of Blue Ridge, in that he:
(1) claimed Roy Hill terminated its contract with Blue Ridge, when it had not;
(2) deceived the applicants as to the reasons for Blue Ridge's termination of the subcontract in circumstances where the real reason was to enable Blue Ridge to take over the works;
(3) misled and deceived Roy Hill about the reasons for and causes of delay on the project so as to persuade Roy Hill to consider his proposal for Blue Ridge to manufacture the units in Perth;
(4) deliberately appointed a voluntary liquidator to Blue Ridge so as to avoid liability for wrongful termination;
(5) misled and deceived the applicants in relation to the payment for the bank guarantee arrangement fee;
(6) failed to facilitate payment of progress payments by Blue Ridge or facilitate payment pursuant to submission of the bank guarantees (arranged by Mulya) to Roy Hill once he had negotiated an extension of time for Blue Ridge to undertake manufacture of the units in Perth;
(7) "confected" a claim of breach by Transerve so as to facilitate Blue Ridge avoiding a termination for convenience and instead terminating for alleged breach;
(8) wrongfully terminated by failing to give a show cause notice under the subcontract and in circumstances where he was on express notice of the invalidity of such purported termination, but persisted in the assertion so as to enable Blue Ridge to proceed with the works in Perth;
(9) misled and deceived the applicants as to Blue Ridge's ability to raise a bank guarantee and the status of approval of the second bank guarantees by Roy Hill, in circumstances where the applicants were chasing confirmation of Blue Ridge's performance of its contractual obligations in relation to the second bank guarantees; and
(10) did not facilitate or prevent Mr Gill walking up to date final drawings through Roy Hill's approval process when the same were transmitted by Transerve to Blue Ridge on 10 March 2012, procured the nonattendance of the Roy Hill inspector on 15 March 2012, and did not bring the Roy Hill inspector to the site meeting of 29 March 2012.
251 As to (1), namely, that Mr Mackenzie claimed Roy Hill had terminated its contract with Blue Ridge, when they had not, the applicants rely on the following evidence:
letter dated 10 April 2012 to Transerve stating "our client, Roy Hill, has now cancelled the supply order with Blue Ridge WA Pty Ltd, citing their support for our findings that Transerve Pte Ltd has failed to comply with the design, material selection and delivery dates required under the contract";
letter dated 22 June 2012 from Roy Hill to Mr Mackenzie stating "Roy Hill did not make any representations of support or agreement to Blue Ridge in their cancellation of this contract. Roy Hill agreed only to the fabrication of these units locally"; and
in cross-examination, Mr Gill of Roy Hill confirmed that he did not report back to Roy Hill that Transerve should be terminated.
252 As to (2), namely, that Mr Mackenzie deceived the applicants as to the reasons for Blue Ridge's termination of Transerve, in circumstances where the real reason was to enable Blue Ridge to take over the works, the applicants refer to the following evidence:
Mr Mackenzie repeatedly informed the applicants that the basis for termination was Roy Hill led and due to their non-performance: see Contract Direction No 1 dated 20 March 2012, Mr Mackenzie's email to Mr Walter Liu dated 4 April 2012 and the letter to Transerve dated 10 April 2012.
From 7 March 2012 onwards, Mr Mackenzie engaged in a scheme to transfer manufacture of the units to Blue Ridge in Perth: see correspondence with Ms De Villiers, Mr Peter Corby and Mr Craig Campbell of Roy Hill from 13 March to 5 April 2012.
Under cross-examination, Mr Mackenzie gave evidence that:
(a) he never received correspondence from Mr Gill that Transerve was not capable of performing the subcontract;
(b) he did not provide any written reports to Roy Hill about Transerve's inability to fulfil the project;
(c) he was selective in providing information to the applicants;
(d) he accepted that he considered his discussions with Roy Hill about fabricating the units in Perth were not a matter for Transerve to be made aware of;
(e) he admitted that he delayed telling Transerve that he was planning to take over the works;
(f) his discussion with Roy Hill on 9 March 2012 was the start of renegotiation for a new contract;
(g) as at 13 March 2012 he was already talking with Roy Hill about cancelling the subcontract;
(h) he admitted that he was aware that Transerve continued to proceed with production in Indonesia whilst he was having discussions with Roy Hill and that he did not advise Transerve to halt their production while he negotiated the transfer of production to Perth;
(i) by the date of the site visit on 29 March 2012, he had already agreed terms with Roy Hill for taking over the works; and
(j) he had requested a cancellation letter from Roy Hill prior to the meeting on 29th March 2012 so that Transerve's termination could be formalised at the meeting on that date.
253 As to (3), namely, that Mr Mackenzie misled and and deceived Roy Hill about the reasons for and causes of delay on the projects so as to persuade Roy Hill to consider his proposal for Blue Ridge to manufacture the units Perth, the applicants point out that under cross-examination, Mr Mackenzie:
admitted that a delay in the approval of drawings could have an impact on the timing for delivery;
admitted Transerve required documents to be properly signed off by Roy Hill and that he was responsible for obtaining the necessary approvals from Roy Hill;
admitted to knowing that Transerve's position was that they could not commit to a delivery date until all documentation was in place;
later gave evidence that he disagreed with the content of an email from Mr Craig Mackenzie to the effect that the mockup needed to be approved by Roy Hill before Transerve could proceed with the real units;
admitted to not having forwarded on to Transerve the fact that Roy Hill had asked him to submit a revised schedule for the purpose of an application for an extension of time, despite the fact that he knew that Transerve had requested an extension of time;
claimed that he had had discussions with Roy Hill in relation to Transerve's request for an extension of time but was unable to produce any written record of any such discussions - there is no written record, by way of email, letter, formal document transmittal or meeting minutes, formally recording Mr Mackenzie seeking an extension of time on behalf of Transerve;
accepted that if Transerve had been granted an extension of time their baseline schedule would have shown the same number of units as he was proposing to supply to Roy Hill by the end of June 2012;
admitted that his proposal to Roy Hill was no better than the position in relation to what Roy Hill would get from Transerve if he had asked for the same extension of time for Transerve which he obtained for Blue Ridge;
accepted that Blue Ridge only delivered 54 units during the period April to October 2012 as Roy Hill reduced the scope of the works due to Blue Ridge's failure to perform;
admitted he was unable to produce any evidence that he had conveyed to Roy Hill Transerve's concerns regarding the lack of drawing approvals;
accepted that a design development process was undertaken following the issue of the award which gave rise to production of drawings which developed and expanded upon the award drawing and accepted that by 19 March 2012, Roy Hill had not provided approval for those drawings despite there being a requirement that those drawings be approved by Roy Hill;
accepted that until Roy Hill had given approval those drawings could not be provided as AFC drawings;
admitted to knowing that Transerve were concerned with the lack of approved drawings by 8 March 2012 and that he did not want Transerve communicating this matter to Roy Hill; and
admitted that he was aware that payment had not been made by Blue Ridge in respect of shipping of goods by 16 March 2012 and that this could have an effect on Transerve's production but acknowledged that he did not respond to any of the texts or other requests for payment from Leembruggen Butler.
254 As to (4), namely, that Mr Mackenzie deliberately appointed a voluntary liquidator to Blue Ridge so as to avoid liability for wrongful termination, the applicants refer to the following evidence:
under cross-examination, Mr Mackenzie admitted that six months after he had made a series of very substantial transfers to himself or entities controlled by him, which were made possible as a result of Blue Ridge undertaking fabrication of the project in its Perth facility, he placed Blue Ridge into voluntary liquidation; and
the consequential effect of this step was to stay the action for breach of contract against Blue Ridge.
255 As to (5), namely, that Mr Mackenzie misled and deceived the applicants in relation to payment for the bank guarantee arrangement fee, the applicants refer to the following evidence:
Mr Leembruggen gave evidence that:
(a) Mr Mackenzie approached him on or about 9 February 2012 and raised his inability to obtain a bank guarantee for provision to Roy Hill under the head contract. Mr Mackenzie agreed to Mulya raising a bank guarantee on behalf of Blue Ridge in favour of Roy Hill, on the basis that Blue Ridge met the cost of raising such a guarantee. Mr Leembruggen's evidence-in-chief was that it was explained payment for the arrangement fee would need to be made upfront by Blue Ridge and that Mr Mackenzie agreed to this.
(b) Subsequently, after arrangements had been made for the second bank guarantees and the fee paid, Mr Mackenzie sought to change the basis upon which payment for the bank guarantee arrangement would be made so as to make it contingent upon acceptance of the bank guarantees by Roy Hill.
The applicants say Mr Mackenzie's evidence under cross-examination was profoundly unsatisfactory on this issue. He gave evidence as follows:
(a) Despite subsequently claiming the $230,000 arrangement fee as "an overseas cancellation cost" from Roy Hill, after Blue Ridge had taken over the works, he was unable to explain the basis upon which he had sought this payment from Roy Hill in circumstances where at the same time he was claiming that he had no liability to make payment of the arrangement fee on the basis that Roy Hill had not accepted the guarantee.
(b) Blue Ridge had represented to Roy Hill that it had committed funds for payment of the sum of $230,000 to Mulya, but did not accept liability to pay that amount. At the same time, Mr Mackenzie also accepted that at no time had he in fact ever paid for the supply of goods as agreed. His evidence on this issue was confused and contradictory.
(c) Further, Mr Mackenzie accepted that he had agreed to make partial discharge of the bank guarantee arrangement fee (at a time prior to confirmed acceptance of the bank guarantees from Roy Hill) through the payment to ElectSales of goods and materials being shipped to Indonesia for use in the units. Despite this admission, Mr Mackenzie also admitted that no such payment had ever been made whilst at the same time acknowledging that he had not responded to the applicants' repeated enquiries following up the status of payment for those suppliers.
256 As to (6), namely, that Mr Mackenzie failed to facilitate payment of progress payments by Blue Ridge or facilitate payment pursuant to submission of the second bank guarantees to Roy Hill once he had negotiated an extension of time for Blue Ridge to undertake manufacture of the units in Perth, the applicants submit:
There is no evidence of any enquiry or follow up on the part of Mr Mackenzie concerning Roy Hill's approval and acceptance of the second bank guarantees submitted to it on or about 22 February 2012 following the period from 9 March 2012 when Mr Mackenzie first raised his proposal for taking over Transerve's works.
Under cross-examination, Mr Mackenzie was evasive and contradictory as to whether Roy Hill had ever rejected the second bank guarantees submitted. What is apparent from the documentation disclosed by Blue Ridge is that he made no attempt to follow up acceptance of the guarantees or corresponding release of the first progress payment by Roy Hill after he had submitted his proposal for transfer of Transerve's works to Blue Ridge.
257 As to (7), namely, that Mr Mackenzie "confected" the claim of breach by Transerve so as to facilitate Blue Ridge avoiding a termination for convenience, and instead terminating for alleged breach, the applicants submit that:
Under cross-examination, Mr Mackenzie, Mr Richardson and Mr Craig Mackenzie accepted that they had already resolved that Transerve's subcontract would be terminated prior to review of the site and the meeting on 29 March 2012. Further, they all acknowledged that none of them had been to site from, in the case of Mr Mackenzie, 1 March 2012, in the case of Mr Richardson, since 9 February 2012, and in the case of Mr Craig Mackenzie, 8 March 2012.
It was also accepted that there was no report from Mr Gill condemning or criticising the units. In evidence Mr Gill himself confirmed that he never reported to Roy Hill that Transerve should be terminated.
Mr Mackenzie has not advanced any cogent evidence or made out a case establishing that there was any breach of contract by Transerve, so as to justify termination, quite apart from the fact that under cross-examination he accepted that he had never provided any show cause notice, or caused Blue Ridge to provide any show cause notice, to Transerve.
Under cross-examination Mr Mackenzie also accepted that he knew and understood that Blue Ridge would be liable for payment of costs to Transerve under the contract if he terminated for convenience.
258 As to (8), namely, that Mr Mackenzie wrongfully terminated by failing to give a show cause notice under the contract and in circumstances where he was on express notice of the invalidity of such purported termination, but persisted in the assertion so as to enable Blue Ridge to proceed with the works in Perth, the applicants submit:
The evidence establishes that following the notice of suspension on 20 March 2012, Transerve wrote to Mr Mackenzie on 26 March 2012 informing him that the suspension would cause delays, that proceeding with the works was being delayed by the failure to provide approved drawings, and that Blue Ridge's breach of contract in failing to pay both the first and second progress payments had impacted Transerve's ability to perform the works.
Further, following the meeting on 29 March 2012 and the purported oral termination for breach, Transerve formally wrote to Mr Mackenzie on 2 April 2012 expressly putting him on notice that under the contract, Blue Ridge had no entitlement to terminate, both as a matter of fact, and as a matter of compliance with the contract.
In the express knowledge of Transerve's rejection of any entitlement to terminate, and in the absence of having given any show cause notice under cl 25 of the subcontract, Mr Mackenzie proceeded to issue a letter to Transerve terminating for breach on 10 April 2012, having received from Roy Hill acceptance of his proposal for Blue Ridge to fabricate the units in Perth on 30 March 2012.
259 As to (9), namely, that Mr Mackenzie misled and deceived the applicants as to Blue Ridge's ability to raise a bank guarantee and the status of approval of the second bank guarantees by Roy Hill, in circumstances where the applicants were chasing confirmation of Blue Ridge's performance of its contractual obligations in relation to bank guarantees, the applicants submit:
Mr Mackenzie misled the applicants as to Blue Ridge's ability to provide to Roy Hill the bank guarantees required under the head contract, both prior to Blue Ridge entering into the subcontract, and in the period up to 9 February 2012. Specifically, in the first six weeks of the contract, Mr Mackenzie created the impression that the provision of the second bank guarantees to Roy Hill was in hand and that the applicants should proceed with incurring liabilities and taking steps to perform the subcontract.
In the period following 22 February 2012, up until suspension of the works on 22 March 2012, Mr Mackenzie continued to give the impression to the applicants that acceptance of the second bank guarantees by Roy Hill was imminent and that payment of the outstanding milestone sums would follow thereafter.
At the same time Mr Mackenzie continued to press the applicants to proceed with incurring further liabilities in the performance of the subcontract, in the full knowledge that, from the period from 9 March 2012, he was then manufacturing a scheme for Blue Ridge to take over the works for Transerve.
260 As to (10), namely, that Mr Mackenzie did not facilitate or prevent Mr Gill, the inspector for Roy Hill, "walking up to date final drawings through Roy Hill's approval process" when the same were transmitted by Transerve to Blue Ridge on 10 March 2012, procured the nonattendance of the Roy Hill inspector on 15 March 2012 and did not bring the Roy Hill inspector on 29 March 2012, the applicants submit:
In circumstances where Mr Mackenzie accepted that from 9 March 2012 he was advancing his proposal to take over the works from Transerve, there is no evidence, by way of transmittal, email, minutes of meeting, correspondence, or other documents to establish that Blue Ridge provided to Roy Hill the up to date drawings for approval, in circumstances where Mr Gill had provided assurances that upon receipt of the most up to date drawings from Transerve he would walk them through the approval process.
At the relevant time, Mr Mackenzie acknowledges that he was the contract administrator and as such was responsible for control and management of the flow of information and the manner in which and the extent to which Blue Ridge's obligations to transmit and obtain approval of drawings under the subcontract were carried out.
261 The applicants submit that, aside from the specific instances of unconscionable conduct they rely on, Mr Mackenzie also engaged in a "system of conduct and a pattern of behaviour which was unconscionable" within the meaning of ss 21 and 22 of the ACL, including the following conduct:
(1) failing to either process drawings to obtain Roy Hill approval, and/or not informing Roy Hill of the problems and delays caused by the lack of AFC drawings and answers to TQs, whilst representing to Roy Hill that Transerve was in delay and not capable of meeting the schedule and this was the reason for transferring the subcontract from Transerve to Blue Ridge;
(2) failing to make payment to Transerve of outstanding sums (first progress payment) due under the subcontract, failing to provide any support in the performance of the contract through the use of own supplier credit terms in circumstances where he knew he had not paid the first progress payment and was representing an inability to make such a payment, whilst at the same time insisting on further purchases of equipment and supplies for use in the units by Transerve;
(3) misrepresenting the ability of Transerve to perform the contract and meet the schedule for the purposes of inducing Roy Hill to both consider and then consent to his expropriation strategy;
(4) misrepresenting the purpose for which Transerve wished to meet with Roy Hill and inhibiting Roy Hill and Transerve from meeting;
(5) seeking to procure the nondisclosure of his expropriation proposal from Roy Hill to Transerve;
(6) representing to the applicants that the bank guarantee arrangement fee had been part paid in relation to essential supply items for use in the units;
(7) from 9 February 2012 to 29 February 2012, representing to the applicants that the second bank guarantees provided by Mulya were not a problem and just administrative issues which remained to be sorted with Roy Hill;
(8) insisting on Transerve purchasing further materials and supplies and proceeding with construction of the units at a time when he had already negotiated for the taking over of the works and had formed the intention not to make any further payments either under the contract or in respect of the bank guarantees to Transerve and Mulya;
(9) in circumstances where Blue Ridge's contract had not in fact been terminated by Roy Hill, and Blue Ridge had entered into an agreement to continue manufacturing the units but in Perth, Mr Mackenzie's refusal to take any of the equipment, materials or supplies purchased by Transerve for use in the units;
(10) failing to administer or transmit any documentation conveyed by Transerve for lodgement with Roy Hill from 7 March 2012 onwards, and while the subcontract was still on foot;
(11) purporting to terminate when Blue Ridge itself was in breach for failure to pay the first progress payment; and
(12) causing Blue Ridge to terminate for default by Transerve, when he knew that Blue Ridge was in default under the contract and Transerve was not in breach for default and Blue Ridge had in any event not given the required notices or time for correcting and responding to or collecting any alleged breach required prior to a termination for default.
262 In the applicants' written outline of closing submissions, the applicants submit that all the circumstances make Blue Ridge's termination, and Mr Mackenzie's role in it, unconscionable. They say Blue Ridge had no right to terminate other than for convenience. In any event, the applicants submit it is unconscionable to exercise a legal right in a way that would be harsh or oppressive. In the applicants' submission, to bring about a termination of a contract after three months of its performance, during which no money has been paid and significant costs have been incurred by the party being terminated, where the circumstances overwhelmingly establish that the primary purpose of the termination is to enable the terminating party to take over the works for its own benefit and profit is, on any analysis, harsh and oppressive. The applicants contend that even ignoring the illegality of the exercise of such a purported legal right, this conduct is unconscionable, both under the ACL and at law, and gives rise to an entitlement on the part of the applicants for the loss and damage thereby occasioned.
263 Mr Mackenzie condenses the claims of unconscionable conduct so expressed as an allegation that he:
(1) knew that Transerve had complied with the security requirements under the subcontract;
(2) knew that Transerve was precluded from building the units because it had not been provided with AFC drawings and had not had TQs answered;
(3) knew that Blue Ridge had breached the head contract;
and with the knowledge of those matters:
(4) caused Blue Ridge to cancel the subcontract with Transerve.
264 Having regard to the loss and damage pleaded at [45] of the statement of claim (and set out earlier in these reasons in the course of dealing with the precontractual representations), Mr Mackenzie observes that it is not clear how such alleged unconscionable conduct in causing Blue Ridge to cancel the subcontract could be said to be causative of Transerve continuing to perform under the subcontract, Mulya continuing to perform under its subcontract with Transerve, and Leembruggen Butler continuing to perform under its agency agreements. He says that if the unconscionable conduct caused the subcontract to be cancelled, there was no need to continue performance after that time.
265 Mr Mackenzie denies that he acted unconscionably and says he adopted rational commercial considerations when it was obvious to him that Transerve would and could not perform. He says he reasonably considered that Transerve was in default of its obligations under the subcontract and was incapable of producing the units under the subcontract, and that he appropriately set about negotiating with Roy Hill so as to avoid a debt for liquidated damages and to preserve the good name and integrity of Blue Ridge.
266 As to the claims of Leembruggen Butler and Mulya for damages as a consequence of unconscionable conduct, Mr Mackenzie says they are misconceived and are not open to third parties.
267 Mr Mackenzie also submits that as there was no agency agreement between Mulya and Leembruggen Butler prior to late 2012 and, in any event, until after the subcontract came to an end, if the second bank guarantees representations and the Roy Hill termination representations were made, they were not made to Mulya. Further, Leembruggen Butler could not have suffered damages as alleged as a consequence of it continuing to perform the agency agreement with Mulya as there was not one in existence.
268 As to the evaluation of the conduct of Mr Mackenzie, and Blue Ridge, upon which the applicants rely in pressing their case for contravention of s 21, Mr Mackenzie submits that the s 22 factors direct the Court towards considering the conduct at issue within the commercial context in which the subcontract was negotiated and performed and that the factors involve both subjective and objective inquiries.
269 In that regard, Mr Mackenzie refers to what the Full Court of this Court said in Hurley v McDonald's Australia Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-741 at [22]; [1999] FCA 1728, that:
For conduct to be regarded as unconscionable, serious misconduct or something clearly unfair or unreasonable, must be demonstrated - Cameron v Qantas Airways Ltd (1994) 55 FCR 147 at 179. Whatever 'unconscionable' means in sections 51AB and 51AC, the term carries the meaning given by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, namely, actions showing no regard for conscience, or that are irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable - Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (1996) 66 FCR 246 at 262. The various synonyms used in relation to the term 'unconscionable' import a pejorative moral judgment - Qantas Airways Ltd v Cameron (1996) 66 FCR 246 at 283-4 and 298.
(Emphasis in original.)
270 Mr Mackenzie submits there is a clear demarcation between conduct which is shrewd or opportunistic, and that which can properly be characterised as "unconscionable" in the sense described by the Full Court in National Exchange.
271 In particular, Mr Mackenzie submits s 22(1)(j)(iii) and (2)(j)(iii) of the ACL provide that the Court may have regard to the conduct of the supplier or acquirer in complying with the terms and conditions of the contract.
272 Mr Mackenzie also notes that in Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 57; [2009] FCAFC 85, the Full Court held that in considering whether the exercise of the right to terminate a contract in that case was unconscionable for the purposes of s 51AC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the decision needed to be assessed independently of the other conduct and surrounding circumstances and that one could only consider matters that have a causal connection with the decision to terminate.
273 Mr Mackenzie contends that courts have held that before a promise deliberately broken can be characterised as "unconscionable", more is required to bring such conduct within s 21. Not every deliberate breach of contract necessarily involves the moral obloquy needed for unconscionable conduct under the ACL: see Body Bronze International at [91] (Macaulay AJA).
274 Mr Mackenzie also notes that the claim of unconscionable conduct is not available against Mr Mackenzie under s 236 unless findings are made against Blue Ridge; and submits that because Blue Ridge is not a party to this proceeding, a necessary requirement of s 236 of the ACL has not been met and liability against Mr Mackenzie cannot therefore be established under s 236 of the ACL.
275 I should deal first with the submission made by Mr Mackenzie that Leembruggen Butler and Mulya can have no claim against Mr Mackenzie for unconscionable conduct under s 21 as that provision is not concerned with the effect of conduct on third parties, and is only concerned with the effect of conduct on a party to whom the respondent supplies or from whom the respondent acquires goods and services. I accept that submission about the operation of s 21: see Monroe Topple and Associates Pty Ltd v Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (2002) 122 FCR 110 at [2] (Black CJ), [116] and [162] (Tamberlin J); [2002] FCAFC 197.
276 For the reasons given above, in the course of dealing with the precontractual representations, I accept and find, in any event, that, at material times, save in respect of the second bank guarantees representations, Leembruggen Butler and Mr Leembruggen are not shown to have acted as the agent of Mulya. As to the second bank guarantees representations, I have found above that they were not made as pleaded. On these bases, Mulya's claims based on s 21 of the ACL must also fail.
277 Accordingly, I accept the submission that Leembruggen Butler's and Mulya's claims against Mr Mackenzie under s 21 of the ACL must fail.
278 Mr Mackenzie makes a further submission, however, that there was no trading or commerce as between Transerve and Mr Mackenzie in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services as contemplated by s 21. I reject that submission. By the subcontract, Transerve undertook contractual obligations to supply the units and in the first instance was to supply 50 such units by the end of March 2012.
279 The question remains whether Mr Mackenzie engaged in the unconscionable conduct alleged, either personally or as a person involved in the conduct of Blue Ridge, for whom he acted as sole director at material times.
280 In light of the findings I have made above to the effect that the precontractual representations, the second bank guarantees representations and the Roy Hill termination representations have not been made out, it follows that a number of the specific instances of unconscionable conduct alleged against Mr Mackenzie or Blue Ridge are either substantially weakened or not made out. The specific conduct relied on by the applicants and mentioned at [250(1), (2), (5), (9)] may be said to fall into this category. I say substantially weakened because it may be that notwithstanding I have found that a pleaded representation is not made out, the general conduct relied upon for the purposes of those representation pleadings remains relevant or of some relevance to the specific claims of unconscionable conduct referred to above at [250] or to the general systems and patterns of conduct and behaviour referred to above at [261].
281 To the extent that the applicants and Transerve in particular attempt to rely on so much of the course of dealings between Transerve, including by its agent Leembruggen Butler (by Mr Leembruggen), and Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie, from before the notification that the subcontract would be awarded to Transerve, on around 16 December 2011, through to the events that occurred after the contractual relationship between Transerve and Blue Ridge plainly was at an operational end as of 10 April 2012, when Blue Ridge wrote to Transerve formally terminating the subcontract, and then beyond, including the appointment of the voluntary liquidator of Blue Ridge and Blue Ridge's and Mr Mackenzie's conduct thereafter, a number of observations should be made.
282 The first is that, in my view, for the purposes of determining whether s 21 of the ACL has been contravened in the present circumstances, the actions by which Blue Ridge appointed a voluntary liquidator and the company's and Mr Mackenzie's conduct thereafter may be considered, at least in the circumstances of this case, to be of little assistance in determining whether conduct at material times during the subsistence of the subcontract, prior to its formal termination by Blue Ridge, was relevantly unconscionable. That is not to say that later conduct, including the appointment of a voluntary liquidator to a respondent company and other behaviour subsequent to the termination of the contract, may not be probative in relation to an earlier unconscionable conduct allegation. It is to say, however, that in my opinion, in the circumstances of this case, the steps taken on behalf of the company in relation to its liquidation after the event of the termination, and the company's and Mr Mackenzie's behaviour in the conduct of the head contract then in place between Roy Hill and Blue Ridge, are equivocal when it comes to assessing whether the earlier conduct relied upon was unconscionable conduct.
283 In very broad terms, as already noted, the applicants say that Mr Mackenzie's conduct, including causing Blue Ridge to be put into voluntary liquidation once claims for damage and loss were made against it by the applicants, following the termination of the contract, was, in effect, all part of a grand design to "expropriate" the subcontract and to replace Transerve in the performance of the subcontract, so that Blue Ridge obtained the benefits of that subcontract and not Transerve. No doubt the placing of Blue Ridge into voluntary liquidation can be seen, especially in the context of a dispute between a company and Transerve, as a cynical exercise designed to frustrate recovery of any judgment debt Transerve and the other applicants may have obtained against the company. But, in this case, I do not place any other significance on that conduct. It is not conduct from which I consider I should draw inferences in relation to the earlier impugned conduct.
284 In this case, I simply do not consider that the Court is able to discern any relevant plan or design in the conduct of Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie before the termination of the subcontract. The subsequent placement of Blue Ridge into voluntary liquidation does not supply the unconscionable characterisation to the pre-termination conduct complained of.
285 In relation to the question of the conduct relied on by the applicants in the early period of dealings between the relevant parties, I also consider that there is little that can be properly relied upon to make out a case of unconscionable conduct by Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie.
286 By that I mean to say, in the precontractual negotiations, the dealings between those relevant parties and persons may be considered commercially unexceptional. Mr Leembruggen met Mr Mackenzie. The identity of Transerve was introduced into the dealings. The fact that Mulya would be subcontracted by Transerve in Surabaya to manufacture the units was disclosed. There was even a question whether Blue Ridge had a business that Transerve might be interested in acquiring. The parties and individuals, at arm's length, relying on usual practices, as far as the evidence discloses those practices, negotiated with a view to being in a position to make a viable bid for the construction of the accommodation units to Roy Hill.
287 I have found above that the precontractual representations pleaded were not made. Nothing in the precontractual period suggests any basis for a finding of unconscionability. The parties bargained from positions of relatively equal strength. The terms of the subcontract ultimately negotiated were not unbalanced and indeed were to be expected in the circumstances. The subcontract was always understood to be one that would be back to back with the Roy Hill award, if successful, to Blue Ridge. There is no evidence of any undue influence, pressure or unfair tactics being used by Mr Mackenzie against Mr Leembruggen, for example, or Transerve more directly. There is nothing to suggest that the conduct and the subcontract itself were any different from what one would expect in a similar transaction with some other party. No applicable industry code was disregarded. There is no question of failure to unreasonably disclose conduct or risks. The terms of the subcontract were openly negotiated between the parties. There was no unilateral right of either of the parties to the subcontract to change its terms or conditions. At all material times leading up to the notification that Transerve would get the subcontract, there is nothing to suggest that the relevant parties acted otherwise than in good faith. In other words, there is nothing in the particular matters identified in s 22(1) or (2) that suggests that in the precontractual period up to the making of the subcontract there was anything done that should not have been done in good conscience or that was unethical, or that exploited any vulnerability or weakness, or abused any position of trust or confidence or involved an insistence upon rights in circumstances that made that insistence harsh or oppressive or otherwise denied any legal obligations.
288 Indeed, nor can it be suggested, in my view, on the evidence set out above, including in the broadly stated factual account and the discussion of the circumstances in relation to each of the pleaded representations above, that there was any conduct that could be described as unconscionable conduct up to and including 7 March 2012, when Mr Mackenzie met with representatives of Roy Hill to discuss the possible fabrication by Blue Ridge of the second and third separable portions of the head contract in place of Transerve.
289 In saying that, I intend to include the conduct that the applicants seek to impugn concerning the second bank guarantees. I have found above that those representations were not made out.
290 The reference to those representations also relates to more generalised complaints, such as those made in [250(6)], that Mr Mackenzie failed to facilitate progress payments under the subcontract. I will leave aside for the moment the further question of facilitating payment pursuant to the submission of the Mulya-arranged second bank guarantees to Roy Hill once Mr Mackenzie had "negotiated an extension of time for Blue Ridge to undertake manufacture of the units in Perth".
291 So far as the second bank guarantees, as they have been called above, are concerned, I am unable to infer that either Blue Ridge's default in satisfying the security term of the head contract with Roy Hill, in that regard, or its subsequent actions, through Mr Mackenzie, in obtaining the assistance of Mulya to supply guarantees from Bank DKI in Indonesia to satisfy that security term, has any unconscionable character to it. The email correspondence of 13 February 2012, referred to above in the course of discussing the second bank guarantees representations, rather suggests that Mr Mackenzie was grateful for the intervention of Mr Leembruggen and especially Mr Suharto of Mulya in obtaining those guarantees. They were supplied to Roy Hill apparently in good faith.
292 Further, when pressed by Mr Leembruggen, on behalf of Mulya, for payment of the $230,000 arrangement fee, Mr Mackenzie obviously felt under some pressure and, as noted above, wrote to Ms De Villiers of Roy Hill on 13 February 2012 and received responses from her. That conduct does not bespeak any lack of good conscience at that point. That Mr Mackenzie did not share the full details of that response, the fact that he had been told by Roy Hill that there was a delay in accepting those second bank guarantees because he had delayed in submitting them, and the other information about the significance of the purchase order, does not, in my view, indicate a lack of good conscience in Mr Mackenzie's conduct at that point, but rather a simple unwillingness to fully disclose everything that had been conveyed to him by Roy Hill. I infer that he failed to do that not out of some grand design to take over the subcontract at that point, but in order to avoid inflaming what he understood to be a difficult situation any further.
293 At that point it is also very plain from the exchange of emails that while Blue Ridge was being pressed for the first progress payment under the subcontract by Transerve, Blue Ridge by Mr Mackenzie was also insistent that the work under the subcontract proceed. I infer from the evidence referred to that all parties, at that point, while appreciating the commercial risks that they were presented within this unsatisfactory state of affairs, were prepared to press on with the contract nonetheless. While Transerve had lodged its invoice for the first progress payment of $1,700,900 on 31 January 2012 and required, for example, as at 6 February 2012, a letter from Blue Ridge stating that all payment milestones would be back to back with Roy Hill payment terms and for bank account details to be set up for the project, contract implementation went forward.
294 There was a strong desire by Transerve to obtain AFC drawings and over the period, as discussed further below, it kept requesting approved drawings. It also demanded answers to TQs. That is also dealt with further below. But the frustrations of Transerve in that regard do not, of themselves, or at this point with any other probative evidence, suggest the failure of Blue Ridge or Mr Mackenzie to cause the provision of AFC drawings and answers to TQs was conduct lacking in good conscience. There is no evidence, for example, that enables the Court to infer that the failure to provide approved drawings or to answer TQs was concerted conduct designed to set up Transerve and Mulya to fail to produce a mockup that met the approval of Roy Hill's inspector and Mr Mackenzie. At least, on the balance of probabilities, I do not draw that conclusion.
295 Whether or not the failure to provide AFC drawings and answers to TQs after 7 March 2012, when Mr Mackenzie was talking to Roy Hill about Blue Ridge manufacturing the accommodation units, is unconscionable is further considered below.
296 But at least up to that point there is, in my opinion, no case to be made that Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie had, in those respects, engaged in conduct that could be described as unethical or unconscionable.
297 As noted above, on 7 March 2012, Mr Mackenzie met with representatives of Roy Hill. He discussed the possibility of Blue Ridge fabricating the second and third separable portions of the head contract in place of Transerve.
298 At the time that meeting occurred, the second site meeting in Surabaya had been held on 1 March 2012 and a third site meeting was planned to be held (and then was held) on 8 March 2012 at Surabaya. That third meeting was not attended by Mr Mackenzie, but was attended by his nephew, Craig Mackenzie.
299 As at 7 March 2012, the first progress payment under the subcontract had become due and payable and on 3 March 2012 Transerve wrote to Blue Ridge outlining concerns, after the second site meeting, that included the fact the first progress payment had not been paid. It also was pressing for AFC drawings.
300 Immediately after that, on 6 March 2012, Blue Ridge by Mr Mackenzie wrote to Leembruggen Butler outlining construction concerns following the meeting of 1 March 2012.
301 It may be seen then that, as of 7 March 2012, Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie were generally concerned about the state of contract performance. Transerve wanted to see their first progress payment as well as AFC drawings, and Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie were complaining about construction concerns. As of 6 March 2012, however, when Mr Mackenzie wrote to Leembruggen Butler about those construction concerns, and on 7 March 2012 when he received a letter from Transerve to Blue Ridge noting it could not proceed with construction in the absence of AFC drawings and answers to TQs, Mr Mackenzie had already arranged a meeting with Roy Hill.
302 It is reasonable to infer that Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie were considering options at that point.
303 It is, however, also important to remember that the second bank guarantees, which had been provided by Blue Ridge (with the assistance of Mulya) around 21 February 2012, had not been resolved, in the sense that while they had been submitted, a first progress payment had not been received. No doubt from Transerve's point of view the expectation was that the Mulya-arranged second bank guarantees provided by Blue Ridge to Roy Hill would shortly see the payment of the first progress payment under the head contract to Blue Ridge and the consequent flow on first progress payment under the subcontract from Blue Ridge to Transerve. But as of 7 March 2012 that had not happened.
304 In his witness statement, provided as evidence-in-chief, Mr Mackenzie says that by email dated 20 February 2012, Blue Ridge raised with Transerve the concerns of Roy Hill about Transerve's ability to make delivery of the units on time and the need to strictly adhere to the specifications and advice regarding material selection.
305 He says that at about 20 February 2012, Transerve forwarded a production schedule indicating that the testing and manufacture of the first batch of 50 units would be finished by 20 March 2012, the second batch of 50 by 8 April 2012, the third by 28 April 2012 and the fourth by 18 May 2012, with the final, fifth batch being completed by 6 June 2012.
306 He says that Transerve provided an engineer's certified copy of the unit plans which confirmed delivery dates to be: first batch by 5 April 2012, second batch by 5 May 2012, third batch by 5 June 2012, fourth batch by 7 July 2012, and the fifth batch by 6 August 2012.
307 He says Blue Ridge notified Roy Hill of these delivery schedules.
308 He says that on 22 February 2012, Mr Leembruggen confirmed that the mockup was not approved due to incorrect materials having been supplied and as a result of Transerve's failure to provide necessary information regarding material used in the manufacture of the building.
309 He further says that after Roy Hill had inspected the mockup he was advised by Mr Gill that the mockup was rejected as the insulation was substandard and the gyprock, fittings and distribution board were all rejected.
310 He says that he then sent an email on 23 February 2012, advising Transerve that they could not vary the items and materials specified by Roy Hill and that the bank guarantees had not been accepted by Roy Hill. He also requested details of various material selections of the outstanding purchase orders.
311 Mr Mackenzie says that on 1 March 2012, with Roy Hill's representative, he inspected the units' construction at Surabaya and it was apparent that not one unit had been completed nor had the mockup been completed. He considered there was no prospect of the 50 units being constructed on time.
312 He said that following that second site visit he prepared a memorandum of his observations which was distributed to Transerve.
313 The materials charting the sequence of events described by Mr Mackenzie are all produced in evidence and tend to confirm the picture painted by Mr Mackenzie's evidence.
314 In cross-examination, Mr Mackenzie was challenged, but did not accept that the inability of Transerve to produce a satisfactory mockup was due to limitations in supply of materials that prevented this happening.
315 Mr Mackenzie insisted that the items including external wall cladding did not stop the mockup from being completed. In fact, he insisted that the wall cladding was actually on the mockup.
316 In cross-examination, however, Mr Mackenzie accepted, begrudgingly perhaps, that Transerve was seeking confirmation in writing to proceed based on submitted AFC drawings.
317 Mr Mackenzie did not necessarily accept, however, that the things that Transerve was then requesting had to be provided as part of the project. Mr Mackenzie answered that:
The whole idea of the mockup is for the client to look at it and for him to have the opportunity to make changes that he may wish to do at that time.
318 In relation to delays in the timetable, in cross-examination Mr Mackenzie was taken to an email he sent on 23 February 2012 to Mr Leembruggen and others at Transerve and Mulya, in which he provided "an update" on where he believed "we are at in regards to both internal questions between ourselves and on the other hand the client".
319 This email was referred to above in dealing with the second bank guarantees representations in that it dealt with the bank guarantees and that a "few questions from their commercial people" had been raised. The email also relevantly noted:
2 the colourboard for all samples, including cladding, vinyl and paint have been accepted. We await signed off drawings currently in document control at their end.
3 all TQ's to the client will receive confirmation in the next 24 hours.
4 TV's will be 22' not any other size.
(As in original.)
320 Plainly the various references are to things being done at the Roy Hill end.
321 In my view, at this point, consistent with what is noted above so far as conduct leading up to 7 March 2012 is concerned, there is nothing in the conduct of Blue Ridge or Mr Mackenzie which can be characterised as unconscionable.
322 Nonetheless, it is fair to observe, by reference to the email from Ms De Villiers of Roy Hill to Mr Mackenzie dated 27 February 2012, in the last paragraph, that Roy Hill required all outstanding TQs to be provided by Blue Ridge to Roy Hill and Ms De Villiers would then "chase a response for you". But that again does not suggest that Blue Ridge or Mr Mackenzie were unconscionably not attempting to progress the TQs. Blue Ridge's conduct in not following up the TQs more assiduously may be criticised, but I do not consider that it, even with other conduct complained of, can be said to be unconscionable.
323 By the end of February 2012, Transerve was extremely concerned, internally, about the position in which they then found themselves. They plainly appreciated the commercial risks to which they were exposed. On 28 February 2012, Ms Lily Png emailed Mr Walter Liu on the instructions of Mr Robert Liu in the following terms (reproduced as in original):
Walter
Mr Liu wants you to write to BR officially to inform them that we cannot wait for another 30 days for them to process the 1st payment to us.
By then, the first 50 units would be completed.
The submission of BG was delayed by BR to RH without keeping us posted when they are unable to come up with the BG.
So many days have been wasted and we have together with the subcontractors comply with all the commercial issue and even purchased
Some items whereas no $$$ have been committed by BR so far.
Just let them know the banker are inquiring into the status of the project progress and when payment coming in.
Mr Liu also wants extension of time to be given by RH/BR.
Please bring this issue to their attention, if possible, after the 2nd audit have been finalized.
324 It will be recalled that the second audit, or site meeting, was due for 1 March 2012.
325 Mr Mackenzie agreed that Mr Walter Liu did in fact bring up these issues with him and in front of the Roy Hill representative at the site meeting on 1 March 2012. He also agreed that he was not happy when that was done. He denied that he was embarrassed in front of the Roy Hill representative, but said he was "annoyed because they had no place to answer. They're - they're not the contractor". He then agreed that he was angry with Mr Walter Liu for airing such issues to Roy Hill. Mr Mackenzie denied, however, that Mr Walter Liu's expression of concern in relation to payment put the spotlight on his - Blue Ridge's - failure to provide guarantees to Roy Hill.
326 Mr Mackenzie also accepted that he received the letter from Mr Suharto of Mulya, addressed to him and dated 29 February 2012, that requested him to pay on Mulya's behalf a number of invoices including that for ElectSales of $165,020 out of the agreed arrangement fee of $230,000.
327 While Mr Mackenzie, when pressed in cross-examination, denied that he was under pressure in relation to the failure to pay the first progress payment to Transerve, I do not accept that evidence. Mr Mackenzie also denied that he was under pressure from Mulya to pay the bank guarantee arrangement fee. I also reject that evidence.
328 It was put to Mr Mackenzie that matters had come to a head as of 1 March 2012, because of the non-payment of the progress payment to Transerve and the arrangement fee to Mulya, but he denied that.
329 He also there denied that from his perspective, as at 1 March 2012, payment issues would be much simpler and easier if he was manufacturing the units himself in Perth.
330 At this point, after this site meeting, Transerve's concerns internally may be said to have been heightened. In an email dated 4 March 2012 from Ms Png to Mr Leembruggen, Mr Walter Liu, Mr Baharudin, and copied to Mr Robert Liu, the suggestion was made to hold a meeting with Mr Mackenzie, pointing out that Transerve could not carry on "indefinitely" without commitment from him and pointing out that he had sat on his (second) bank guarantee for six weeks "without informing us" of his financial problem. The suggestion was made that Mr Mackenzie "take all of us for a ride". It was added that Transerve could not proceed without a firm decision and commitment from Blue Ridge's end. The proposition was also put that Transerve did not know "whether RH n BR may be in Cahoot to lay the proj n charge liquidated damages later". The further point was made that two months had passed and Transerve was still on the mockup and changes of drawings. Ms Png also said that a purchase order "is very easy to issue out" but Transerve was wondering why "they are still sitting on it".
331 Mr Leembruggen replied to that email later the same day, stating, amongst other comments, that he believed that Transerve had the right to lodge a formal complaint as discussed by him with Ms Png and Mr Walter Liu.
332 On 6 March 2012, Mr Mackenzie sent to Mr Leembruggen and Ms Butler, Mr Suharto at Mulya and Mr Walter Liu and Mr Robert Liu at Transerve the report he had written entitled "Project report - visit 1/3/2012". In it, Mr Mackenzie commenced by making "no apologies, personal or professional for the comments that follow". He then proceeded to describe the project as little more than "an absolute shambles" and make a number of observations as follows:
• I make no bones of the fact, that had I been the client, I would be reporting back to say 'cancel the order'.
• Indeed … I am almost tempted to pull out and apologise to Roy Hill and face the consequences. I remind you that my reputation is on the line in Perth…
• It is transparent that nobody on the ground knows how to manufacture THESE UNITS.
• Documentation is poor and lacking in many areas, empty storage sheds and shelves emphasize the many problems I have highlighted in purchasing, materials and such as it is, was wrong…
• After nearly two months the lack of materials suggests the statements made at that time regarding basic skill supply were either misleading or just lies.
• Prior to leaving Perth on this visit, calls from suppliers made it apparent that attempts to source Australian compliant materials by [Leembruggen and Butler] either show ignorance of the end product, that they had no previous accounts with suppliers and no money to pay for items which required air freight or should have been in containers weeks ago…
• You are now thinking this is pretty bad and very serious. Indeed it is, so let us now turn our attention to the so-called 'proto-type'. Basically it was a joke…
• Even making allowance for the lack of many of these items, where are the jigs for the chassis, the jigs for the wall frames which could and should have been done in recent weeks? …
• Somebody needs to grab this whole mess and get it into shape, its simply not happening.
• I could probably go on and write even more damning comments, however, by now of you don't have the big picture, its time you were off the team and the project! …
• Let me make this clear at this point before moving onto another damning situation, again picked up and commented on by the client, we got the go ahead for this contract on 23/12. That was the clients instruction to proceed, the much debated PO is simply for the benefit of accounts departments and does not constitute any delays in ordering material.
• I acknowledge the bank guarantees were an issue and they have still not been accepted or approved officially by Roy Hill. Once again, should that have impacted, or stopped the purchase of materials, definitely not. This manufacturing order was passed from Blue Ridge to Transerve NOT Mulya, at which point I unreservedly acknowledge the personal support of Suharto in his financial commitment.
• The order was therefore not given to [Leembruggen Butler] and the issues in Perth should and could have been avoided, if on one hand Transerve had adequate funding to undertake the project, or had Blue Ridge been asked to contribute by accessing existing accounts for materials ready available to them…
• Firstly, you never ever, ever, admit in front of a client that you are having difficulties in getting materials...
• Geoff, I am afraid this one falls on you. For almost two months you have promoted yourself as the only person to get this job done…
• Unfortunately, you condemned yourself during our visit by your no show to meet myself with the client and late in the day when you did appear for minutes with Natasha [Butler], you simply beat a hasty retreat...
• I am annoyed at myself that I allowed affirmation of such matters to believe that everything was indeed under control. Sadly, the truth is, they certainly are not, a long way short of that.
• In summary this was a disaster of a visit. How much can be turned around in 7 days, I am not sure? …
• I do need a quick and honest answer to the following:
- Who is going to take charge to make an immediate impact and turn around this mess?
- Who is going to guarantee 50 units by mid April and confirm the capability of finishing the project?
(As in original.)
333 Given that document was circulated on 6 March 2012, it should come as no surprise that on 7 March 2012, in discussions with Roy Hill, Mr Mackenzie raised the question whether the second and third separable portions of the head contract should be performed by Transerve or someone else, such as Blue Ridge itself. No doubt Blue Ridge did not want to lose the contract overall. Plainly, Mr Mackenzie had put his mind to the question whether, if the situation described in his document was unlikely to improve, from his point of view, it would be possible for Blue Ridge to carry out the later separable portions itself in Perth rather than lose the contract by default.
334 What is noteworthy about the subject matter of the meeting of 7 March 2012 is that, at that point at least, Mr Mackenzie was not discussing performance of the first separable portion, which was then in the hands of Transerve under the subcontract. The inference that I draw from that is that Mr Mackenzie and Blue Ridge were wanting to remedy the situation, as per the document he had circulated in the last bullet point in the preceding paragraph, and were not at that point contemplating terminating the subcontract.
335 In my view, as unreasonable as Transerve may consider Mr Mackenzie's outburst concerning their performance to be, and however unreasonable it may have considered Mr Mackenzie's failure to acknowledge Blue Ridge's shortcomings in not making the required progress payment, advancing the second bank guarantees and otherwise obtaining AFC drawings and answers to TQs, I do not consider that the conduct of Mr Mackenzie and Blue Ridge as of 7 March 2012 can be characterised as unconscionable and I do not infer that the conduct, including the letter circulated as of 6 March 2012, was merely a smokescreen for some larger, grand design of Mr Mackenzie to terminate the subcontract in respect of the first separable portion, as at that date.
336 While to some extent the observations made by Ms Png in her email of 4 March 2012 may be said to have been coming to some sort of head, there is nothing to indicate that Mr Mackenzie on behalf of Blue Ridge was seeking unconscionably to enter into arrangements with Roy Hill to defeat Transerve's interests under the subcontract, at least in respect of the first separable portion thereof.
337 On the same day that Mr Mackenzie met with the representatives of Roy Hill, Transerve emailed him requesting an urgent meeting involving not only Blue Ridge, but also representatives of Mulya and Roy Hill.
338 On 8 March 2012, Mr Mackenzie, by email, indicated that Roy Hill would not be involved in any such meeting.
339 To some extent one can understand the complaint made that Mr Mackenzie was thereby seeking to avoid any circumstance whereby Transerve and the others came to appreciate that Mr Mackenzie had been talking with Roy Hill about implementation of the head contract, but at the same time it could not necessarily be expected that the head contractor would attend a meeting between its contractor and its subcontractor. At the same time, it may be said that as Mr Gill had been Roy Hill's inspector at earlier site meetings, it was not entirely inappropriate for Transerve to request that Roy Hill attend the meeting.
340 In any event, the next day, 8 March 2012, at the third site meeting in Surabaya, Mr Mackenzie did not attend. His nephew, Craig Mackenzie, did attend as did representatives of Transerve and Mulya, and Mr Leembruggen and Mr Gill, the Roy Hill inspector.
341 Craig Mackenzie gave evidence so far as the mockup was concerned, that Transerve:
had no provision for the sealing of the elements at their connection details of sheeting, under flashings, and over flashings;
there was no silicone, no profiling of the over flashings and no silicone sealing where required; and
the screws were too far apart and there were no screws to a number of the purlins.
342 He said he suggested to Transerve and later to Blue Ridge that they needed a suitable qualified production manager from Australia to be there full time to oversee the manufacture.
343 Craig Mackenzie said that after the visit he spoke to Mr Gill about the benefit and cost implications, to their respective companies, regarding a return to the facility in seven days' time to monitor the progress of the construction. He said that they had grave concerns about the ability and time required for Transerve to implement the changes and whether that could be achieved in seven days. The visit seven days later did not occur.
344 As noted below, Craig Mackenzie provided a report more or less to the above effect to his uncle, Mr Mackenzie, soon after the site visit.
345 Mr Gill was called to give evidence by Mr Mackenzie.
346 He made it clear that he did not inform Transerve not to proceed with work. He believed he may have said that Transerve required Roy Hill-approved drawings before commencement of production as that was normal industry practice. He said it was not reasonable to commence construction without AFC drawings.
347 Mr Gill also said, however, that the methods of construction used by both Transerve and Blue Ridge did not meet best practice. In his opinion neither had the capability or capacity to meet the schedule they had committed to.
348 In cross-examination Mr Gill said of the last visit in Surabaya in early March 2012 (which I infer was this third site meeting on 8 March), that one mockup building had been attempted. He said that it was at this time, probably, that he formed the view that neither Transerve nor Blue Ridge had the ability to complete compliant units. In referring to compliant units he said he was talking about finished units, ready for shipment.
349 I have little doubt on the evidence, especially that given by Mr Gill who had no particular axe to grind in the matter, that as of the third site meeting of 8 March 2012, the mockup of the unit was far from satisfactory.
350 While Mr Gill appeared to agree AFC drawings were important, from Mr Gill's point of view, he by then also considered neither Transerve nor Blue Ridge appeared to be competent or likely to complete the work in the required timeframe.
351 Mr Mackenzie, by an email dated 9 March 2012 that appears to have been sent to Mr Leembruggen, Ms Png, Mr Robert Liu, Mr Baharudin and Mr Suharto, emphasised there was no need to have the client at the meeting and that they (Transerve) should be solving issues with the construction. He insisted that the notice of award gave them the go ahead to manufacture and they did not, therefore, need Roy Hill's further approval - that is to say, Mr Mackenzie considered they did not need to await the AFC drawings before proceeding with the manufacture of the units.
352 Mr Mackenzie added that the second bank guarantees were not in English and not in the format required for the contract and therefore until Roy Hill's legal team signed off and accepted Blue Ridge's in the current format, Roy Hill would not process the invoices and so they (Transerve) would only get paid thirty days from Roy Hill's acceptance. Mr Mackenzie insisted that he had already explained this.
353 In this email Mr Mackenzie added:
I suspect you have no chance of completing 50 units by mid-April let alone end of March. Too much time has been wasted on material selection and getting basic steelwork on the shop floor. You should by now have had the majority of chassis completed and at least 50% of all frames stood and started on the fit out. You still do not have ANY Australian compliant material on site.
354 After further exhorting Transerve, Mulya and Leembruggen Butler to "get building" and apply 24 hours a day to the task, he added:
The client will today award the installation contract and they need DATES for supply. I NEED TO KNOW BY RETURN TODAY, WHEN THE FIRST 50 WILL BE SHIPPED???????????????????? NOT A GUESS A COMMITMENT!!!!!!!!!!!!
(As in original.)
355 That same day, 9 March 2012, Mr Mackenzie provided a submission to Roy Hill regarding the proposition that it should take over the second and third separable portions of the head contract. In his email to Ms De Villiers that day, Mr Mackenzie made a number of points to Roy Hill that should be noted, including that:
He had received a verbal report from Craig Mackenzie the evening before that indicated some improvement on the documentation requirements and some further chassis on the shop floor but that he continued to share "your views and concerns" over the delivery schedule.
The first shipment would not be ready before the end of March 2012 and while the yard continued to insist that they would meet the mid-April date, which they believed was accepted, he had been unable to secure a guarantee that this will be achieved.
He had also been looking at the possibility of sending people from Blue Ridge to site to push production along.
Transerve and Mulya would be in Perth on the Tuesday and had suggested that they meet with Roy Hill but that was "simply a request to discuss the BG's and payments, which I have explained to them already".
"I will leave it with you to let me know, if you would like to take this opportunity to vent your frustration and concerns, without venturing into discussion on the following proposal".
"On the matter of not only separable portion 1, but 2 and 3, I am seriously looking at pulling the pin on the overseas supply in favour of local build, although we may have to allow that first two shipments to go ahead. To this end we have already started our spread sheet on materials, labour and production".
The final production schedule point made was that, "[e]ven if we allowed Separable portion 1 to be completed, we would undertake to start on 2 & 3 almost immediately to Guarantee delivery".
"As we know, bank guarantees have been an issue. I would propose, with units being manufactured locally, that we can revert back to the standard practice we have in place with Rio Tinto and FMG and others" of a 10% deposit on order to proceed, other payments as current and two retentions of 5% again reducing, as per existing arrangements.
"I trust this offers some comfort, that BR recognise the shortcomings of Indonesia at this stage and are prepared to resolve matters NOW to regain your trust and safe in the knowledge that local supply will ensure the product meets your expectations".
356 Mr Michael Mattes of Roy Hill responded to that email stating that the situation was a "major concern" and that a Roy Hill director would like to go with him in the next "couple of weeks" to attend the manufacturing facility, which I infer meant Blue Ridge's, and work through the issues highlighted.
357 It may reasonably be inferred at this point that Mr Mackenzie had formed the view that while there may still be some possibility that at least the first separable portion of 50 units might be produced under the current schedule, more or less on time, there was no way that Transerve could be relied upon to fulfil the second and third separable portions of the head contract.
358 In my view, as frustrating as Mr Mackenzie's mode of communication with Transerve, Mulya and Leembruggen Butler plainly was, it is not apparent that at that point he had acted in a manner which can be described as unconscionable - arguably in anticipatory breach of the subcontract - but not unconscionable.
359 It must be acknowledged that Transerve was insisting that it needed AFC drawings and payment of the first progress payment. One can readily understand that in the circumstances as they existed, Transerve was not only frustrated by Mr Mackenzie's manner but more particularly by Transerve's inability to get not only answers to a range of TQs, but AFC drawings and, most importantly, payment of the first progress payment due under the subcontract. That payment of course, in a practical sense, depended upon Roy Hill processing the second bank guarantees and making the first progress payment under the head contract to Blue Ridge. Ms Png's expressed concerns as to the difficult circumstances in which Transerve found itself and whether or not they were being "taken for a ride" were no doubt magnified at this point.
360 Mr Mackenzie's apparent frustration then saw him, on 13 March 2012, again meeting with representatives of Roy Hill. At this meeting he expressly raised the prospect of Blue Ridge performing all work under the subcontract including under the first separable portion. Undoubtedly at this point Mr Mackenzie decided that Blue Ridge might, in prospect, terminate the subcontract with Transerve and come to an arrangement with Roy Hill to provide all the required accommodation units.
361 On 13 March 2012, Ms Png emailed Mr Mackenzie, with copies to others, disputing Mr Mackenzie's claims that Transerve had given all kinds of excuses. At this point there had been a number of exchanges about ISO requirements. Ms Png told Mr Mackenzie that he had chosen to disregard and ignore all of Transerve's emails and compliance requirements and demanded that they proceed forward. She pointed out that the project was a several million dollar project and that initially Transerve did not wish to take the project on as it had to be carried out overseas and required a lot of resources. She noted that the terms of payment were not favourable and they did not want to "jam" their bank facilities with $5.88 million earmarked for bank guarantees which would affect their facilities running existing projects. Thus it was that Mulya had obtained the bank guarantees and handled the procurement and fabrication.
362 Ms Png added that from 22 February 2012 until that time, Transerve had assisted Mulya with almost SGD600,000 to assist it purchase further goods, and complained that Mr Mackenzie was "impatient" and proceeded without checking if his presumptions were correct.
363 She added that she would have to bring these issues to the attention of Roy Hill and let them decide whether they would still want to proceed with the project which would have to be handled in accordance with "proper procedures and policies to be set by Transerve".
364 At that point, as may be appreciated, resolution of the impasse, so far as the subcontract was concerned, was effectively out of Transerve's hands and was about to be resolved through the side dealings between Mr Mackenzie and Roy Hill.
365 Nonetheless, in my view, it cannot be said that Mr Mackenzie's proposals, as they were at this stage, were borne of any conduct that is unconscionable. Rightly or wrongly, he considered that the performance of Transerve under the subcontract was unsatisfactory and, in particular, that they were unlikely to produce the required units on time.
366 At the same time, while no evidence has been led in the proceeding from any representative of Roy Hill, the Court is apprised of the evidence of Mr Gill and, as noted above, he plainly was less than impressed with the capability of Transerve, and Blue Ridge, to produce the required units and to produce them on time. No doubt that information was fed back into Roy Hill. One can infer that in all the circumstances, Roy Hill was prepared to listen to the proposals being put by Mr Mackenzie on behalf of Blue Ridge, first in relation to the second and third separable portions of the head contract, and then, from 13 March 2012, in relation to the construction of the units under the first separable portion, because of what it knew, including from Mr Gill, about progress on the head contract and subcontract.
367 As noted above, Roy Hill is not a party to these proceedings and its officers have not been required to give evidence in the proceedings. By inference, they were concerned to protect their own interests, obviously enough, in seeing the substance of the terms and conditions of the head contract complied with and, in particular, the accommodation units produced in the required numbers, of appropriate quality, and on time.
368 Thereafter, the evidence, including the documentary evidence, shows that both Transerve and Blue Ridge by Mr Mackenzie were occupying what might be called an uncertain space. On 15 March 2012, Transerve provided a report to Roy Hill and Blue Ridge concerning the completed mockup of the unit, which had not been done a week earlier, and which both Craig Mackenzie and Mr Gill, I accept, doubted could be produced in seven days.
369 That same day Mr Mackenzie put a proposal to Roy Hill for Blue Ridge to fabricate the full scope of the separable portion of the head contract, effectively cutting Transerve out of the works.
370 The next day, 16 March 2012, Blue Ridge requested Transerve to confirm the forecasted completion dates for the first 50 units. It must be said that, at this point, Mr Mackenzie for Blue Ridge must necessarily have been anticipating that Transerve would not be able to meet its obligations to produce the first 50 units at the end of March 2012, or, as he had said in the earlier email, even by mid-April.
371 Transerve's response was that they could not estimate a date until they received the AFC drawings and the written commitment as to when the first progress payment would be paid, and would likely require 10 days to get the remaining items on site, plus 30 days for production of the 50 units.
372 That same day Roy Hill wrote to Mr Mackenzie confirming receipt of his proposal for Blue Ridge to take over construction of all of the units and scheduled a meeting with Blue Ridge for 18 March 2012.
373 On 19 March 2012 Roy Hill conducted an audit of Blue Ridge's facilities in Perth.
374 In the light of that audit, Mr Mackenzie plainly felt that, if he were to proceed to terminate the subcontract with Transerve, he would be able to conclude appropriate alternative arrangements with Roy Hill for the construction of the accommodation units.
375 It was in those circumstances that on 20 March 2012, Blue Ridge issued Contract Direction No 1 to Transerve.
376 By Contract Direction No 1, signed by Mr Mackenzie and dated 20 March 2012, provided to Transerve, Leembruggen Butler and Mulya, Blue Ridge stated as follows:
Further to our site visits, your e-mail from Lily Png on 13 March and our discussions with Roy Hill, you are hereby instructed to suspend all works, including the purchase of materials, until further notice. We will not be making payment for the shipping of the containers currently sitting in Jakarta, pending their possible return to WA.
We advise that BR is presently in negotiations with RH, as to proceeding with the current supply agreement, or face the possibility of cancellation, due to your nonperformance and failure to meet the delivery schedule by Transerve.
Given this situation, BR will visit Surabaya on Thursday 29 March to carry out an audit and determine the future of our relationship and this project in particular.
377 On the same day, 20 March 2012, a memorandum from Mr Mackenzie on behalf of Blue Ridge, dated 15 March 2012, was circulated amongst various officers of Roy Hill. It referred to the meeting on 13 March 2012 and noted the view Blue Ridge expressed at the meeting that "our selection of Transerve as overseas manufacturers of separable portion 1 was proving to cause us concern on a number of levels, not least, their ability to meet the scheduled delivery dates".
378 The memorandum went on to say that they had discussed the possibility of limiting the number of units from offshore and supplementing supply from Blue Ridge's yard at Welshpool. It was then stated:
Subsequent to that proposal, we received your instruction to consider the 'Fabrication of the full scope of Separable Portion 1'.
379 In relation to its proposal to consider fabricating the first separable portion, in the memorandum Blue Ridge requested a formal letter from Roy Hill instructing Blue Ridge to terminate the current arrangements with immediate effect, based on non-performance and inability to meet contract delivery dates.
380 Blue Ridge also proposed changes to the current terms of the bank guarantees.
381 Blue Ridge further stated that:
The reason for making this offer is simply, we made a wrong choice in contracting TRANSERVE and we pay the price.
382 Finally, Blue Ridge stated:
In conclusion, BR was privileged to receive this order to supply accommodation units to RH and having identified the problems with our contractor at the earliest opportunity, trust that our honesty in approaching you now, rather than have matters fester and get out of control, will, in addition to our offer to maintain the unit price, enable us the opportunity to retrieve the situation and gain your support and respect.
In order to minimise further activity offshore and allow us to make an immediate start to local sourcing and production, we respectfully request a decision from you no later than noon on Friday, 16th March.
383 In the circumstances, while the question of Transerve's alleged default under the subcontract can be debated long and hard, and it may reasonably be contended, as did Ms Png in her email to Mr Mackenzie, that Transerve's difficulties were to be explained by Mr Mackenzie's failure to progress AFC drawings, answers to TQs and to ensure that the first progress payment under the subcontract was made, those contract performance issues do not, in my opinion, justify a finding that Mr Mackenzie, or Blue Ridge, thereby engaged in unconscionable behaviour.
384 In relation to what was happening at about this point, and happened later when the contract was formally terminated and Blue Ridge made fresh arrangements with Roy Hill to carry out the same works, Transerve contends that in effect Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie engaged in conduct to "expropriate" the subcontract of Transerve with Blue Ridge. That may in a practical sense have been the consequence of what occurred, for in fact, in my view, a fresh head contract was made between Roy Hill and Blue Ridge which saw Blue Ridge perform, subject to different financial terms, price and delivery schedule, the substance of the works required under the subcontract. But the reason why Contract Direction No 1 and the subsequent termination notice were given by Blue Ridge and Mr Mackenzie is what is presently important to the question whether or not either or both acted unconscionably in terms of s 21 of the ACL. In my view, as sharp and concealing as Mr Mackenzie's conduct was at this point - ensuring that Transerve did not get any wind of his side-dealings with Roy Hill - that conduct was driven by the factors set out in Mr Mackenzie's and Blue Ridge's correspondence to Roy Hill and set out in the memorandum circulated amongst Roy Hill officers on about 20 March 2012. It was to do with commercial concerns and the estimation made, rightly or wrongly, by Mr Mackenzie that unless he took the action he was proposing, the existing contractual arrangements that Blue Ridge had with Roy Hill and the subcontract arrangements that Blue Ridge had with Transerve would effectively collapse to Blue Ridge's financial and reputational disadvantage.
385 Consequently, I do not consider that in issuing Contract Direction No 1, Mr Mackenzie exhibited any conduct that can be described as unconscionable for the purposes of s 21 of the ACL, even though his actions may have exposed Blue Ridge to a damages claim for breach of contract.
386 Following Contract Direction No 1, matters proceeded to the final purported termination of the subcontract by Blue Ridge rather quickly. In receipt of Contract Direction No 1, Mr Walter Liu emailed Blue Ridge and others noting the Contract Direction No 1 and a number of other factors and also noting that Transerve's request for signed drawings (revision J) and the date of the first progress payment "still stands".
387 That same day, 21 March 2012, Ms De Villiers of Roy Hill sought clarification from Mr Mackenzie on his proposal to manufacture the units in Perth, requiring a response by close of business that day.
388 The next day, Mr Walter Liu decided to write to Mr Peter Jewell at Roy Hill and copied in Ms De Villiers, obviously seeking to retrieve the fast declining situation, stating that:
At the same time, we have through the appropriate channels (Blue Ridge) requested the following which we do not know if it has been made known to Roy Hill:
1. Signed drawings and the sign off on mockup (completed on 17 Mar 2012)
2. Written confirmation of actual date of payment of 1st milestone and 2nd milestone
3. Formal reply to our documents/ procedures/ TQs submitted.
389 On 22 March 2012, Blue Ridge by Mr Mackenzie provided the clarification that Ms De Villiers had sought in her letter of 21 March 2012.
390 On 26 March 2012, Mr Walter Liu provided Blue Ridge with Transerve's response to Contract Direction No 1, disputing that the notice had been correctly served in accordance with the contract (but noting that activities would be suspended nonetheless) and disputing the reasons for the suspension. Again, the issues of the fault of Blue Ridge were raised, including:
delays in approval of TQs;
no formal acceptance of design by way of AFC drawings as discussed at the site meeting 8 March 2012;
the absence of inspectors on 15 March 2012 to review and approve the revised mockup as discussed during the site meeting on 8 March 2012; and
default of payment of project milestone claims (progress payments).
391 Transerve advised Blue Ridge it considered Blue Ridge in substantial breach of the contract, pursuant to cl 25.5(b). It was noted that failure by Blue Ridge to remedy that breach as requested under s 25.7(a) would result in Transerve having the right to terminate the contract and claim all reasonable damages. It was stated:
The above suspension measures (items 1 to 3) will remain in force until such time as the substantial breach has been remedied and all due payments have been received in full.
392 A fourth site meeting was set for 29 March 2012. On 27 March 2012, Mr Richardson from Blue Ridge emailed Ms De Villiers to ask if she could advise Mr Mackenzie, Mr Craig Mackenzie or him via text message when she had emailed "the letter" so that they could print it before their meeting with Transerve. The letter was referred to as the "cancellation letter".
393 Prior to the site meeting of 29 March 2012, Ms De Villiers advised Mr Mackenzie and Craig Mackenzie that further to their telephone conversation earlier that morning, it was "Blue Ridge's responsibility to manage its subcontractors and we will not enter into discussions surrounding your contract with Transerve".
394 She added:
With regards to the Blue Ridge/Roy Hill relationship going forward we have not received formal approval from Roy Hill regarding the manufacturer of separable portion 1 of the contact. We have recommended to the client that Blue Ridge manufacture the units in your Welshpool facility, however until the client approves this recommendation, we cannot give you formal notification to do so.
395 The email added:
This email is not a direction to proceed with manufacture in Perth or acceptance of your proposal, It is for information purposes only.
(Emphasis in original.)
396 At the site meeting, which was attended by Mr Mackenzie, Craig Mackenzie and Mr Richardson as well as representatives of Transerve, Mulya and Leembruggen Butler, Blue Ridge, according to a minute prepared by the applicants' representatives, advised in the following terms:
Mr Mackenzie mentioned that the "mockup unit is of no use to Blue Ridge & Roy Hill and therefore the contract is terminated";
Craig Mackenzie mentioned that the construction "is a shambles as quality is important and the finishing works on the mockup is not acceptable";
Craig Mackenzie and Mr Richardson mentioned that the "building is uninhabitable to anyone and will not sign-off for delivery";
water ingress is a major factor as unit will be subjected to leakage during shipment;
Mr Mackenzie mentioned that the first drawing from Siam Steel is the AFC drawing by Blue Ridge;
Craig Mackenzie mentioned that Blue Ridge wished to end the contract amicably with all parties and wanted to know the applicants' future plan despite saying that Blue Ridge has no intention to buy over the steel or any materials purchased for the project;
Mr Mackenzie mentioned that Mr Gill of Roy Hill had visited and seen the mockup and the progress photos and reported its status to Roy Hill, and "[t]hat was the reason for termination of contract";
Mr Leembruggen mentioned to Mr Mackenzie that Transerve to date had not received any signed AFC drawings, then Mr Mackenzie got upset and said "[d]on't even go there, you were given approved drawings during the award and TPL [Transerve] were supposed to work off that drawing";
Mr Mackenzie terminated the contract "based on non-performance and failure to deliver" despite not issuing AFC drawings and unanswered TQs; and
the meeting became heated and Blue Ridge walked out of the meeting at 11.30am.
397 Those minutes were signed by Transerve and Mulya but not by Blue Ridge.
398 Also, on 29 March 2012, Craig Mackenzie responded to Ms De Villiers' email concerning her observation that it was Blue Ridge's responsibility to manage its subcontractors, stating that:
we understand that you are unable to give direction to proceed with production in Perth at this time, and we are only looking for instructions to cease production of the units overseas and understand you have no involvement with our subcontractors.
399 On 2 April 2012, Transerve by Mr Robert Liu disputed that Blue Ridge was entitled to terminate the subcontract and was of the view that the purported termination was unlawful and in breach of the subcontract. It advised that in accordance with the subcontract, the parties must continue to perform their obligations. Demand was then made under the subcontract for the amount of AUD3,401,800 to be paid pursuant to invoices 15225 and 15227, which were attached, being the first two progress payment invoices.
400 Consistent with my view set out earlier, I do not consider that at the time of the termination or purported termination of the subcontract on 29 March 2012, it can be said that either Blue Ridge or Mr Mackenzie was motivated other than by their direct commercial interests. In the circumstances I do not consider that their conduct can be properly characterised as unconscionable for the purposes of s 21 of the ACL.
401 In these circumstances, the claim for damages against Mr Mackenzie based on his alleged unconscionable conduct or involvement in the unconscionable conduct of Blue Ridge must fail.