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[2011] WASCA 190
Court of Appeal (WA)
2011-09-14
Martin CJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- BURKE [2011] WASCA 190
Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Citation : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- BURKE [No 3] [2010] WASC 110
Criminal law - State appeal - Trial by judge alone - Judgments of acquittal entered upon a submission of no case to answer by the respondents - Applicable test where a submission of no case to answer is made in a criminal prosecution which depends upon circumstantial evidence
Criminal law - Government contractor - Duty not to make disclosure of official information - Criminal Code (WA) s 81
Criminal law - Public officer - Official corruption - Criminal Code (WA) s 83
Criminal law - Proviso in Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 33(2a) - Whether no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred as a result of the trial judge's erroneous decision that none of the respondents had a case to answer
Criminal Code (WA), s 1(1), s 7, s 31, s 81, s 83, s 266(2)
Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (WA)
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 108, s 117, s 119
Pearling Act 1990 (WA), s 24, s 38
Police Service Act 2003 (Tas), s 42
Public Officers' Superannuation Benefits Recovery Act 1998 (Qld), s 4, s 6
Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA), s 3(1), s 9, s 21, s 68
State Service Act 2000 (Tas), s 9
Leave to appeal granted on grounds 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7
Judgments of acquittal on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 set aside
New trial ordered on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 before a differently constituted court
First Respondent : Mr G R Donaldson SC & Ms P M Tantiprasut
Third Respondent : Mr M T Ritter SC & Ms C H Meighan
Agnew v The Queen [2003] WASCA 188
Bosselman v United States 239 F 82 (2d Cir 1917)
Callaghan v The Queen [1952] HCA 55; (1952) 87 CLR 115
Chew v The Queen [1992] HCA 18; (1992) 173 CLR 626
Cortis v The Queen [1979] WAR 30
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Hogarth (1995) 93 A Crim R 452
Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Pirone (1997) 68 SASR 106
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Marks [2005] VSCA 277
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Zierk [2008] VSC 184; (2008) 184 A Crim R 582
Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135
Gebert v The Queen [1992] SASC 3637; (1992) 60 SASR 110
Grant v Headland (1977) 17 ACTR 29
Johnston v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 97 FLR 424
Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216
Kessing v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 310; (2008) 73 NSWLR 22
May v O'Sullivan [1955] HCA 38; (1955) 92 CLR 654
Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 203; (1998) 19 WAR 482
Pense v Hemy [1973] WAR 40
Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) [1993] SASC 4152; (1993) 61 SASR 1
R v Bailey [2003] QCA 506
R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321
R v Crisp (1919) 83 JP 121
R v Goreng-Goreng [2008] ACTSC 74; (2008) 220 FLR 21
R v Guise (1998) 101 A Crim R 143
R v Hodgetts & Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456
R v Hyman (1990) 2 WAR 222
R v Moran [2007] QCA 428
R v Smith [1960] 2 QB 423
Re Austin [1994] 1 Qd R 225
Rompotis v The Queen (1996) 18 WAR 54
Snell v Pryce [1990] NTSC 2; (1990) 99 FLR 213
The State of Tasmania v Johnston [2009] TASSC 60; (2009) 197 A Crim R 152
The State of Western Australia v Burke [No 3] [2010] WASC 110
The State of Western Australia v Montani [2007] WASCA 259; (2007) 182 A Crim R 155
United States v Fasolino [1978] USCA2 757; 586 F 2d 939 (2d Cir 1978)
United States v Polakoff 121 F 2d 333 (2d Cir 1941)
Willers v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 219
1 MARTIN CJ: For the reasons given by Buss JA, with which I agree, this appeal should be allowed, the notice of contention dismissed, the judgments of acquittal on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the indictment set aside, and a new trial ordered on each of those counts before a court differently constituted.
2 BUSS JA: On 11 August 2009, an indictment was presented against the first respondent (Mr Burke), the second respondent (Mr Grill) and the third respondent (Mr Hondros), which alleged:
(1) On 25 September 2006, at Perth, Nathan John Hondros, a government contractor, without lawful authority made an unauthorised disclosure to Brian Thomas Burke, in that he disclosed official information, namely a letter from the Hon Jonathon Ford MLC to Senator Eric Abetz, in circumstances where Nathan John Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure.
(2) Between 8 October 2006 and 12 October 2006, at Perth, Nathan John Hondros, a public officer, without lawful authority or a reasonable excuse acted corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment so as to gain a benefit for Brian Thomas Burke, Julian Fletcher Grill and others.
(3) In the alternative to Count 2, on 11 October 2006, at Perth, Nathan John Hondros, a government contractor, without lawful authority made an unauthorised disclosure, in that he disclosed official information, namely a draft version of the Pearl Oyster Hatchery Policy: Phase III, in circumstances where he was under a duty not to make the disclosure.
(4) Between 8 October 2006 and 12 October 2006, at Perth, Brian Thomas Burke and Julian Fletcher Grill counselled or procured Nathan John Hondros, a public officer, without lawful authority or a reasonable excuse to act corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment so as to gain a benefit for Brian Thomas Burke, Julian Fletcher Grill and others.
(5) In the alternative to Count 4, between 8 October 2006 and 12 October 2006, at Perth, Brian Thomas Burke and Julian Fletcher Grill counselled or procured Nathan John Hondros, a government contractor, to make, without lawful authority, an unauthorised disclosure, being disclosure of official information, namely a draft version of the Pearl Oyster Hatchery Policy: Phase III, in circumstances where Nathan John Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure.
3 Count 1 alleged a contravention of s 81(2) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code), count 2 a contravention of s 83(c) of the Code, count 3 a contravention of s 81(2) of the Code, count 4 a contravention of s 83(c) read with s 7 of the Code, and count 5 a contravention of s 81(2) read with s 7 of the Code.
4 Count 3 was in the alternative to count 2. Count 5 was in the alternative to count 4.
6 On 20 April 2010, the trial commenced in the Supreme Court before Murray J sitting alone and without a jury.
7 The State opened its case and led evidence from numerous witnesses over 10 sitting days between 20 April 2010 and 4 May 2010.
8 When the State closed its case, a submission was made on behalf of each of the respondents, pursuant to s 108 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) read with s 117 and s 119(1) of that Act, that there was no case to answer.
9 After hearing submissions from counsel for the State and counsel for each of the respondents, the trial judge reserved his decision. On 10 May 2010, his Honour held that there was no case to answer in respect of each of the counts in the indictment. He published written reasons. See The State of Western Australia v Burke [No 3] [2010] WASC 110. His Honour therefore entered a judgment of acquittal on each count.
10 The State appeals to this court, pursuant to s 24(2)(e)(i) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), against the trial judge's decision in respect of counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 (but not count 5).
11 The State relies on seven grounds of appeal. On 16 August 2010, Mazza J granted leave to appeal on grounds 2 and 3, and referred the application for leave to appeal on grounds 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 to the hearing of the appeal.
The test to be applied in determining a submission of no case to answer
12 The test to be applied by a trial judge in determining a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case has been considered and discussed in numerous authorities. See, for example, May v O'Sullivan [1955] HCA 38; (1955) 92 CLR 654; R v Bilick (1984) 36 SASR 321; Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd [1998] WASCA 203; (1998) 19 WAR 482; The State of Western Australia v Montani [2007] WASCA 259; (2007) 182 A Crim R 155. The question is not whether, on the evidence as it stands, the accused ought to be convicted, but whether, on the evidence as it stands, he or she could lawfully be convicted.
13 In Bilick, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia considered the application of the test in a case which depends on circumstantial evidence. King CJ (Mohr J agreeing) said:
The same test is to be applied to deciding a submission of no case to answer in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence as in a case depending upon direct evidence, although the manner of its application will be different. The question to be answered by the trial judge is whether there is evidence with respect to every element of the offence charged which, if accepted, could prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. Where there is direct evidence of the actus reus and that evidence is capable of supporting an inference of mens rea, there is a case to answer except in the extreme case, as perhaps of testimony which is manifestly self-contradictory or the product of a disorderly mind, envisaged by the Privy Council [in Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor [1981] 3 WLR 395] in which the direct 'evidence' is so incredible as to amount to no evidence. Where the case is a circumstantial or partly circumstantial case and therefore depends on inferences, the question may be expanded so that it becomes: On the assumption that all the evidence of primary fact considered at its strongest from the point of view of the case for the prosecution, is accurate, and on the further assumption that all inferences most favourable to the prosecution which are reasonably open, are drawn, is the evidence capable of producing in the mind of a reasonable person satisfaction, beyond reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused? That, as it seems to me, was the question which the learned trial Judge was required to answer in deciding on the submission of no case to answer (337).
See also Morrison (489 - 491); Montani [39] - [40].
14 In Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) [1993] SASC 4152; (1993) 61 SASR 1, King CJ (Bollen J agreeing) referred to the Bilick test and re-stated the principles, in summary form, as follows:
If there is direct evidence which is capable of proving the charge, there is a case to answer no matter how weak or tenuous the judge might consider such evidence to be. If the case depends upon circumstantial evidence, and that evidence, if accepted, is capable of producing in a reasonable mind a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and thus is capable of causing a reasonable mind to exclude any competing hypotheses as unreasonable, there is a case to answer. There is no case to answer only if the evidence is not capable in law of supporting a conviction. In a circumstantial case that implies that even if all the evidence for the prosecution were accepted and all inferences most favourable to the prosecution which are reasonably open were drawn, a reasonable mind could not reach a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or to put it another way, could not exclude all hypotheses consistent with innocence, as not reasonably open on the evidence (5). (original emphasis)
15 In Questions of Law (No 2 of 1993), King CJ noted that suggestions had been made by counsel in the course of argument that certain expressions used in Gebert v The Queen [1992] SASC 3637; (1992) 60 SASR 110 may not be consistent with the principles his Honour had re-stated. In Gebert, the appellant appealed against his conviction on a charge of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia upheld the refusal of the trial judge to rule that there was no case to answer. Mullighan J wrote the reasons of the Court of Criminal Appeal and King CJ and Olsson J agreed with them. Mullighan J said:
If the evidence in the Crown case cannot exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence (Peacock v The King [1911] HCA 66; (1911) 13 CLR 619), then the evidence is not capable in law of proving the charge beyond reasonable doubt and there is no case to answer. In the present context that means that if the evidence cannot exclude any reasonable hypothesis that the appellants were guilty of some conspiracy other than as charged, there is no case to answer (115 - 116).
16 In Questions of Law (No 2 of 1993), King CJ explained that passage in Mullighan J's reasons in Gebert, as follows:
The emphasis in that passage is on the word 'cannot' twice appearing. That word denotes incapacity. There is no implication that it is for the judge to decide whether any hypothesis consistent with innocence is reasonable. There is no case only if the evidence lacks the capacity to lead a reasonable mind to reject all such hypotheses as unreasonable. At 116-117, Mullighan J crystallised the question to be answered in relation to the particular issues in that case as follows:
'The question is whether the evidence and the inferences which could safely be drawn are capable of excluding any reasonable hypothesis that there was an agreement to commit some other crime.'
That formulation is clearly not intended as an exhaustive formulation of principle. It was sufficient for the purpose of the case. There was no intention on the part of the Court to modify the test in Bilick which Mullighan J was purporting to apply. Stated more fully the formulation would have referred to the acceptance, for this purpose, of the evidence for the prosecution and to the inferences as being those most favourable to the prosecution. The word 'safely' is used in the sense of 'reasonably' and is, of course, not intended to suggest that it is the function of the judge to consider whether any verdict of guilty would be unsafe. That is plainly not his function: Doney v The Queen (supra) (at 215). If there is evidence capable in law of supporting a conviction, the case must go to the jury. The question of the safety of any consequent verdict of guilty is for the Court of Criminal Appeal (5 - 6). (emphasis added)
17 Senior counsel for Mr Hondros, in his oral submissions (appeal ts 71 - 72), referred to Gebert in support of the proposition that it is for the trial judge to decide, on a no case submission, whether any hypotheses consistent with innocence are reasonable. Senior counsel for Mr Grill referred to Gebert in his written submissions (WAB 54). None of the counsel who appeared cited Questions of Law (No 2 of 1993).
18 I respectfully agree with King CJ's explanation in Questions of Law (No 2 of 1993) of Mullighan J's reasons in Gebert and with King CJ's re-statement of the principles.
19 Accordingly, where a submission of no case to answer is made in a criminal prosecution which depends upon circumstantial evidence, the trial judge should rule on the submission on the basis of such inferences as are reasonably open on the evidence and as are most favourable to the State. The trial judge should not choose between such inferences. He or she is concerned only with whether a reasonable tribunal of fact, properly instructed, could conclude beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty or, to put it another way, could exclude all hypotheses consistent with innocence as not reasonably open on the evidence.
20 This test applies where the tribunal of fact is a jury and, also, where the tribunal of fact is a judge in the context of a trial before a judge alone without a jury. See Morrison, where the principles formulated by King CJ in Bilick were followed in relation to the decision of a magistrate that there was no case for the respondents to answer.
21 At all material times, Mr Hondros was a 'ministerial officer', as defined in s 3(1) of the Public Sector Management Act 1994 (WA). He was appointed under s 68(1) of the Public Sector Management Act to assist the Honourable Jonathon Ford MLC who was, at all material times, the Minister for Fisheries of Western Australia. Mr Hondros was employed as Mr Ford's chief of staff under a written contract of employment dated 5 September 2006. See s 68(2) and s 68(3) of the Public Sector Management Act.
22 At all material times, s 9 of the Public Sector Management Act applied to Mr Hondros. Section 9 reads:
The principles of conduct that are to be observed by all public sector bodies and employees are that they -
(a) are to comply with the provisions of -
(i) this Act and any other Act governing their conduct;
(ii) public sector standards and codes of ethics; and
(iii) any code of conduct applicable to the public sector body or employee concerned;
(b) are to act with integrity in the performance of official duties and are to be scrupulous in the use of official information, equipment and facilities; and
(c) are to exercise proper courtesy, consideration and sensitivity in their dealings with members of the public and employees. (emphasis added)
23 The term 'public sector body' is defined in s 3(1) of the Public Sector Management Act to include, relevantly, 'ministerial office'. The term 'ministerial office' is defined in s 3(1) to mean 'one or more ministerial officers appointed to assist a particular political office holder'. The term 'political office holder' is defined in s 3(1) to include, relevantly, a Minister of the Crown. The term 'ministerial officer' is defined in s 3(1) to mean a person appointed under s 68 as a ministerial officer.
24 At all material times, Mr Hondros was obliged under cl 9.1 of his contract of employment to comply with 'the principles of official conduct set out in [the Public Sector Management Act], as well as the Western Australian Public Sector Code of Ethics and the Department of the Premier and Cabinet's Code of Conduct'.
25 Also, at all material times, Mr Hondros was obliged under cl 3 of his contract of employment to perform 'the functions as are from time to time specified by the Minister or the political office holder'.
26 At all material times, Mr Burke was a former Premier of Western Australia and Mr Grill was a former Cabinet Minister of this State. Each of them had been a member of Parliament for many years, but had ceased to hold office well before the events giving rise to the counts in the indictment.
27 At the material time, Mr Burke and Mr Grill worked together as consultants and lobbyists.
28 Section 81 of the Code is contained in ch XII of pt III. Section 83 is contained in ch XIII of pt III.
29 Part III is headed, 'Offences against the administration of law and justice and against public authority'. Chapter XII bears the heading, 'Disclosing official secrets'. Chapter XIII bears the heading, 'Corruption and abuse of office'.
(a) any publication or communication; and
(b) in relation to information in a record, parting with possession of the record;
government contractor means a person who is not employed in the Public Service but who provides, or is employed in the provision of, goods or services for the purposes of -
(a) the State of Western Australia;
(b) the Public Service; or
(c) the Police Force of Western Australia;
information includes false information, opinions and reports of conversations;
official information means information, whether in a record or not, that comes to the knowledge of, or into the possession of, a person because the person is a public servant or government contractor;
public servant means a person employed in the Public Service;
(a) the disclosure by a person who is a public servant or government contractor of official information in circumstances where the person is under a duty not to make the disclosure; or
(b) the disclosure by a person who has been a public servant or government contractor of official information in circumstances where, were the person still a public servant or government contractor, the person would be under a duty not to make the disclosure.
(2) A person who, without lawful authority, makes an unauthorised disclosure is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 3 years.
Summary conviction penalty: imprisonment for 12 months and a fine of $12 000.
Any public officer who, without lawful authority or a reasonable excuse -
(a) acts upon any knowledge or information obtained by reason of his office or employment;
(b) acts in any matter, in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment, in relation to which he has, directly or indirectly, any pecuniary interest; or
(c) acts corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment,
so as to gain a benefit, whether pecuniary or otherwise, for any person, or so as to cause a detriment, whether pecuniary or otherwise, to any person, is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.
32 Count 1 relates to the disclosure by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke, on 25 September 2006, of a letter from Mr Ford to the Honourable Senator Eric Abetz, the then Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation of the Commonwealth.
33 The letter related to the management of a southern and a northern fishery for which Western Australia and the Commonwealth share responsibility.
34 A major difficulty in the management of the northern fishery was poaching by foreign fishermen. There was an issue between Mr Ford and Senator Abetz as to whether the Commonwealth was taking adequate steps to prevent the poaching.
35 The impact of poaching upon Australian fishermen and the regulation by the Commonwealth and Western Australian Governments of the northern fishery was described by the trial judge, as follows:
One of the issues was the taking of sharks, for their fins particularly, to the extent that the numbers of fish were reduced by what were regarded as the depredations of overseas fishermen. It put pressure on the Australian and WA regulation of locally based fishermen, and the result was measures to preserve the fishery by reducing their catch, and the number of days in any given month of the season when they were entitled to fish. The numbers of locally based fishermen were small, but they were in the habit of petitioning the Minister for financial assistance when Government action to restrict their fishing rights had adverse economic consequences for their business [94].
36 Mr Ford's letter to Senator Abetz was headed, 'JOINT AUTHORITY MANAGED FISHERIES ACCESS TO THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT'S $220 MILLION "SECURING OUR FISHING FUTURE" PACKAGE'.
37 Mr Ford requested Senator Abetz to allow 'operators in the two Western Australian Joint Authority managed fisheries (the Joint Authority Southern Demersal Gillnet and Demersal Longline Managed Fishery and the Joint Authority Northern Shark Fishery) to access' this financial package.
38 As to the southern fishery, Mr Ford said, amongst other things:
As you are aware, substantial management changes have recently been introduced into the Joint Authority Southern Demersal Gillnet and Demersal Longline Managed Fishery. As a result, and in addition to other fishing adjustments faced by them, the operators in this fishery have effectively incurred effort reductions of approximately 40%. Introduction of these management changes and effort reductions has resulted in the two operators with the greatest share of units and largest catch history in the fishery facing extreme adjustment pressures. As a result the fishing businesses of these two operators are likely to suffer substantial losses for several years into the future.
While it is accepted that the fishery is managed under State law, I consider that there is a clear obligation for the Commonwealth to provide some financial assistance to assist with the required adjustments (BAB/GAB 484).
39 As to the northern fishery, Mr Ford said, amongst other things:
The impact of illegal foreign fishing in the Joint Authority Northern Shark Fishery means that consideration is also being given to significant changes in the way that fishery is managed. It is already considered that the extent of illegal foreign fishing in this region means that neither the ecological sustainability of the fishery nor the conservation of certain vulnerable species can be assured. Therefore, to ensure that the operations of the domestic fishing fleet are not compounding the adverse effects of the illegal foreign fishing this and other domestic fisheries in the region (eg trochus) may need to be closed.
In this situation, and in the context of the Commonwealth's responsibility to control and prevent illegal foreign fishing, there is a strong case to argue that the 'Securing our Fishing Future' package should be available to compensate fishers in these northern fisheries or provide them with financial assistance to help them meet any associated adjustment requirements. Certainly, if the Joint Authority Northern Shark Fishery needs to be closed to ensure the conservation of species placed at-risk by the illegal foreign fishing, I believe that the Commonwealth would have an obligation to contribute to funding any related compensation, adjustment or buy back costs (BAB/GAB 485).
40 Brian Scimone and John Triantafyllou were Western Australia based fishermen who made representations personally to Mr Ford for financial assistance. Also, they engaged Mr Burke to assist in advancing their case.
41 In or about mid-2006, Mr Ford and Mr Hondros became aware that Mr Burke was acting for Mr Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou. Mr Ford was endeavouring to deal with their applications for financial assistance.
42 On 18 August 2006, Mr Ford made a ministerial statement to the media. He said that the northern fishery would remain open and that new management controls were being prepared. The statement referred to Mr Ford's frustration that the Western Australian authorities could not obtain a clear indication from the Commonwealth as to the true impact of poaching on the fishery. The statement also referred to correspondence with Senator Abetz in relation to their joint responsibility for the management of the fishery.
43 On 25 September 2006, Mr Burke telephoned Mr Hondros. Mr Hondros was unavailable. Mr Burke left a message. In the message, Mr Burke requested Mr Hondros to send him a short email 'about the position in respect of the fishing discussions we had'. The trial judge made these observations about the message:
It is clear that Mr Hondros knew what that meant because, on the same date, he obtained from Ms Comrie, an administrative [assistant] in the office of the Minister, who acted primarily as Mr Hondros's personal assistant, an electronic version of the undated letter which had been written to Senator Abetz by Mr Ford, as Minister for Fisheries, in which he expressed views about a number of issues concerning fisheries which were jointly managed by the State and the Commonwealth [97].
44 His Honour then summarised what, in his view, were the essential aspects of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz:
The particular topic was a request to allow WA fishermen in the jointly managed fisheries access to the Australian Government's $220M fund entitled, 'Securing our Fishing Future'. That was a request made, among other fisheries, in respect of the Joint Authority Northern Shark Fishery in which Mr Burke's clients were engaged. The letter presents arguments in an endeavour to persuade the Federal Minister to the point of view being put by Mr Ford that WA fishers should have access to those funds which, as I understand the evidence, among other things, would provide money which might be used to meet compensation claims made by fishermen who suffered financially as a result of tightening management controls [98].
45 Mr Ford gave evidence at the trial that he regarded a letter written by him to another Minister as a confidential communication which only he might release publicly. However, Mr Ford said that his letter to Senator Abetz did not contain anything of substance that was not already publicly released information [99].
46 On 25 September 2006, Mr Hondros, without the knowledge or consent of Mr Ford, sent Mr Burke an email. Mr Hondros attached to the email the electronic copy of Mr Ford's letter to Senator Abetz which Mr Hondros's personal assistant, Claire Comrie, had sent him. The contents of this email were reported by Mr Burke to his clients [100].
47 The email from Mr Hondros to Mr Burke is the disclosure with which count 1 is concerned. The portion of the email which is relevant to count 1 is this:
Jon Ford has also written to Abetz seeking access for these fishermen to the Commonwealth's 'Securing our fishing future' package, which is a $220 million buy-out of Commonwealth fisheries (the shark fishery is a joint Cth-WA fishery). I have attached that letter and will let you know when we have a response. This might also be of some assistance if Abetz agrees (BAB/GAB 482).
48 The Pearling Industry Advisory Committee (PIAC) is part of the statutory structure for the governance of the pearling industry in Western Australia.
49 PIAC was established under s 38 of the Pearling Act 1990 (WA). It provides advice to the Minister or the chief executive officer (CEO) of the Department of Fisheries concerning the pearl industry and, in particular, hatchery activities in this State.
50 The trial judge made these observations in relation to people who were 'members' of PIAC, and people who were 'observers' to PIAC, in 2006:
The members of PIAC ... were ministerial appointees, but it is evident that the industry nominees and appointees were substantially drawn from major industry participants. They included Mr Kelly, the CEO of the Paspaley group, Mr Nicholas Paspaley and Mr George Kailis of the Kailis group. Mr Smith, an 'independent' ministerial appointee, was PIAC's chairman. Mr Rogers [the CEO of the Department of Fisheries] was an ex officio member of PIAC.
In addition, a number of people were appointed as observers to PIAC, and the practice seems to have permitted them not only to attend meetings, but, when called upon, to make a contribution to debate. Those observers included Mr McCallum, the CEO of the [Pearl Producers Association], Mr Barton of the NT Fisheries Department, and Ms Kennedy, a senior officer in the WA Department of Fisheries, acting as Principal Management Officer (Pearling). There were other departmental observers including, for example, Dr Hart and Dr Jones, officers of the Department of Fisheries who would provide technical advice, and Ms McCrea, the manager of the Pearling and Aquaculture Program at the Department of Fisheries. From time to time, witnesses before me described PIAC as not only an advisory committee, but as a body which tended to act as an industry lobby group. Perhaps, given the membership, that was not surprising [122] - [123].
51 By s 24(1) of the Pearling Act, the Minister may issue, from time to time, 'for the assistance of the CEO [that is, the chief executive officer of the Department] and the information of the pearling industry a policy statement consisting of guidelines in respect of matters considered by the Minister to be of significance' in relation to licences and the general administration of the Act in connection with pearling and hatchery activities.
52 In March 2005, Mr Ford became the Minister for Fisheries and Mr Hondros became his chief of staff. At that time, the then current pearl hatchery policy had been in place since 1992. It was embodied in Ministerial Policy Guideline No 17. The policy was designed to develop the hatchery process within the industry, but it was outdated and due to expire at the end of 2005. At the beginning of 2005, a new hatchery policy was being developed [126].
53 The development of the new pearl hatchery policy comprised three phases.
54 Phase I, which had already occurred, involved the review of the successes, failures and inadequacies of the previous policy.
55 Phase II culminated in Fisheries Department Occasional Publication No 27, which was released publicly in September 2005. This document considered the various options for the establishment of a new pearl hatchery policy. It was available for public comment. Comments were received, especially from participants in the industry [127].
56 Three options were under consideration. The trial judge described them, as follows:
Essentially three options were discussed. The first would see existing quota levels maintained. I was told that that was unpopular with everyone. The second proposal was to increase quotas for hatchery farming, recognising that because existing quotas for the fishing of wild stock were at about the limit of the fishery's capacity to sustain the current level of fishing, it was in the area of hatchery development that increases in quota would need to be made.
The overwhelming consensus in the industry, unsurprisingly having regard to what I have already written about the dominance in the industry of major participants, favoured pro rata increases in licence quotas. That would preserve the position of the larger participants as against smaller producers. The third proposal, favoured by the small producers, would see the increases in quota administered on a case by case basis, but recognising that small producers needed relatively greater increases in quota if they were to remain viable in the changing economic circumstances to which I have referred [128] - [129].
57 Phase III began with PIAC preparing a policy document to be presented to Mr Ford for his adoption or endorsement, after he had received advice from the Department. If the document was adopted or endorsed by the Minister, it would be published as a Fisheries Department Occasional Publication and be available generally within the industry and to the public at large [130] - [131].
58 His Honour described the next stage in the process, as follows:
The policy would then be the basis for a new policy guideline formulated within the framework of amendments to the Pearling Act or the enactment of new legislation [132].
59 The trial judge recounted the history of the development of the Phase IIII policy document up to 10 October 2006:
It appears that the Phase III policy document emerged from PIAC in November 2005, although the document also bears the date February 2006. At about that time, it was therefore submitted to Mr Ford for his endorsement. As I understand Mr Ford's evidence, that was the recommendation of the CEO of the Department, Mr Rogers. The Phase III policy is set out in a comprehensive document. Unsurprisingly, in view of its origin, it presents what is described in the document as the consensus of the industry. I need not discuss its terms, and it is sufficient to note the essential thrust of the policy, as set out in the report, as follows:
1.1 No new licences - except where a person or corporate entity acquires quota from an existing quota holder. There is no barrier to entry for new entrants into the pearling industry as the secondary market exists and functions well.
1.2 Changes to legislation to ensure that all future allocations are pro-rata and administratively allocated in line with combined current hatchery and wild quotas.
1.3 Industry to have a formal role of advising on timing and allocation of quota. The details of business rules would need to be determined by industry (exhibit 4).
Mr Ford's evidence was that he read the document carefully and took some time to understand it. He was not happy with the policy direction recommended. It seemed to him to be weighted in favour of the major participants in the industry, which he described as the Paspaley/Kailis interests. It did not permit the interests of small WA producers to be fostered, he thought, and it did not provide adequately for a particular interest which Mr Ford had in fostering the participation in the industry of indigenous groups and people.
Nonetheless, after a time, Mr Ford endorsed the policy and it became publicly available. On 25 May 2006, he signed and sent letters advising his acceptance of the policy to all concerned in the industry who needed to know ...
Shortly after [Ms Kennedy] became the Acting Principal Management Officer (Pearling) she received and reviewed the endorsed Phase III policy document. She was centrally placed in the Department in relation to the processes to which I have referred above. For example, it was she who provided the departmental liaison with PIAC, upon which body she was an observer. She would draft background papers for PIAC, attend meetings, draft PIAC's policy recommendations, and forward those recommendations to the Minister's office, together with advice which she would prepare for Mr Rogers, to be provided to the Minister in relation to PIAC's recommendations or otherwise.
So it was she who was primarily responsible for implementing the endorsed Phase III policy, and when she received the document she formed the view that it required amendment, not substantively, but so that it would be in harmony with legislative drafting instructions for amendments to the legislation which were in the course of preparation in the Department. As she said, the changes which she thought were required were 'operational in nature'. They did not concern the underlying principles of the policy, but dealt with the practicalities of their implementation. So far as she dealt with the Minister's office, it was Mr Hondros who was her contact.
On 15 September 2006, Ms Kennedy circulated by email to Mr Rogers, her immediate superior (as I understood it), Ms McCrea, the Manager of the Pearling and Aquaculture Program in the Department, and Mr McCallum [the chief executive officer of the Pearl Producers Association], a copy of the Phase III policy with suggested revisions 'to deal with the separation of fishing and first operation seeding rights and the concept of secure rights under the PMB [Pearling Management Bill]'. She asked for their comments (exhibit 158).
As I understand it, Ms Kennedy then proposed that the amended document would be placed before PIAC for its consideration at the October meeting of that body. The changes she made are tracked in the document, and, in its amended form, it can be compared with the original. In cross-examination Ms Kennedy was taken through the changes she had proposed. She agreed that none were of a substantive character.
...
The next step in the process was to take the Phase III policy, as amended, to the PIAC meeting which was held on 6 October 2006. Exhibit 162 includes all the documentary material, including the Phase III policy document prepared by Ms Kennedy which was provided to PIAC and discussed. The record shows that, apart from ten members of PIAC, including Mr Rogers, who were present, there were six observers and a minute secretary in attendance. From the Department, apart from Ms Kennedy and her superior, Ms McCrea, Dr Jones and Dr Hart were present. The other two observers were Mr Barton, from the NT, and Mr McCallum.
...
Following that meeting, Ms Kennedy made the various small changes required, and circulated the document within the Department, to Mr McCallum and to the members of PIAC. She received no further advice that changes were required ... [134] - [149].
60 The trial judge referred, in the passage set out at [50] above, to the Pearl Producers Association (PPA). At all material times, Brett McCallum was the executive officer of the PPA. The PPA was established to represent pearl producers. Its membership comprises Western Australian and Northern Territory fishing and hatchery licence holders who pay membership fees. In 2006, of the 17 licensees in Western Australia, only one, being a small producer known as Arrow Pearls, was not a member. His Honour found that the decisions of and submissions to Government made by the PPA were 'very much influenced by the views of the major producers' [117].
61 When Dr Gallop was the Premier of Western Australia, he imposed a ban upon any member of his government and any government officer having any contact with Mr Burke or Mr Grill. In January 2006, Dr Gallop resigned as Premier and as a member of Parliament. Mr Carpenter then became the Premier. Soon afterwards, he removed the ban from members of his government.
62 At all material times, Mr Burke and Mr Grill had represented Kelvin Waldron-Brown. Mr Waldron-Brown appears to be generally known as Kel Brown. He is the principal of a pearling business. This business has been conducted through various entities, some of which are known as Nor-West Seafoods Pty Ltd, Nor-West Pearls, West Australian Southsea Pearls or Pilbara Pearls [79].
63 Mr Brown is a small producer. The trial judge described the views of Mr Brown in relation to the pearling industry, as follows:
People like Mr Kel Brown were apparently of the view that, to remain viable producers, they needed to increase their production and, by aggressive marketing, endeavour to increase their market shares. As I understand it, the large producers were not averse to increased quotas, but argued for the maintenance of a policy which would see any increases given proportionately to existing holdings to enable them to maintain their competitive power in the local industry [120].
64 At all material times, Mr Brown had retained Mr Burke and Mr Grill to assist him in lobbying for changes to government policy in the pearling industry; in particular, to improve the prospects of Mr Brown and other small producers in remaining viable in the industry [157].
65 Mr Brown had also retained the services of John Nicholls, an economist. Mr Brown had sought Mr Nicholls' assistance in preparing a case to be put to Mr Ford with a view to obtaining an easing of the restrictions on competition in the pearling industry, and achieving a restructuring of the industry so that it was more favourable to small pearl producers. Mr Nicholls was very familiar with the pearling industry and the structures of government administering the industry. He was also well acquainted with the governmental and political processes involved in the adoption of policy and its implementation [108] - [110].
66 In early to mid-2006, Mr Burke was endeavouring to make contact with Mr Ford as part of his lobbying activities on behalf of Mr Brown. This was complicated by the existence of a personal animosity by Mr Ford towards Mr Burke. The trial judge described this animosity and Mr Burke's attempts to lobby on behalf of Mr Brown:
There is evidence that in the early part of 2006, Mr Burke was in regular contact with Ms Archer MLC. She was a member of Parliament for the mining and pastoral region, as was Mr Ford. She too had an interest in the pearling industry, on behalf of her constituents, and it is evident that Mr Burke was using his friendship with her to endeavour to arrange a meeting with Mr Ford, or otherwise to advocate the case of Burke's client, Mr Brown, and incidentally to advance the interests of the other small WA producers.
Mr Ford's evidence was that, from time to time, Ms Archer would pester him to meet with Burke, towards whom Ford had a personal animosity, such that he made it clear to Mr Hondros that those who engaged Burke as a lobbyist did themselves a disservice, in Ford's eyes, because even if their case had merit, Mr Ford would feel unable to advance it or provide a remedy if there was any prospect that Burke may be able to claim the credit for achieving that result.
The evidence shows that Burke was making efforts, through third parties, to make contact with Ford throughout the earlier part of 2006. There was a flurry of activity in May, particularly around the time of the release of the Phase III policy, and in early June, when the commercial association between the Paspaley and Kailis interests became public. There is evidence that, despite the tone of the publicly released Phase III policy, Mr Brown's contacts with the Minister enabled him to report that Mr Ford seemed sympathetic to their case. Burke had discussions with Mr Brown, Ms Archer and Grill about how best to make a case to be submitted to Ford [158] - [160].
67 By early August 2006, Mr Burke had persuaded Mr Hondros to arrange an appointment for him with Mr Ford. Mr Ford gave evidence that he agreed to meet with Mr Burke. Mr Ford hoped that if he met with Mr Burke then contact between Mr Burke and Mr Hondros would cease and Shelley Archer MLC would stop pestering him. The meeting was held on 16 August 2006 at Mr Ford's ministerial office. It was attended by Mr Ford, Mr Hondros, Mr Burke and Mr Grill [161] - [163].
68 Mr Ford said in evidence that he made no specific commitment to Mr Burke and Mr Grill at the meeting, but he did indicate that he was sympathetic to the need to structure the industry so as to permit the advancement of the interests of small producers [163].
69 Mr Ford gave evidence that in the days shortly after the meeting on 16 August 2006, Mr Hondros asked him if he could provide a copy of the Phase III policy to Mr Burke and Mr Grill. Mr Ford said that he told Mr Hondros that he could give them a copy because it had been released publicly. It appears that Mr Hondros did not in fact provide Mr Burke and Mr Grill with a copy of the document at that time. On the evidence, Mr Brown already had a copy [166].
70 On 7 September 2006, Mr Hondros sent an email to Mr Burke (exhibit 63). The email said, relevantly:
I'm still working out a way that Jon Ford can unpick the appalling parts of the current pearling regime (including issues around quota). Would I be able to quietly seek your advice on that in the near future, if that's not too much of an imposition? (BAB/GAB 457)
71 The trial judge made the following observations in relation to this passage in the email:
Two things would seem to be clear. Mr Hondros recognised that he was not supposed to have contact with Burke (it will be recalled that Mr Ford's principal reason for holding the meeting on 16 August was that there might then be no more meetings with Burke). Secondly, there would seem to be no reason to suppose that Mr Hondros's request for advice was not genuine. It seems that he was having difficulty devising an amended policy to put to the Minister to take to Cabinet, by his own efforts. I shall return to the significance of this, but one can understand his difficulty.
Mr Ford had given him the responsibility of progressing the formulation of a new pearl hatchery policy to give effect to the Minister's views. He could not get advice as to how to go about that directly from PIAC or from the PPA, because he knew the predominant industry view was not that espoused by the Minister. He knew he could not go to the Department because he was aware that the CEO, Mr Rogers, also espoused the predominant industry view. On the other hand, he knew of the interest of Burke and Grill, and that Mr Nicholls had been recruited to advise and support Brown's case [172] - [173].
72 On 26 September 2006, Mr Burke requested Mr Nicholls to send him a short and simple policy that might be adopted by Mr Ford. On 28 September 2006, Mr Nicholls sent Mr Burke a document. The essence of the policy embodied in the document was this:
The allocation of additional future hatchery shell entitlement and seeding rights will be:
(a) administered to provide, as a priority, a basis for a viable future operation among the small entitlement holding producers in this State under likely prospective market conditions and for encouraging participation by the indigenous community; and
(b) granted so as to not add unnecessarily to industry costs in the face of increasing overseas competition (BAB/GAB 503).
73 On 3 October 2006, Mr Grill sent Mr Nicholls' draft policy document to Mr Hondros. At the time, Mr Burke was absent from Perth. Mr Grill offered to meet with Mr Hondros upon Mr Burke's return to Perth to discuss the draft [177].
74 Mr Hondros accepted this offer. On 5 October 2006, he telephoned Mr Grill [178]. The conversation, which was intercepted and recorded by investigators with the Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC), was, relevantly, as follows:
HONDROS: ... Mate uhm I'd love to catch up uhm early next week if I could.
GRILL: Great.
HONDROS: Uhm.
GRILL: Where do you want to do it, up at my place, down at your office?
HONDROS: I wouldn't mind coming to see you guys just
GRILL: ... good.
HONDROS: I know that uhm, er, you know, my boss will, if we could do it sometime Monday when my boss is in cabinet it would be sort of a bit easier for me uhm you know save explaining what I'm up to, if you know what I mean so.
GRILL: Good.
HONDROS: Uhm.
GRILL: So uhm, I think we could probably do it at ten thirty.
HONDROS: Ten thirty sounds good, I'm down at er Fisheries at nine for er for a briefing on a separate matter so ten thirty might, might slot in perfectly.
GRILL: Great.
...
HONDROS: Okay I'll be able to give you a run down of er where I'm up to, also where I'm up to with er, with [Jon] so uhm
GRILL: Great.
HONDROS: [It's], [it's] positive but tricky, I think is the best way to er, to look at it, yeah. Okay, mate.
GRILL: Great, see you then.
HONDROS: Look forward to seeing you there (BAB/GAB 522 - 525).
75 Accordingly, arrangements were made for Mr Hondros to meet with Mr Burke and Mr Grill at Mr Grill's home in Perth, on 9 October 2006 at 10.30 am.
76 Mr Hondros made a note in his diary to the effect that on 9 October 2006 he had a 'Private Appointment (Doctor)' between 10.30 am and 11.00 am.
77 Mr Hondros met with Mr Burke and Mr Grill, as arranged. The conversation was intercepted and recorded by investigators with the CCC [181].
78 At the meeting, Mr Hondros informed Mr Burke and Mr Grill of the current status of the draft Phase III policy and why amending the policy to improve the position of small producers in relation to the allocation of quotas was 'possible but hard':
BURKE Mate what do you think about this pearling business, Julian sent me a note saying it's possible but hard?
HONDROS Ah possible but hard, should I give you a run down where I'm,
BURKE Yeah.
HONDROS I think I'm up to? Ah I think [Jon] is ah turned around to the point where he sees the, the sense in the argument that if he proceeds down the path he's proceeding down it's gunna damage ah, you know the small producers in the industry and ah you know the quality of the, the WA you know side of the,
BURKE Yeah
HONDROS of the bargain. Ah he's got ah, he's he's got a number, a number of problems in front of him. Firstly, his first problem that he thinks err what he's got, Roger's pushing hard for the alternative, he's got uhm the industry on his pearling industry advisory committee pushing hard, ah for, what they've proposed in the legislation, uhm, and he's got ah, ah you know he's got ah, I guess an imperative that comes out of the Premier's Office, and from the Premier to not create any fuss or stink about anything what so ever. That er, that's holding him back. Ah, all on top of that err he's made a ah, you know he's made a statement to industry regardless of you know what he said I think in the meeting ah with you and Julian, that he will endorse the hatchery policy ah and uhm look at putting it in legislation. Ah that was, that was sometime ago. Ah since then the industry's had its restructure and Kailis and Paspaley are working closer together ... (BAB/GAB 581).
79 Mr Grill suggested at the meeting that they look at the draft Phase III policy, as endorsed by Mr Ford, and see 'how with a few words' the policy could be changed to accommodate the interests of the small producers. The following exchange occurred:
HONDROS Yeah. Do you think uhm, do you think it's ah it's ah step too far, and they'd sniff it out too quickly if you if you make it indigenous interests and you know for the interests of the industry or?
GRILL I think we've got to make it a bit wider. What I was going to suggest is we ah actually have a look at the hatchery policy that he's
HONDROS Yeah.
GRILL informally endorsed.
HONDROS Yeah.
GRILL And just see how with a few words
HONDROS Yeah.
BURKE we can change
HONDROS I can get a copy of that.
BURKE Yeah that's a good idea Julian.
GRILL Would you send that?
BURKE Would you send that to Julian?
HONDROS Absolutely. Absolutely (BAB/GAB 585 - 586).
80 A little later at the meeting, there was discussion about how the draft Phase III policy might be approved by Cabinet after it had been amended by Mr Burke and Mr Grill:
HONDROS [I]t's, it's a matter of how to unpick it and frame it so he can actually get it right.
BURKE I reckon what happens is this, that when you get the decision from Rogers, it comes to you, Julian will look and I'll look at the guidelines that you send us.
HONDROS Yeah.
BURKE We'll send them back to you
HONDROS Mm hm
BURKE Then you take those to cabinet after [Jon's], don't send them back to Rogers
HONDROS No no I won't
BURKE Just take them straight to cabinet and let cabinet endorse them and then if the industry wants to kick up a fuss, it has to then do two things.
HONDROS Mm mm
BURKE Argue about the
HONDROS Yep.
BURKE content of the guidelines but secondly
HONDROS Yeah.
BURKE throw back in every cabinet minister's face that he or she made a wrong decision.
HONDROS Yes.
BURKE And once you get it through
HONDROS Yeah.
BURKE they're not going to want to do that, cos no one likes to admit they're wrong.
HONDROS That's right, (laughs) especially cabinet, yeah.
GRILL Yes.
HONDROS Okay, that's a great idea.
BURKE So I, if you can get that to us, it will be changed imperceptibly I reckon.
HONDROS Yeah
BURKE And then the other thing is this, if Jon doesn't want to, he needn't.
HONDROS Mm mm
BURKE So if he doesn't want to give x y z or Kel Brown or Bill Smith additional quota he doesn't have to but he's got the authority to do it if he judges he should.
HONDROS Yeah (BAB/GAB 587 - 589).
81 During this discussion Mr Burke referred to 'Rogers'. At all material times, Peter Rogers was the chief executive officer of the Department of Fisheries.
82 Towards the end of the meeting, Mr Burke summarised what had been agreed upon:
BURKE Alright mate that's good. Thanks for your time with that and if you can get that policy to Jul, guidelines to Julian, we'll do em and send it back to you and make it as imperceptible as possible. But I wouldn't then just send it back to Rogers or anywhere else.
HONDROS No that's a great idea. I'm gunna uhm, I've asked the question about when they'll be translated into ah guidelines and we'll just take the guidelines to, Cabinet.
BURKE And change what we want yeah. Goodo.
HONDROS You know, which is unusual but they won't know about it before we do it.
BURKE Not at all.
HONDROS And they've plenty of chance to be consulted prior to whatever.
BURKE Oh yeah, yeah, No I think it's very fair, and it, I can tell you from my own experience that there's plenty of precedent. Happened lots of times when I was Premier.
HONDROS Mm mm (BAB/GAB 593).
83 As the meeting was finishing, the following exchange occurred:
BURKE And, when d'you reckon these guidelines'll go up?
HONDROS Ah, I'd say they, they're preparing them now I think but, I I think they've got the ah, ah they've got the accelerator off pending, a decision from [Jon] on the legislation. So I will, I'll get em to proceed with the guidelines.
BURKE Quicker the better.
HONDROS quicker the better, uhm, and ah, y'know
GRILL So in that context do, do we need to tweak the guidelines or tweak the policy?
HONDROS Ah oh look I'll shoot through to you the uhm, the policy
GRILL Yeah.
HONDROS that'll, that'll give you an understanding about where
GRILL Right.
HONDROS it'll merge in the guidelines, as soon as the guidelines appear anyway.
GRILL Okay mate.
BURKE But the guidelines must be in the legislation anyway.
HONDROS No. No no, their their plan is to say, ah, you take the, take hatchery policy, that'll uhm, that'll create the, provisions in the, in the guideline, and moving from there they'll become legislation (BAB/GAB 597 - 598).
84 On 9 October 2006, after the meeting with Mr Hondros, Mr Burke sent an email to Mr Brown, with a copy to Mr Nicholls and Mr Grill. In the email, Mr Burke said, relevantly:
Julian and I had a good meeting with Nathan Hondros today.
Nathan will be forwarding the Draft guidelines for the Hatchery Policy to Julian with an understanding that Julian and I will advise on how they might be amended to protect and enhance small producers.
You might like to ring Julian for further details (BAB/GAB 599).
85 On 10 October 2006, Mr Hondros requested Joanne Kennedy, who at that time was the Principal Management Officer (Pearling) at the Department of Fisheries, to send him an electronic version of the draft Phase III policy. She sent Mr Hondros an email on that date to which she attached the latest draft. Ms Kennedy's email reads:
As expected, PIAC considered the Phase III Hatchery Policy again on Friday. The main aim of these discussions was to amend the policy document to make it consistent with the separation of fishing and first operation seeding rights as proposed in the PMB drafting instructions. These amendments don't effect the essence of the policy. They do however greatly simplify its implementation.
I am currently in the process of finalising the required amendments with PIAC members. The finalised version will be sent to the Minister in the near future, but in the meantime I have attached the document currently being considered by the Committee.
Please note that as some minor changes may still be necessary before the final document is sent to the Minister by the PIAC Chair, it would be desirable for this version not to be released publicly (BAB/GAB 601).
86 As mentioned above, at the material time, Ms Kennedy attended meetings of PIAC as an observer and provided the committee with information and advice, as required, in respect of its deliberations on agenda items (ts 586).
87 On 11 October 2006, Mr Hondros sent an email to Mr Grill, to which he attached the latest draft Phase III policy forwarded by Ms Kennedy. Mr Hondros's email states:
As discussed, please find attached the latest incarnation of the Phase III Hatchery Policy, as prepared by PIAC and the Department of Fisheries (BAB/GAB 687).
88 On 26 October 2006, Mr Grill sent an email to Mr Nicholls, with a copy to Mr Brown and Mr Burke, which reads:
Here is the lastest [sic] draft of the Hatchery Policy. I was going to have a look at them on the weekend to ascertain how we could subtly amend them to meet our objectives.
Your input would be very much appreciated.
Naturally, this must be kept in confidence (BAB/GAB 687).
89 On 30 October 2006, Mr Grill telephoned Mr Nicholls. The conversation was intercepted and recorded by the CCC. During the conversation, the following exchange occurred about 'subtly amending' the latest draft Phase III policy and ensuring that the draft, with the 'subtle amendments', was not returned to anyone but the Minister:
GRILL: Yeah, I think we, we should address it but I'd think our job, you and I, if we could just sit down and just see how we can gently amend the guidelines um to um change it so that it's acceptable to our client. Um there's a chance we can get an amended document up but I think the um changes need to be fairly subtle.
NICHOLLS: Yeah.
GRILL: Does that make any sense to you?
NICHOLLS: Yeah, it does. Wonder what impact subtlety is going have unless the ...
GRILL: Well it probably won't go back to that group.
NICHOLLS: Decision makers seize on it that's all.
GRILL: It probably won't get back to that group if we can work it properly. It's just something for the Minister.
NICHOLLS: Yeah.
GRILL: But I don't see that a, the industry should be taken out of his hands and that's what that document does.
NICHOLLS: Absolutely. I'm surprised the Minister's surrender.
GRILL: Yeah.
NICHOLLS: Yeah all over to you Paspaley. You tell me what you want.
GRILL: Yeah (BAB/GAB 690).
90 On 7 November 2006, Mr Grill met with Mr Nicholls. Their conversation was recorded by the CCC. They discussed possible amendments to the latest draft Phase III policy.
91 On 13 November 2006, Mr Grill sent Mr Burke, Mr Brown and Mr Nicholls a note he wanted to give 'to Government' in relation to the draft Phase III policy. He also sent a copy of the draft policy itself, which incorporated 'the very modest changes that [Mr Nicholls] and I agreed to recommend' to the draft.
92 The proposed changes incorporated by Mr Grill in the version forwarded by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros (and subsequently sent by Mr Hondros to Mr Grill) were, relevantly, as follows:
Policy includes:
1.1 No new licences - except where a person or corporate entity acquires quota from an existing quota holder. There is no barrier to entry for new entrants into the pearling industry as the secondary market exists and functions well.
1.2 Changes to legislation to ensure that all future allocations are pro rata equitable, and in accordance with past history of the industry and administratively allocated in line with the existing first operation seeding rights held.
1.3 Industry to have a formal role in of advising on timing and allocation of quota. The details of business rules would need to be determined by the Minister after consultation with industry (BAB/GAB 807).
93 As the trial judge noted in relation to Mr Grill's changes:
It can be seen that the changes were directed to remove the final control of allocation of quota units from the pro rata process and from the industry and to vest it again in the discretionary powers of the Minister [200].
A debate then ensued, principally between Messrs Grill and Nicholls, with occasional comments by Mr Burke. All the email exchanges were copied to Mr Brown. The nature of the debate is really immaterial for present purposes. It is fair to say that Mr Nicholls continued to wish to run economic arguments against the policy, which he thought had been deliberately ignored by PIAC and the Department because they were contrary to the position adopted in the Phase III policy document.
Finally, on 21 November, Mr Brown sent by facsimile to Mr Hondros a covering note and the letter which Mr Grill had earlier drawn up, containing the critique of the Phase III policy document. Mr Brown said that he, later on the same day, organised for Mr Schaap, in his office, to send Mr Hondros, by email, the electronic version of the Phase III policy marked up with Mr Grill's proposed changes (exhibits 134 and 135) [201] - [202].
95 Mr Brown's facsimile transmission of 21 November 2006, referred to by the trial judge, was marked for the attention of Mr Hondros. The subject matter of the transmission was described as 'Hatchery Policy "Pearling"'. The facsimile reads, relevantly:
Dear Nathan,
Please find attached a covering letter on my thoughts on the future direction of the above, the full document will be forwarded by e'mail.
I would also like to arrange a time to meet with you at your convenience along with John Nicholls.
I am quite alarmed at the prospect of losing control of 'our' pearling industry to interests based in the Northern Territory (BAB/GAB 953).
96 His Honour noted that in a telephone conversation between Mr Grill and Mr Brown on 22 November 2006, Mr Grill was 'keen to be sure' that Mr Hondros was aware that he [Mr Grill] was the author of the proposed changes to the draft policy and that these changes were made as a result of 'previous conversations' between Mr Grill and Mr Hondros [202].
97 The trial judge recorded the conclusion of the scenario, as follows:
The evidence indicates that the debate, particularly between Grill and Nicholls, continued in the dying weeks of 2006. I can see no evidence that the letter from Brown to Hondros was taken any further, and there is certainly no evidence that Mr Ford was asked to do anything with the Phase III policy document which was returned to Hondros. Mr Ford seems to have been unaware of its existence until during the investigation of this matter [203].
The organisation of the balance of these reasons
98 It is convenient, first, to examine the appeal in relation to count 1, then count 3, next count 2 and, finally, count 4. I will then deal with a notice of contention filed by Mr Hondros and a submission made about the 'proviso' in s 33(2a) of the Criminal Appeals Act.
99 Counts 1 and 3 have a common feature in that each alleges a contravention of s 81(2) of the Code.
100 Counts 2 and 4 have a common feature in that each alleges a contravention of s 83(c) of the Code.
101 The elements of the offence alleged against Mr Hondros in count 1, being an alleged contravention of s 81(2) of the Code, are:
(a) At the material time, was Mr Hondros a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1)?
(b) If 'yes' to par (a), did Mr Hondros disclose 'official information', as defined in s 81(1), that is, were the contents of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz 'official information'?
(c) If 'yes' to par (b), was the disclosure an 'unauthorised disclosure', within par (a) of the definition of that term in s 81(1), in that Mr Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure?
(d) If 'yes' to par (c), did Mr Hondros make the disclosure 'without lawful authority', within s 81(2)?
102 It is unnecessary, in this appeal, to decide whether an accused who has been charged with a contravention of s 81(2) bears any evidential onus in relation to whether the information in question was published with 'lawful authority'. Similarly, it is unnecessary, in this appeal, to determine the proper construction of the phrase 'without lawful authority' or the relationship between that concept and s 31 of the Code. As I will recount, the trial judge found, in the present case, that there was no evidence to suggest that if the disclosure of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz was an 'unauthorised disclosure', it was made other than 'without lawful authority'.
103 The State gave particulars of the counts in the indictment.
104 The particulars given of the allegation in count 1 that Mr Hondros disclosed the letter to Mr Burke 'without lawful authority' were as follows:
As a ministerial officer Mr Hondros was obliged to comply with the requirements of the Public Sector Management Act 1994, which Act required Mr Hondros to comply with the Department of Premier and Cabinet's Code of Conduct. The Code precluded disclosing the contents of any internal reports or documents to unauthorised persons, or the giving to unauthorised persons of information relating to the business of a Department or other government agency.
In February 2006 Mr Hondros was directed by [Mr Ford] that he was not to have contact with Brian Burke or Julian Grill, or to organise meetings with them, without the Minister's permission.
Mr Hondros received no authorisation from the Minister to provide Mr Burke with a copy of the Minister's letter to Senator Abetz (BAB/GAB 73).
105 The particulars given of the allegation in count 1 that the disclosure was an 'unauthorised disclosure', in that Mr Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure, were identical to the particulars given of the allegation that the disclosure was made 'without lawful authority'.
Count 1: the trial judge's construction of s 81 of the Code: the duty not to make disclosure
106 The trial judge construed s 81 of the Code for the purpose of determining the nature and source of the duty not to make disclosure which is referred to in the definition of 'unauthorised disclosure'.
107 His Honour referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in The State of Tasmania v Johnston [2009] TASSC 60; (2009) 197 A Crim R 152, as follows:
In Tasmania v Johnston [2009] TASSC 60, Evans J had to deal with a case where the Tasmanian Commissioner of Police was charged with disclosing official secrets to the then Premier, Mr Lennon. The charges were brought under s 110 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code which is the equivalent of s 81 of our Code. At [52] his Honour made the useful observation that the question in that case was whether the sections of the relevant legislation relied upon by the prosecution to establish the duty not to disclose, 'impose a duty, the breach of which has criminal consequences for the purposes of the Code, s 110, as distinct from disciplinary requirements of the nature of functions of office.' In other words, one must not overlook the fact that in relation to s 81, the duty not to disclose should be of a kind, breach of which may properly attract the sanction of punishment by the criminal law [37]. (emphasis added)
His Honour said that he accepted that 'that is the law' [38].
[U]nless it is right to consider that the disclosure was, in the circumstances, punishable as a crime, there can be no duty not to disclose the information within the meaning of s 81 of the Code, even though the disclosure may be of a kind which is punishable by disciplinary processes concerned with the accused's office or employment [38]. (emphasis added)
109 Next, his Honour made this reference to other observations of Evans J in The State of Tasmania v Johnston:
At [62] and [65] [Evans J] also drew attention to the fact that in that case the duty of non-disclosure under the relevant legislative enactments was discretionary in character, importing a judgment as to the appropriateness of the disclosure. That was a factor, his Honour thought, in considering whether there was, in the particular circumstances, a duty not to disclose the information [39].
110 The trial judge expressed the view that a duty not to disclose 'official information', as defined in s 81(1), may be derived from the express instruction of the accused's superior to keep particular information secret, 'in the sense that it must not be disclosed' [41]. His Honour thought that the accused's superior, for this purpose, included a person whose directions the accused was contractually bound to obey, 'provided those instructions themselves were made lawfully' [41].
[A] duty not to make a disclosure may be derived from the terms of the law applicable to the circumstances of the proposed disclosure, or from the lawful direction of a superior authority not to make the disclosure of particular information, the subject of the direction. Further, I see no reason why the direction could not be to prohibit disclosure to nominated individuals: cf Cortis v The Queen [1979] WAR 30 [42].
112 Finally, in this context, the trial judge emphasised that s 81 is concerned with information as distinct from a 'record'. In particular, it is 'the information which must come within the definition of official information and it is the disclosure of information which must be unauthorised so as to constitute the commission of the offence' [44].
Count 1: the trial judge's construction of s 81 of the Code: 'without lawful authority'
113 The trial judge said that a disclosure which is unauthorised, in either of the senses he had discussed, may nevertheless be made 'with lawful authority' in the circumstances set out in s 31 of the Code [45]. His Honour set out s 31 as currently enacted, rather than s 31 as in force at the material time, but nothing turns on this error.
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if he does or omits to do the act under any of the following circumstances, that is to say -
(1) In execution of the law;
(2) In obedience to the order of a competent authority which he is bound by law to obey, unless the order is manifestly unlawful;
(3) When the act is reasonably necessary in order to resist actual and unlawful violence threatened to him, or to another person in his presence;
(4) When he does or omits to do the act in order to save himself from immediate death or grievous bodily harm threatened to be inflicted upon him by some person actually present and in a position to execute the threats, and believing himself to be unable otherwise to escape the carrying of the threats into execution;
But this protection does not extend to an act or omission which would constitute an offence punishable with strict security life imprisonment, or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who has, by entering into an unlawful association or conspiracy, rendered himself liable to have such threats made to him.
Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a question of law.
115 His Honour expressed the view that the effect of s 81 and s 31 of the Code, read together, was this:
A particular disclosure might be unauthorised because, by the operation of the law or in accordance with instructions given by a superior authority, there exists a duty not to make the disclosure [46].
On the other hand, if the disclosure was itself in the execution of a different law, conflicting with the general duty not to make the disclosure, or was in obedience to the order of a competent authority countermanding the earlier instruction, which itself was not manifestly unlawful, then, under s 31, the accused would not be criminally responsible for the unauthorised disclosure, which would properly be held to have been made with lawful authority.
It is, of course, because s 31 prevents the accused being held to be criminally responsible for the conduct in question, that it is an element of the offence to be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution that the unauthorised disclosure was made without lawful authority. However, as I have mentioned, in the case of neither of the offences alleged in count 1 or in count 3, is there is [sic] any suggestion of lawful authority. Indeed, the issue in the case of both of the offences charged in count 1 and count 3 of the indictment is whether Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure with which the count is concerned [47] - [48].
Count 1: the trial judge's findings in relation to the material facts and circumstances
117 The 'unauthorised disclosure' was alleged to have occurred on 25 September 2006 when Mr Hondros sent to Mr Burke by email a copy of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz.
118 As I have mentioned, Mr Hondros was a ministerial officer. He was employed under contract in Mr Ford's office as his chief of staff [56]. As chief of staff, Mr Hondros provided services for Mr Ford, in the course of Mr Ford's official duties, and he therefore provided services for the State [56]. The trial judge was satisfied that, at the material time, Mr Hondros was a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1) of the Code [33], [56].
119 The letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz contained information which came into Mr Hondros's possession because he was a government contractor; that is, Mr Ford's chief of staff [57]. Mr Hondros received the letter by email from his personal assistant, Ms Comrie [57]. His Honour was satisfied that Mr Hondros disclosed 'official information', as defined in s 81(1) of the Code [33], [57].
120 The trial judge found that there was no evidence to suggest that if the disclosure of the letter was an 'unauthorised disclosure', as defined in s 81(1), it was made 'other than without lawful authority', within s 81(2) [58]. That is, if the disclosure was an 'unauthorised disclosure', Mr Hondros did not have any 'lawful authority' to make the disclosure [33]. No law required disclosure, and the disclosure was not made on Mr Ford's instructions. Indeed, his Honour found that, on the evidence, it was made without Mr Ford's knowledge and entirely on Mr Hondros's own initiative [58].
121 According to his Honour, the critical question was whether the disclosure of the letter was an 'unauthorised disclosure'; that is, did the letter contain information which Mr Hondros was under a duty not to disclose? [59]
Count 1: the trial judge's construction of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct
122 At the material time, par 3.8 of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet's Code of Conduct (the Code of Conduct) read:
3.8 Confidentiality
In the course of official duties, Department employees will have access to information classified as restricted or confidential information. Classified information must be captured and stored in approved records systems with appropriate security and access controls applied. Employees dealing with highly sensitive material may be required to sign confidentiality agreements.
Classified information may only be used in the course of official duties or for other lawful purposes eg under the requirements of Freedom of Information Act 1992. In general, employees are not to disclose classified information nor use information for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was retained. Improper disclosure includes any of the following:
Section 81 of the Criminal Code makes it illegal for a public official to disclose confidential information, and prohibits employees of the public service from publishing or communicating any fact or document that came to their knowledge or possession by virtue of their office and which it is their duty to keep confidential (BAB/GAB 1053 - 1054).
123 The Code of Conduct was developed under s 21(1) of the Public Sector Management Act. By s 21(1)(c), the functions of the Commissioner for Public Sector Standards are, relevantly, to assist public sector bodies to develop, amend or repeal codes of conduct setting out minimum standards of conduct and integrity to be complied with by themselves and their employees, and to monitor compliance with those codes.
124 The trial judge expressed the view that par 3.8 was 'badly drafted' [208]. After recounting what he perceived to be the deficiencies in the drafting, his Honour said:
In my opinion, the best that can be said for par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct is that, for present purposes, I should treat it as imposing a duty not to disclose information to persons who may, by the application of undefined criteria, be judged not to be persons who are authorised to receive the information. While the paragraph refers to s 81 of the Criminal Code, it does not attempt to define the relationship between a 'duty' expressed in those terms, and a duty not to disclose information which would be recognised for the purpose of deciding whether a person has committed an offence against s 81. Nor, I note, does par 3.8 refer to s 83 of the Criminal Code [213].
Count 1: the trial judge's view of the express instructions by Mr Ford not to make disclosure of information
125 The trial judge was of the view that 'a duty not to disclose information for the purpose of s 81 (and, incidentally, in this case, for the purpose of s 83) may be derived from the express instruction of the accused's superior not to make a disclosure of the information, within the meaning of s 81, either generally or to specified persons' [214].
126 Mr Ford gave evidence to the effect that he informed Mr Hondros and other members of his staff that they were not to contact Mr Burke or Mr Grill. His Honour recorded the evidence of Mr Ford, Ms Comrie and Dennis Liddelow, Mr Ford's appointments secretary, as follows:
Mr Ford gave an instruction about meeting with Burke and Grill after the Premier, Mr Carpenter, had told his ministers that the ban on contact with Burke and Grill which, during the period when Mr Gallop was Premier, had been imposed on ministers and their staff, was to be lifted. Mr Ford's evidence was that he gathered his staff together, including Mr Hondros, and told them that no matter what announcement was made by Mr Carpenter, the ban would remain in effect, in his office.
His evidence was that he said to his staff that if they met with Burke or Grill, without his permission and knowledge, and he found out about it, he would dismiss them. If any staff member met with them by accident, eg, if they turned up at a meeting uninvited, and the staff member did not inform Mr Ford and he found out about it, again he would dismiss them (ts 237). It has to be said that it is not abundantly clear that meeting with Burke and Grill was the same as having any contact with them. In re-examination he was also asked about the instruction he gave:
'So far as the direction that you had given in relation to contact with Mr Burke and Mr Grill was concerned, how did you regard that?---You weren't allowed to go out and have contact with Burke and Grill. In the first part of my ministry it was still under the Gallop government, and so that was the Premier's rule. When that was lifted, I sought to maintain Geoff's rule by imposing it myself on the office.'
I have mentioned Ms Comrie. In the early part of 2006, she was Mr Hondros's personal assistant. At ts 659, she gave evidence that Mr Ford's instructions were:
'that it didn't matter what Premier Carpenter had said, that no-one in his office was to have contact with Brian Burke or Julian Grill. He said that if you were found to be contacting them, that you would be sacked and that there was no coming back from that position. He also said that if they contacted you unsolicited that you were to let him know immediately (ts 659 and see also ts 668).'
The evidence of Mr Liddelow, the appointments officer, in relation to this matter was much less positive. He said that to the best of his recollection there were two meetings when the matter of Messrs Burke and Grill was broached by the Minister. On both occasions he gave the same instruction, that no-one was to meet with Burke and Grill. Mr Liddelow could not recall Mr Ford giving any reason for that direction (ts 682). When cross-examined, he repeated that evidence and said that it was not his recollection that Mr Ford said that there was a ban on staff making contact with or receiving contact from Mr Grill or Mr Burke without his permission.
When it was put to the witness that that is what he had said when he made a statement during the investigation, he agreed that what had been said by Mr Ford in about September 2006 was a reiteration of the previous instruction that there was a blanket ban on staff making contact with or receiving contact from Mr Grill or Mr Burke without his permission (ts 684 - 687). Mr Liddelow conceded that his recollection about those matters was not good.
For my part, I would find it difficult [to] rely upon evidence given by Mr Liddelow as an unsupported recollection of the events of 2006, but given the nature of the application that I should conclude that the accused persons have no case to answer, I should, I think, proceed upon the basis that the best view of the evidence of these three witnesses was that Mr Ford instructed generally that no member of his staff was to seek out or receive contact from Messrs Burke and Grill without his permission, and that Mr Ford said that if such contact should occur uninvited, they were to tell the Minister what had happened [216] - [221].
127 Accordingly, the trial judge found that the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, was that Mr Ford had given a general instruction that no member of his staff was to seek out or receive contact from Mr Burke or Mr Grill without Mr Ford's permission and that if such contact occurred uninvited, his staff were to tell him what had happened.
Count 1: the trial judge's conclusion in relation to whether there was an unauthorised disclosure
128 The trial judge's reasoning in relation to the relevance and significance of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct was this:
In my opinion, the disclosure by Hondros to Burke on behalf of Scimone and Triantafyllou of the fact that the Minister was seeking access on behalf of State licensed fishers to the Commonwealth's 'Securing Our Fishing Future' package was, at best, the disclosure of only technically confidential official information. The evidence does not establish that it was classified information within the meaning of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct. Putting the prosecution case at its highest, it might perhaps be the case that the information of which count 1, as particularised, makes complaint could be regarded as information relating to the business of the Fisheries Department, or as information contained in a document which was 'internal' only in the sense that it was a letter written by one minister for fisheries to another.
But in my opinion, it is not open to conclude that, having regard to the fact that Messrs Scimone and Triantafyllou and their claims for compensation were subjects of the correspondence, and having regard to the fact that Mr Burke was acting for them, the disclosure to Mr Burke was to an unauthorised person, within the meaning of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct. This was not a disclosure to the world at large. Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou were entitled to know what efforts the Minister for Fisheries was making on their behalf, and what he was doing about their claims. Mr Burke was entitled to receive that information for them [225] - [226]. (emphasis added)
129 Next, his Honour turned his attention to the relevance and significance of Mr Ford's instruction to Mr Hondros not to contact Mr Burke or Mr Grill:
The question then would be whether, putting it at its highest, Mr Ford's instruction not to have contact with Burke may ground a relevant duty not to disclose the information. By itself, I think not. Mr Burke made the request to be told what progress was being made with the claims of Scimone and Triantafyllou. There was no meeting in any relevant sense, and Mr Ford's instruction to his staff accepted that they may receive approaches of this kind from Mr Burke. If Mr Hondros was in breach of that instruction, it was only because he did not tell Mr Ford that he had sent the email which is the subject of count 1 [227]. (emphasis added)
130 His Honour then expressed his conclusion on the critical issue relating to count 1:
If Mr Ford's instruction, with or without assistance from the terms of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct, may be the source of a duty not to disclose information, which I doubt, then it is not a duty of non-disclosure, breach of which should be held to expose a person to punishment for the commission of a crime. On no view of the evidence could Mr Hondros's guilt of the offence charged by count 1 in the indictment be established beyond reasonable doubt [228]. (emphasis added)
131 The trial judge therefore decided that Mr Hondros had no case to answer on count 1 and that a judgment of acquittal should be entered on that count.
132 It is unnecessary to reproduce the grounds of appeal that attack the trial judge's conclusion in relation to count 1. It is sufficient to note that the grounds allege, in essence, that:
(a) The trial judge's decision as to the nature and source of the duty not to make disclosure, referred to in the definition of 'unauthorised disclosure' in s 81(1) of the Code, was erroneous.
(b) His Honour's construction of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct was erroneous.
(c) Mr Ford's instruction, together with the terms of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct, may be the source of a duty not to make disclosure of information, and his Honour's doubt about this proposition was erroneous.
(d) His Honour's decision that any duty not to make disclosure of information (arising from Mr Ford's instruction together with the terms of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct) is not a duty the breach of which should be held to expose a person to punishment for the commission of a crime, was erroneous.
(e) His Honour's decision that, taking the State's case at its highest, the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz was, at best, merely 'technically confidential official information', and not 'classified information', within par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct was erroneous.
(f) His Honour's decision that, taking the State's case at its highest, the disclosure by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz was not a disclosure by Mr Hondros to an 'unauthorised person', within par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct, was erroneous.
Count 1: matters not in issue in the appeal
133 As I have mentioned, the trial judge found that, at the material time, Mr Hondros was a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1). Mr Hondros challenges that finding in his notice of contention.
134 Also, as I have mentioned, his Honour found that it was open to conclude that the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz contained information which came into Mr Hondros's possession because he was a government contractor and that Mr Hondros's disclosure of this information to Mr Burke was a disclosure of 'official information', as defined in s 81(1). These findings (apart from the finding that Mr Hondros was a government contractor) are not challenged in the appeal.
135 Further, as I have mentioned, his Honour found that there was no evidence to suggest that if the disclosure of the letter was an 'unauthorised disclosure', as defined in s 81(1), it was made other than 'without lawful authority', within s 81(2). This finding is not challenged in the appeal.
Count 1: was there a case to answer at the close of the State's case?
136 Section 81 of the Code, as originally enacted in 1902, replicated s 86 of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld).
Any person who, being employed in the Public Service, publishes or communicates any fact which comes to his knowledge by virtue of his office and which it is his duty to keep secret, or any document which comes to his possession by virtue of his office and which it is his duty to keep secret, except to some person to whom he is bound to publish or communicate it, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for 2 years. (emphasis added)
138 No amendment of substance was made to s 81, as originally enacted, before it was repealed and replaced pursuant to the Criminal Code Amendment Act 2004 (WA).
139 Section 81, as originally enacted, was considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Cortis v The Queen [1979] WAR 30. The salient facts were these. The appellant was found guilty, after a trial in the District Court, on a charge that alleged that 'you, being the person employed in the Public Service as a clerk in the State Housing Commission communicated to one Brian Thomas Burke the facts contained in certain documents addressed to the Honourable Minister for Housing from the general manager of the State Housing Commission ... which facts had ... come to your knowledge by virtue of your office and which it was your duty to keep secret, by causing copies of the said documents to be delivered to the said Brian Thomas Burke who was not a person to whom you were bound to communicate such facts'. The appellant appealed against his conviction. The critical issue on the appeal was the meaning to be ascribed to the words 'which it is his duty to keep secret' appearing in s 81.
The duty spoken of is not laid upon a member of the Public Service by any provision to be found within the Criminal Code. The Crown's case was that the duty was imposed upon the appellant as a member of the Public Service by reg 40 of the Public Service Regulations made by the Governor in the exercise of the power granted to him by s 77(1) of the Public Service Act and more specifically by par (h) of that sub-section. That regulation so far as is now relevant is in these terms:-
(a) ...
(b) disclose the contents of any official papers or documents that have been supplied to him or seen by him in the course of his official duty as an officer or otherwise,
except in the course of his official duty and with the express permission of the Head of the Sub-department or the Permanent Head of the Department of which he is employed (31).' (emphasis added)
141 The Chief Justice rejected submissions made on behalf of the appellant to the effect that:
(a) the 'duty to keep secret' referred to in s 81 can only exist with reference to facts within a document which 'were not known to the world at large, ... intimate information for the Housing Commission alone and that unless the jury was satisfied with this the charge could not be found to be proved' (31); and
(b) the 'duty to keep secret' arises not from the application to the public servant of reg 40 of the Public Service Regulations but by reason of the nature of the facts and the circumstances under which they came to his knowledge (31).
[T]_h_e duty placed upon the appellant not to disclose was, when expressed in positive terms, a duty to 'keep secret' within the meaning of s 81 of the Criminal Code and it is a duty laid upon a public servant by reg 40 of the Public Service Regulations with reference to 'all documents that have been supplied to him or seen by him in the course of his official duty as an officer or otherwise' and it is laid upon him without regard to the nature of the contents of the document and without regard to the particular circumstances under which the facts came to his knowledge or the document came into his possession (32). (emphasis added)
143 The Chief Justice said, however, that the question which he had answered was one of such importance as to call for the attention of the Parliament 'either to confirm and to put beyond doubt the position as I have expressed it in these reasons or to qualify it as it might think fit' (32).
144 In the event, no amendment of substance was made to s 81 before 2004, when it was repealed and replaced.
145 I have set out at [30] above the provisions of s 81 as currently enacted and in force at the material time.
146 Section 81, as originally enacted, applied to persons employed in the Public Service. It did not apply to persons who were contracted to the State, but not employed in the Public Service. A comparison of the text of s 81, as originally enacted, with the text of s 81, as currently enacted, indicates that the purpose or object of the Parliament in repealing and replacing the provision was to extend the operation of the prohibition against disclosure so that it applied to 'government contractors' and, incidentally, to restate the provision in the modern drafting style and language. This apparent purpose or object is confirmed by the second reading speech of the Attorney General and the explanatory memorandum in relation to the Criminal Code Amendment Bill 2003 (WA). See Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 April 2003, page 6170; explanatory memorandum, cl 66, page 17.
147 Section 81(2), as currently enacted, which creates the offence of disclosing official secrets, contains several terms that are defined in s 81(1).
148 As McHugh J noted in Kelly v The Queen [2004] HCA 12; (2004) 218 CLR 216, the function of a definition is not to enact substantive law, but to provide aid in construing the statute [103]. His Honour added:
Nothing is more likely to defeat the intention of the legislature than to give a definition a narrow, literal meaning and then use that meaning to negate the evident policy or purpose of a substantive enactment. There is, of course, always a question whether the definition is expressly or impliedly excluded. But once it is clear that the definition applies, the better - I think the only proper - course is to read the words of the definition into the substantive enactment and then construe the substantive enactment - in its extended or confined sense - in its context and bearing in mind its purpose and the mischief that it was designed to overcome. To construe the definition before its text has been inserted into the fabric of the substantive enactment invites error as to the meaning of the substantive enactment [103].
149 After the definitions in s 81(1), as currently enacted, which are material to the appeal are, to the extent relevant for present purposes, incorporated in s 81(2), as currently enacted, the provision reads:
A person who, without lawful authority, makes disclosure of information that comes to the knowledge of, or into the possession of, the person because the person is a government contractor, in circumstances where the person is under a duty not to make the disclosure, is guilty of a crime and is liable to imprisonment for 3 years.
150 A number of observations may be made about s 81, as currently enacted.
151 First, the offence created by s 81(2) appears to reflect a policy decision by the Parliament that preserving the secrecy of government operations is necessary to enhance the effective operation of government (including, for example, the formulation or implementation of policies or programmes). See Australian Law Reform Commission Report No 22: Privacy (1983) vol 2, par 1319; J McGinness, Secrecy Provisions in Commonwealth Legislation (1990) 19 FL Rev 49, 51.
152 Secondly, a 'duty not to make [the] disclosure' expresses in negative terms a 'duty to keep secret'. See Cortis (32). The 'duty to keep secret' in s 81, as originally enacted, is not materially different from the 'duty not to make the disclosure' in s 81, as currently enacted.
153 Thirdly, s 81 refers to a 'duty' not to make disclosure as distinct from a 'duty in his or her office' or a 'duty of his or her office'. Compare Pense v Hemy [1973] WAR 40; R v Hyman (1990) 2 WAR 222.
154 The definition of 'official information' in s 81(1) states, in effect, that information is 'official information' if it 'comes to the knowledge of, or into the possession of, a person because the person is a public servant or government contractor' (emphasis added). The word 'because' requires a causal connection between the information coming to the knowledge of, or into the possession of, a person on the one hand and the person's status or position as a public servant or government contractor on the other. If that causal connection exists, and the public servant or government contractor discloses the information, the disclosure will be an 'unauthorised disclosure' if, relevantly, the public servant or government contractor was 'under a duty not to make the disclosure'.
155 Significantly, s 81 extends to a person who is not employed in the Public Service, but who 'provides', or 'is employed in the provision of', goods or services for the purposes of the State, the Public Service or the Police Force of Western Australia.
156 Although the 'duty' referred to in s 81 is not expressed as a 'duty in his or her office' or a 'duty of his or her office', the duty in question must arise or be laid upon the public servant or government contractor in his or her capacity as a public servant or government contractor.
157 Fourthly, s 81 applies to all persons employed in the Public Service and all persons who provide, or are employed in the provision of, goods or services for the purposes of the State, the Public Service or the Police Force.
158 Fifthly, the offence created by s 81 does not, in its terms, condition or qualify the 'duty not to make disclosure' by reference to the nature of the information in question or the circumstances under which it came to the knowledge or into the possession of the person charged with contravening the provision. See Cortis (31 - 32); R v Crisp (1919) 83 JP 121, 123 (Avory J). However, the 'duty not to make disclosure' may be conditioned or qualified, by reference to the nature of the relevant information or the circumstances under which it came to the knowledge or into the possession of the relevant person, by the provisions or facts and circumstances that impose the duty.
159 Sixthly, the 'duty not to make disclosure', with which s 81 is concerned, is not imposed on a public servant or government contractor by s 81 or any other provision of the Code. Section 81 assumes the existence of the duty under an external source.
160 The nature and source of the duty with which s 81 is concerned is, however, to be ascertained from the language of s 81, the statutory context and the apparent purpose or object of the provision.
161 Section 81 appears in pt III of the Code. As I have mentioned, pt III is headed, 'Offences against the administration of law and justice and against public authority'. It comprises s 81 - s 178.
162 Section 81 refers to 'duty' as distinct from 'function'. Similarly, s 173 (which provides, relevantly, that any person who, being employed in the Public Service, or as an officer of any court or tribunal, perversely and without lawful excuse omits or refuses to do any act which it is his duty to do by virtue of his employment, is guilty of a crime) is based upon the existence of a 'duty' as distinct from a 'function'.
163 By contrast, s 83, which creates an offence of corruption by a public officer, and s 85, which creates an offence of falsification of records by a public officer, are concerned with the performance or discharge by the public officer of the 'functions' of his or her office or employment.
164 Like s 81, the provisions of s 83 and s 85, as currently enacted, are of relatively recent legislative origin. Section 83 and s 85 were inserted by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1988 (WA) and were amended in 2002. Section 85 was further amended in 2004. Although s 173 was inserted in the Code when it was originally enacted in 1902, it was amended in 1994 and 2004.
165 It is unnecessary, in this appeal, to state exhaustively the source or sources of the duty that are relevant for the purposes of s 81. The duty includes, at least, a duty of confidentiality imposed on a public servant or government contractor (in his or her capacity as such) by an Act of Parliament or a regulation made pursuant to an Act. Also, the definition of 'government contractor' in s 81(1), by the words 'contractor' and 'employed' and the reference to 'goods or services', contemplates that a person within the definition will be engaged to provide, or will be employed to provide, goods or services under a contract. A government contractor is not employed in the Public Service. In these circumstances, the duty with which s 81 is concerned also includes, at least in the case of a government contractor, a duty of confidentiality imposed on the government contractor (in his or her capacity as such) by contract.
166 Seventhly, a public servant or government contractor who makes an unauthorised disclosure (that is, relevantly, a disclosure made in breach of a duty not to make the disclosure) will not contravene s 81(2) if the disclosure was made with 'lawful authority'. Section 81 does not specify how or by whom lawful authorisation may be given to the making of an unauthorised disclosure. As I have noted at [102] and [135] above, it is unnecessary, in this appeal, to pursue or resolve the point. See, however, McGinness, Secrecy Provisions in Commonwealth Legislation, 62, in the context of s 70 and s 79(3) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
167 I turn now to examine and construe the alleged duty which the State contended was imposed on Mr Hondros.
168 At all material times, s 9 of the Public Sector Management Act applied to all public sector bodies and employees including, relevantly, ministerial officers. It therefore applied to Mr Hondros. Section 9 in terms directed that all public sector bodies and employees were, relevantly, to comply with the provisions of any code of conduct applicable to the public sector body or employee concerned.
169 By s 9 of the Public Sector Management Act and, also, by cl 9.1 of his contract of employment, Mr Hondros was bound to comply with par 3.8 (and other provisions) of the Code of Conduct. See [21] - [24] above.
In the course of official duties, Department employees will have access to information classified as restricted or confidential information. Classified information must be captured and stored in approved records systems with appropriate security and access controls applied. Employees dealing with highly sensitive material may be required to sign confidentiality agreements.
171 The first sentence of the first paragraph refers to information 'classified as restricted or confidential information'. This sentence distinguishes between two categories of information, namely, 'information classified as restricted' on the one hand and 'confidential information' on the other. If it had been intended that the word 'classified' should apply to 'confidential information' the phrase would have read 'information classified as restricted or confidential'. The expression 'information classified as restricted' is not in common usage. The word 'classified' connotes, in the context in which it appears, that whether information should be restricted or not will be determined in accordance with criteria specified by the Department. By contrast, the expression 'confidential information' is in common usage. It is well-known in various branches of the law. The expression 'confidential information' does not necessarily connote, in the context in which it appears, that whether information is confidential or not will be determined in accordance with criteria specified by the Department.
172 The second sentence refers to 'classified information'. It is apparent, when the first and second sentences are read together, that the term 'classified information' means 'information classified as restricted'. No doubt, some 'confidential information' will be 'information classified as restricted' and some 'confidential information' will not be 'information classified as restricted'.
173 The third sentence states that some employees (that is, those dealing with 'highly sensitive material') may be required to sign confidentiality agreements. (Mr Hondros was not required to sign, and did not sign, any relevant agreement apart from his contract of employment.)
Classified information may only be used in the course of official duties or for other lawful purposes e.g. under the requirements of Freedom of Information Act 1992. In general, employees are not to disclose classified information nor use information for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was retained. Improper disclosure includes any of the following:
175 The first sentence of the second paragraph states that 'classified information' (that is, 'information classified as restricted') may only be used in the course of 'official duties or for other lawful purposes'.
176 The second sentence is concerned with two categories of information, namely, 'classified information' (that is, 'information classified as restricted') and information generally. This sentence states in effect that, in general, employees must not disclose 'classified information' and, also, employees must not use information generally for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was retained.
177 The third sentence gives examples of disclosures of information that are improper. Relevant examples include:
(a) giving 'unauthorised persons' information relating to the business of the Department or any other government agency;
(b) disclosing the contents of any 'official papers', including internal reports or documents, to 'unauthorised persons'.
Section 81 of the Criminal Code makes it illegal for a public official to disclose confidential information, and prohibits employees of the public service from publishing or communicating any fact or document that came to their knowledge or possession by virtue of their office and which it is their duty to keep confidential. (emphasis added)
Although the third paragraph does not precisely reproduce s 81, this paragraph contemplates that a person bound to comply with par 3.8 will be under a duty not to disclose 'confidential information'.
179 It is apparent, when the first, second and third paragraphs of par 3.8 are read together, that 'confidential information', for the purposes of par 3.8, includes information the disclosure of which the third sentence of the second paragraph states is improper.
180 On a proper construction of par 3.8, a person who is bound to comply with par 3.8 must not give or disclose to 'unauthorised persons', relevantly:
(a) information relating to the business of the Department or any other government agency; or
(b) the contents of any 'official papers', including internal reports or documents.
181 Neither par 3.8 nor any other provision of the Code of Conduct defines 'government agency'. The natural and ordinary meaning conveyed by these words includes other government departments including the Department of Fisheries.
182 Also, neither par 3.8 nor any other provision of the Code of Conduct defines 'unauthorised persons'. The natural and ordinary meaning of these words, in the context of a provision which regulates the publication or communication of confidential information, is that the person bound by par 3.8 must be lawfully authorised to make the disclosure to the person receiving it.
183 Further, neither par 3.8 nor any other provision of the Code of Conduct defines 'official papers'. The natural and ordinary meaning of these words, in the applicable context, includes papers or other documents where:
(a) the papers or other documents (or their contents) have come to the knowledge, or into the possession, of a person bound by par 3.8 in his or her capacity as a public servant or government contractor; and
(b) the papers or other documents (or their contents) have been prepared or generated by, for or on behalf of the Department or any other government agency.
184 In my opinion, s 9 of the Public Sector Management Act and, also, cl 9.1 of Mr Hondros's contract of employment, read with par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct, imposed upon Mr Hondros, in his capacity as a government contractor, a 'duty not to make [the] disclosure', within s 81, to 'unauthorised persons', within par 3.8, of, relevantly, any information relating to the business of the Department of Fisheries and, also, the contents of any 'official papers', within par 3.8, including internal reports or documents of that Department. By s 9 and, also, cl 9.1, read with par 3.8, Mr Hondros was subjected to a legal obligation not to disclose, relevantly, confidential information including information answering the description of the examples set out in the third sentence of the second paragraph of par 3.8, and this obligation was a 'duty' within par (a) of the definition of 'unauthorised disclosure' in s 81(1). None of the provisions in question conferred a discretion on Mr Hondros in relation to the disclosure of this information.
185 As I have mentioned, the trial judge concluded that the duty not to disclose, with which s 81 is concerned, must be 'of a kind, breach of which may properly attract the sanction of punishment by the criminal law' [37], so that 'unless it is right to consider that the disclosure was, in the circumstances, punishable as a crime, there can be no duty not to disclose the information within the meaning of s 81' [38]. His Honour did not articulate the basis on which a determination should be made as to whether a duty is of the kind he described.
186 The trial judge introduced a value judgment to be applied in determining the nature of the duty with which s 81 is concerned; namely, whether the accused's conduct ought to attract criminal sanction, even though the elements of an 'unauthorised disclosure', as defined in s 81(1), are satisfied.
187 This approach is analogous to that which is required to be undertaken in determining whether criminal negligence has been established in the context of the offence of manslaughter.
188 Section 266(2) of the Code (which appears in ch XXVII, headed 'Duties relating to the preservation of human life') reads:
It is the duty of every person who has in his charge or under his control anything, whether living or inanimate, and whether moving or stationary, of such a nature that, in the absence of care or precaution in its use or management, the life, safety, or health of any person may be endangered, to use reasonable care and take reasonable precautions to avoid such danger; and he is held to have caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person by reason of any omission to perform that duty.
189 In Callaghan v The Queen [1952] HCA 55; (1952) 87 CLR 115, Dixon CJ, Webb, Fullagar and Kitto JJ observed that s 266 (as then enacted, which was identical to s 266(2) as currently enacted) was expressed in terms of duty 'in gross', and that the provision was not connected with criminal liability in itself (119). The duty was 'to use reasonable care and take reasonable precautions to avoid such danger'. Their Honours held that the standard set both by s 266 and by s 291A (which, at the material time, created the offence of manslaughter) was that set by the common law in cases where negligence amounts to manslaughter (124). See also R v Hodgetts & Jackson [1990] 1 Qd R 456; R v Guise (1998) 101 A Crim R 143; Agnew v The Queen [2003] WASCA 188.
190 Unlike s 266(2), the provisions of s 81 are not expressed in terms of duty 'in gross'. Also, unlike s 266(2), s 81 is connected with criminal liability in itself.
191 More significantly, the notion of criminal negligence, in the context of the offence of manslaughter, is not applied to determine whether a duty exists. Rather, the notion is concerned with the standard or degree of negligence that justifies criminal sanction.
192 By contrast, s 81 is predicated on the existence of a duty arising or created otherwise than under the Code. In the present case, the trial judge impermissibly glossed the statutory text by requiring that the appropriateness of criminal sanction be assessed in the individual case for the purpose of deciding whether a duty not to make disclosure within s 81 existed or not.
193 In my opinion, if a duty of the kind described in the definition of 'unauthorised disclosure' in s 81(1) exists, and a person who is a public servant or government contractor breaches this duty, the seriousness of the breach has no bearing on whether an offence against s 81(2) is established (or, indeed, whether, at the close of the State's case, the evidence is capable of establishing the offence).
194 There are numerous statutory provisions in Australia which have created offences with at least some features comparable to s 81 of the Code, as currently enacted. See, for example, Pense; Grant v Headland (1977) 17 ACTR 29; Cortis; Johnston v Director of Public Prosecutions (1989) 97 FLR 424; Snell v Pryce [1990] NTSC 2; (1990) 99 FLR 213; Hyman; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Marks [2005] VSCA 277; Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Zierk [2008] VSC 184; (2008) 184 A Crim R 582; Kessing v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 310; (2008) 73 NSWLR 22; R v Goreng-Goreng [2008] ACTSC 74; (2008) 220 FLR 21; The State of Tasmania v Johnston. However, the decision in each of those cases turned on the proper construction of the relevant offence-creating provision, the identification and interpretation of the circumstances or provisions which created the alleged duty, and the application of the offence-creating provision to the facts of the particular case in the context of the nature and source of the relevant duty. It is sufficient, for present purposes, to refer to and distinguish The State of Tasmania v Johnston, a decision relied on heavily in the present case by his Honour.
195 In The State of Tasmania v Johnston, the defendant was charged with three counts of disclosing official secrets, one of which was an alternative count, contrary to s 110 of the Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas). The defendant was the Commissioner of Police in Tasmania. It was alleged that he had disclosed official secrets to Paul Lennon, who was the Premier of the State.
196 Section 110 of the Criminal Code Act provides, relevantly:
Any public officer who discloses (except to some person to whom he is authorized to publish or communicate the same) any fact which comes to his knowledge, or the contents of any document which comes to his possession, by virtue of his office and which it is his duty to keep secret, is guilty of a crime.
197 The provisions relied on by the Crown in The State of Tasmania v Johnston to impose a duty of secrecy on the defendant were embodied in s 42 of the Police Service Act 2003 (Tas) and s 9 of the State Service Act 2000 (Tas). By s 42(4) of the Police Service Act, a police officer 'must maintain appropriate confidentiality about any dealing made and information gained in the course of his or her duties in the Police Service' (emphasis added). Similarly, by s 9(7) of the State Service Act, an employee 'must maintain appropriate confidentiality about dealings of, and information acquired by, the employee in the course of that employee's State Service employment' (emphasis added).
198 Evans J held that the Crown case against the defendant was 'doomed to fail' on the issues of duty and authorisation [99]. His Honour decided, relevantly:
(a) The discretionary nature of the requirement as to confidentiality in s 42(4) of the Police Service Act and s 9(7) of the State Service Act was 'essential in order for those subject to it to function' [65].
(b) 'Information is crucial to policing and few positions involve such a wide variety of circumstances in which it is necessary to assess the appropriateness of the disclosure of information. In many instances it may be open to argue that for one reason or another a disclosure is inappropriate and in breach of the requirements of s 42(4). It would be a significant step to expose a police officer to criminal consequences for such a breach' [65].
(d) 'To establish its case on any one charge the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant made the disclosure that is the subject of that charge. Plainly if he made the disclosure, he authorised the making of the disclosure. Whilst it is perhaps conceivable that in some circumstances it could be demonstrated that a person who made a disclosure did not authorise its making, there is nothing in the circumstances of this case that might so indicate' [97] (emphasis added).
(e) Finally, his Honour rejected the proposition that the defendant did not have the authority to authorise disclosures that others might conclude were inappropriate [98].
199 The State of Tasmania v Johnston may be contrasted with the present case. First, Johnston was concerned with whether there was a common law or statutory duty of non-disclosure arising from the 'office' of constable [43]. Secondly, the requirement as to confidentiality in Johnston was not unqualified, but discretionary [52]. Thirdly, none of the sources of Mr Hondros's duty not to disclose conferred a discretion on him; that is, the prohibition on disclosure was not in any material respect discretionary in character. Fourthly, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, Mr Hondros was not lawfully authorised to provide Mr Burke or Mr Grill with a copy of Mr Ford's letter.
200 In my opinion, the trial judge's decision as to the nature and source of the duty not to make disclosure, within s 81, was erroneous.
201 At the material time, Mr Ford was a Minister of State to whom Mr Hondros was accountable. As I have mentioned, the trial judge found that on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, Mr Ford had given a general instruction that no member of his staff (including Mr Hondros) was to seek out or receive contact from Mr Burke or Mr Grill without his permission and that if such contact occurred uninvited, his staff were to tell him what had happened. See [127] above. In my opinion, it was open to the tribunal of fact (taking the State's case at its highest) to find that Mr Ford's instruction necessarily included, by implication, an instruction that no member of his staff (including Mr Hondros) was to send any 'official papers' or documents of his Department to Mr Burke or Mr Grill without Mr Ford's permission.
202 At the trial, the State did not rely on Mr Ford's instruction to his staff (including Mr Hondros) as the source of the 'duty not to make disclosure', within s 81. Rather, the State relied on that instruction to establish that Mr Burke and Mr Grill were 'unauthorised persons', within par 3.8 and, further, that the relevant disclosure was made 'without lawful authority', within s 81(2).
(a) he did not give Mr Hondros permission, and Mr Hondros did not seek permission, to provide Mr Burke with a copy of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz (ts 271 - 272);
(b) letters such as those between Ministers were regarded as personal correspondence, and treated by him as such (ts 272);
(c) a Minister would not show third parties private correspondence between the Minister and another Minister (ts 272);
(d) even if Mr Ford had wanted to show the letter to another Minister, he would first seek the approval of Senator Abetz as a matter of protocol (ts 272); and
(e) only he had authority to let people look at correspondence between him and anyone else (ts 567).
204 In my opinion, the trial judge was in error in concluding, in relation to Mr Ford's letter, that there was merely a disclosure of 'technically confidential official information' [225] and that it was not an 'unauthorised disclosure' because Mr Burke received a copy of the letter in his capacity as agent for Mr Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou [224] - [226].
205 The trial judge's process of reasoning in relation to Mr Ford's letter was, in effect, as follows:
(a) Mr Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou, and their compensation claims, were the subject of the ministerial correspondence;
(b) Mr Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou were entitled to know what efforts Mr Ford was making on their behalf, and what he was doing about their claims;
(c) Mr Burke was acting as agent for Mr Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou; and
(d) therefore, Mr Burke was entitled to receive that information on their behalf.
206 It is implicit in his Honour's findings and conclusions that it was not open to the tribunal of fact (taking the State's case at its highest) to find that Mr Burke and Mr Grill were 'unauthorised persons', within par 3.8, or that the disclosure to them was made 'without lawful authority', within s 81(2).
207 Mr Ford's letter related, in part but not exclusively, to the compensation claims of Mr Scimone and Mr Triantafyllou.
208 The evidence before the trial judge did not include any unchallenged evidence that Mr Scimone or Mr Triantafyllou had any right or entitlement, either personally or by his agent, to have access to the contents of, or to receive a copy of, any minister-to-minister correspondence which dealt, in part, with their compensation claims. Indeed, to the contrary, there was the evidence of Mr Ford which I have summarised at [203] above.
209 Further, the evidence before his Honour did not include any unchallenged evidence that Mr Burke should be treated differently from the manner of treatment required under Mr Ford's general instruction to his staff (including Mr Hondros) if Mr Burke was acting as agent for a constituent. Indeed, to the contrary, there was evidence from Mr Ford and Ms Comrie that members of Mr Ford's ministerial staff were not permitted to have contact with Mr Burke (ts 554, 659, 668), this prohibition applied to Mr Hondros (ts 430), and he (Mr Ford) discouraged constituents from engaging Mr Burke as a lobbyist (ts 357, 486 - 487, 550).
210 The status of Mr Ford's letter as 'information relating to the business of' the Department of Fisheries, for the purposes of par 3.8, must be assessed not merely by reference to the information set out in the letter and the extent to which that information was publicly or generally known, but by reference to the broader context of the incorporation of the relevant information in a letter sent by a State minister to a Commonwealth minister which dealt, in part, with matters of policy and which reflected Mr Ford's thinking on some contentious issues between Mr Ford and his Commonwealth counterpart.
211 In my opinion, it was open to the tribunal of fact (taking the State's case at its highest) to find that the disclosure of Mr Ford's letter, in the context in which it was written and the identity of the addressee, had the potential to undermine Mr Ford's right to determine the manner in which his relationship with a Commonwealth minister would be conducted and had the potential to inhibit the frank disclosure of views between ministerial counterparts.
212 On the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that the contents of the letter from Mr Ford to Senator Abetz constituted information relating to the business of the Department of Fisheries and, also, that the letter and its contents constituted an 'official paper', or document, of that Department. The contents of the letter included the identity of the author and the addressee and the fact that it had been sent by one Minister of State to another.
213 In my opinion, the trial judge was in error in deciding that, taking the State's case at its highest, Mr Ford's letter was, at best, merely 'technically confidential official information' for the purposes of par 3.8.
214 On the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Burke was an 'unauthorised person', within par 3.8, in relation to the disclosure by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke of the contents of Mr Ford's letter.
215 Also, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Hondros was not lawfully authorised to disclose to Mr Burke or Mr Grill the contents of Mr Ford's letter.
216 In my opinion, the trial judge was in error in deciding that, taking the State's case at its highest, the disclosure by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke of Mr Ford's letter was not a disclosure by Mr Hondros to an 'unauthorised person' within par 3.8.
217 In my opinion, the State has established that the trial judge made material errors in relation to count 1. His Honour's decision that Mr Hondros had no case to answer on count 1 cannot be sustained.
218 Subject to my consideration of Mr Hondros's notice of contention and the possible application of the 'proviso', the State succeeds in its appeal against the trial judge's decision that Mr Hondros had no case to answer on count 1.
219 The elements of the offence alleged against Mr Hondros in count 3, being an alleged contravention of s 81(2) of the Code, are:
(a) At the material time, was Mr Hondros a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1)?
(b) If 'yes' to par (a), did Mr Hondros disclose 'official information', as defined in s 81(1), that is, were the contents of the relevant draft version of the Phase III policy 'official information'?
(c) if 'yes' to par (b), was the disclosure an 'unauthorised disclosure', within par (a) of the definition of that term in s 81(1), in that Mr Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure?
(d) If 'yes' to par (c), did Mr Hondros make the disclosure 'without lawful authority', within s 81(2)?
220 I repeat, in the context of count 3, the relevant part of the observations I have made at [102] above about the phrase 'without lawful authority' in the context of count 1. See also [228] below.
221 The particulars of count 3 given by the State in relation to the alleged disclosure having been made 'without lawful authority', and the alleged disclosure having been an 'unauthorised disclosure' in that Mr Hondros was under a duty not to make the disclosure, were, relevantly, identical to the particulars of those matters given in relation to count 1.
Count 3: the trial judge's findings in relation to the material facts and circumstances
222 As I have mentioned, on 10 October 2006, Mr Hondros sought and obtained from Ms Kennedy, in electronic form, a draft version of the Phase III policy.
223 The draft Phase III policy was a draft of a document which, at that time, Ms Kennedy was preparing and which, on the State's case, was then being considered by PIAC.
224 The trial judge said the evidence established, and there was 'no contest', that on 11 October 2006, Mr Hondros disclosed the information in the draft Phase III policy to Mr Grill by sending him a copy of the document by email [63].
225 His Honour repeated, in substance, his finding that, at the material time, Mr Hondros was a 'government contractor' [64].
226 The State contended that the draft Phase III policy contained information relating to the business of the Department of Fisheries (BAB/GAB 76 - 77). Also, the State contended that the draft Phase III policy was an internal report or document (of an official character) (BAB/GAB 76 - 77). His Honour accepted these propositions [243].
227 His Honour said that there was 'no doubt' that the draft Phase III policy contained 'official information' [65]. His Honour explained that the document came into Mr Hondros's possession because he was Mr Ford's chief of staff and he was performing the duties of his office. In other words, the document came into Mr Hondros's possession because he was a government contractor [65].
228 The trial judge found that there was 'no question' that if the disclosure of the draft Phase III policy was 'unauthorised' then it was made 'without lawful authority' [66].
229 According to his Honour, the critical question was whether the disclosure of the draft Phase III policy was an 'unauthorised disclosure'; that is, did the draft contain information which Mr Hondros was under a duty not to disclose? [67]
Count 3: the trial judge's conclusion in relation to whether there was an unauthorised disclosure
230 The trial judge concluded that, on the evidence, Mr Hondros could not be found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of count 3. He found the evidence was incapable of establishing that Mr Hondros's disclosure to Mr Grill of the draft Phase III policy was an unauthorised disclosure.
[R]egard must be had to the meeting of 16 August, and the fact that Hondros sought and was given permission to disclose the publicly released Phase III policy to Burke and Grill. In my view, having regard to the very minor nature of the changes which had been made to the policy following its public release on 25 May 2006, it is not open to conclude that the Phase III policy, disclosed in electronic form by Hondros to Burke and Grill on 11 October, was not authorised in fact within the meaning of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct or was unauthorised because it was the subject of a duty of non-disclosure which would be recognised for the purposes of s 81 of the Code.
In my opinion, there could be no breach of a duty not to disclose for the purposes of s 81, so as to expose the accused to the punishment of imprisonment for a crime, when the only parts of the statement of the Phase III policy in the draft document which were not included in the document originally published were minor amendments of an 'operational' nature and editorial changes.
Further, it should not be overlooked that the provision of the Phase III policy to Burke and Grill involved disclosure to persons whom Mr Hondros knew were acting for Mr Kel Brown to advance his case for the adoption of a policy which would benefit him and other small WA producers. The known purpose of doing so was so that they might amend the policy in a way which would, in fact, advance the policy objectives which Mr Hondros knew Mr Ford wanted to implement [244] - [246].
232 The trial judge therefore decided that Mr Hondros had no case to answer on count 3 and that a judgment of acquittal should be entered on that count.
233 It is unnecessary to reproduce the grounds of appeal that attack the trial judge's conclusion in relation to count 3. It is sufficient to note that the grounds allege, in essence, that:
(a) the trial judge also made in the context of count 3 the errors alleged in pars (a) - (d) of [132] above in the context of count 1;
(b) his Honour's decision that, taking the State's case at its highest, it was not open to conclude that the draft Phase III policy, disclosed in electronic form by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke and Mr Grill on 11 October 2006, was not authorised in fact, was erroneous;
(c) his Honour's decision that, taking the State's case at its highest, the only parts of the draft Phase III policy sent by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke and Mr Grill, which were not included in the document previously published, were minor amendments of an 'operational' nature, and editorial changes, was erroneous.
Count 3: matters not in issue in the appeal
234 As I have mentioned, the trial judge found that, at the material time, Mr Hondros was a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1). Mr Hondros challenges that finding in his notice of contention.
235 Also, as I have mentioned, his Honour found that it was open to conclude that the draft Phase III policy, disclosed in electronic form by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke and Mr Grill on 11 October 2006, came into Mr Hondros's possession because he was a government contractor and that Mr Hondros's disclosure of this information to Mr Burke and Mr Grill was a disclosure of 'official information', as defined in s 81(1). These findings (apart from the finding that Mr Hondros was a government contractor) are not challenged in the appeal.
236 Further, as I have mentioned, his Honour found that there was no evidence to suggest that if the disclosure of the draft Phase III policy by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke and Mr Grill was an 'unauthorised disclosure', as defined in s 81(1), it was made other than 'without lawful authority' within s 81(2). This finding is not challenged in the appeal.
Count 3: was there a case to answer at the close of the State's case?
237 In my opinion, for the reasons I have given at [133] - [200] above, the trial judge also made, in the context of count 3, the errors relating to the nature and source of the duty not to make disclosure, within s 81, which I have found in the context of count 1.
238 Mr Ford gave evidence to the effect that the only relevant permission he had given Mr Hondros was permission to provide Mr Burke with a copy of the draft Phase III policy that had previously been approved by Mr Ford and made available to the public. The following exchange occurred between the trial judge and Mr Ford:
[W]hat I was interested to understand was your best recollection as to what it was you told Hondros about giving information or documents to Burke?---I think he had asked for a copy of a document, which I think is a copy of the phase III hatchery policy, which had been given to PIAC with my endorsement.
Yes?---There may have been
So when you say you think he had asked, does that mean you think Mr Burke had asked Mr Hondros?---Yes.
It does, all right. Mr Hondros told you that. Is that what I should understand?---Yes.
What did you say to Mr Hondros when he told you that?---Yes, provided that the document has been published or it's public (ts 265 - 266).
239 The draft Phase III policy sent by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros was different from the publicly available document that Mr Ford had previously permitted Mr Hondros to give to Mr Burke.
240 Ms Kennedy described the differences between the draft Phase III policy approved by Mr Ford and the new draft sent by her to Mr Hondros, as follows:
Before we go to the request from Mr Hondros, as far as the amendments that you were proposing to the policy were concerned, how would you describe the nature of those amendments?---They were really things that tried to make that document more consistent with where we thought we might be heading with the new primary pearling legislation. They didn't actually change the underlying nature of the policy itself; more dealing with the practicalities of implementing it and, you know, some of the concepts around how hatchery quota was described, to make it consistent with possibly future legislation (ts 589).
241 It is sufficient, for present purposes, to refer to three differences.
242 The first difference relates to cl 4.2, which is headed 'Policy objectives in detail'. Clause 4.2.1 is headed 'Background' and includes 'Policy Objective 1', namely, 'to achieve a coordinated and consistent approach by the Northern Territory and Western Australian Governments so as to achieve integrated management for both Pearling Fisheries'.
243 In the document approved by Mr Ford, cl 4.2.1 read, relevantly:
The Northern Territory manages its pearling industry under wildstock and hatchery quotas, in a manner similar to the Western Australian management system.
This consistent approach will be achieved through:
244 In the document sent by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros, the third and fifth bullet points in this passage were amended to read:
245 The second difference relates to cl 4.2.3, which is headed 'Parallel and separate pearling legislation in each jurisdiction'.
246 In the document approved by Mr Ford, cl 4.2.3 read, relevantly:
The extent of the proposed changes calls for a new Act and Regulations, together with amended Ministerial Policy Guidelines, rather than amendment of the Pearling Act 1990, although longstanding management principles will be carried over to the new Act.
For these very same reasons a separate Pearling Act may prove desirable in the Northern Territory.
Having parallel legislation will assist in the development of complementary compliance regimes and quota management frameworks. Involvement of respective jurisdictions in the pearling industry advisory committee processes in each state or, ideally, a joint pearling industry advisory committee process will maintain the consistency (BAB/GAB 285).
247 In the document sent by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros, cl 4.2.3 was amended by including after this passage a further provision, as follows:
A joint Ministerial Advisory Committee consisting of balanced representation of pearling operators and licensees, independent experts and government officials from both Western Australia and Northern Territory jurisdictions having a rotating independent chairman and single secretariat support would provide an acceptable model. This approach is not intended to prevent separate jurisdictions dealing with issues that fall within their own province, for example leasing requirements (BAB/GAB 621).
248 The third difference relates to cl 4.5, which is headed 'Administrative decisions versus market mechanisms for allocation'.
249 In the document approved by Mr Ford, cl 4.5 read, relevantly:
The proportional allocation across all quota units in the fisheries sector has proven the most effective elsewhere in Australia to avoid unnecessary litigation costs and delays by eliminating arbitrary decisions through implementing legislation providing clear direction about how quota is to be varied and the variations allocated. Litigation detracts from the effectiveness of the policy and results in substantial costs to the regulator and the industry.
ACIL Tasman set out that the current quota holdings of the industry licensees are the result of trade in quota (options, hatchery and wild) incurring considerable investments in utilising that quota. A pro rata allocation across all quotas is consistent with the current distribution of the industry and minimises the impact on the existing distribution of assets. Pro rata allocations are currently applied in the annual adjustments to the pearl oyster wildstock Total Allowable Catch (BAB/GAB 289).
250 In the document sent by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros, the second sentence of the second paragraph in this passage was amended, as indicated below:
ACIL Tasman set out that the current quota holdings of the industry licensees are the result of trade in quota (options, hatchery and wildstock) incurring considerable investments in utilising that quota. The establishment of a [discrete] first operation seeding quota, based on the current seeding entitlements attached to wildstock and hatchery quota, and the pro rata allocation of future variations in first operation seeding rights is consistent with the current distribution of entitlement within industry and minimises the impact of quota variations on the existing distribution of assets. Pro rata allocations are currently applied in the annual adjustments to the pearl oyster wildstock Total Allowable Catch (BAG/GAB 625). (emphasis added)
251 In my opinion, it was open to the tribunal of fact (taking the State's case at its highest) to find that the three differences to which I have referred were material changes of substance, and not merely 'minor amendments' of an 'operational' nature, or editorial changes, as found by the trial judge.
252 His Honour accepted that, for the purposes of par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct, the information in the draft Phase III policy document given by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros, being the latest version, could be regarded as 'information relating to the business of the Fisheries Department' or an 'internal report or document of an official nature' [243].
253 As I have mentioned, when Ms Kennedy sent the draft Phase III policy to Mr Hondros, she told him that 'as some minor changes may still be necessary before the final document is sent to the minister by the PIAC Chair it will be desirable for this version not to be released publicly'. Ms Kennedy elaborated upon this point in her evidence:
Can you tell us why you indicated to Mr Hondros that it would be desirable for this version not to be released publicly?---Because this particular version hadn't been endorsed by the minister and I was also keen to clarify because there had been an earlier version that was endorsed by the minister to make sure that he understood the status of the version that I was actually providing to him.
All right. Now ... after sending that email and the attachment to Mr Hondros did you have any response from Mr Hondros?---No, I didn't (ts 595).
254 There was evidence from Mr McCallum, the executive officer of the PPA, an observer on PIAC and a person who had been invited to assist in drafting the policy, that he regarded documents he received as an observer on PIAC as confidential. Mr McCallum did not disclose the details of the changes in the latest version of the policy to the membership of the PPA because he did not consider it was his position to do so, although he discussed with various members the background and principles in respect of the changes (ts 759, 835 - 838).
255 The Phase III policy was a document being prepared by PIAC (ts 586; BAB/GAB 969). In about May 2006, the draft of the Phase III policy, on which Mr Ford had endorsed his approval, was made available to the public (ts 586). Ms Kennedy's role, at that stage, was to endeavour to commence the implementation of the new policy (ts 586). However, she became aware that there were 'some issues and inconsistencies in terms of [the] ... practical application of the policy that warranted further consideration by [PIAC]' (ts 586 - 587). Ms Kennedy discussed the issues which occurred to her with Mr Rogers, her immediate supervisor and the chief executive officer of the Department of Fisheries (ts 587). After these discussions, Ms Kennedy amended the version which had been approved by Mr Ford. She then sent the amended document to PIAC (being the document she gave to Mr Hondros) 'as a background paper for the PIAC meeting which was held in October [2006]' (ts 587).
256 Ms Kennedy gave evidence about the people to whom the amended document was sent before the PIAC meeting held in October 2006:
Are you able to tell us who you forwarded the document to?---Prior to the PIAC meeting I believe I would have forwarded it to Brett McCallum and to the PIAC members as a background paper for the meeting and then I guess subsequent to that meeting, at the meeting the committee wanted to make some further amendments so I then made those and [sent] that amended document to Brett McCallum, to Peter Rogers, Jo McCrae who was my immediate supervisor, and Michael Smith, the chairman of PIAC, for them to consider those amendments before I then sent it to the rest of the committee (ts 587).
257 Ms Kennedy also gave evidence about her dealings with Mr Ford's office, including Mr Hondros:
Apart from the persons that you have mentioned and being persons either involved with PIAC or in your department or Mr McCallum who, as you say, is an observer on PIAC, was there anyone else that you sent the document with the proposed amendments to?---Well, initially immediately after the PIAC meeting when I sent it to those four people, actually on that same day I received a request for a copy of the hatchery policy from Nathan Hondros from the minister's office, and I forwarded a copy of that version of the document to him. A later version of that document also went to the Northern Territory - my Northern Territory counterpart who provided it to the Northern Territory PIAC, and then subsequent to that the finalised document was sent to the minister for fisheries.
All right. We'll come to each of those in steps but let's deal first of all with the request from Mr Hondros. Had you dealt with Mr Hondros previously?---Yes. From time to time he was our - he was our primary contact on pearling matters in the minister's office.
I've asked you about your role in relation to PIAC. Now, so far as dealing with the minister's office was concerned, what sort of dealings did you have with the minister's office?---Well, basically part of my role was to prepare the department's advice on pearling matters for consideration by the minister's office. Those pieces of advice were signed off by the CEO before they went to the minister's office, so I was responsible for actually drafting those documents, so you know, it might be that the minister's office might contact me from time to time wanting clarification on a certain matter or that I would contact the minister's office to find out about progress on a certain matter.
All right. Now, the CEO during most of 2006, was that Mr Peter Rogers?---Yes, it was.
Did you ever deal directly with the minister Mr Ford?---No, I didn't.
Are you able to tell us what persons you did deal with within the minister's office?---Primarily with Mr Hondros. To a lesser extent with department employees who were working as advisers in the minister's office. Mr Ian Curnow was the person up there at the time and then Mr Tim Bray later on in early 2007, but primarily on pearling was Mr Hondros (ts 588 - 589).
258 The October 2006 meeting of PIAC was held on 6 October 2006 (ts 590). Ms Kennedy attended the meeting (ts 590). She described in evidence what occurred at the meeting, and subsequently, in relation to the draft Phase III policy as amended by her:
Were the amendments discussed at that meeting?---Yes, they were discussed fairly briefly.
What was the upshot of any discussions in relation to the amendments?---That by and large the amendments that I'd suggested were adopted with a few more subsequent changes that the committee had come up with.
And what was done in relation to the document after that meeting?---Well, I took the document back and made the further changes requested by the committee. At some point, although I can't recall when, I had been requested to provide that document to the four people previously mentioned: Michael Smith, Jo McCrae, Brett McCallum and Peter Rogers. They considered the amendments that I'd made subsequent to the PIAC meeting prior to the document being sent to the committee as a whole.
Right. So just taking it in stages, it went back to the committee with your proposed amendments, further amendments were suggested at the meeting on 6 October?---Yes.
Is that correct?---Yes.
You then took it away, incorporated those further changes?---Yes.
And was it after that, do you say, that you actually made it available to the persons you mentioned earlier?---Yes, it was, yes.
All right. And did that include Mr Hondros?---Yes, but it was sent to Mr Hondros separately from those other people.
I understand that, but it was the document that included the further amendments after the meeting that you sent to Mr Hondros?---Yes.
Is that correct?---That's right, yes (ts 590).
259 Eventually, the final form of the draft Phase III policy, as prepared by PIAC, was sent to Mr Ford and Ms Kennedy's counterpart in the Northern Territory. Ms Kennedy gave this evidence towards the end of her evidence-in-chief:
You have told us, Ms Kennedy, that a document was eventually [sent] to the minister. What happened then in between the sending of this document to the people that you mentioned earlier and it going to the minister?---In the intervening weeks there were some final changes that were recommended. I believe they were recommended by Peter Rogers. So those changes were incorporated into the final document which was forwarded to the minister's office. At about the same time I also provided a copy of - it was the finalised document but it still had changes marked up in it - to my counterpart in the Northern Territory. Because the policy had implications for both WA and the Northern Territory it was forwarded to my Northern Territory counterpart so it could go to the Northern Territory version of PIAC.
Who was that?---At the time it was someone called Murray Barton.
You say that it had some implications for the Northern Territory as well. Is that correct?---Yes, that's right.
All right. And sorry, were you aware of a memorandum of understanding in place at that stage?---Yes, I was aware that the minister had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Northern Territory government (ts 595 - 596).
260 As I have mentioned, at the material time Mr Hondros, in his capacity as a government contractor, was under a 'duty not to make [the] disclosure', within s 81 of the Code, to 'unauthorised persons', within par 3.8 of the Code of Conduct, of, relevantly, any information relating to the business of the Department of Fisheries and, also, the contents of any 'official papers', within par 3.8, including internal reports or documents of that Department. See [184] above.
261 On the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that the contents of the draft Phase III policy sent by Ms Kennedy to Mr Hondros on 10 October 2006 constituted information relating to the business of the Department of Fisheries and, also, that the draft policy and its contents constituted an 'official paper', or document, of that Department.
262 Also, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that each of Mr Burke and Mr Grill was an 'unauthorised person', within par 3.8, in relation to the disclosure by Mr Hondros to Mr Grill of the contents of the document sent to him by Ms Kennedy on 10 October 2006.
263 Further, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Hondros was not lawfully authorised to disclose to Mr Burke or Mr Grill the contents of that document.
264 In my opinion, the trial judge was in error in deciding that, taking the State's case at its highest:
(a) it was not open to conclude that the disclosure of the draft Phase III policy, disclosed by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke and Mr Grill, was not authorised in fact; and
(b) the only parts of the draft Phase III policy sent by Mr Hondros to Mr Burke and Mr Grill, which were not included in the document previously published, were minor amendments of an 'operational' nature, or editorial changes.
265 Subject to my consideration of Mr Hondros's notice of contention and the possible applicable of the 'proviso', the State succeeds in its appeal against the trial judge's decision that Mr Hondros had no case to answer on count 3.
266 The elements of the offence alleged against Mr Hondros in count 2, being an alleged contravention of s 83(c) of the Code, are:
(a) At the material time, was Mr Hondros a 'public officer', as defined in s 1(1) of the Code?
(b) If 'yes' to par (a), did Mr Hondros act corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment so as to gain a benefit for Mr Burke, Mr Grill and others?
(c) If 'yes' to par (b), did Mr Hondros act corruptly 'without lawful authority' or 'a reasonable excuse', within s 83?
Count 2: the trial judge's findings in relation to the material facts and circumstances
267 The trial judge said that Mr Hondros's guilt on count 2 would be established if a 'wrongful act of unauthorised disclosure was for the purpose of improperly gaining a benefit for any person or causing a detriment to any person'. His Honour said that, in these circumstances, 'the corruption would be established by the link between the wrongful act ... and the improper purpose'. Given his Honour's conclusion as to count 3, this 'avenue to a conviction' on count 2 was 'lost to the prosecution' [247].
268 His Honour said, however, that this was not the end of the matter in relation to count 2 because Mr Hondros may still be guilty of corruption if he performed his duty for an improper purpose of the kind referred to in s 83. His Honour then said:
In this case, it is alleged that Hondros acted corruptly because he made the disclosure for the improper purpose of giving Burke and Grill the benefit of access to the policy so that it might be amended and presented to Cabinet for adoption by the Government, as if it was the policy of PIAC and the Department. The other aspect of the improper purpose was, by that means, to improve Mr Brown's prospect of obtaining a more favourable allocation of hatchery quota [248].
269 The trial judge noted that the focus of counts 2 and 3 was the meeting of 9 October 2006 at which, on the State's case, Mr Burke and Mr Grill counselled the corrupt behaviour and purpose, and Mr Hondros agreed to be involved in it [252]. His Honour found that, pursuant to an agreement made at this meeting, Mr Hondros obtained the draft Phase III policy in electronic form and transmitted it to Mr Grill [252].
270 His Honour thought that the plan adopted by Mr Burke, Mr Grill and Mr Hondros at the meeting of 9 October 2006 'was clear' [252]. He described it as follows:
The policy document was to be amended as unobtrusively as possible so that it might not attract the attention of PIAC or the Fisheries Department, and so that, in any event, there could be no criticism that the Minister was putting the amended policy to Cabinet without first submitting it for the views of PIAC and the Department [253].
271 The amendments that were made pursuant to what had been agreed on 9 October 2006 related to changes in pearl hatchery quotas. The reference to pro rata increases in the quota were deleted and the Minister was given control of any increases to be made. The idea was to confer on the Minister a discretion which would enable him or her to confer greater increases on smaller producers and to facilitate entry of indigenous groups to the industry [257]. His Honour observed that:
The plan formulated in those terms might well be regarded as displaying a degree of naivety which was surprising, having regard to the experience in politics and government possessed by Messrs Burke and Grill [258].
Count 2: the trial judge's conclusion in relation to whether Mr Hondros acted corruptly
272 The trial judge said that, in his view, the State's case that Mr Hondros had acted corruptly when he gave the draft Phase III policy to Mr Burke and Mr Grill so that the plan formulated on 9 October 2006 might be put into effect, could not be made good [258]. His Honour's reasoning was as follows:
[Mr Hondros] did not improperly perform the duties of his office by giving the Phase III policy, in electronic form, to Grill for the purpose mentioned. He was misguided, undoubtedly, but he was not, in my opinion, involved in any relevant dereliction of duty. The purpose of achieving the formulation of a change in the policy so that it was expressed in terms of which the Hon Minister might approve, was not an improper purpose of a kind which would expose Mr Hondros to conviction of the crime of corruption, and it was not an improper purpose, therefore, that the electronic document was provided to Burke and Grill so that it might be changed in a way which would be of benefit to the commercial interests of Mr Brown [259].
273 According to his Honour, the evidence was incapable of proving that Mr Hondros was guilty of the offence alleged in count 2 [260]. Mr Hondros therefore had no case to answer and a judgment of acquittal should be entered on that count.
274 It is unnecessary to reproduce the grounds of appeal that attack the trial judge's conclusion in relation to count 2. It is sufficient to note that the grounds allege, in essence, that:
(a) in determining whether the evidence was capable of establishing that the purpose for which Mr Hondros gave the draft Phase III policy to Mr Burke and Mr Grill was an improper purpose, such as to render his conduct corrupt, his Honour failed to have regard to a critical aspect of the State's case, namely, that the evidence supported the conclusion that the respondents' plan was to have the draft Phase III policy amended by Mr Grill and then presented to Cabinet in due course as a policy document approved by PIAC, thereby misleading Cabinet;
(b) alternatively, his Honour did not provide reasons as to why the evidence could not establish such a purpose or why, if the evidence was capable of establishing such a purpose, that purpose would not be improper such as to render Mr Hondros's conduct corrupt;
(c) his Honour erred in failing to find, on the assumption that all inferences most favourable to the State which were reasonably open were drawn, that the evidence of the meeting on 9 October 2006 was capable of satisfying a reasonable person beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of Mr Hondros in respect of count 2 on the basis that the evidence was capable of establishing that the purpose for which Mr Hondros gave the draft Phase III policy to Mr Burke and Mr Grill was an improper purpose.
Count 2: matters not in issue in the appeal
275 It was not in dispute, either at the trial or on the appeal, that at the material time Mr Hondros was a 'public officer', as defined in s 1(1) of the Code.
276 Also, it was not in issue, on the appeal, that if Mr Hondros had acted corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment so as to gain a benefit for Mr Burke, Mr Grill and others, then Mr Hondros acted corruptly 'without lawful authority' and without 'a reasonable excuse', within s 83.
Count 2: was there a case to answer at the close of the State's case?
277 Count 2 alleged, relevantly, that between 8 October 2006 and 12 October 2006 Mr Hondros, without lawful authority or a reasonable excuse, acted 'corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment', within s 83(c) of the Code, 'so as to gain a benefit' for Mr Burke, Mr Grill and others.
278 The word 'corruptly' is capable of different meanings in different contexts or connections. See Bosselman v United States 239 F 82, 86 (2d Cir 1917); United States v Polakoff 121 F 2d 333, 335 (2d Cir 1941).
279 In Drummoyne Municipal Council v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1990) 21 NSWLR 135, Priestley JA said that the word 'corruptly' has at least three distinct meanings (154 - 155).
280 A person will act 'corruptly' if the action is motivated by an improper purpose. See United States v Fasolino [1978] USCA2 757; 586 F 2d 939, 941 (2d Cir 1978). Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language (1961) includes, within the definition of 'corruption', inducement of a person, by means of improper considerations, to commit a violation of duty (512).
281 In Re Austin [1994] 1 Qd R 225, the applicant sought determination of the question whether offences of which each respondent was convicted were 'prescribed offences' within s 4 and s 6 of the Public Officers' Superannuation Benefits Recovery Act 1998 (Qld) (the Recovery Act). The respondents had been convicted of offences of misappropriation of property under s 408C of the Criminal Code (Qld).
282 The term 'prescribed offence' was defined in s 4(1) of the Recovery Act as follows:
'prescribed offence' means an indictable offence consisting wholly or partly in conduct whereby the offender -
(a) has been corrupt in discharging any of the duties of a public office held by him;
(b) has corruptly neglected to discharge any of the duties of a public office held by him;
(c) has corruptly used a public office held by him;
(d) has corruptly asked for, received or agreed to receive or corruptly attempted to obtain any property, benefit, service, or advantage for himself or another in circumstances that include, as a relevant circumstance, the offender's holding a public office.
283 McPherson SPJ examined in detail the meaning that has been ascribed, in various contexts, to the words 'corrupt' and 'corruptly'. His Honour said:
In State v Barnett 69 P (2d) 77 the Criminal Court of Oklahoma cited with approval a passage from 14A Corpus Juris 1430, in which, speaking of corruption, it was said that it 'includes bribery, but is more comprehensive, because an act may be corruptly done, although the advantage to be derived from it is not offered by another'. See now 67 CJS 256, at 790. Examples from the same source include 'the unlawful disbursement of public moneys'. Corruption in office was defined in the contemporary edition of Black's Law Dictionary as 'the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others'. See also Hamburg-American Steam Packet Co v United States 250 F 747, 758 (1918); and Johnson v United States 260 F 783, 786 (1919). As I mentioned in Bjelke-Petersen v Burns [1988] 2 Qd R 129, 135, the expression 'corrupt' or 'corruption' has for some two centuries or more been in currency as connoting the use of a power to obtain 'some private advantage or for any purpose foreign to the power': see Mills v Mills [1938] HCA 4; (1938) 60 CLR 150, 185, per Dixon J. A recent example of its use in this sense, to which Mr Dunphy referred me, is Re A Company; Ex parte Glossop [1988] 1 WLR 1068, 1076 (229).
284 McPherson SPJ held that a person who uses a power of or incidental to a public office to obtain some private advantage or for any purpose foreign to the power will use the power 'corruptly'. His Honour concluded, on the facts of the case before him, that when each of the respondents exercised, for private purposes, authority to use credit facilities invested in them in their capacities as Ministers of the Crown, and as incidents of their holding office as such, they 'corruptly' used the public office that each of them so held, and therefore committed 'prescribed offences' (229 - 230). See also Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Hogarth (1995) 93 A Crim R 452, 454 - 455 (Higgins J); R v Bailey [2003] QCA 506 [19] (McPherson JA); R v Moran [2007] QCA 428 [61] (Keane JA, Holmes JA & Daubney J agreeing).
285 In Willers v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 219, the appellant, a police officer, was convicted of acting corruptly in the discharge of the functions of his public office so as to cause a detriment to a corporation, contrary to s 83 of the Code. He appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal against his conviction. A critical point in the appeal was whether the trial judge had properly instructed the jury in relation to the elements of the offence; in particular, as to the expression 'act corruptly' in s 83(c) and as to what constituted 'detriment'. Malcolm CJ (Anderson J agreeing) said that s 83 is concerned with the use of power or authority for improper purposes (222). His Honour referred to the decision of the High Court in Chew v The Queen [1992] HCA 18; (1992) 173 CLR 626, and then said:
It follows from Chew that, in order for a public officer to 'act corruptly', it is not necessary that he or she act in such a way in the performance of his or her duty which was likely to or tended to corrupt, another. It is the exercise of authority for an improper purpose, such as a purpose activated by malice, that constitutes the corrupt action and takes the acting outside of the scope of the officer's authority. This does not necessarily involve doing anything which was likely to or [tended] to corrupt, another. The submission that so long as the officer acted within the scope of his authority, he could not be said to be acting corruptly, even though he gained a benefit for himself or caused a detriment to another must be rejected. The abuse of the lawful authority to achieve an improper purpose is the very thing which takes the relevant act or conduct outside the scope of the lawful authority. It also follows that it is not necessary for the Crown to prove that a benefit was in fact obtained or a detriment was in fact caused to another: cf Chew, above (225).
286 In s 83, the concluding words 'so as to gain a benefit' or 'to cause a detriment' take the offence created by s 83 beyond the mere disclosure of information the subject of the offence created by s 81. See Rompotis v The Queen (1996) 18 WAR 54, 57 (Malcolm CJ).
287 In Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Pirone (1997) 68 SASR 106, Doyle CJ (Bollen & Duggan JJ agreeing) held that conduct which involves an abuse of a public office can properly be described as 'corrupt', in the sense of an exercise of authority for an improper purpose (110). His Honour cited Willers (225) and Re Austin.
288 The State's case against Mr Hondros on count 2 (and its case against Mr Burke and Mr Grill on the related count 4) alleged that Mr Hondros, having received the draft Phase III policy on 10 October 2006, sent it by email to Mr Grill on the following day for an improper purpose, and that this purpose would have involved a benefit being gained improperly by Mr Burke and Mr Grill and their client, Mr Brown.
289 The State's case was put on the basis that the improper purpose was to be inferred from the conversation at the meeting on 9 October 2006 between Mr Hondros, Mr Burke and Mr Grill and against the relevant background to that meeting.
(a) at the meeting it was agreed that Mr Hondros would provide the latest version of the draft Phase III policy to Mr Burke and Mr Grill in an electronic format so that it could be changed by them subtly or imperceptibly, in a manner favourable to Mr Brown, and then presented to Cabinet for approval, as if it had been approved by the Department of Fisheries and PIAC, but without the changes in fact being disclosed to the Department of Fisheries or PIAC or sent to them for consideration; and
(b) this agreement involved the implementation of a plan to deceive Cabinet in relation to the provenance of the Phase III policy document.
291 It was submitted by counsel for the State that it was open to a tribunal of fact to conclude that the intended by-passing of the proper processes for consultation and scrutiny of the policy document by the Department of Fisheries and PIAC, in circumstances in which it would appear that these processes had been undertaken, rendered Mr Hondros's participation in the plan a dereliction of his duty and involved a perversion of his office. According to counsel for the State, Mr Hondros's action in sending the document to Mr Grill was imbued with this impropriety and was, therefore, a corrupt act.
292 I have set out at [78] - [83] above the relevant parts of the conversation at the meeting on 9 October 2006. Those parts must, of course, be considered in the context of the whole of the conversation.
293 The following parts of the conversation at the meeting on 9 October 2006 are of particular importance in considering whether Mr Hondros had a case to answer on count 2:
(a) In my opinion, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to infer from the following passage, in the context of the conversation as a whole and the relevant background, that Mr Hondros, Mr Burke and Mr Grill agreed to amend, 'with a few words', the draft Phase III policy that had been endorsed by Mr Ford to confer a general discretion on the Minister in relation to the allocation of quotas:
HONDROS Yeah. Do you think uhm, do you think it's ah it's ah step too far, and they'd sniff it out too quickly if you if you make it indigenous interests and you know for the interests of the industry or?
GRILL I think we've got to make it a bit wider. What I was going to suggest is we ah actually have a look at a hatchery policy that he's
HONDROS Yeah.
GRILL Informally endorsed.
HONDROS Yeah
GRILL And just see how with a few words
HONDROS Yeah
BURKE we can change
HONDROS I can get a copy of that
BURKE Yeah that's a good idea Julian.
GRILL Would you send that?
BURKE Would you send that to Julian?
HONDROS Absolutely. Absolutely. Now his ah, how they how they tended to operate is they ah in terms of hatchery quota is you ah you you shut the gate you limit it to the players who are currently there, you allow new entrants merely on the purchase of of entitlement, ah and then if ah if ah it it's if it's deemed that it's in the interest of the ah industry and there's the supply, sorry and there's the demand to warrant it, they can increase quota pro rata......................
BURKE Who, who can increase
HONDROS Ah the minister on the advice of the ah of the industry, ah
BURKE Well you need to make the minister can to do it, whether it's on advice or not or
HONDROS Yeah.
GRILL Exactly so you can't fetter his discretion
HONDROS Yeah so an an escape clause so that's, however that translated into in the legislation or a or a guideline ah there needs to be an escape clause there for him to do what he wants (BAB/GAB 585 - 586).
(b) In my opinion, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to infer, from the following passage, in the context of the conversation as a whole and the relevant background, that the 'guidelines' referred to in the passage comprised the draft Phase III policy approved by Mr Ford and that it was this policy, after it was 'changed imperceptibly' by Mr Burke and Mr Grill, that would be sent to Cabinet, without the amendments being disclosed to the Department of Fisheries or PIAC or sent to them for consideration:
HONDROS It's it's a matter of how to unpick and frame it so he can actually get it right
BURKE I reckon what happens is this, that when you get the decision from Roger's, it comes to you, Julian will look and I'll look at the guidelines that you send us.
HONDROS Yeah
BURKE We'll send them back to you
HONDROS Mm hm
BURKE Then you take those to cabinet after [Jon's], don't send them back to Rogers
HONDROS No no I won't
BURKE Just take them straight to cabinet and let cabinet endorse them and then if the industry wants to kick up a fuss, it has to then do two things.
HONDROS Mm mm
BURKE Argue about the
HONDROS Yep.
BURKE content of the guidelines but secondly
HONDROS Yeah.
BURKE throw back in every cabinet ministers face that he or she made a wrong decision
HONDROS Yes.
BURKE And once you get it through
HONDROS Yeah
BURKE they're not going to want to do that, cos no one likes to admit they're wrong
HONDROS That's right, (laughs) especially cabinet, yeah.
GRILL Yes.
HONDROS Okay that's a great idea.
BURKE So I, if you can get that to us, it will be changed imperceptibly I reckon.
HONDROS Yeah
BURKE And then the other thing is this, if Jon doesn't want to, he needn't.
HONDROS Mm mm
BURKE So if he doesn't want to give x y z or Kel Brown or Bill Smith additional quota he doesn't have to but he's got the authority to do it if he judges he should.
HONDROS Yeah (BAB/GAB 587 - 589).
(c) In my opinion, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to infer from the following passage, in the context of the conversation as a whole and the relevant background, that there would be an opportunity for other people with a responsibility for or an interest in quota allocations (for example, Mr Rogers, the chief executive officer of the Department of Fisheries) to be consulted about how the Minister's proposed general discretion in relation to quota allocations should be exercised, after the draft Phase III policy (as approved by Mr Ford) had been changed imperceptibly by Mr Burke and Mr Grill, and approved by Cabinet:
BURKE Alright mate that's good. Thanks for your time with that and if you can get that policy to Jul, guidelines to Julian, we'll do em and send it back to you and make it as imperceptible as possible. But I wouldn't then just send it back to Rogers or anywhere else.
HONDROS No that's a great idea. I'm gunna uhm, I've asked the question about when they'll be translated into ah guidelines and we'll just take the guidelines to, Cabinet.
BURKE And change what we want yeah. Goodo.
HONDROS You know, which is unusual but they won't know about it before we do it.
BURKE Not at all.
HONDROS And they've plenty of chance to be consulted prior to whatever.
BURKE Oh yeah Yeah, No I think it's very fair, and it, I can tell you from my own experience that there's plenty of precedent. Happened lots of times when I was Premier.
HONDROS Mm mm (BAB/GAB 593).
294 In my opinion, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to make findings and inferences, as to the relevant background to the meeting on 9 October 2006 and, in the case of par (p), as to an aspect or consequence of the plan agreed upon at that meeting, as follows:
(a) The dealings between Mr Burke and Ms Archer from 30 January 2006 to 22 June 2006 in relation to Mr Ford reveal that Mr Burke was aware that Mr Ford was unwilling to deal with him. See exhibits 5, 7, 8, 10 - 13, 17, 18, 23 - 25, 27, 28, 30, 32, 38, 39A, 40A and 44 (BAB/GAB 171 - 392).
(b) On 16 August 2006, at the meeting between Mr Ford, Mr Hondros, Mr Burke and Mr Grill, Mr Burke and Mr Grill became aware, as was the fact, that Mr Hondros had primary responsibility for pearling industry matters within Mr Ford's office, and that Mr Ford was sympathetic to the position of their client, although he gave no commitment as to what would occur. See Mr Ford's evidence at ts 260, 338, 431, 499, 571 and 671.
(c) Dealings between Mr Burke and Mr Grill reveal that they doubted Mr Ford's competence in relation to pearling industry matters. See exhibit 54 (BAB/GAB 428 - 429).
(d) In an email sent on 18 August 2006, Mr Grill reported to Mr Brown about the meeting on 16 August 2006 with Mr Ford and Mr Hondros. Mr Grill told Mr Brown that he and Mr Burke had 'started to pay a little more attention to [Hondros] now that we are more fully aware of his role'. See exhibit 54 (BAB/GAB 428 - 429).
(e) Mr Burke proceeded to cultivate Mr Hondros's loyalty, in part, by suggesting to Mr Hondros that he should put himself forward as an Australian Labor Party candidate for election to the State Parliament. See Mr Burke's telephone conversation on 19 September 2006 with 'Michelle', apparently a member of the State Caucus of the Australian Labor Party (BAB/GAB 468 - 469); Mr Burke's telephone conversation on 19 September 2006 with Mr Hondros (BAB/GAB 470 - 479); and the early part of the conversation at the meeting on 9 October 2006 between Mr Burke, Mr Grill and Mr Hondros (BAB/GAB 541 - 581).
(f) In an email sent on 31 August 2006, Mr Grill informed Mr Burke, Mr Nicholls and Mr Brown that Mr Ford was not 'stupid', but it was important that Mr Nicholls 'not make [his] presentation to him too complex'. On that date, Mr Burke sent an email to Mr Nicholls, with a copy to Mr Grill and Mr Brown, in which he set out his views, relevantly, as to Mr Ford's intellectual capacity:
I note Julian says John is not stupid ... well, make sure its all one syllable stuff with pictures and not too much running writing. My eyes glaze over at the arcane complexity of this industry and I really think the minister will be looking out the window if we make things too complex.
(g) The views of Mr Burke and Mr Grill to the effect that Mr Ford was a man of only modest intellect, and their knowledge of the role and responsibilities of Mr Hondros within Mr Ford's office, are consistent with a belief, at least on their part, that Mr Ford was unlikely:
(i) to detect the subtle or imperceptible changes that it was contemplated, at the meeting on 9 October 2006, would be made to the draft Phase III policy before it was sent to Cabinet; or
(ii) to ascertain, before the draft Phrase III policy was sent to Cabinet, that the subtle or imperceptible changes had not been disclosed to the Department or PIAC or sent to them for consideration,
(h) At all material times, Mr Hondros was well-acquainted with Mr Ford's abilities as a Minister of State and his approach to matters of policy requiring Cabinet approval, including the likelihood of his detecting the subtle or imperceptible changes that were contemplated and the likelihood of his ascertaining, before the draft Phase III policy was sent to Cabinet, that the proposed subtle or imperceptible changes had not been disclosed to the Department or PIAC or sent to them for consideration, if these matters were not drawn to his attention.
(i) At all material times, the respondents were aware of the processes associated with the obtaining of Cabinet approval to matters of policy. Mr Burke was a former Premier, Mr Grill was a former Minister for Fisheries and Mr Hondros was the chief of staff of the current Minister for Fisheries. In particular, it was open to conclude that each of the respondents was aware that Cabinet had to be satisfied that the relevant Department had been consulted in relation to any policy document it was being asked to consider. See the evidence of Malcolm Wauchope, the current Public Sector Commissioner for Western Australia and a former Director General of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet (ts 1104 - 1107).
(j) On 13 September 2006, Mr Brown spoke by telephone with Mr Grill after Mr Brown had met with Mr Ford. Mr Brown told Mr Grill in effect that Mr Ford had been sympathetic, but Mr Ford needed to inform himself better about the economics of the matter. See exhibit 66 (BAB/GAB 462 - 465).
(k) Mr Ford gave evidence that he had requested Mr Hondros to obtain advice from an independent economist about pearling industry matters (ts 287 - 288, 558). Mr Hondros had not responded to Mr Ford in relation to that request, and Mr Ford was unaware that Mr Hondros was seeking advice from Mr Burke and Mr Grill.
(l) Mr Hondros was willing to assist Mr Burke, and to provide him with information, despite Mr Ford's instruction to his staff (including Mr Hondros) that no such contact was to occur. See, for example, the telephone message left by Mr Burke for Mr Hondros on 25 September 2006 requesting an update on fishing and pearling issues (exhibit 70 (BAB/GAB 480)) and the email from Mr Hondros to Mr Burke on the same date in response to the message (exhibits 72A and 73 (BAB/GAB 482 - 487)).
(m) On 5 October 2006, Mr Hondros telephoned Mr Grill and requested a meeting at a time when Mr Ford would be in Cabinet (exhibit 83 (BAB/GAB 522 - 525)). Mr Hondros said that a meeting at this time would save him having to explain 'what [he was] up to'. This is consistent with a desire by Mr Hondros to conceal from Mr Ford that he was meeting with Mr Burke and Mr Grill, in the knowledge that he would be contravening Mr Ford's instruction. Mr Hondros commented to Mr Grill during the telephone conversation, in an apparent reference to the pearling policy issue, that 'It's positive, but tricky'. Mr Grill later informed Mr Burke of Mr Hondros's request for a meeting and Mr Hondros's comment, although Mr Grill misquoted it as 'It's doable, but tricky'. See exhibits 84, 86 and 87 (BAB/GAB 526 - 527, 530 - 534).
(n) Mr Hondros's diary entry for the time at which he was to meet with Mr Burke and Mr Grill on 9 October 2006 showed a different appointment, namely, a doctor's appointment. See exhibit 88 (BAB/GAB 535). This is consistent with Mr Hondros wanting to conceal from Mr Ford the fact that he was meeting with Mr Burke and Mr Grill, in the knowledge that he was contravening Mr Ford's instruction.
(o) The drafts of the Phase III policy have statements on the coversheets to the effect that they have been prepared by PIAC and published by the Department of Fisheries. Also, they are described on the coversheets as a 'Fisheries Occasional Publication No XX'.
(p) The subtle or imperceptible changes contemplated by Mr Burke, Mr Grill and Mr Hondros would operate in a manner favourable to Mr Brown, as a small producer in the pearling industry. Also, pursuant to the plan agreed upon between Mr Burke, Mr Grill and Mr Hondros, Mr Burke and Mr Grill, as professional consultants and lobbyists, would gain a benefit by having access to the relevant draft Phase III policy (which they would not otherwise have had) and by amending the policy in a manner favourable to their client, Mr Brown, before it was submitted to Cabinet.
295 In my opinion, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Hondros deliberately gave the draft Phase III policy to Mr Burke and Mr Grill in an electronic format for an improper purpose, such as to render his conduct corrupt. In particular, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that:
(a) the respondents' plan was to have the draft Phase III policy amended subtly or imperceptibly by Mr Grill, in a manner favourable to Mr Brown, and then presented to Cabinet for approval, as if it had been approved by the Department of Fisheries and PIAC, but without the changes in fact being disclosed to the Department of Fisheries or PIAC or sent to them for consideration; and
(b) this plan involved deceiving Cabinet in relation to the provenance of the Phase III policy document.
296 Put another way, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to exclude all hypotheses consistent with the innocence of Mr Hondros as not reasonably open on the evidence.
297 The hypotheses consistent with the innocence of Mr Hondros that it was open to exclude included the hypothesis that Mr Hondros did not act for an improper purpose because his purpose was 'achieving the formulation of a change in policy so that it was expressed in terms of which the Hon Minister might approve' [259].
298 In my opinion, the trial judge was in error in failing to find, on the assumption that all inferences most favourable to the State, which were reasonably open, were drawn, that the evidence of the meeting on 9 October 2006, in the context of the relevant background to that meeting and the relevant aspects or consequences of the plan agreed upon at that meeting, was capable of establishing Mr Hondros's guilt in respect of count 2 beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, on this assumption, the evidence of the meeting, in the applicable context, was capable of establishing, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Hondros acted 'corruptly' in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment, by deliberately giving the latest version of the draft Phase III policy in electronic format to Mr Burke and Mr Grill for an improper purpose involving deception, so as to gain a benefit for Mr Burke, Mr Grill and others (including Mr Brown).
299 It is unnecessary, in the circumstances, to consider that aspect of the State's grounds of appeal which attacks the adequacy of the trial judge's reasons as to why, in his view, the evidence could not establish the impugned purpose or why, if the evidence was capable of establishing the impugned purpose, that purpose would not be improper such as to render Mr Hondros's conduct corrupt.
300 Subject to my consideration of Mr Hondros's notice of contention and the possible application of the 'proviso', the State succeeds in its appeal against the trial judge's decision that Mr Hondros had no case to answer on count 2.
301 The elements of the offence alleged against Mr Burke and Mr Grill in count 4, being an alleged contravention of s 83(c) read with s 7 of the Code, are:
(a) At the material time, was Mr Hondros a 'public officer', as defined in s 1(1) of the Code?
(b) If 'yes' to par (a), did Mr Hondros act corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment so as to gain a benefit for Mr Burke, Mr Grill and others?
(c) If 'yes' to par (b), did Mr Hondros act corruptly 'without lawful authority' or 'a reasonable excuse', within s 83?
(d) If 'yes' to pars (a), (b) and (c), did Mr Burke or Mr Grill counsel or procure Mr Hondros to act corruptly?
302 The particulars given by the State in relation to the alleged counselling and procuring by Mr Burke in relation to count 4, were as follows:
4.1 Counselling (by Mr Burke)
On 9 October 2006, at Mr Grill's residential unit in ... Perth, Mr Burke, by his own statements and by his complicity in the statements of Mr Grill, advised and urged Mr Hondros to provide him and Mr Grill with the Pearl Oyster Hatchery Policy endorsed by the Minister for Fisheries, in order for Mr Burke and Mr Grill to make amendments to the policy favourable to their client, with a view to the amended policy being submitted to Cabinet for approval without further review by the Department of Fisheries: see transcript of conversation recorded 9 October 2006 pursuant to CCC Warrant 10/05 at pp 45 - 48.
4.2 Procuring (by Mr Burke)
On 9 October 2006, at Mr Grill's residential unit in ... Perth, Mr Burke, by his own statements and by his complicity in the statements of Mr Grill, advised and urged Mr Hondros to provide him and Mr Grill with the Pearl Oyster Hatchery Policy endorsed by the Minister for Fisheries, in order for Mr Burke and Mr Grill to make amendments to the policy favourable to their client, with a view to the amended policy being submitted to Cabinet for approval without further review by the Department of Fisheries: see transcript of conversation recorded 9 October 2006 pursuant to CCC Warrant 10/05 at pp 45 - 48 (BAB/GAB 78).
303 The particulars given in relation to the alleged counselling and procuring by Mr Grill were, relevantly, identical to those given in relation to Mr Burke.
304 The particulars given in relation to the alleged benefits that Mr Burke and Mr Grill stood to gain were as follows:
4.5 Benefit (Mr Burke stood to gain)
The benefit that Mr Burke stood to gain from the corrupt conduct was access to the then current draft of the Pearl Oyster Hatchery Policy Phase III, to which he would not otherwise have had access (and was not authorised to have access), and the opportunity to make amendments to the document beneficial to his client before it was submitted to Cabinet for approval.
4.6 Benefit (Mr Grill stood to gain)
The benefit that Mr Grill stood to gain was the same as that for Mr Burke. Further, Mr Grill's client also stood to benefit as a result of Mr Grill and Mr Burke having the opportunity to amend the Pearl Oyster Hatchery Policy before it was submitted to Cabinet, in that the amendments were intended to improve his prospects of an increased hatchery quota (BAB/GAB 79).
Count 4: the trial judge's reasoning and conclusion
305 The trial judge's conclusion in relation to Mr Hondros and count 2 necessarily disposed of count 4, in that count 4 alleged, relevantly, that Mr Burke and Mr Grill had counselled or procured the criminal conduct alleged against Mr Hondros in count 2. As a result, neither Mr Burke nor Mr Grill could be convicted of count 4.
306 His Honour made these additional observations about count 4:
[I]t will be evident from what I have written that although the purpose was clear, in my judgment, to amend the document so as to have it go to Cabinet without reference to the Department or PIAC, or without anyone in the Department or PIAC realising that it had been materially changed, this was not a corrupt purpose under s 83 [262].
307 The trial judge therefore decided that Mr Burke and Mr Grill did not have a case to answer on count 4 and that a judgment of acquittal should be entered on that count.
308 The grounds of appeal allege, in essence, that the trial judge also made in the context of count 4 the errors alleged at [274] above in the context of count 2.
Count 4: matters not in issue in the appeal
309 It was not in dispute, either at the trial or on the appeal, that at the material time Mr Hondros was a 'public officer', as defined in s 1(1) of the Code.
310 Also, it was not in dispute, on the appeal, that if Mr Hondros acted corruptly in the performance or discharge of the functions of his office or employment so as to gain a benefit for Mr Burke, Mr Grill and others, then Mr Hondros acted 'without lawful authority' and without 'a reasonable excuse', within s 83.
Count 4: was there a case to answer at the close of the State's case?
311 For the reasons I have given at [275] - [298] above, in the context of count 2, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude, beyond reasonable doubt, that Mr Burke and Mr Grill had deliberately counselled or procured Mr Hondros to act corruptly, as alleged against Mr Hondros in count 2.
312 Put another way, on the best view of the evidence (from the State's perspective), at the close of the State's case, it was open to conclude that all hypotheses consistent with the innocence of Mr Burke or Mr Grill had been excluded as not reasonably open on the evidence. See [296] - [297] above.
313 Subject to my consideration of Mr Hondros's notice of contention and the possible application of the 'proviso', the State succeeds in its appeal against the trial judge's decision that Mr Burke and Mr Grill had no case to answer on count 4.
314 Mr Hondros filed a notice of contention in which he asserted that the orders of the trial judge should be affirmed on grounds other than those relied on by his Honour.
315 There are two grounds in the notice of contention, which read:
Ground 1
That (contrary to his Honour's findings of law at paragraphs [33], [40] and [56] in The State of Western Australia v Burke [No 3] [2010] WASC 110 (Burke [No 3]) Mr Hondros was not a 'government contractor' for the purposes of s 81 of the Criminal Code.
Ground 2
That, instead of deciding that count 2 could not be proved in accordance with the law as wrongly explained in Willers v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 219, his Honour ought to have dismissed the count against Mr Hondros as there was no evidence his conduct was 'corrupt' within the meaning of s 83(c) of the Criminal Code, in that his conduct was not:
(a) deliberate;
(b) contrary to the duties incumbent upon him by virtue of his office; and
(c) dishonest or attended by moral turpitude in the sense of a perversion of integrity.
Ground 1 of the notice of contention: Mr Hondros's submissions
316 According to counsel for Mr Hondros, Mr Hondros was neither a 'public servant', as defined in s 81(1) (that is, a person employed in the Public Service) nor a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1). Counsel argued that although Mr Hondros was a ministerial officer appointed under s 68(1) of the Public Sector Management Act, he was employed to provide services to the Minister but not to the State.
317 Counsel for Mr Hondros also submitted that Mr Hondros, as a ministerial officer, could not be a 'government contractor' for the purposes of s 81 of the Code. This submission was based on the assertion that the categories of 'public officer' and 'government contractor' under the Code are mutually exclusive. In other words, it was submitted that the expression 'government contractor' is used in contradistinction to 'public officer'.
Ground 1 of the notice of contention: its merits
318 In my opinion, Mr Hondros was a 'government contractor', as defined in s 81(1), in that he was a person who was not employed in the Public Service but who provided, or was employed in the provision of, services for the purposes of the State of Western Australia.
319 The phrase 'for the purposes of the State of Western Australia', in the definition of 'government contractor', connotes that the services in question are or will be provided for or in connection with, relevantly, activities which are within the exercise of the State's legislative or executive powers. The services provided by Mr Hondros fell within this description. It is unnecessary to state exhaustively the matters comprehended by the phrase 'for the purposes of the State of Western Australia'.
320 It is true that, by virtue of his appointment as a 'ministerial officer', Mr Hondros was appointed to assist a particular political office holder, namely, Mr Ford in his capacity as Minister for Fisheries. See the definitions of 'ministerial office', 'political office holder' and 'ministerial officer' in s 3(1) of the Public Sector Management Act.
321 However, Mr Ford, in his capacity as Minister for Fisheries, was a servant or agent of the State. He was the political head of the Department of Fisheries. Also, he was responsible for administering the statutes dealing with the Department's business. Services that are provided for a Minister in his or her capacity as a servant or agent of the State, or for the lawful activities of a department of government, are services 'for the purposes of the State of Western Australia', within the definition of 'government contractor' in s 81(1).
322 At the material time, the term 'public officer' was defined in s 1(1) of the Code, as follows:
The term 'public officer' means any of the following -
(a) a police officer;
(aa) a Minister of the Crown;
(ab) a Parliamentary Secretary appointed under section 44A of the Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899;
(ac) a member of either House of Parliament;
(ad) a person exercising authority under a written law;
(b) a person authorised under a written law to execute or serve any process of a court or tribunal;
(c) a public service officer or employee within the meaning of the Public Sector Management Act 1994;
(ca) a person who holds a permit to do high level security work as defined in the Court Security and Custodial Services Act 1999;
(cb) a person who holds a permit to do high level security work as defined in the Prisons Act 1981;
(d) a member, officer or employee of any authority, board, corporation, commission, local government, council of a local government, council or committee or similar body established under a written law;
(e) any other person holding office under, or employed by, the State of Western Australia, whether for remuneration or not.
323 Section 81 is the sole provision in ch XII of the Code, headed 'Disclosing official secrets'. The offence created by s 81 expressly relates to public servants and government contractors, as defined. Section 81 makes no reference to public officers, as defined.
324 Chapter XIII of the Code, headed 'Corruption and abuse of office', comprises s 82 - s 88. Section 82 is concerned with the bribery of a public officer, as defined; s 83 is concerned with corruption by a public officer, as defined; s 85 is concerned with the falsification of records by a public officer, as defined; and s 87 is concerned with impersonating a public officer, as defined. None of the provisions of ch XIII or the offences it creates refers to a 'public servant' or a 'government contractor'.
325 Section 81 and s 83 create different offences. No doubt, the definitions of 'government contractor' and 'public officer' overlap. Some 'government contractors' will be 'public officers' and some 'government contractors' will not be 'public officers'. Similarly, some 'public officers' will be 'government contractors' and some 'public officers' will not be 'government contractors'. There is no basis, in logic or on the application of the accepted principles of statutory construction, for concluding that the Parliament intended that the categories of 'public officer' and 'government contractor' under the Code should be mutually exclusive.
326 Ground 1 of the notice of contention is without merit.
Ground 2 of the notice contention: Mr Hondros's submissions
327 Counsel for Mr Hondros submitted that Willers was wrongly decided. It was asserted on behalf of Mr Hondros that:
(a) Malcolm CJ did not endeavour to construe and put together all elements of s 83(c) of the Code;
(b) The term 'corruptly' in s 83(c) involves conduct done deliberately, contrary to the duties incumbent upon the public officer by virtue of his or her office, and attended by 'moral turpitude', in the sense of the perversion of a person's integrity or dishonesty.
(c) Malcolm CJ erred in saying that s 83 is 'concerned with the use of power or authority for improper purposes' and that in relation to a 'public officer' the scope of s 83 was similar to the scope of s 232(6) of the Corporations Law, as then enacted, and as analysed by the High Court in Chew. Although Chew was relevant to an understanding of 'so as to gain a benefit', within s 83 of the Code, it was not relevant as to the meaning of 'corruptly'.
(d) Malcolm CJ erred in failing to discern the intention of the Parliament, and construe s 83, by an understanding of the meaning of the statutory text.
(e) The word 'corruptly' should be given the dictionary meanings quoted in Willers at 224.
328 According to counsel for Mr Hondros, it was not open to the tribunal of fact (taking the State's case at its highest), to find that the State had made out the 'corruption element' in count 2 beyond reasonable doubt.
Ground 2 of the notice of contention: its merits
329 The dictionary meanings set out by Malcolm CJ in Willers at 224 are these:
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed 1989) Vol III at 974 the adverb 'corruptly' means to act 'In a corrupt or depraved manner; pervertedly; by means of corruption or bribery'. The participle 'corrupt' is said relevantly at 972 to include 'Debased in character, inflicted with evil, depraved; perverted; evil, wicked' and 'Perverted from uprightness and fidelity in the discharge of duty; influenced by bribery or the like'. The verb 'corrupt' includes 'To destroy or pervert the integrity or fidelity of (a person) in his discharge of duty; to induce to act dishonestly or unfaithfully; to make venal; to bribe'. See also the Shorter Oxford Dictionary at 400. The Macquarie Dictionary gives the meaning of the adjective 'corrupt' as including 'dishonest, without integrity; guilty of dishonesty, esp involving bribery'. This meaning is extended to the adverb which clearly includes acting dishonestly or without integrity. The noun 'corruption' includes the act of corrupting and extends to 'corrupt or dishonest proceedings' as well as 'bribery'.
330 It is apparent from these definitions that acting 'corruptly' can include acting 'dishonestly'. However, as Malcolm CJ went on to observe in Willers (224), acting 'corruptly' does not necessarily mean acting 'dishonestly'. See R v Smith [1960] 2 QB 423, 428 - 429 (Lord Parker CJ).
331 It is unnecessary, in this appeal, to examine the correctness of Malcolm CJ's reasoning in Willers or to consider whether Willers was wrongly decided.
332 It is sufficient, for present purposes, to state that a government contractor who is a public officer will act 'corruptly' within s 83(c) if he or she, without lawful authority or a reasonable excuse, deliberately performs or discharges a function of his or her office or employment for an improper purpose, so as to gain a benefit, or so as to cause a detriment, to any person, at least where (as on the State's case in these prosecutions) the improper purpose involves a plan to deceive. See [278] - [287], [295] - [298] above.
333 For the reasons I have given at [275] - [298], [309] - [312] above, it was open to the tribunal of fact (taking the State's case at its highest), to find that Mr Hondros had a case to answer on count 3 and Mr Burke and Mr Grill had a case to answer on count 4.
A miscellaneous issue: the 'proviso' in s 33(2a) of the Criminal Appeals Act
335 Section 33 of the Criminal Appeals Act applies in the case of an appeal by a prosecutor against any decision referred to in s 24(2) of the Act in relation to an indictable charge.
336 By s 24(2), the prosecutor may appeal to this court against any one or more of the following decisions by a judge of a superior court in relation to a charge of an indictable offence:
(a) a decision refusing to consent to the discontinuance of the prosecution of the charge;
(b) a judgment entered under the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 section 128(2) or (3);
(c) a decision ordering a permanent stay of proceedings on the charge;
(d) a decision ordering an adjournment of proceedings on the charge;
(da) a judgment of acquittal (other than a judgment of acquittal on account of unsoundness of mind) entered after a jury's verdict of not guilty of a charge the statutory penalty for which is or includes imprisonment for 14 years or more or life, but only on the grounds that before or during the trial the judge made an error of fact or law in relation to the charge;
(e) a judgment of acquittal (other than a judgment of acquittal on account of unsoundness of mind) -
(i) entered after a decision by the judge that the accused has no case to answer on the charge; or
(ii) entered in a trial by the judge alone;
(f) any judgment entered as a result of any of the above decisions;
(g) any order made as a result of any of the above decisions or judgments.
337 Section 33(2a) provides that even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the prosecutor, this court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.
338 Section 24(2)(da) and s 33(2a) were inserted into the Criminal Appeals Act by the Criminal Law and Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (WA). Section 24(2)(da) confers a statutory right of appeal on the prosecutor from a judgment of acquittal (other than a judgment of acquittal on account of unsoundness of mind), entered after a jury's verdict of not guilty on a charge carrying a maximum penalty of at least 14 years' imprisonment or life, on the ground that the trial judge made an error of fact or law in his or her charge to the jury. It appears that s 24(2)(da) and s 33(2a) were enacted to give effect to recommendation 349 in the final report of the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia's Review of the Criminal and Civil Justice System in Western Australia, Project 92, September 1999.
339 I am not persuaded, in the present case, that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred as a result of the trial judge's erroneous decision that none of the respondents had a case to answer on any of counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the indictment.
340 The critical issue for the trial judge, on the no case submission, was whether a reasonable tribunal of fact, properly instructed, could conclude beyond reasonable doubt, in relation to each count, that the relevant respondent or respondents was guilty. Put another way, the critical issue for his Honour was whether a reasonable tribunal of fact, properly instructed, could exclude all hypotheses consistent with the innocence of the relevant respondent or respondents as not reasonably open on the evidence.
341 The critical issue for this court, on the appeal, is whether his Honour's decision on the no case submission was in error. For the reasons I have given, his Honour's decision was erroneous.
342 The State's case against the respondents has not been tried according to law. The trial judge should have decided that there was a case to answer on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4, and his Honour should have put each of the respondents to his election in relation to whether to give or adduce evidence. A final determination as to the facts to be found and the inferences to be drawn can be made only after each respondent has made his election and the procedures for the taking of evidence and the receipt
of submissions have been completed. A fair trial involves fairness both to the accused and the State.
343 In these circumstances, it is not open to conclude that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred. The 'proviso' in s 33(2a) should not be applied.
344 I would grant leave to appeal on grounds 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7, allow the appeal, dismiss the notice of contention, set aside the judgments of acquittal on counts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the indictment, and order a new trial on each of those counts before a differently constituted court.
(1992) 173 CLR 626
(1997) 68 SASR 106
(1989) 97 FLR 424
(2008) 73 NSWLR 22
(1955) 92 CLR 654
(1998) 19 WAR 482
(1993) 61 SASR 1
(1984) 36 SASR 321
(1990) 2 WAR 222
(1938) 60 CLR 150
(1911) 13 CLR 619
(1990) 21 NSWLR 135
(2004) 218 CLR 216
(2008) 220 FLR 21
(1996) 18 WAR 54
(1990) 99 FLR 213
(1952) 87 CLR 115
(1992) 60 SASR 110