9 These questions and what was submitted by the plaintiff make no mention of a challenge to the rehearing. Presumably, this aspect of the appeal was not pressed because no appeal lies from a refusal of an application for a rehearing (s68(8) of the Act).
10 I will now briefly return to matters concerning the Scheme. There is no dispute that the plaintiff is a "beneficiary" within the meaning thereof. What the Court is presently concerned with falls within the losses specified in (d) and (e) of clause 5(1). Clause 7 deals with the matter of time limitations. The relevant provisions are as follows:-
"7. (1) Subject to subclause (2), to qualify for the benefits under this scheme, the beneficiaries must notify the Corporation in writing of the matters that could give rise to the losses referred to in clause 5 or 5A within the following times:
(a) for loss in relation to incomplete residential building work - within 12 months from:
(i) the contract date; or
(ii) the date provided in the contract for commencement of work; or
(iii) the date work ceased on the project,
whichever is the latest;
(b) for loss relating to heads of claim in clause 5(1)(d) or (e) incurred in rectifying major structural defects or in repairing damage to the dwelling that has occurred in consequence of major structural defects - within 6 months after the beneficiary first becomes aware of the defect, but no later than 7 years from:
(i) the commencement of insured building work which is not also insured owner-builder work; or
(ii) the date of issue of the owner-builder permit for insured owner-builder work;"
…..
11 It can be seen that what must be done by a beneficiary within time is to notify, in writing, of the matters that could give rise to the losses referred to in, inter alia, clause 5.
12 The Scheme contains a provision enabling an extension of time. Clause 7(2) provides as follows:-
"(2) The Corporation may extend the times specified in subclause (1) if it is satisfied that the delay in notification was due to circumstances outside the control of the beneficiary".
13 This provision confers a discretionary power to extend time. The discretion is available for exercise when and if the Corporation is satisfied that the delay in notification was due to circumstances outside the control of the beneficiary. This may be seen as a threshold requirement.
14 The attention of the Court has been directed to certain cases which have considered the application of the Scheme (Fair Trading Administration Corporation v The Owners-Strata Plan No. 43551 [2002] NSWSC 624 and McCallum Developments Pty Ltd v The Owners-Strata Plan No. 53908 [2002] NSWSC 1103).
15 Before dealing with the three questions that have been distilled by the plaintiff, I should first look at the question of the ambit of the avenue of appeal provided by s67 of the Act. It is a question that has been posed in numerous cases (inter alia, Kalokerinos v HIA Insurance Services P/L [2004] NSWCA 312). What has been said in the cases may still leave doubt.
16 Leaving aside what may fall within the category of the doubtful, certain aspects of the ambit of the appeal seem to be clear.
17 The ambit of the challenge is narrow. It has to concern the deciding of a question of the nature specified in the section. It is not synonymous with the common law concept of error in point of law or the like (which is a familiar form of limited right of appeal conferred by Statute). It has been said to be drafted in careful language and it has been distinguished from the familiar forms used in the granting of limited rights of appeal by Statute. It has been said that it is restricted to cases where the appeal involves a pure question of law.
18 The section has to be construed in context (inter alia, having regard to other provisions thereof and the provisions of s65). Section 67(8) provides that a reference in the section to a matter of law includes a reference to a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Section 65 provides an avenue of challenge in respect of matters of jurisdiction and denial of procedural fairness.
19 It seems to me that the first of the three questions inevitably fails on the facts. There was evidence before the Tribunal member to support the finding of awareness of defects on or about 30 October 1996 (rather that on or about 18 June 1997). The evidence is to be found, inter alia, in the complaint form dated 1 September 1997. It does not assist the plaintiff if there is merely error in the fact finding process.
20 Leaving that matter aside, I do not accept the plaintiff's submission that an absence of evidence to support a finding of fact constitutes a ground of appeal falling within the ambit of s67 of the Act.
21 On this question, the plaintiff has referred to passages to be found in two decided cases (what was said by Burchett AJ (at paragraph 25) in Fair Trading and what was said by Mason J (as he then was) in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond and Others (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 356).
22 In my view, Mason J (as he then was) was addressing the question of what constitutes error in point of law and the like (he used the expression "question of law"). He was not addressing the question of the proper construction of s67.
23 There were many cases which were decided some years ago on the basis that the ambit of s67 coincided with error in point of law. In certain of them there had been a consensus between Counsel as to the ambit of appeal and courts had proceeded on the assumption that the consensus correctly represented the ambit of appeal (see, inter alia, Janos Hoey v Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal [2002] NSWSC 1023). Perhaps, what was said by Burchett AJ can be so explained.
24 However, the better view seems to be that he put his mind to what was contemplated by an "error of law" (rather than the unique language of s67). He erroneously took the view that s67 had the meaning of what had been the position at common law, and failed to address the particular provisions of the section. As a consequence he addressed the wrong question. Whatever be the position, I prefer a different view.
25 I consider that the narrow ambit of a s71 appeal excludes the "no evidence" ground (whether there is any evidence of a particular fact). It is a view that I have expressed in other cases (see, inter alia, Alex Constructions Pty Limited v John Zavodnyik & Ors [2004] NSWSC 1152).