Administrator's entitlement to remuneration
17Clause 8(e) of the scheme document entitles the administrator to remuneration at the rate or rates from time to time recommended by the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia or its successor (IPAA):
(e) The Scheme Administrator shall be entitled to remuneration at the rate or rates from time to time recommended by the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia (or its successors) ("IPAA") for work of a like nature which shall be paid to the Scheme Administrator out of the various Funds constituted by the Scheme and/or by the Overseas Reinsurer and/or the Local Reinsurers in accordance with the Overseas Reinsurer's Deed and the Local Reinsurers' Deed as the case may be. A copy of the rates currently recommended by the IPAA forms the Fourth Schedule hereto.
18However, the IPAA, which was subsequently renamed the IPA, ceased to publish recommended rates from 1 July 2000, and instead recommended that insolvency practitioners should charge hourly rates in accordance with their own internal cost structures. In his first report, Mr Weston advised the reinsurers of this, and that he proposed to be remunerated on the basis of the schedule of hourly rates charged by his firm Pitcher Partners from time to time in respect of insolvency matters. In his second report, he provided a remuneration report which set out details of remuneration incurred for the period 14 December 2010 to 23 August 2012, totalling $62,297.50, and advised of his intention to approach the court to have his remuneration determined on the basis of the Pitcher Partners insolvency rates, seek approval for his remuneration and seek a regime by which future remuneration could be approved by a majority of the reinsurers. He also provided an estimate of further remuneration costs to complete the administration of the Scheme, amounting $175,865.00 (plus GST). He has since become aware of a potential taxation issue associated with the Scheme, in respect of which members of his firm's specialist tax team has been engaged, and considers that their likely costs may amount to $100,000.00.
19By the present application, Mr Weston seeks, on various bases, the protection of a court's approval of his proposed remuneration.
20It is well established that a scheme, once approved by the court, cannot be amended by the Court, except pursuant to a meeting of creditors approving an amended scheme [BTS Bearings Pty Limited v Transmission Supplies Pty Ltd (1983) 1 ACLC 923 (Needham J); Re Telmak Teleproducts Pty Ltd (1983) 1 ACLC 1054 (Needham J)]. Moreover, the court does not have jurisdiction, when making an order confirming a scheme, to authorise applications to the court to resolve questions relating to or out of the discharge of the Scheme Administrator's duties and powers, and a judgment approving a scheme which purports to confer such jurisdiction is legally ineffective to do so [Commonwealth Minister for Health v Trustees of the Ancient Order of Foresters Friendly Society in Queensland (1985) 10 FCR 27; Re Slade Constructions Pty Ltd [1970] SASR 561; Re Forklift Sales (SA) Pty Ltd (1972) 3 SASR 21, 24; Re RM Eastmond Pty Ltd (1972) 4 ACLR 801; Re SDR Apparel Pty Ltd & The Companies Act (1977) 3 ACLR 162].
21However, the legislation confers on the Court jurisdiction to fix a Scheme Administrator's remuneration, in certain circumstances. Companies Code, s 315(11) relevantly provides:
Where a person is or persons are appointed, whether by the terms of a compromise or arrangement or pursuant to a power given by the terms of a compromise or arrangement, to administer the compromise or arrangement:
(a) section 325, sub-sections 326(1A) and (2) and sections 327, 330 and 332 apply in relation to that person or those persons as if:
(i) the appointment of the person or persons to administer the compromise or arrangement were an appointment of the person or persons as a receiver and manager, or as receivers and managers, of the property of the Company; and
(ii) a reference in any of those sections or sub-sections to a receiver, or to a receiver of the property, of a company were a reference to that person or to those persons;
...
22Section 325 provides as follows:
(1) The Court may, on application by the liquidator or the official manager of a company, or by the Commission, by order fix the amount to be paid by way of remuneration to any person who, under the powers contained in any instrument, has been appointed as receiver of the property or part of the property of the Company.
(2) The power of the Court to make an order under this section:
(a) extends to fixing the remuneration for any period before the making of the order or the application for the order;
(b) is exercisable notwithstanding that the receiver has died or ceased to act before the making of the order or the application for the order; and
(c) where the receiver has been paid or has retained for his remuneration for any period before the making of the order any amount in excess of that fixed for that period - extends to requiring him or his personal representatives to account for the excess or such part of the excess as is specified in the order.
(3) The power conferred by paragraph (2)(c) shall not be exercised in respect of any period before the making of the application for the order unless, in the opinion of the Court, there are special circumstances making it proper for the power to be so exercised.
(4) The Court may from time to time, on an application made by the liquidator, the official manager, the receiver or the commission, vary or amend an order made under this section.
23Corporations Act, s 411(9), relevantly provides:
(9) Where a person is or persons are appointed by, or under a power given by, the terms of a compromise or arrangement, to administer the compromise or arrangement:
(a) section 425, subsections 427(2) and (4) and sections 428, 432 and 434 apply in relation to that person or those persons as if:
(i) the appointment of the person or persons to administer the compromise or arrangement were an appointment of the person or persons as a receiver and manager, or as receivers and managers, of property of the body; and
(ii) a reference in any of those sections or subsections to a receiver, or to a receiver of property, of a corporation were a reference to that person or to those persons;
...
24Section 425 relevantly provides as follows:
Court's power to fix receiver's remuneration
(1) The Court may by order fix the amount to be paid by way of remuneration to any person who, under a power contained in an instrument, has been appointed as receiver of property of a corporation.
(2) The power of the Court to make an order under this section:
(a) extends to fixing the remuneration for any period before the making of the order or the application for the order; and
(b) is exercisable even if the receiver has died, or ceased to act, before the making of the order or the application for the order; and
(c) if the receiver has been paid or has retained for the receiver's remuneration for any period before the making of the order any amount in excess of that fixed for that period--extends to requiring the receiver or the receiver's personal representatives to account for the excess or such part of the excess as is specified in the order.
(3) The power conferred by paragraph (2)(c) must not be exercised in respect of any period before the making of the application for the order unless, in the opinion of the Court, there are special circumstances making it proper for the power to be so exercised.
(4) The Court may from time to time vary or amend an order under this section.
(5) An order under this section may be made, varied or amended on the application of:
(a) a liquidator of the corporation; or
(b) an administrator of the corporation; or
(c) an administrator of a deed of company arrangement executed by the corporation; or
(d) ASIC.
(6) An order under this section may be varied or amended on the application of the receiver concerned.
(7) An order under this section may be made, varied or amended only as provided in subsections (5) and (6).
(8) ...
25As I do not think that there are any material differences between the relevant provisions of the Companies Code and those of the Corporations Act, it is unnecessary to consider the effect of the transitional provisions so as to resolve which of those two regimes is applicable. It is prima facie arguable that the effect of Corporations Law 1990, s 85 - the effect of which is continued by Corporations Act 2001, s 1408(1) - is that the present application, being a matter arising directly or indirectly out of a matter that arose before the commencement of the 1990 legislative scheme, is one in respect of which the former co-operative scheme laws of 1980 would therefore continue to apply. However, as there is no material difference, I shall for convenience refer to the current legislation.
26It is conspicuous that s 425(7) provides that an order under the section may be made, varied or amended only as provided in sub-sections (5) and (6); that sub-section (5) specifies those with standing to make an application, and does not include the receiver (to whose position a Scheme Administrator is for relevant purposes by s 411(9) assimilated); whereas standing to apply for a variation or amendment of an order made under the section is conferred on the receiver by sub-section (6). Although the predecessor section did not contain an equivalent of sub-section (7), it was otherwise to the same effect.
27The reason for the section being structured this way is that a receiver's right to remuneration is contractual, arising under the instrument of appointment. The receiver is entitled to that remuneration as a matter of contractual right, unless the court interferes at the suit of a party with standing under s 425(5). There is no need for a receiver to have standing to make such an application. However, where the court does interfere, the receiver is then given standing, under s 425(6), to apply to vary or amend the order so made. The purpose of the section is to allow the court to fix the remuneration of a receiver appointed under an instrument, if the receiver's remuneration would otherwise be excessive [Re Potters' Oils Ltd (No 2) [1986] 1 All ER 890; [1986] 1 WLR 201; Cape v Redarb (1992) 8 ACSR 67]. I respectfully disagree with the view adopted in this respect by Jacobson J in Shannon v North East Wiradjuri Co Ltd (No 4) [2012] FCA 836; in expressing the view that the provisions of s 425(5), which made no reference to the standing of a receiver, did not effect the scope of the power under s 425(1) which specifically referred to the power of the court to fix the remuneration of a receiver, his Honour's attention does not appear to have been drawn to sub-section (7). Although the rules [Supreme Court (Corporations) Rules 1999, r 9.1(1)] assume that a receiver can make such an application, the rules cannot validly confer such standing in the face of the explicit limitation in Corporations Act, s 425(7).
28Accordingly, in my view, is it not open to the court to fix the Scheme Administrator's remuneration under Corporations Act, s 425.
29Other potential bases for jurisdiction referred to were Corporations Act s 413(1)(g), UCPR r 36.17 (formerly Supreme Court Rules, Pt 20 r 10) (the "slip rule"), and the court's inherent jurisdiction. In Re AGL Gas Networks Limited [2001] NSWSC 165; (2001) 160 FLR 269, the validity of a scheme was challenged six years after the event, having been treated by all as effectual in the meantime, on the basis that a document had been executed very shortly after midnight of the last day on which the condition permitted. Santow J, as he then was, made an order extending time for compliance with a precondition of a scheme, in reliance on Corporations Act s 413(1), SCR, Pt 2 r 3 or Pt 20 r 10, and the court's inherent jurisdiction.
30Corporations Act, s 413, provides that where on an application for the approval of an arrangement it is shown to the Court that the arrangement has been proposed for the purposes of or in connection with a scheme for the reconstruction of any corporation and that under the scheme, the whole or any part of the undertaking or of the property of any corporation concerned in the scheme is to be transferred to a company, the Court may, by the order approving the arrangement or by any subsequent order, provide for a range of associated matters to give effect to the arrangement, including "such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters as are necessarily to ensure that the reconstruction or amalgamation is fully and effectively carried out":
Provisions for facilitating reconstruction and amalgamation of Part 5.1 bodies
(1) Where an application is made to the Court under this Part for the approval of a compromise or arrangement and it is shown to the Court that the compromise or arrangement has been proposed for the purposes of, or in connection with, a scheme for the reconstruction of a Part 5.1 body or Part 5.1 bodies or the amalgamation of 2 or more Part 5.1 bodies and that, under the scheme, the whole or any part of the undertaking or of the property of a body concerned in the scheme (in this section called the transferor body) is to be transferred to a company (in this section called the transferee company), the Court may, either by the order approving the compromise or arrangement or by a later order, provide for all or any of the following matters:
(a) the transfer to the transferee company of the whole or a part of the undertaking and of the property or liabilities of the transferor body;
(b) the allotting or appropriation by the transferee company of shares, debentures, policies or other interests in that company that, under the compromise or arrangement, are to be allotted or appropriated by that company to or for any person;
(c) the continuation by or against the transferee company of any legal proceedings pending by or against the transferor body;
(d) if the transferor body is a company--the deregistration by ASIC, without winding up, of the transferor body;
(e) the provision to be made for any persons who, within such time and in such manner as the Court directs, dissent from the compromise or arrangement;
(f) the transfer or allotment of any interest in property to any person concerned in the compromise or arrangement;
(g) such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters as are necessary to ensure that the reconstruction or amalgamation is fully and effectively carried out.
(2) Where an order made under this section provides for the transfer of property or liabilities, then, by virtue of the order, that property is transferred to and vests in, and those liabilities are transferred to and become the liabilities of, the transferee company, free, in the case of any particular property if the order so directs, from any security interest that is, by virtue of the compromise or arrangement, to cease to have effect.
...
31Companies (New South Wales) Code, s 317(1), made substantially identical provision.
32The scheme in this case cannot be characterised as one for the purposes of, or in connection with, a scheme for the reconstruction of Dominion, or its amalgamation with another body. Moreover, it does not involve the transfer of the whole or any part of the undertaking or property of any corporation involved in the scheme to a company. Even if Santow J were correct in relying on this source of power in Re AGL Gas Networks, it is not available in the present case.
33SCR Pt 2 r 3 (see now UCPR r 1.112) authorised the Court by order to "extend ... any time fixed ... by any judgment or order". Santow J, commencing from the position that a scheme of this type derived its force from the court order, and not from the antecedent resolutions of members or creditors [Hill v Anderson Meat Industries Ltd [1971] 1 NSWLR 868, 877; Caratti v Hillman [1974] WAR 92, 94-5; 4 ACLR 170, 173; Bond Corporation Holdings v Western Australia (No 2) (1992) 7 WAR 61, 68], held that the effect of these cases was that, once approved, there was no scheme separate from the order of the court, and that the "scheme" was subsumed into and by the court order. In the words used in Caratti v Hillman, the order speaks in terms of the scheme. Accordingly, where the scheme fixed a time by which certain steps were to be taken, that time could be extended under the rule. I confess to some reservations at this approach - which in my view goes further than what Street J said in Hill v Anderson Meat Industries [and see also Kempe v Ambassador Insurance Co (in liq) [1998] 1 WLR 271 (PC)]. However, I should follow the prevailing Australian authority [Re Matine Ltd (1998) 28 ACSR 268, 286; Re AGL Gas Networks, [46]].
34The current equivalent of SCR Pt 2 r 3 does not avail the plaintiff here, because the problem is not one that can be solved by an extension of time. However, this characterisation of the nature of an approved scheme as being an order of the court informs consideration of the slip rule and the inherent jurisdiction, in respect of which his Honour's approach relied on the same characterisation of an approved scheme, as authorising its variation upon the grounds on which a court order could be varied. Relevantly, his Honour held that the slip rule extended to giving effect to the intention that the court would have had but for the failure that caused the accidental slip or omission, and in the particular case that had the court known that the relevant step would not be completed until moments after midnight on the date fixed, it would have approved of the scheme but subject to an alteration extending the time for performance of the step accordingly.
35I am prepared to accept that where the defect can properly be brought within the scope of the "slip rule", an amendment to correct the error would be authorised, though I respectfully doubt whether failure to provide a longer period for satisfaction of a condition precedent could qualify as a "slip". I am not so inclined to accept that a scheme, being a creature of statute, could be amended under the inherent jurisdiction, where the statute prescribes the procedures for approval, and authority establishes that once approved a scheme cannot be amended except by following those same procedures.
36In any event, in the present case the difficulty is in accepting that the relevant "slip" was not only in failing to make provision for the possibility that IPAA might cease to publish recommended rates, but that such provision should be to the effect that the Scheme Administrator would be entitled to remuneration at the hourly rates charged in accordance with his own internal cost structures. The effect would be to substitute, for an objective external standard, one fixed by the Scheme Administrator himself. While it can well be said that there was a slip in failing to provide for the eventuality that IPAA might cease to publish recommended rates, it cannot be said that the intent was that, in that event, the Scheme Administrator be able to charge whatever rates his firm set.
37Accordingly, I am unable to find a basis in Corporations Act s 413(1)(g), the slip rule, or the court's inherent jurisdiction, for, in effect, approving Mr Weston's remuneration.
38Nor am I able to conclude that on the proper construction of clause 8(e) in the events which have happened, the Scheme Administrator's firm's schedule of rates is substituted for the IPAA published rates by the IPA recommendation that insolvency practitioners should charge hourly rates in accordance with their own internal cost structures. The purpose of clause 8(e) was to apply an objective industry standard, and not whatever rate of charges was applied by the particular Scheme Administrator; it would be inconsistent with that intent to substitute the subjective standard of the administrator's own internal cost structures.
39In my view, the true intent that informed clause 8(e) of the scheme document was that the Scheme Administrator should be entitled to reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner doing like work, and the reference to the IPAA published rates was a proxy for that. The IPAA rates were the machinery that provided the means for determining what was reasonable remuneration, so long as there was such a scale. But it is inconceivable that it was intended that, should the IPAA cease to publish recommended rates, the Scheme Administrator would be obliged to act without remuneration, or cease to administer the scheme.
40Courts have not infrequently had to deal with similar situations in the context of uncertainty and incompleteness of contracts, where parties have left certain contractual provisions - often price - to be ascertained, typically in terms of what is "fair" or "reasonable". Where there is a formula, either to be inferred from the parties' arrangements and course of dealings, or expressly stated in the contract itself, the court can itself supply the machinery to work it out [Hillas & Co Ltd v Arcos Ltd (1932) 38 Com Cas 23; Sweet & Maxwell Limited v Universal News Services [1964] 2 QB 699, 735; Brown v Gould [1972] Ch 53, 58 (Megarry J); Upper Hunter County District Council v Australian Chilling & Freezing Co Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 429, 437; Talbot v Talbot [1968] Ch 1; Attorney General v Barker Brothers Limited [1976] 2 NZLR 495, 499-500 (Richmond P); Andrews v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited [1982] 2 NZLR 556, 565; Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444, 459].
41In this case, the IPAA published rates provided the machinery for determining what was reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner doing like work. The failure of the machinery results in the requirement to determine, without the assistance of that machinery, what is reasonable remuneration. That task can be undertaken by the court. Being a specialist court, which is frequently engaged in the determination of the remuneration of insolvency practitioners, it is equipped to undertake that task itself.
42An alternative approach, which leads to the same result, is founded on the notion of a quantum meruit. If the mechanism for determination of the Scheme Administrator's remuneration has failed, but where it is manifest that it was intended that he be remunerated, an obligation to pay on a quantum meruit would be imposed. That would result in the same test - reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner for work of a like nature.
43My attention has very properly been drawn to authority for the proposition that, where the appointment of a liquidator is defective, so that the liquidator is not entitled to remuneration on the normal basis, there is no entitlement to a quantum meruit, since there can be no implied contract to pay for work performed as a result of an invalid request - although where the work of the invalidly appointed liquidator has been of incontrovertible benefit a restitutionary claim may be available [Re Allison, Johnson & Foster Ltd; ex parte Birkenshaw [1904] 2 KB 327 (CA); In re Wood and Martin (Bricklaying Contractors) Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 293, 297; Re Kyra Nominees Pty Ltd [1981] WAR 120; (1980) 5 ACLR 60; Monks v Poynice (1987) 8 NSWLR 662; Young v ACN 081 162 512 [2005] NSWSC 139, [9]-[10]; Dean-Willcocks v Nothintoohard Pty Ltd (in liq) [2006] NSWCA 311, [102]-[104], [107]]. There is no need to resort to a restitutionary claim here, because the appointment of the Scheme Administrator is not defective; to the contrary, it is valid and effective, and there is an implied if not express provision for reasonable remuneration. The only defect is in the machinery for quantification of the remuneration.
44In my view, therefore, this result is reached as a matter of construction of the scheme document, and upon the true construction of the scheme document and in the events which have happened, the Scheme Administrator is entitled to reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner for work of a like nature.
45If it were not possible to reach this conclusion as a matter of construction, then the slip rule - as explained above - would provide a third route to the same end: the "slip" was in providing only the proxy or machinery, and omitting reference to the underlying formula, namely reasonable remuneration for work of a like nature. It cannot be doubted that, had attention been given to the possibility that IPAA might cease to publish recommended rates, the Court's approval of the scheme would have been subject to the alteration that clause 8(e) refer to "reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner for work of a like nature". In this respect, the case is stronger than one involving failure to advert to the possibility that a time stipulation might not be satisfied, as in Re AGL Gas Networks.