The parties' submissions
31 ASIC submitted that the court should make the orders it seeks for two main reasons:
(1) it is in the interests of fairness that ASIC should, through its counsel, be heard and have an opportunity to make submissions as to the content of the PwC report; and
(2) the court would be assisted to a greater degree if there was a contradictor in respect of any submissions made by TerraCom as to the content of the PwC report.
32 ASIC submitted that if TerraCom made "submissions in respect of which no response can be proffered [it] would … effectively reduce ASIC to becoming an uninformed bystander in respect of a significant aspect (if not the entirety) of the appeal, contrary to the fundamental tenets of the adversarial system upon which the Court operates" and that "the presence and appearance of ASIC's counsel at the hearing of the appeal would become futile as submissions by the appellant would be effectively made ex parte".
33 ASIC also submitted, in the alternative, that the Full Court "would be assisted to a greater degree if there were a contradictor to submissions which may be made to the Court concerning the content of the PwC Report". Another suggestion was the appointment of amici curiae.
34 ASIC also submitted that provision of access would have no material effect upon TerraCom's claim of privilege because:
(1) ASIC seeks access for counsel only subject to the provision of strict undertakings;
(2) even if confidentiality were not maintained in the PwC report, the provision of access in accordance with an order of the court would not involve a voluntary act by TerraCom inconsistent with its maintenance of privilege; and
(3) ASIC undertook that it would not contend that the provision of the PwC report to its counsel constitutes an act by TerraCom that is inconsistent with its maintenance of privilege.
35 I was also taken by Dr McNicol to some cases involving public interest immunity where a contradictor was appointed. She referred in particular to this passage from the judgment of Leeming JA in Re Timor Sea Oil & Gas Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2020] NSWSC 1832; (2020) 389 ALR 545 at 548-9 [19]:
Thirdly, the application by the Commonwealth to proceed in closed Court, and its application to read paragraphs 30-34 of Ms McGregor's affidavit whilst preserving their confidentiality, infringe basic notions of procedural fairness. Put simply, the Commonwealth seeks to obtain a court order in its interests without the plaintiff seeing let alone testing or being heard as to the evidence on which the Commonwealth relies. This is contrary to a defining characteristic of a court. The application of procedural fairness and adherence, as a general rule, to the open court principles have been said to be a defining or essential characteristic of a court … There are, as mentioned in argument, instances where such a course may be appropriate, a point recognised by the qualification given by French CJ and Kiefel J to adherence "as a general rule" to the open court principles. In Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano Pty Ltd (2013) 252 CLR 38 at [68], French CJ indicated that public interest considerations might qualify those defining or essential characteristics of courts. But it may be expected that a court will be astute to determine whether some less unfair procedure may be adopted whilst still preserving the confidentiality underlying the claim of privilege.
36 Dr McNicol also relied on this passage from the judgment of Allsop P, as the Chief Justice then was, and with whom Hodgson JA and Sackville AJA agreed, in State of New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corporation (No 3) (2011) 81 NSWLR 394 at 398 [19]:
There are a number of circumstances in which the courts have been faced with a handicap or a difficulty in efficiently or justly resolving an aspect of a dispute where one party cannot see the material upon, or in respect of which, the court must adjudicate. Fairness may be compromised because the nature of the right or privilege asserted or claimed is one that excludes the other party from an examination of relevant material, but to disclose it to the other party for the purpose of resolving the claim of right would destroy that very right (if legitimately claimed). Further, fairness may be compromised by the court examining the material without a contradictor. This is, in part, alleviated by the recognition that the hearing without the substantive participation of the other party will have features of an ex parte application, thereby requiring appropriate disclosure from the party claiming the right. Nevertheless, it is easily seen how the other party may feel less than fully satisfied with the decision of the court, the foundation of which it cannot know or understand. Further, efficiency, to a degree, is impeded. A court, without a contradictor, must seek to understand the litigious context of the claim of right and assess it with only one side assisting. Here, the time of three judges on appeal was taken examining material without the assistance of a contradictor.
37 In his written submissions, Mr Elliott said this in relation to the conduct of his client's case on appeal:
At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant will ask the Court to read the [PwC report] and accept a contention that [it] dealt with a number of different issues, that the disclosure was only in respect of one of them, and that privilege was not lost in respect of [it] save for the part dealing with the issue the subject of the disclosure. The primary judge and ASIC accepted that the appellant's approach in this regard was correct at the level of principle, but his Honour ultimately concluded that there was not a sufficient degree of separation between the parts of the [PwC report] the subject of the disclosure and the balance.
38 Mr Elliott made the following points:
(1) ASIC has not pointed to any authority for the proposition that the court may order a party who claims privilege in a proceeding (here, this appeal proceeding) in respect of a document to disclose the document to another party in advance of the determination of the claim in the proceeding;
(2) ASIC is seeking a final order which involves a final and irreversible outcome under which TerraCom must hand over to nominated third parties a document which it says is privileged, which requires a determination of the substantive privilege dispute;
(3) making the order sought would compel TerraCom to act contrary to the very substantive right it claims in the proceeding, and in doing so, would confer upon ASIC a potential advantage that it would never enjoy if the privilege were later found to be available;
(4) the order sought would undermine the essential public policy underpinning privilege, which is to give citizens the comfort and confidence that they can speak with advisers openly;
(5) the court is "uniquely empowered to determine the validity of privilege claims and holding the depth of expertise and experience to do so, is the entity who may look at the relevant document and determine the disputed privilege issues for itself", which "process exists to, inter alia, address the fact that the counter-party to the privilege dispute and its representatives cannot themselves access the document …";
(6) there was no suggestion by ASIC below that the primary judge was incapable of reading the PwC report and forming a view as to whether the requisite degree of separation existed between issues described in it; and
(7) the fact that ASIC may want its counsel to look at the PwC report in advance of the hearing, and that if that occurred ASIC may be able to participate in the hearing more than it otherwise would, are not valid reasons for making the orders sought - those facts exist in every privilege contest.
39 In his oral submissions, Mr Elliott added:
[T]here would be nothing to stop us - and we wouldn't oppose a direction from your Honour that we provide in advance of the hearing [of the appeal] the - as it were, a full form of the document and what we say ought be the redacted form of the document. And if we did that, we wouldn't, quite frankly, anticipate saying anything to … your Honours about what might be called the severability topic because - principally, your Honour, because I can't really do it without risking waiving the privilege I'm trying to protect, but secondly, I think, to be frank, your Honour, those kinds of exercises in persuasion aren't particularly useful when one just has the document. And your Honours will be, with respect, perfectly able to form your own views about severability or otherwise …
…
I do make that submission, in part, to highlight the fact that there would not be such a disparity in the position between the parties, in terms of submissions. What would ultimately be happening is the court would be forming a view about the issue in circumstances where one party did not have the benefit of the document in question, and in that regard the submission we make in writing is that that is not anything other than the usual feature of a case where there are privilege issues in contest, and my learned friend's submissions about unfairness do nothing more than recognise the way in which the principles about right to be heard are altered in a case where there is a privilege dispute in issue.