consideration
113 The Councils' case, as I have explained above, is founded principally on the proposition that Telstra's intention to display commercial advertising, if granted planning permission, operates to strip the New Payphone Cabinets of their otherwise proper characterisation as low-impact facilities, even before the consideration of any relevant planning application to display such advertising.
114 The Councils' case in that regard is, with respect, an improbable one, and it derives no support from the language of the Telecommunications Act or the Determination. To the contrary, the relevant definitional criteria for a low-impact facility that is a public payphone cabinet, which appear under the heading "Facility" in the Determination, are concerned with the function of those facilities, not statements of future, conditional intention. As the High Court said in Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd v City of Mitcham [2006] HCA 12; (2006) 80 ALJR 711, 727 [85] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Heydon JJ) "… the definition of the term 'facility' in the [Telecommunications] Act requires that attention be directed, not to the motive for the installation of a structure or thing, but the function which that structure or thing serves or was designed to serve".
115 The Minister has determined that a public payphone cabinet or booth will be a low-impact facility if it is: (a) used solely for carriage and content services; (b) not designed for uses other than carriage and content services (for example, as a vending machine); (c) not fitted with devices or facilities for uses other than carriage and content services; and (d) not used to display commercial advertising other than advertising related to the supply of standard telephone services. In my view, none of those criteria suggests that the proper characterisation of a public payphone cabinet or booth has anything to do with future intentions of the carrier - rather, they speak to the functions which the cabinet or booth serves or was designed to serve.
116 One of the functions that the 81 New Payphone Cabinets were designed to serve is the display of commercial advertising. (Whether they will, in fact, ever serve that function is another matter, discussed below.) However, I accept Telstra's submission that advertising is either a content service or a carriage service. For this reason, the fact that the New Payphone Cabinets are designed to display commercial advertising does not mean they fail criterion (b) or (c) in the Determination.
117 However, Telstra's contention that criterion (d) in the Determination does not require a facility to continue to operate, or to continue to be used, as a low-impact facility after its "installation" derives no support from the language of the Determination.
118 In my view, the fact that cl 6(1) of Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act empowers a carrier to "carry out the installation of a facility if … the facility is a low-impact facility" is no basis for reading into criterion (d) in the Determination the words of limitation "at the time of installation". As senior counsel for the MCC put it in the course of his oral opening:
[Telstra's first] proposition is that the right or power to carry out the installation of a facility, the power conferred by clause 6 of schedule 3 to the Act is available if a facility is a low-impact facility at the time of its installation. And, of course, subject to the area to which it is installed. And we would agree with it. But Telstra moves impermissibly from that proposition to contend that in respect of the relevant facility here in question, the elements of the definition must themselves be construed and assessed as if confined to the moment of installation.
119 I also accept the Councils' submission, put by the MCC in its closing submissions, as follows:
Essentially, installation of the New Payphone Cabinets will stop at the point that they are ready to be 'powered up'. However, at that point in time, they are not being 'used' and are not capable of being 'used' for anything. It is not until electricity flows to the structure that they can be 'used'. But at that point in time they are in operation, and the installation authorisation given by clause 6(1) has ceased to apply. It follows that the construction proposed by Telstra, as a matter of text, context, logic and evidence, is simply not supportable.
(Emphasis in original.)
120 Telstra's submission that the wholesale replacement of one public payphone booth or cabinet with another occupying the same volume may be effected without planning permission because it is an act of "maintenance" must also be rejected. If I may say so with great respect, that submission flies in the face of the ordinary meaning of the verb "to maintain", viz "to keep in existence or continuance; preserve; retain …": see Macquarie Dictionary (online at March 2020) "maintain" (def 1).
121 It is true that cl 7(3)(d) of Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act says that a reference to the "maintenance" of a facility includes a reference to "the replacement of the whole or a part of the original facility in its original location", but that is so only where the conditions specified in subclause (5) are satisfied. One such condition that is relevant here is that "the volume of the replacement facility [must] not exceed the volume of the original" (cl 5(c)(i)). Here, the volume of the New Payphone Cabinets far exceeds the volume of all but one of the "old style payphone cabinets" to be replaced (see the measurements listed in Annexure A to these reasons).
122 The Councils make two submissions which do not turn on Telstra's stated intention to display commercial advertising, namely that:
(1) the New Payphone Cabinets are not "public payphone cabinets" within the meaning of Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act; and
(2) the USB charger is not a use for either a carriage or content service within the meaning of criterion (a).
123 But, as I have explained above, the first submission cannot be accepted. And the second is wrong because, as the MCC's own witness agreed, it is a "trivial variation". By operation of s 3.1(3) of the Determination it is therefore "to be disregarded".
124 Once the Councils' contentions that (i) a New Payphone Cabinet is not a "cabinet", and (ii) a future intention to display commercial advertising operates to strip the cabinet of its status as a low-impact facility, are rejected (as they must be, in my view), and the presence of the USB charger is understood to be trivial and thus irrelevant to the relevant inquiry, then leaving aside the question whether planning permission is given to display commercial advertising on them, the New Payphone Cabinets satisfy the definitional requirements of a low-impact facility, on the (balance of) the Councils' own case.
125 In my view, the MCC misconceived its function when it formed the opinion that the New Payphone Cabinets were not low-impact facilities and were therefore subject to the Melbourne Planning Scheme. In that regard I agree with this submission put by senior counsel for Telstra in his closing submission:
[The MCC's finding that the proposed payphone and electronic promotional signs were not low-impact facilities as described in the Determination and were] therefore subject to the [Melbourne Planning Scheme] can only be a reference to the proposal that will result if a permit is granted. It cannot be a reference to the circumstances that would exist if no permit … were granted. Yet it's the situation that would exist if no permit were granted that is the critical situation, because that, if you like, sets the base position - and the question then arises whether permission should be given to enable the use of that base position to display commercial advertising. The council has asked itself the wrong question.
126 In my view, Telstra correctly described the effect of the Telecommunications Act and the Determination in its 81 planning applications to the MCC (see [26]-[30] above), to this extent:
(1) Telstra may install a New Payphone Cabinet as a low-impact facility with immunity from state law and the powers and functions of the MCC pursuant to Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act;
(2) that statutory right permits the installation and use of a digital screen (as part of the New Payphone Cabinets) for the purposes of the display of STS advertising; and
(3) town planning approval is required to use those digital screens to display third-party commercial advertising.
127 The next step in Telstra's chain of legal reasoning set forth in its MCC permit applications is the proposition that the "[i]ntroduction of [commercial] advertising content on the [New Payphone Cabinets], after the completion of the compliant exercise of statutory rights under Schedule 3 of the Telecommunications Act … (and subject to town planning approval being procured for a change of content for the existing digital screen), does not invalidate the installation nor affect Telstra's statutory powers and immunities in respect of the [New Payphone Cabinets]".
128 In this proceeding, however, Telstra emphasised that it will not and cannot display commercial advertising on any New Payphone Cabinet unless and until it secures planning permission from a relevant local authority to do so, and that "the question whether a New Payphone Cabinet will display commercial advertising is one that can only be answered after completion of the planning approval process". Further, Telstra submitted that "whether the New Payphone Cabinets will display commercial advertising is a matter that is entirely contingent upon the grant of planning permission by the relevant responsible authority. It may be that no commercial advertising will be displayed on the New Payphone Cabinets if the responsible authority (which, depending on the proposed location of a New Payphone Cabinet, includes the Respondents) determines not to grant planning permission."
129 The MCC, on the other hand, contends that "[a]s a matter of undisputed fact, the New Payphone Cabinets will be used for the display of third-party commercial advertising after they are installed. This is not a hypothetical future use - and as such the Court does not need to be concerned that it is being asked to answer a hypothetical question".
130 I am unable to accept that proposition, because whether the New Payphone Cabinets will or will not be permitted to display commercial advertising is in the hands of the relevant local authority.
131 It is not a "matter of undisputed fact" because, as Telstra correctly submits, the relevant question is entirely contingent. It follows that the legal questions whether, if planning permission to display commercial advertising were granted, (i) the New Payphone Cabinets would continue properly to be characterised as low-impact facilities, (ii) installation of any such cabinets would be "invalidated", or (iii) Telstra's statutory powers and immunities would be relevantly affected, may never arise.
132 Further, if such planning permission were granted, other fact dependent issues might also then arise, including: (i) whether the local authority which granted such permission might be precluded (by operation of an estoppel, for example) from contending that its own decision to grant permission to display commercial advertising on a New Payphone Cabinet could affect its status as a lawfully installed low-impact facility and so on, and (ii) who else, if anyone, might have standing to agitate such questions.
133 It follows that these issues must await another day, because courts do not grant declarations in relation to circumstances that have not occurred, and might never happen: see, eg, University of New South Wales v Moorhouse (1975) 133 CLR 1, 10 (Gibbs J); Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, 582 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
134 I should lastly say something about the point concerning the "mischief" to which the definitional criteria are said to be directed. As I said earlier, Telstra submitted that their purpose is to ensure that carriers do not rely on the powers and immunities conferred by Schedule 3 to the Telecommunications Act to display commercial advertising without first seeking relevant state regulatory and planning approval. The Councils, on the other hand, submit that the mischief sought to be addressed is commercial advertising, other than STS advertising.
135 It may be accepted that the final paragraph of the extract from the Explanatory Statement to the Telecommunications (Low-impact Facilities) Determination 1997 (Amendment No. 1 of 1999) (Cth) set out at [52] above lends some small support to Telstra's contention, but to accept the contention would, in effect, be to read into definitional criterion (d) words along the lines of "absent local authority approval", which I am not prepared to do: compare, by way of example only, Taylor v Owners - Strata Plan No 11564 (2014) 253 CLR 531, 547-549 [35]-[40] (French CJ, Crennan and Bell JJ).
136 My own researches and those of the parties were unable to unearth what lay behind the inclusion of payphone cabinets or booths within the broader ambit of "low-impact" facilities, which include, perhaps more obviously, towers, poles, masts and the like (see, eg, Hutchison 3G Australia Pty Ltd v City of Mitcham [2006] HCA 12; (2006) 80 ALJR 711), or why the provision in relation to "commercial advertising" was included in the definitional criteria. Absent any sufficient indication of what lay behind it, as at present advised, the identification of some relevant mischief would involve impermissible speculation.