TCL
12 TCL argues that the Court should not be satisfied there is sound reason to direct that the proceedings should be conducted in a location other than where they were commenced because:
(a) the proceedings concern uniform national law being the Corporations Act;
(b) the proceedings are about whether TCL relevantly 'carries on business in Australia' so as to be a Pt 5.7 body under the Corporations Act (by reference to the s 9 definition of a Pt 5.7 body and s 21 and s 583);
(c) only if there is a finding that TCL relevantly 'carries on business in Australia' does the next question arise as to whether the place the demand was left at was TCL's 'principal place of business' in Australia pursuant to s 585 of the Corporations Act;
(d) the issue of 'carries on business in Australia' involves the application of a non-exhaustive definition under s 21(3) of the Corporations Act and the general law concept as to whether TCL conducted some form of commercial enterprise in Australia systematically and regularly with a view to profit: see the discussion in Gebo Investments (Labuan) Ltd v Signatory Investments Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 544 (at [35]-[41]);
(e) as to the contingent second issue, namely, whether the demand was left at TCL's 'principal place of business' in Australia, TCL relies on an affidavit of Wang Yong, on behalf of TCL, dated 26 April 2017. That evidence is to the effect that TCL never had a place of business at 194 New Cleveland Road, Tingalpa, Queensland where the demand was purportedly left. That address, it is said, appeared on a website not operated by TCL, but rather, by a former Australian distributor of products of TCL;
(f) the issues of whether TCL 'carries on business in Australia' and, if so, whether the demand was left at TCL's 'principal place of business' in Australia are likely to be resolved by uncontroversial documentary evidence. They are unlikely to involve questions of credibility of witnesses requiring cross-examination in person, rather than video-link, if there is to be any cross-examination at all;
(g) as to the historical factors pointed to by Castel in its submissions, they are either irrelevant, neutral or of little weight. The only substantive point being that if cross-examination is necessary (which it does not accept), the main witness for Castel resides in Victoria;
(h) Castel has not identified the nature of the evidence intended to be given by that witness, resident in Victoria, so as to enable any assessment to be made by the Court as to its relevance or by TCL as to whether it would cross-examine that witness;
(i) Castel has not provided any evidence of what the costs would be for that witness to travel from Victoria to Perth should that witness ultimately be required to attend in person for cross-examination; and
(j) the Court is a national court with video conferencing facilities, in any event, and having regard to the issues arising in the application, whatever the evidence sought to be adduced will be, it must be of a brief compass.