Tallong Park Association Inc v Sutherland; Sutherland v Tallong Park... [2004] NSWCA 404 | Case summary

REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION Background 1 Mr Sutherland contracted polio as a teenager in the 1950s. He uses leg callipers and a cane and has difficulty walking for long distances. Doctors treating him have recommended swimming as a good form of exercise. In 1989 a company of which Mr Sutherland is the principal shareholder, bought a lot at Tallong Park Estate. Tallong Park is a private residential estate comprising 169 lots ranging from 2.5 acres to 10 acres. The estate has various recreational facilities, including a swimming pool, which are managed by the Tallong Park Association Incorporated (the Association). The Association is incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1984 (NSW) and each purchaser of a lot must become a member of the Association. All the common land is owned by the members and the maintenance of those areas is financed through an annual levy. Mr Sutherland is not a member of the Association because he purchased his lot through a company. Nevertheless, it is not in dispute that he is entitled to use the facilities in the common areas. 2 From 2000 to late 2003, Mr Sutherland drove his car to the swimming pool. The route he used was a gravel pathway which, according to the Association, was never intended or designed to be used for vehicular access. When the pool re-opened in 2003, after being closed for the winter, a timber railing had been erected which prevented Mr Sutherland from using the gravel pathway he had previously used to access the swimming pool. According to Mr Sutherland, the only way he could access the pool was to leave his car in the car park and walk 75 meters across the pathway. He tried to walk that distance but could not manage it and stopped using the pool. 3 After attempting to resolve the question of access to the pool with the Association, Mr Sutherland lodged a disability discrimination complaint with the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board. The complaint alleged that the Association had discriminated against him on the ground of his disability in relation to the terms on which it provided him with services: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (AD Act), s 49M(1)(b). The Tribunal found that the Association had unlawfully discriminated against Mr Sutherland and that the discrimination was "indirect". That means that it arose from an unreasonable requirement about access that Mr Sutherland could not comply with and which disproportionately affected people with Mr Sutherland's disability. The Tribunal also decided that the exception for so-called "voluntary bodies" in s 57 of the AD Act did not apply to the conduct of the Association. The Tribunal found the complaint to be substantiated and, in a separate decision, made an order enjoining the Association from continuing or repeating the unlawful conduct. The Tribunal also ordered the Association to pay Mr Sutherland $6,000 in damages. 4 The Association has appealed against the Tribunal's decision in relation to liability, but not the decision in relation to remedies. The main ground of appeal is that the conduct of the Association comes within the exception in s 57 of the AD Act for so called "voluntary bodies". Mr Sutherland appealed against the Tribunal's decision in relation to remedies. He said that the Tribunal should have made an order compensating him for "pain and suffering" in relation to events which were causally related to the Association's unlawful conduct. In addition, Mr Sutherland said that the Tribunal should have ordered the Association to apologise to him and pay his costs. 5 An appeal may be made as of right on a question of law, but leave is required before an appeal may be extended to the merits of the Tribunal's decision: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (ADT Act), s 113(2). Grounds of Appeal 6 The Association's grounds of appeal were that the Tribunal erred in concluding that: (i) the Association is not a body to which s 57 applies; (ii) even if the Association is a body to which s 57 applies, its conduct in relation to Mr Sutherland is not exempt under s 57(2); and (iii) the Association had imposed a particular requirement on Mr Sutherland in relation to his claim of indirect discrimination. 7 Mr Sutherland's grounds of appeal were that the Tribunal erred in concluding that: (i) Mr Sutherland's loss of enjoyment of his property arising from disharmony with others in the Association community was not a loss suffered by reason of the unlawful conduct of the Association; (ii) the deterioration in Mr Sutherland's health had not been materially caused by or contributed to by the Association's unlawful conduct; (iii) the Association did not have to apologise to Mr Sutherland; (iv) the Association did not have to pay Mr Sutherland's costs. THE ASSOCIATION'S APPEAL Ground 1 - Is the Association a "body" to which s 57 applies? 8 Terms of s 57. Section 57 is in Part 6 of the AD Act which is headed "General Exceptions to this Act". Section 57(1) defines the bodies referred to in s 57(2). Section 57(2) sets out the nature and scope of the exception for such bodies: 57 Voluntary bodies (1) In this section, "body" means a body, the activities of which are carried on otherwise than for profit and which is not established by an Act, but does not include: (a) a co-operative registered under the Co-operatives Act 1992 or a society under the Friendly Societies Act 1989 , or (b) a friendly society registered under the Friendly Societies Act 1989 , or (c) a building society or credit union registered under the Financial Institutions (NSW) Code , or (d) a co-operative housing society registered under the Co-operative Housing and Starr-Bowkett Societies Act 1998, or (e) a registered club. (2) Nothing in this Act affects: (a) any rule or practice of a body which restricts admission to membership of that body, or (b) the provision of benefits, facilities or services to members of that body. 9 The Association bears the onus of proving that its conduct comes within the exception in s 57: AD Act, s 104. 10 Tribunal's findings in relation to s 57(1). The Tribunal noted at [22] that three criteria must be satisfied for a body to come within the terms of s 57(1). Those criteria are that: (i) the activities of the body must be carried on "otherwise than for profit"; and (ii) the body must not be established by an Act; and (iii) the body must not be a body specified in s 57(1)(a)-(e). 11 The Tribunal found at [23] (and it was not in dispute) that the Association fulfilled the criteria set out in (ii) and (iii). In relation to whether the Association was a body carried on "otherwise than for profit," the Tribunal adopted the reasoning in another decision of the Tribunal, Strong v The Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia Ltd [2004] NSWADT 176. That decision found that HCF was not a "body" as defined in s 57. The Tribunal in that matter said, at [108], that: ... in our view the term 'carried on otherwise than for profit' does not identify a body by reference to its actual financial results each year. It identifies a body by reference to its character. Whether it has a profit or a loss, and whether it calls a profit a surplus and a loss a deficit, the question is "what is it its character? Does it have the character of a relatively small voluntary body, the activities of which could be carried on by an unincorporated association of people for purposes of pursing a common interest? The exception provided for in s 57 is, in our view, directed towards such bodies, and that it is bodies with that character that are identified by the term 'carried on otherwise than for profit'. 12 The Tribunal in the present case applied this passage at [30]: In answer to the question, "does the Respondent have the character of a relatively small voluntary body the activities of which could be carried on by an unincorporated association of people for purposes of pursing a common interest;" we consider the answer to be "No". Its functions are akin to a body corporate in that it manages, cares for, and controls the common areas of the estate. The Respondent owns these common areas. Its operations are such that the Balance Sheet for the Respondent as at 30 June 2005 recorded its net assets as $1,061,854.23, of which $186,100.58 was described as "retained profits". Membership of the Respondent is clearly tied to ownership of Lots within the estate. A purchaser of a Lot cannot choose not to become a member of the Association. Nor is there any discretion as to whether the Association can chose particular persons to be members. In this sense, the respondent is not a voluntary body. 13 Competing interpretations of s 57(1). The Association submitted that the Tribunal's conclusion that the Association was not a voluntary body was incorrect for several reasons, including that: (i) the uncontroverted evidence was that the Association was a body carried on "otherwise than for profit"; (ii) section 4, s 7(2)(a) and s 66 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1984, as well as the Associations rules, support the Association's submission that it is a body "carried on otherwise than for profit"; (iii) a "range of factors" including the size of the Association, cannot be imported into s 57 in circumstances where the legislature has not specified those factors in the provision; (iv) the heading "voluntary bodies" is not part of the provision and, in any case, any obscurity or ambiguity in s 57 is not removed by reference to the heading; and (v) membership of the Association is voluntary because a person cannot be compelled to purchase a lot in the Tallong Park estate. 14 Failure to accept concession. We agree that there was uncontroverted evidence that the Association was a body carried on "otherwise than for profit". The Tribunal erred by not accepting the concession made by Mr Sutherland's representative when he said that: The Applicant does not dispute that the activities of the Respondent "are carried on otherwise than for profit", and accepts that it "is not established by an Act". 15 Mr Sutherland's representative went on to say, "[H]owever, those facts alone do not resolve the matter in favour of the Respondent", and submitted to the Tribunal that: ... there is no policy justification consistent with the overall objectives of the AD Act for including bodies such as the Respondent. Indeed, the inclusion of the respondent would, in the Applicant's submission, be anomalous and inconsistent with the application of the AD Act to like bodies. Of course, that does not mean that express words in the statute can be ignored. But it does mean that any doubt about whether the express words of s 57 require that the Respondent be entitled to the protection of s 57 should be resolved against it. The applicant submits that the Respondent is plainly not the kind of body which was contemplated by parliament when enacting s 57(1). Furthermore, the plain words of the statute do not require that the Respondent should be allowed to bring itself within s 57(1). 16 It is apparent from the Tribunal's reasoning that it did not accept Mr Sutherland's concession that the Association was a body carried on otherwise than for profit. Rather than accepting that concession and going on to deal with the submissions as to why the Association nevertheless came within the terms of s 57(1), the Tribunal deliberated on the meaning of the phrase "carried on otherwise than for profit" and applied the decision in Strong v the Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia Ltd [2004] NSWADT 176. That case turned on the meaning of "a body carried on otherwise than for profit" because, on the facts, uncertainty arose as to the meaning to be given to the word "profit". But in this matter, Mr Sutherland's representative had conceded that the Association was "a body carried on otherwise than for profit" and, quite reasonably, did not expect any issue to arise on that point. The Tribunal did not put the parties on notice that it did not accept that concession, and it erred by asking and deciding whether the Association was such a body: University of New South Wales v Gerard Michael McGuirk [2006] NSWSC 1362 (8 December 2006) at [67]. 17 We do not need to decide whether the Tribunal erred in its conclusion that the Association was not such a body, as it is not a question the Tribunal was entitled to ask. Extension to the merits on whether Association is a body within s 57(1) 18 Leave granted. Having found that the Tribunal erred by not accepting a concession made by Mr Sutherland's representative, it makes sense for the Appeal Panel to grant leave to extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal's decision on that point. That means we will decide, on the basis of the evidence and submissions before the Tribunal and the submissions before the Appeal Panel, whether the Association, satisfying as it does the criteria in s 57(1)(a)-(c), is nevertheless not a body as defined by that provision. That could only be the case if, as is submitted by Mr Sutherland's representative, the heading changes the meaning of the provision. Mr Sutherland's representative submits that because of the heading "Voluntary bodies", a further inquiry as to whether the Association is in fact a voluntary body is required. 19 Interpreting definitions. Because s 57(1) is a provision which defines the term "body", s 6 of the Interpretation Act 1987 is relevant: Definitions to be read in context Definitions that occur in an Act or instrument apply to the construction of the Act or instrument except in so far as the context or subject-matter otherwise indicates or requires. 20 The definition of "body" appears in the same section as the substantive provision exempting certain conduct of such bodies. Applying s 6, there is no doubt that the definition applies to the construction of s 57(2). When given a literal or grammatical interpretation, section 57(1) exhaustively defines the bodies to which s 57(2) applies. The provision commences with a definition of such a body saying that "body" means: (a) a body the activities of which are carried on otherwise than for profit; and (b) which is not established by an Act; (c) but does not include the bodies listed in (a) to (e). 21 Definition exhaustive. The use of the word "means" to define the bodies subject to s 57(2) indicates that the definition is exhaustive, rather than inclusive: Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1976) 10 ALR 441 at 455. The definition could be regarded as non-exhaustive only if the heading, 'Voluntary bodies' adds any meaning to the definition. 22 Headings. Section 35(1) of the Interpretation Act 1987 states that headings to Chapters, Parts, Divisions or Subdivisions into which the Act is divided are part of the Act. In relation to headings to provisions, such as s 57, s 35(3) states that: A heading to a provision of an Act or instrument (not being a heading referred to in subsection (1)) shall be taken to be part of the Act or instrument if, immediately before 1 February 1981 (being the date on which section 3 of the Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1980 commenced), it was part of the Act or instrument. 23 Whether the heading "Voluntary bodies" is, or is not, part of the Act makes no difference in this case. If it is not part of the Act, it is regarded as "extrinsic material" and may be referred to in order to assist in ascertaining the meaning of the provision, but only to confirm the ordinary meaning or to determine the meaning of the provision if that meaning is ambiguous or obscure, or if the ordinary meaning is manifestly absurd or ridiculous: Interpretation Act 1987, s 34. This is what the Tribunal in Strong v the Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia Ltd [2004] NSWADT 176 did when, in its view, the meaning of the words "carried on otherwise than for profit" were ambiguous or obscure in the circumstances of that case. In this case, however, the meaning of the provision - disregarding the heading - is not contested, and its ordinary meaning is clear. In those circumstances, in accordance with s 34 of the Interpretation Act 1987, the heading may only be used to confirm "that the meaning of the provision is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision." Section 57(1) is expressed as an exhaustive definition. Consequently, unless the heading repeats or accurately summarises that definition, it would not confirm its ordinary meaning. In our view, the heading does not confirm the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text, and so is irrelevant. 24 If the heading is part of the Act, similar considerations apply. In Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 92 ALR 193 Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ held at 195-196 that: The general heading "Consumer Protection" at the commencement of Pt V is part of the Act ( Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 13). It constitutes part of the context within which the substantive provisions of Pt V must be construed and should be taken into consideration in determining the meaning of those provisions in case of ambiguity. The heading does not, however, control the permissible scope of the substantive provisions of Pt V and cannot properly be used to impose an unnaturally constricted meaning upon the words of those substantive provisions. 25 Consequently, even if the heading "Voluntary bodies" is part of the AD Act, it should only be taken into consideration if there is an ambiguity. As there is no ambiguity in this case, it cannot be taken into consideration. Even if there were an ambiguity, a heading cannot be used to impose an unnaturally constricted meaning on the words in the provision. 26 Other federal, state and territory anti-discrimination legislation which exempts certain conduct of voluntary bodies also defines that term exhaustively. In each instance (Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), s 4; Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), s 4; Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), dictionary; and Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA), s 4) the term 'voluntary body' is defined only by reference to activities that are "not engaged in for the purpose of making a profit". 27 Conclusion. In our view, whether the heading is or is not part of the AD Act, s 57(1) exhaustively defines the bodies to which it applies. That definition is not ambiguous when applied to the facts of this case because the parties have agreed that the definition applies to the Association. Consequently, contrary to the Tribunal's finding, and on the basis of the concession made by Mr Sutherland, the Association is a body within the meaning of s 57(1). There is no need to determine whether the Association is a "voluntary body" for the exception in s 57 to apply. 28 Law reform. In 1998, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission published a two volume report entitled "Review of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)". In the report the Commission noted that when originally enacted the AD Act contained a general exemption for both voluntary bodies and registered clubs in relation to the admission of members and the benefits, facilities and services available to members. The exception for registered clubs was removed in 1981 and a new area of discrimination enacted in relation to the treatment of members of those bodies. The Commission recommended at p 214 and p 355, that the exception for voluntary bodies be removed and that the ". . . area currently identified as "registered clubs" should be renamed "clubs and associations" and extended to cover all associations of persons which are incorporated or registered as corporations in Australia." Had that recommendation been implemented, there would have been no doubt that the Association was a body covered by the AD Act, and considerable time and expense would have been saved in this and other matters on that point. Ground 2 - Is the conduct of the Association conduct which is excepted by s 57(2)? 29 Terms of s 57(2). Section 57(2) provides that: (2) Nothing in this Act affects: (a) any rule or practice of a body which restricts admission to membership of that body, or (b) the provision of benefits, facilities or services to members of that body. 30 Identification of conduct. The Tribunal found that the conduct which breached the AD Act was the Association's requirement that in order to use the pool facilities, a person must traverse a pedestrian pathway from the main car parking area, a distance of approximately 75 metres. Two questions arise on appeal. The first is whether the words "that body" in s 57(2)(b) further restrict the kind of body that is subject to the exception. Secondly, whether, if Mr Sutherland is not a member of the Association, s 57(2)(b) applies at all. On that point, the Tribunal found that Mr Sutherland is not a member of the Association and that s 57(2)(b) did not apply. 31 Purposive construction. The fundamental rule of statutory construction, as set out in s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 is that: 33 Regard to be had to purposes or objects of Acts and statutory rules In the interpretation of a provision of an Act or statutory rule, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or statutory rule (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or statutory rule or, in the case of a statutory rule, in the Act under which the rule was made) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object. 32 The long title of the AD Act is "An Act to render unlawful racial, sex and other types of discrimination in certain circumstances and to promote equality of opportunity between all persons." 33 Reference to "that body" in s 57(2)(b). Section 57(2) is ambiguous. One possible meaning is that the exception applies to the conduct of bodies generally, in relation to rules or practices which restrict admission to members and which affect the provision of benefits, facilities or services to members. The alternative meaning arises because the words "that body" are used in s (2)(b), possibly restricting that paragraph to conduct by the bodies referred to in s (2)(a). The exception would then apply only to the provision of benefits, facilities or services by bodies which restrict admission to membership. 34 Applying a purposive approach to the construction of the provision, as required by s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987, the first meaning is correct. That is because the words "that body" are used in both s 57(2)(a) and s 57(2)(b) and, in context, are on each occasion a reference to the "body" defined in s 57(1). Secondly, s 57(2)(a) and s 57(2)(b) are linked by the word "or" which suggests that the paragraphs are alternatives and that the second use of the term "that body" is to be read as an alternative to, and not a refinement of the firs use of the term. Finally, the scope of the exception would be artificially narrowed if it were confined to the conduct of bodies which restrict membership in a way that breaches the AD Act. 35 Meaning of "members" of the Association. The second question is whether the word "members" in s 57(2)(b) should be given its literal meaning, or a broader meaning incorporating individuals who are entitled to use the services provided by the Association because of their relationship with a member. Mr Sutherland is not a member of the Association because he purchased his lot through a company. Nevertheless, it was not in dispute that he is entitled to use the facilities in the common areas. 36 Construction of exceptions. The High Court has held that exemptions and other provisions which restrict rights should be interpreted proportionately with the intention of the legislation. In Qantas Airways v Christie 1998 193 CLR 280 at 332, Kirby J, who dissented, but not on this point, said that: The international experts have emphasised that "exceptions" to the main rule must be consistent with, and proportional to, adherence to the primary requirement which is designed to diminish discrimination on arbitrary grounds and to secure the object t of equal opportunity. 37 Meaning of "members". In this case, there is no doubt about the scope of the exception. It applies to members. There is no alternative construction that would allow us to apply a purposive approach and conclude that the word "members" means something other than what it says. Raphael FM took the same approach when interpreting the voluntary bodies exception in the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SD Act). In Gardner v AANA Ltd (2003) 197 ALR 28 the Federal Magistrates Court had to decide whether conduct of the All Australian Netball Association Ltd (AANA Ltd) in refusing to allow pregnant women to play netball in a particular competition, was in breach of s 39 of the SD Act. The relevant parts of s 39 are: Nothing in Division 1 or 2 renders it unlawful for a voluntary body to discriminate against a person, on the ground of the person's sex, marital status or pregnancy, in connection with: (a) the admission of persons as members of the body; or (b) the provision of benefits, facilities or services to members of the body. 38 It was agreed that the AANA Ltd was a voluntary body within the meaning of that term in s 4 of the SD Act. It was also agreed that Ms Gardner was not a member of the AANA Ltd. Raphael FM rejected a submission that the words "in connection with" in s 39 expanded the definition of "members" to include de facto members. 39 In our view, the phrase "members of that body" in 57(2) should be given its ordinary meaning, not an expanded meaning to incorporate people other than members. The word "member" is not ambiguous or obscure; its meaning is plain. 40 We appreciate that this conclusion allows the Association to avoid its obligations under the AD Act by changing its constitution to make Mr Sutherland a member of the Association. The exemption in s 57(2) would then include the Association's conduct towards him. Nevertheless, Parliament has made its intention clear. The exemption applies to conduct in relation to members only. The consequence of this conclusion is that the Association, in circumstances where there is no contest that the requirements of s57(1) are satisfied, is free to discriminate against members in relation to the provision of services, but is prohibited from discriminating against non-members who are entitled to use those services. Although this is an anomalous state of affairs, there is no alternative construction available. 41 Non-existent discretion. The Association submitted that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Tribunal should find that the complaint is not substantiated because it would not have been substantiated if Mr Sutherland were a member of the Association. Alternatively, the Association submitted that the Tribunal should not have found the complaint substantiated because the Association is able to change the Constitution to nullify the effect of its decision. As there is no such discretion available to the Tribunal, this ground of appeal fails. 42 Conclusion. The Tribunal did not err when it concluded at [35] that: The Applicant purchased a Lot in the Estate through a corporate entity, namely Croydon Park Service Station Pty Ltd. The constitution of the Association specifically makes provision for the appointment of a representative of a corporate member. . . .Croydon Park Service Station Pty Ltd is the registered proprietor, and is therefore the Association member. Having regard to all the evidence, we find that Mr Sutherland is not a member of the Association, and that his position is that of an occupier. Therefore s 57(2)(b) does not apply. Ground 3 - Did the Tribunal make an error in its characterisation of the requirement for the purposes of indirect discrimination? 43 Background. Having found that the Association's imposition of the requirement on Mr Sutherland is not protected by the exception in s 57, we turn to consider the remaining ground of appeal put forward by the Association. The Association said that the Tribunal had misconstrued section 49B which defines "indirect" discrimination. However, before determining that question, it is important to note that the Association's conduct must come within an area of activity that the AD Act makes unlawful before the question arises as to whether that conduct is discriminatory. Mr Sutherland's complaint is that the Association has discriminated against him on the ground of his disability in the area of the provision of services. He said that the Association had breached s 49M(1)(b) of the AD Act: (1) It is unlawful for a person who provides, for payment or not, goods or services to discriminate against a person on the ground of disability: (a) by refusing to provide the person with those goods or services, or (b) in the terms on which he or she provides the person with those goods or services. (2) Nothing in this section renders it unlawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's disability if the provision of the goods or services would impose unjustifiable hardship on the person who provides the goods or services. 44 Tribunal's finding about "services". The Tribunal found that the services the Association provides are "recreational, sporting and leisure facilities on the common areas". The Tribunal also found that despite the fact that Mr Sutherland is not a member of the Association, under Cl 19.2 of the Constitution, he is an "occupier" and is entitled to "be upon and use the land", subject to the by-laws. The Tribunal found that as an occupier, Mr Sutherland was entitled to use the services provided by the Association including the swimming pool. As we have said, the Tribunal found that the Association had discriminated against Mr Sutherland "indirectly", that is, contrary to s 49B(1)(b) of the AD Act. That provision states that: (1) A person ("the perpetrator") discriminates against another person ( "the aggrieved person") on the ground of disability if, on the ground of the aggrieved person's disability or the disability of a relative or associate of the aggrieved person, the perpetrator: ... (b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have that disability, or who do not have such a relative or associate who has that disability, comply or are able to comply, being a requirement which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case and with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply. 45 Elements of indirect discrimination. The four elements which Mr Sutherland needed to establish to prove that the Association had "indirectly" discriminated against him were that it: (a) required him to comply with a requirement or condition; (b) a substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have that disability comply or are able to comply with that requirement or condition; (c) Mr Sutherland does not or is not able to comply with that requirement or condition; and (d) the requirement or condition was not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case. 46 Tribunal's characterisation of the requirement. The Tribunal characterised the requirement or condition as "in order to use the pool facilities, a person must traverse a pedestrian pathway from the main car parking area, a distance of approximately 75 meters, to the pool." The Tribunal was satisfied that each of the other elements of indirect discrimination had been proved. 47 Association's submissions. The Association accepted the Tribunal's definition of the "services" it was providing, but said that the requirement could be expressed as either: (a) do not use a motor vehicle in areas not designated for vehicular use by members of the public; or (b) to use the Association swimming pool facility, you must present yourself at the facility. 48 The Association went on to say that it does not require Mr Sutherland to comply with either of those requirements "on the ground of" his disability. 49 The first reason for rejecting this submission is that it relies on a statement of the requirement that is not the requirement as found by the Tribunal. The Tribunal made its finding of fact as to the terms of the requirement imposed on Mr Sutherland. It did not find that the Association imposed requirements in the terms now submitted by the Association, so it is irrelevant whether Mr Sutherland can comply with them. 50 The second reason for rejecting this submission is that despite the use of the words "on the ground of" in s 49B, the Court of Appeal made it clear when interpreting the equivalent provision in relation to sex discrimination that those words are "mere surplusage" and have no work to do: Amery v New South Wales (Director-General, NSW Department of Education and Training) [2004] NSWCA 404 at [49]. Whether a requirement is imposed "on the ground of disability" is not a question that properly arises. 51 The Association submitted that in order to have access to the swimming pool, Mr Sutherland must use a form of transport that he dislikes, that is a wheelchair. According to the Association, that is not the imposition of a requirement in the provision of swimming pool amenities which causes discrimination on the ground of Mr Sutherland's disability. Again, this submission relies on a statement of the requirement that is not the requirement as found by the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not characterise the requirement imposed on Mr Sutherland as a requirement to access the swimming pool by using a wheelchair. Consequently, this ground of appeal fails. 52 Alternatively, the Association said in oral submissions that the requirement that was identified by the Tribunal was not correct because it relates to the manner in which Mr Sutherland obtains access to the swimming pool, not to the provision of the swimming pool itself. According to the Association's representative, how a person accesses a service is not part of the service. 53 We understand the Association's submission to be that the requirement, as characterised by the Tribunal, is not conduct that relates to the "terms" on which the Association provides Mr Sutherland with "recreational, sporting and leisure facilities on the common areas". Rather, it is a requirement about how he obtains access to those facilities. As s 49M makes it unlawful for a person who provides services to discriminate on the ground of disability "in the terms on which he or she provides the person with those goods or services", it was submitted that the requirement identified by the Tribunal cannot be unlawful. 54 When a similar submission was made to the Tribunal, it pointed out that s 4 of the AD Act defines "services" to include "services relating to entertainment, recreation or refreshment" and "services consisting of access to, and the use of any facilities in, any place or vehicle that the public or a section of the public is entitled or allowed to enter or use, for payment or not." At [42] the Tribunal dealt with the Association's submission that the recreational swimming facilities provided by the Association are distinct from the provision of access to the pool: Given the broad approach taken by the courts to the term "services" and its inclusive statutory definition, we do not find it necessary to interpret each paragraph within the definition of "services" as impliedly limited by any other paragraph in the definition. 55 The Tribunal did not make an explicit finding that the services being provided by the Association include both the "recreational, sporting and leisure facilities on the common areas" and access to those facilities. However, the Tribunal's reasons at [42] makes it clear that the Tribunal regarded access to the swimming pool as part of the service provided by the Association. This view of the facts was clearly open to the Tribunal. The Association's submission is mistaken in saying that the Tribunal had separated the idea of access to the facilities from the idea of provision of those facilities. 56 In relation to the first element of indirect discrimination, that the respondent has imposed a "requirement or condition", McHugh J in Waters said, at p 407, that: In the context of providing goods or services, a person should be regarded as imposing a requirement or condition when that person intimates, expressly or inferentially, that some stipulation or set of circumstances must be obeyed or endured if those goods or services are to be acquired, used or enjoyed. 57 The requirement or condition in this case, that in order to use the swimming pool a person must "traverse a pedestrian pathway from the main car parking area a distance of approximately 75 metres to the pool" is a stipulation that must be obeyed or endured if a person is to gain access to and use the swimming pool. The Tribunal made no error of law in relation to these findings. Extension to the merits on question of whether Association's conduct is discriminatory 58 The Association sought the Appeal Panel's leave to extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal's decision. We granted leave in relation to the question of whether the Association came within the exception in s 57. We decline to grant leave in relation to the question of whether the Association discriminated against Mr Sutherland in breach of s 49M. The grounds relied on by the Association do not raise any question of sufficient significance to justify re-opening the findings of fact made by the Tribunal. Nor did the Tribunal go about its fact-finding process in an unfair or unorthodox manner. Orders The decision of the Tribunal, that the complaint of disability discrimination in the provision of goods and services is substantiated, is affirmed. MR SUTHERLAND'S APPEAL Introduction 59 The Tribunal handed down a separate decision on remedies on 3 October 2006. The Tribunal made the following orders: 1. The respondent is enjoined from continuing or repeating the unlawful conduct; that conduct being the imposition of a requirement that in order to use the pool facilities at Tallong Park Estate a person must traverse a pedestrian pathway from the main car parking area a distance of approximately 75 metres to the pool. 2. To give the respondent time to comply, Order 1 does not come into effect for 42 days from the date of this decision. 3. Within 28 days of the date of this decision the respondent is to pay to the applicant the sum of $6000 by way of damages. 4. No order as to costs. 60 Mr Sutherland has appealed on questions of law in relation to orders 3 and 4 and has applied for the Appeal Panel to give leave for the appeal to be extended to the merits of the Tribunal's decision. Ground 1 - damages - s 108(2)(a) 61 Terms of s 108(2). Section 108(2) of the AD Act provides that: (2) If the Tribunal finds the complaint substantiated in whole or in part, it may do any one or more of the following: (a) except in respect of a matter referred to the Tribunal under section 95 (2), order the respondent to pay the complainant damages not exceeding $40,000 by way of compensation for any loss or damage suffered by reason of the respondent's conduct (Emphasis added.) 62 Tribunal's decision on damages. The Tribunal awarded Mr Sutherland $6,000 in general damages pursuant to 108(2) of the AD Act to compensate him for the distress caused to him, and the loss of the enjoyment of his property, that occurred by reason of the Association's unlawful conduct. The Tribunal did not award Mr Sutherland any damages for the treatment he said he received from members of the management committee, or others in the community, because the Tribunal found that that loss was not suffered "by reason of the respondent's conduct." 63 The Tribunal's reasons for refusing to compensate Mr Sutherland for the alleged treatment by members of the management committee and others are set out [9] and [10] of the decision Sutherland v Tallong Park Association Incorporated (No.2) [2006] NSWADT 287: We find that any alleged vilification by the respondent's management committee cannot be regarded as a loss suffered by reason of the unlawful conduct of the respondent, namely, the imposition of an unlawful requirement regarding access to the pool facilities. ... We also find that the loss of enjoyment of his property arising from disharmony with others in the Tallong Park community is not a loss suffered by reason of the unlawful conduct of the respondent. We see this alleged loss as a consequence of individual perceptions regarding these proceedings and the respective positions adopted by the applicant and the respondent over the issue of access to the pool. 64 Submissions. Mr Sutherland submitted that the Tribunal made an error of law by interpreting the phrase "loss or damage suffered by reason of the respondent's conduct" in s 108(2)(a) too narrowly. He said that the chain of causation is as follows: (a) the Association's unlawful conduct (imposing a requirement about access to the pool) caused Mr Sutherland to take reasonable action to end that conduct through negotiation and through proceedings in the Tribunal; (b) the Association wrongfully and unreasonably portrayed Mr Sutherland in an unfavourable light to other members of the community as part of its resistance to Mr Sutherland's attempts to seek an end to the Association's unlawful conduct; and (c) the Association's actions thereby materially caused or contributed to his loss and damage. 65 Mr Sutherland said that the ordinary meaning of the words "by reason of" the Association's unlawful conduct, when interpreted in accordance with the purpose of the AD Act, encompassed the lawful conduct which occurred as a consequence of the unlawful conduct. If parliament had intended the Tribunal to limit its consideration only to the direct effects of the unlawful act or unlawful conduct itself, in assessing damages under s 108(2)(a), it would have said so in clear terms. The use of the general term the respondent's "conduct", rather than "acts" was deliberately designed to ensure that any conduct of the respondent, whether lawful or unlawful, could be taken into account in assessing damages as long as it had some relevant connection to the unlawful discrimination. 66 Conclusion. We do not agree with Mr Sutherland's submissions. Section 108(2)(a) requires that the connection is between the unlawful conduct and the loss or damage, not between an intervening lawful event and the loss. That view is supported by the decision in Commissioner of Police v Mooney (No 3) [2004] NSWADTAP 22. In that case the Appeal Panel considered the meaning of the words "by reason of the respondent's conduct" in a former provision of the AD Act, s 113(1)(b), which is relevantly in identical terms to s 108(2)(a). The Appeal Panel noted at [25], that in more recent times judges have rejected the characterisation of a complaint of unlawful discrimination as a statutory tort: Commissioner of Police v Estate of Russell (2002) 55 NSWLR 232 at 245-246; Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 217 at 264. The Appeal Panel agreed with the views expressed on that point in those cases and concluded at [27] that while common law rules about causation my assist the Tribunal when determining whether any loss or damage was suffered "by reason of the respondent's conduct", those rules are not controlling. The Appeal Panel adopted the "material contribution" test set out by McHugh J in Commissioner of Police v Estate of Russell (2002) 55 NSWLR 232 at 245-246; Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 217 at 493. His Honour said that the "principles that assist tribunals of fact in deciding causation issues" may be described as follows: If the defendant's breach has "materially contributed" to the loss or damage suffered, it will be regarded as a cause of the loss or damage, despite other factors or conditions having played an even more significant role in producing the loss or damage. As long as the breach materially contributed to the damage, a causal connection will ordinarily exist even though the breach without more would not have brought about the damage. In exceptional cases, where an abnormal event intervenes between the breach and damage, it may be right as a matter of common sense to hold that the breach was not a cause of damage. But such cases are exceptional. 67 We agree with the Appeal Panel's reasoning in Commissioner of Police v Mooney (No 3) [2004] NSWADTAP 22 and adopt it in this case. Using the words of McHugh J in Henville v Walker (2001) 206 CLR 459, an event has intervened between the breach and the alleged damage, namely the conduct of members of the management committee and others in the community towards Mr Sutherland. That conduct or event is not a breach of s 49M(1) of the AD Act, but a separate event that occurred after the breach. (Such conduct could in some circumstances be characterised as a breach of the victimisation provisions in s 50 of the AD Act however we note that Mr Sutherland did not make such a complaint.) 68 The Tribunal did not make an error of law in finding that damage resulting from the intervening conduct cannot be regarded as a loss suffered "by reason of" the unlawful conduct of the respondent. The unlawful conduct was the imposition of the requirement regarding access to the pool facilities, not the treatment of Mr Sutherland following that conduct. As we agree with the Tribunal's conclusion, the question of extending extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal's decision on this point does not arise. Ground 2 - reason for deterioration of Mr Sutherland's health 69 Mr Sutherland's next ground of appeal is that the Tribunal erred by failing to find that the deterioration in his health occurred "by reason of" the Association's unlawful conduct. Mr Sutherland said that the Tribunal wrongly directed itself as to the onus and standard of proof by which loss or damage must be proved. The Tribunal's findings on this issue are set out at [7] and [8] of its reasons: 7 The Tribunal may order the respondent to pay damages for any loss or damage suffered by reason of the respondent's conduct. The applicant bears the onus of proving, on the balance of probabilities, that he has sustained the loss he claims. The loss must be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty ( Mooney v Commissioner of Police (No3) [2003] NSWADT 18.) 8 The applicant claims damages for deterioration in his health. However, it is difficult to identify whether any deterioration in the applicant's health is attributable to the unlawful conduct in question. The brief report of Dr Lalak, tendered by the applicant, refers to increased weakness in his legs and impaired balance, as well as increased pain since mid 2004. However, the report does not give any reason for this change, and makes no direct mention of lack of exercise being a contributing factor. We have reviewed a number of medical reports that were filed by the applicant on 14 March 2006. These consistently emphasise the need for the applicant to obtain regular exercise for his polio and diabetes. The applicant submits that we should draw an inference that the deterioration in the applicant's health is due to his inability to access the pool. This inference is said to arise from the fact that all the medical evidence points to the need for someone in the applicant's position to exercise regularly, that the applicant attested he was not able to exercise as much as he would otherwise have done, because other pools were not as convenient and accessible, and that there has been a deterioration in his health. The respondent submits that factors such as age and other health issues may have caused the deterioration. The applicant bears the onus of showing on the balance of probabilities that he has suffered the particular loss he claims. In the absence of any clear medical evidence on this point, we are unable to find that any alleged deterioration in the applicant's health is attributable to the respondent's unlawful conduct regarding access to the pool. 70 Mr Sutherland's representative cited McDonald v Director-General of Social Security (1984) 1 FCR 354 in support of the proposition that there is no general onus of proof in proceedings before the Tribunal. In relying on such a case, it is apparent that he is referring to the Tribunal's merits review jurisdiction in relation to reviewable decisions as defined in s 8 and 38 of the ADT Act and not to an original decision as this is: ADT Act, s7 and s 37; AD Act, s 95(3). Reliance on that authority is irrelevant to the Tribunal's statement that "[T]he applicant bears the onus of showing on the balance of probabilities that he has suffered the particular loss he claims." This ground of appeal fails. 71 Mr Sutherland also challenged the Tribunal's statement at [7] that the loss must be proven "with a reasonable degree of certainty". That comment was drawn from the Appeal Panel's decision in Commissioner of Police v Mooney (No 3) [2004] NSWADTAP 22 at [38]: As with every other fact in issue in a case before it, the Tribunal must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a successful applicant in a discrimination case has sustained the economic loss he or she claims. Another way of making the same point is to say that any loss claimed by a successful applicant in a discrimination complaint must be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty (see Bonella v Wollongong City Council [2001] NSWADT 194 at [119]). That statement reflects the position at common law where a plaintiff in an action in tort or contract must prove his or her damages with reasonable certainty (see M Tilbury, Civil Remedies, Volume One: Principles of Civil Remedies (1990) at 150-151). It is self-evident that, in most cases, the Tribunal may reasonably expect an applicant to present evidence which more readily satisfies it on the balance of probabilities, or which conveys a higher degree of certainty, when his or her claim is for compensation for past loss rather than for damages for some projected future loss. 72 We find no error in this passage, or with the Tribunal's reference to it in this case. Proving loss "with a reasonable degree of certainty" is merely another way of saying that the loss must be proved on the balance of probabilities. As we agree with the Tribunal's conclusion, the question of extending extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal's decision on this point does not arise. Ground 3 - failure to order an apology 73 Terms of s 108(2)(d). Section 108(2)(d) allows the Tribunal to order an apology: (2) If the Tribunal finds the complaint substantiated in whole or in part, it may do any one or more of the following: (d) order the respondent to publish an apology or a retraction (or both) in respect of the matter the subject of the complaint and, as part of the order, give directions concerning the time, form, extent and manner of publication of the apology or retraction (or both) 74 Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal rejected Mr Sutherland's submission that it should order the Association to apologise to him. At [22]-[24] the Tribunal dealt with this submission: 22 Apology. The applicant seeks an order that the respondent publish an apology to the applicant (in a form approved by the applicant) and that the respondent be directed to provide a copy of the apology by pre-paid registered post to each and every lot owner and resident of the Tallong Park Estate. The respondent opposed the order of an apology as inappropriate in the circumstances and not serving any useful purpose. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines apology as a "regretful acknowledgement of fault or failure; assurance that no offence was intended; explanation, vindication". 23 The applicant claims the respondent has misled members and residents of the estate as to the outcome of the case and the costs, and that as a consequence a significant amount of anger has been directed towards him in the community. He expressed his concern with the interpretation given to the proceedings and wants a balanced account to be provided. At the hearing on the issue of relief the Tribunal noted that although the relief was still to be determined, the Respondent's President's Letter dated 8 June 2006 stated that the decision of the Tribunal on 1 June 2006 "includes the TPA providing road access from the current disabled car park to a new parking facility to be built adjacent to the pool". 24 In our view an apology that takes the form of an expression of regretful acknowledgement of fault or remorse for the unlawful conduct would not serve any purpose in these circumstances. In these proceedings, the respondent argued that it is not covered by the Act, and continues to maintain that position. We do not order that the respondent publish an apology. However, we would recommend that the respondent take steps to inform its members in writing of the terms of the orders made by the Tribunal in these proceedings. 75 Submissions. Mr Sutherland submitted that the Tribunal had misconceived its powers by assuming that an apology should be published only if it would represent a "regretful acknowledgment of fault or failure". Mr Sutherland said that an apology did not have to reflect the subjective state of mind of the person apologising. It could merely be a public acknowledgement of wrongdoing. 76 Conclusion. Courts have questioned the efficacy of ordering apologies and retractions in anti-discrimination proceedings, including those involving vilification. For example, in Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243 at [245], a case in which the respondent was found to have contravened Part IIA of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) by distributing anti-Semitic leaflets, Hely J stated: During the course of submissions I suggested to the applicant's counsel that, prima facie, the idea of ordering someone to make an apology is a contradiction in terms. Mr Rothman accepted this. Although an apology has been ordered in proceedings of this type in the past (see, for example, Oberoi v HREOC [2001] FMCA 34), I do not think that an order that the respondent publish an apology is appropriate in these proceedings. 77 However, it is clear that an apology may be ordered to fulfil a legal requirement rather than as a statement of genuinely held feelings. In Burns v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd & Ors (No2) [2005] NSWADT 24 at [29] and [30] the Tribunal discussed this issue in the context of the former equivalent provision in the AD Act in relation to vilification complaints: 29 We agree that if an apology is understood, as it is commonly understood, to be a statement that reflects a person's own feeling of regret for conduct that has caused offence or harm, then of its nature it cannot be ordered to be made, unless the feeling is in fact held and it is only its expression that is ordered. In submissions the applicant, however, says that an apology for purposes of s113(1)(b)(iiia) should be understood as being associated with a legal requirement, rather than "genuine and voluntary". The Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 makes clear that there is power to order an apology in respect of a vilification complaint. The apology is acknowledgement of the wrongdoing and, seen as fulfilment of a legal requirement rather than as a statement of genuinely held feelings, it can properly be compelled by way of order. There would be a welcome extra dimension to the apology if it reflected that the person actually regrets the conduct. 30 We agree, therefore, with the respondents' argument that to compel the publication of an apology is misguided, only to the extent that the argument refers to what we will call a personal apology, rather than an apology that is one made for the purposes of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977. An apology of the type that meets the purposes of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 can, and in this case will be, compelled by order. 78 In this case the Tribunal said that "an apology that takes the form of an expression of regretful acknowledgement of fault or remorse for the unlawful conduct would not serve any purpose ... " While that may be so, the Tribunal failed to appreciate that an apology within the meaning of that term in s 108(2)(d), could also take the form of an acknowledgement of wrong doing whether genuinely held or not. It follows that the Tribunal erred by failing to appreciate the extent of its power to order an apology. 79 Again, it makes sense for the Appeal Panel to extend the appeal to the merits of the Tribunal's decision on this point and to invite submissions from the parties as to whether an apology should be ordered and, if so, what form it should take. Mr Sutherland should make any such submissions within 14 days of receiving these reasons and the Association should reply within a further 14 days. We will then determine the issue "on the papers" pursuant to s 76 of the ADT Act. Order The Tribunal's decision not to order the Association to apologise to Mr Sutherland is set aside. The appeal is extended to the merits of the Tribunal's decision on that point and we make the following directions: 1. Mr Sutherland to make submissions within 14 days of receiving these reasons on whether an apology should be ordered and what form it should take. 2. The Association to make submissions in reply within 14 days of receiving Mr Sutherland's submissions. Ground 4 - failure to make a costs order 80 Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal refused Mr Sutherland's application for costs. The reasons for that decision are set out at [27] and [29]: 27 Costs. Section 110 of the Act provides that each party is to pay his or her own costs. An exception is provided in s 110(2) where the Tribunal is of the opinion that in a particular case there are circumstances that justifies it doing so. In Sebastian v Rail Infrastructure Corporation [2005] NSWADT 281 at [99] the Tribunal reviewed the authorities on the question of costs and concluded "what those cases demonstrate is that in order to justify awarding costs there must be something over and beyond a normal course of circumstances"(See Battenberg v The Union Club (No 3) [2005] NSWADT 126 at [8] and Borg v Commissioner, Department of Corrective Services [2003] NSWADT 35 at [21]). The circumstances that may be relevant to this question include: whether the applicant's costs exceed or are disproportionate to the amount of damages awarded; the manner in which the parties have conducted the proceedings; whether the case raises any important public policy or public interest considerations; and whether the proceedings determine or clarify an important question of law. ... 29 We do not find that the circumstances justify an order as to costs. The applicant's principal complaint is that the respondent would not negotiate an outcome. Although parties can be encouraged to resolve the issues informally, an informal settlement by negotiation relies on a willingness of both parties. The respondent asserted that the Act did not apply to it in its capacity as an association. We have found otherwise. However, the respondent chose to have that issue tested, rather than settle the matter earlier. The proceedings also raised other issues such as whether the respondent as an association provided a service within the terms of the Act, and to whom that service was provided, as well as the capacity of the applicant to bring the proceedings given that he purchased his Lot in the estate through a corporate entity, which were important unresolved legal and factual questions in these proceedings. 81 Submissions. Mr Sutherland said that the Tribunal erred in coming to this conclusion because it took into account irrelevant considerations and failed to take into account relevant considerations when exercising its discretion in relation to costs. As far as we can ascertain, the irrelevant consideration that the Tribunal is said to have taken into account was giving credit to the Association for relying on a technical legal argument to submit that it was not liable under the AD Act. The relevant considerations that Mr Sutherland said that the Tribunal should have taken into account were: (a) the manner in which the Association conducted the factual proceedings; (b) the manner in which the Association misrepresented both Mr Sutherland's claim and the rulings of the Tribunal to members of the Tallong Park community ...; (c) the fact that part of the funding thereby secured by the Association had been contributed to by Mr Sutherland; and (d) the unreasonableness of the Association's opposition to Mr Sutherland's claim, given the cost of ceasing the Association's unlawful conduct on the one hand, compared to the cost of defending the proceedings on the other hand. 82 Exercising discretion. It is a fundamental principle of law that in exercising discretionary power, a decision maker must take into account relevant considerations and must not take into account irrelevant considerations. The leading Australian case in this area is Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1985-1986) 162 CLR 25. The principles as set out by Mason J at p 39 that are applicable in this case may be para-phrased as follows: (a) the ground of failure to take into account a relevant consideration can only be made out if a decision-maker fails to take into account a consideration which he or she is bound to take into account in making that decision; (b) where a statute confers a discretion which in its terms is unconfined, the factors that may be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion are similarly unconfined, except in so far as there may be found in the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the statute some implied limitation on the factors to which the decision-maker may legitimately have regard; (c) similarly, where the ground of review is that a relevant consideration has not been taken into account and the discretion is unconfined in terms of the statute, the court will not find that the decision-maker is bound to take a particular matter into account unless an implication that he is bound to do so is to be found in the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act; and (d) not every consideration that a decision-maker is bound to take into account but fails to take into account will justify the court setting aside the impugned decision and ordering that the discretion be re-exercised according to law. A factor might be so insignificant that the failure to take into account could not have materially affected the decision. 83 Conclusion. In this case the discretion in s 110 is unconfined. Mr Sutherland did not submit that the subject matter, scope or purpose of the AD Act implied that the Tribunal is bound to take into account certain considerations. Even if the Tribunal were bound to take into account the considerations listed by Mr Sutherland, we are not persuaded that the Tribunal failed to take those considerations into account or, if it did, that taking them into account would have materially affected the decision. Costs of this appeal 84 Both parties applied for costs of the appeal. If either party wishes to pursue an application for costs, then they should file written submissions within 14 days of receiving these reasons. The other party then has 14 days from the receipt of that submission in which to respond. The issue of costs, if any, will be determined "on the papers" pursuant to s 76 of the ADT Act.

Tallong Park Association Inc v Sutherland; Sutherland v Tallong Park Association Inc

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Catchwords

Source

Catchwords

Judgment (10 paragraphs)

Legislation Cited (11)

Cases Cited (11)

Cited By (9)