Disposition of the applications and consideration
22 The applications in each of the matters must be dismissed. Were leave granted, none of the appeals would have any prospect of success. Each is also an abuse of the process of this Court.
23 In the past six months, I have now had before me nearly 40 migration applications or appeals which are of the same character as these five and which can each be described as an abuse of process. By the time these applications reach this Court, it is not uncommon for ten or more judicial officers to have considered and rejected proceedings instituted by the applicants in relation to the delegate's decision. The applicants can have little doubt about the futility of the proceedings. In the past many cases of the type dealt with in this Court have been the subject of special leave applications to the High Court, which, as far as I am aware, are invariably unsuccessful. Often a further round of litigant is commenced at a trial level in the Federal Magistrates Court, within three weeks of the application being dismissed by the High Court. This creates the framework for the litigant to pass through the primary hearing and appeal process again. Experience would suggest that the dismissal of these applications will also lead to application for special leave in the High Court.
24 It is a matter of concern that each of the present applicants, and those who institute like proceedings, have been granted bridging visas repeatedly and, as a consequence, permitted to remain in Australia and prosecute proceedings. One means of attempting to discourage or prevent the institution of proceedings of this general character is to make orders requiring prior leave of the court before further applications (either in relation to reviews of specific decisions or generally) may be accepted for filing. Such orders are commonly sought by the Minister's solicitors and are often granted, both in this Court and the Federal Magistrates Court. As I have indicated to legal representatives appearing for the Minister on previous occasions, it is questionable whether this mechanism is effective in discouraging or preventing such proceedings. Orders of this kind have been made in a number of the present matters. In Applicant S1000 of 2003, such orders were made on two occasions by the Federal Magistrates Court and on one occasion by this Court. The burden of giving effect to such orders is placed on the registry of the relevant court, and in practice, the requirement for leave may merely create another opportunity for litigation. Additionally, the use of pseudonyms because of s 91X of the Act renders the registry's task more difficult. It is doubtful whether the course of declaring an applicant a vexatious litigant, as occurred in Applicant S1000 of 2003 in the Federal Magistrates Court, is effective in practice as a means of addressing the problem.
25 An issue of relevance in the grant of bridging visas is of course the need to ensure litigants are not removed from Australia pending legitimate attempts to challenge decisions concerning their right to remain in Australia or the validity of their removal. In Tchoylak v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 872, an appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in which the Tribunal found that the appellant was ineligible for a protection visa, the appellant had been removed from Australia by the Minister prior to the hearing before the Full Court of the Federal Court. The Court at [50] to [53] said:
Although we consider that we must dismiss this appeal, we cannot allow the situation to pass without expressing our disquiet at what has occurred. The material filed on behalf of the applicant suggested that there may have been several other recent instances where applicants for review in this Court have been removed from Australia by officers of the Department while their applications were pending. Amnesty International claims that Mr Tchoylak case was the third occasion in recent times in which the Department had pre-empted the Court by deporting an applicant while his or her case was pending. When pressed by the respondent for particulars, Amnesty International referred specifically, inter alia, to Kopiev v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1831 per Sackville J. There the applicant was removed from this country three days before the first directions hearing by the Court.
The respondent has filed extensive affidavit material which casts doubt upon whether at least some of Amnesty International's claims are justified. It is neither necessary nor appropriate that this Court determine whether Mr Tchoylak's case represents an isolated instance, now never likely to be repeated, or whether it is but one of a number of cases where the Department has failed properly to discharge its responsibilities.
The respondent has offered an apology to the Court and, it may be inferred, to the applicant, for what has occurred. There is no suggestion, in the present case, that the applicant's removal from Australia was the result of anything other than a series of misunderstandings on the part of officers within the Department. That, of course, is little comfort to the applicant.
The respondent must take responsibility for ensuring that no one is removed from this country while there are proceedings pending in this Court challenging the validity of that removal. We do not accept that any of the various subsections of s 198 of the Act, which impose a duty in the circumstances there specified to remove a non-citizen "as soon as reasonably practicable" can be invoked by the respondent to justify what occurred in the present case.
26 The Court ordered that the Minister pay the appellant's costs (paid to the applicant's pro bono counsel) on an indemnity basis.
27 Courts are entitled to take a critical view of the removal from the country of any person seeking to challenge the validity of removal where he or she has not yet exhausted all reasonable and legitimate avenues of review open to him or her. This is clearly the situation to which their Honours' comments at [53] were directed. No doubt there are also great practical difficulties in administering legislation in this area, and to closely monitor the circumstances of every individual who is potentially someone who should be removed from Australia. However, it is difficult to accept that applicants who have repeatedly instituted unsuccessful and futile proceedings should be allowed to remain in Australia by the grant of bridging visas to continue the cycle of vexatious litigation in the Australian court system. It is also difficult to accept that the repeated grant of bridging visas in relation to such litigation is a necessary and unavoidable by-product of the need to protect the rights of individuals to prosecute proceedings in the courts.
28 I have now also raised on a number of occasions, including at the hearing on 9 May 2007, whether the Minister should have his costs in these cases, where the Minister, or his Department and officers, have failed to remove the applicant from Australia assuming, absent a bridging visa, that would have occurred. In the present proceedings however, I am prepared, with some hesitation, to make orders that each of the applicants pay the Minister's costs and where a fixed costs order has been sought, order that costs be fixed in the amount sought.
29 I conclude by noting that almost always litigants in the position of the present applicants have been assisted by others. It may well be that the Department should take steps to identify these individuals. If identified, costs orders and other relief might be available against them.
I certify that the preceding twenty nine (29) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.