Applicant S1000/2003 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
[2006] FCA 509
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2006-05-05
Before
Conti J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
Introduction 1 By an application filed on 16 February 2006, the applicant applied for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment of the Federal Magistrates Court ('the FMC') given on 31 January 2006. 2 The FMC recorded that the application for judicial review purportedly filed on 13 January 2006 was accepted for filing in breach of order 3 made by the FMC on 13 December 2004 and as a consequence made the following orders: '1. Leave is refused for the filing of the application purportedly filed on 13 January 2006 insofar as it relates to the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal ('the RRT') made on 20 March 2000. 2. The application is dismissed as incompetent insofar as it relates to the decision of the delegate made on 12 October 1998. 3. The application to pay the first respondent's costs and disbursements of and incidental to the application pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Court scale.' 3 That order made by the FMC on 13 December 2004 was to the effect that no further application for review of the decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal, which was handed down on 4 April 2000, be accepted for filing in the FMC. 4 The application purportedly filed on 13 January 2006 seeks inter alia to challenge the decision of the RRT made on 20 March 2000. That decision had been the subject of several earlier judicial review proceedings, as recorded in Applicant S1000/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FMCA 963 per Driver FM at [4] and [5]. The application for review of that RRT decision had been ruled as incompetent, in so far as it related to the decision of the Minister's delegate made on 12 October 1998. 5 In support of the present application for leave to appeal is an affidavit of the applicant sworn on 16 February 2006, and a draft notice of appeal containing five purported grounds of appeal (numbered 3 to 7). 6 On 26 April 2006 the applicant filed an outline of submissions and a further affidavit affirmed on 26 April 2006 which annexed a transcript of the applicant's proceedings before the RRT. 7 The applicant's submissions purport to distil error in the Refugee Review Tribunal's decision made more than six years ago, errors said to have been overlooked by the FMC. What follows below reflects the Minister's reasons for decision on the subject of the present application for leave to appeal. 8 In Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397, the Full Federal Court considered as an 'appropriate litmus test for the general run of cases, in which leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision is sought' (at 399), being the two principles stated in Niemann v Electronic Industries Ltd [1978] VR 431, namely, whether in all the circumstances the interlocutory decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by a court on appeal, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused, supposing the decision be wrong. 9 The Full Court in Décor (at 400) also endorsed the proposition that leave will be more readily granted where the decision the subject of appeal determined a 'substantive right' rather than a 'point of practice'. 10 In the present case, the Federal Magistrate's decision determined points of practice and/or procedure, that is to say, first whether the application purportedly filed on 13 January 2006 was filed in breach of an order of the Federal magistrate Court which required the applicant to first obtain leave of the FMC to appeal, secondly whether that leave should be granted, and thirdly whether the application was incompetent insofar as it related to the decision of the Minister's delegate. The Minister submitted that the court should be reluctant to grant leave in such circumstances. 11 The Minister submitted further that the applicant would need to meet both of the principles enunciated in Décor before the Court would be willing to grant the applicant leave to appeal, and moreover that the applicant did not meet either of those principles for the reasons below.