FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE PERIOD IN SUBSECTIONS 443(B)(2)-(3)
25 In the Court's earlier reasons concerning the administration of the Virgin Companies (see Strawbridge, in the matter of Virgin Australia Holdings Ltd (administrators appointed) [2020] FCA 571) ('Prior Reasons'), at [44]-[46] I set out the principles that apply with respect to an application for an extension of the period in sub-s 443B(2):
[44] The principles governing the Court's power to extend time under section 443B of the Corporations Act were usefully summarised by Markovic J in Strawbridge (Administrator), in the matter of CBCH Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2020] FCA 472, where her Honour said this at [39]:
Section 447A(1) of the Act also gives the Court ample power to alter the operation of s 443B(2) and (3) of the Act: see In the matter of Mothercare Australia Limited (administrators appointed) [2013] NSWSC 263 at [6]. Alternatively, s 443B(8) gives the Court an additional power to alter the operation of s 443B(2) and (3): see Silvia v FEA Carbon Pty Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 301 (Silvia v FEA) at [13]. The usual rationale behind the extension of the five business day period in s 443B(2) and (3) or the exercise of the power in s 443B(8) is because the administrator has had insufficient time to conduct the necessary investigations to decide whether he or she thinks it best to retain or give up possession of leased property: see Silvia v FEA at [12]-[13]. Further it seems that s 443B(8) allows the Court to excuse the administrator from liability to pay rent even after the five business day period has passed (see Silvia v FEA at [13]-[14]) or that s 447A enables a court to amend the operation of Pt 5.3A of the Act retrospectively (see Australasian Memory v Brien at [26]). (Emphasis in original)
[45] In that decision, her Honour went on to note, at [52] and [57], that when considering an extension of this type, it is important to balance the interests of different creditors (particularly in the circumstances of a complex administration).
[46] In In the matter of Mothercare Australia Limited (administrators appointed) [2013] NSWSC 263, Black J canvassed the rationale for granting an extension of time for administrators to decide whether to give notice to landlords limiting their personal liability, and made the following pertinent comments, at [2]-[4]:
[2] The first issue which arises is the application for an extension of time in order to give any notice to lessors under s 443B(3) of the Corporations Act. That section broadly deals with the circumstances in which an administrator becomes subject to personal liability for rental or other amounts payable by a company under a lease. In broad terms, the section provides that the administrator is liable for rent payable by a company under administration for the period which begins more than five days after the administration begins, but may avoid that liability by giving notice that specifies the property and states that the company does not propose to exercise its rights in relation to the property. That section will operate in a relatively straightforward manner in circumstances that, for example, a company occupies a single or a small number of properties, and assumes that the administrator will be in a position, by the exercise of appropriate diligence, to form a view as to whether the company should continue to occupy the premises and whether or not to assume personal liability in respect of the premises within that period.
[3] However, a situation may arise where there are obstacles to the administrator forming that view within that period. Such a situation was considered in Silvia v Fea Carbon Pty Ltd (ACN 009 505 195) (admins apptd) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2010] FCA 515; (2010) 185 FCR 301, where Finkelstein J noted the policy behind the section and that the section was intended to allow the administrator the opportunity to avoid personal liability for rental payable by giving notice within the five day period, but also recognised the possibility that that period may be too short in a particular case. His Honour noted that the Court can either excuse such liability under s 443B(8) of the Corporations Act or extend the time for investigation under s 447A of the Corporations Act.
[4] The Administrators here seek orders under s 443B(8) of the Corporations Act or alternatively under s 447A which, in effect, extend the time for the giving of notice of an intention not to exercise rights in respect of the relevant properties to 5 March 2013, a month from today. A number of factors relevant to making such an order were identified in Silvia v Fea Carbon, including that there may be a large amount of paperwork to review; factual uncertainty in relation to the leases; or the administrators' inability to form a view within the five business days allowed by the section as to whether it was necessary or desirable to exercise rights over the relevant property for the purpose of maximising the chances that some or all of the members of the companies can continue in existence or maximising the return to creditors.
26 Those principles apply equally to the further extension of time now sought.
27 However, there is also a particular regime that applies to aircraft, by reason of the Convention and the Protocol.
28 Both the Convention and the Protocol are incorporated into domestic law by the International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Cape Town Convention) Act 2013 (Cth) (the 'Cape Town Convention Act'). By reason of s 8 of the Cape Town Convention Act, the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol prevail over the Corporations Act to the extent of any inconsistency.
29 Article XI of the Protocol deals with the moratorium on recovery of property that applies in a corporate insolvency. Article XI, Alternative A, relevantly provides that, upon the occurrence of an insolvency-related event, the insolvency administrator or the debtor, as applicable, shall, subject to paragraph 7, give possession of the aircraft object to the creditor no later than the earlier of: (a) the end of the 'waiting period'; and (b) the date on which the creditor would be entitled to possession of the aircraft object if this Article did not apply. (Paragraph 7 permits the insolvency administrator or the debtor to retain possession where all defaults are cured and the insolvency administrator or debtor agrees to perform all future obligations under the agreement.)
30 Australia has made a declaration that it will apply Article XI, Alternative A, in its entirety to all types of insolvency proceeding and that the 'waiting period', for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Article XI, shall be sixty calendar days.
31 These provisions prevail over the statutory moratorium in s 440B of the Corporations Act and, as a result, Aircraft Lessors are entitled to possession of their property by 19 June 2020, which is 60 days from the commencement of the administration on 20 April 2020, unless the Administrators cure all outstanding defaults and agree to perform all future obligations under the leases.
32 Therefore, the further extension of time sought by the Administrators to decide whether the Virgin Companies ought to continue to remain in possession of the Aircraft Leased Property continues to fall within the waiting period prescribed by the Protocol.
33 The extension of the period in sub-ss 443B(2)-(3) of the Corporations Act is designed to extend the time to 16 June 2020 for the Administrators to decide whether to cause the Virgin Companies to remain in possession of leased property in accordance with the terms of existing agreements in place at the commencement of the administration period (and to exclude the Administrators' personal liability for the obligations of the Virgin Companies under those leases in the interim).
34 The Administrators' personal liability under future agreements, including with respect to the Aircraft Protocols, is governed by the Court's orders of 15 May 2020: Order 2(a)(i) of the orders made on 15 May 2020, in the case of the Aircraft Protocols. This application does not relate to such future agreements and there is nothing in the orders now sought that will excuse the Virgin Companies from being liable to pay usage charges under the Aircraft Protocols (once agreed). Nor do the orders derogate from the rights of Aircraft Lessors under the Convention and the Protocol, given that the further extension now sought (to 16 June 2020) is still within the 60 day 'waiting period' prescribed by paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Protocol.
35 The further extension of time is only sought with respect to the Aircraft Leased Property.
36 In my view, the further extension should be granted for the reasons set out in the Administrators' written submissions.
37 First, aircraft, engines and other associated aviation equipment are a species of property with peculiar characteristics. Obviously enough, ongoing possession of this type of property is critical to the continuing viability of any airline business, including the Virgin Companies.
38 Secondly, the Administrators have been negotiating with the Aircraft Lessors with a view to reaching agreement on the form of the Aircraft Protocols. Whilst a complex process, substantial progress has been made and the Administrators are close to finalising the arrangements with the counter-parties. The further extension will facilitate agreement being reached with the counter-parties, governing future dealings over the course of the administration period.
39 Thirdly, the timing of the proposed further extension is harmonised with that of the sale process. Final bids are expected by 12 June 2020 and the prospective bidder or bidders are expected to be in a position to provide an indication as to which specific aircraft are sought to be retained following a sale or restructure of the business of the Virgin Companies. Accordingly, by 16 June 2020, the Administrators are likely to be in a position to ascertain which specific aircraft may not be required for the business. Ultimately, given the nature of the property in question, that is a decision the Administrators can only be expected to make in conjunction with a proposed purchaser of the business and assets of the Virgin Companies.
40 Fourthly, the liabilities associated with the Aircraft Leased Property are significant, exceeding $40 million per month. The Administrators are not willing to take on personal liability for those liabilities and, if that were to occur, the Aircraft Lessors would be entitled to take possession of the property before 19 June 2020 (as otherwise permitted by the Protocol), which would be detrimental to the prospects of the Virgin Companies remaining as a going concern.
41 Fifthly, there is unlikely to be any material prejudice to the Aircraft Lessors from the further extension. The Aircraft Leased Property is insured and properly maintained, with the Aircraft Lessors being kept regularly informed of these matters and having had the opportunity to inspect electronic records and the aircraft in their physical form. Moreover, once the Aircraft Protocols are agreed, payments will be made to Aircraft Lessors in cases when the Administrators cause the Virgin Companies to use the particular aircraft as part of the operation of the business. Also, having regard to the significant travel restrictions in place during the COVID-19 pandemic, as a matter of commercial reality it is not apparent that the return or surrender of Aircraft Leased Property to the Aircraft Lessors will enable the relevant lessors and financiers to derive any better financial return for their property in the short term.
42 Sixthly, Mr Algeri, an experienced insolvency practitioner, has deposed that:
(1) the Administrators consider that they require the further three weeks to finalise the Aircraft Protocols; and
(2) the extension of time is designed to preserve and enhance the value of the Virgin Companies' business as part of a sale or positive restructure of the business as a going concern.
43 Seventhly, it is necessary for the Court to have regard to the best interests of the creditors of the Virgin Companies as a whole. An extension of time under s 443B maximises the prospect of preserving (either in whole or in part) the business of the Virgin Companies with a view to a sale or restructure of the business as a going concern. That is in the creditors' best interests (including those of the Aircraft Lessors as it also increases the prospect that there will remain a counter-party in place with respect to existing aircraft leases): Prior Reasons at [49].
44 Finally, to the extent that the Aircraft Lessors are adversely affected, the orders sought are framed in such a way to permit those persons to apply to the Court for a variation of the orders: Prior Reasons at [51].
I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Middleton.