Song v Commissioner of Taxation
[2018] FCA 840
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2018-08-02
Before
Davies J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (24 paragraphs)
- The parties provide minutes of proposed orders giving effect to these reasons within 7 days. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
DAVIES J: 1 The applicant has made a claim of legal professional privilege over a number of documents that the respondent ("the Commissioner") obtained from the applicant's premises pursuant to the Commissioner's access powers under s 353-15 of Schedule 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). The Commissioner's access powers were used in connection with an audit of the individual taxation affairs of the applicant, her husband and her son and companies with which they are associated. A schedule of the documents over which legal professional privilege is claimed has been prepared which identifies the privilege holder and the basis of the privilege claim which, in each instance, is under the legal advice head of privilege. There are 23 primary documents, being original emails, emails forwarding chains of emails and attachments as described in the schedule. The schedule also identifies the basis of the Commissioner's comments on the privilege claims. 2 The privilege claimants are: (a) the applicant in her personal capacity and in her capacity as a director of Soma (Aust.) International Pty Ltd ("Soma"), Dynasty International Australia Pty Ltd ("Dynasty") and Lyu Song Investments Pty Ltd ("Lyu Song Investments"); (b) Mrs Ting Ding Wang ("Mrs Wang"); and (c) Henan Prosper Skin and Leather Co. Ltd ("Henan Prosper"). 3 In support of those claims, the applicant has filed an affidavit in support and also relies on the affidavit evidence of Xingai (Julia) Song ("Julia Song"), the chief financial officer of Henan Prosper and Man Yau Frank Ng ("Mr Ng"), the principal lawyer in the firm of APAC Legal. There is also an affidavit of Kaitlin Pippi Lowdon, a solicitor employed by the solicitors for the applicant, which annexes translations of the documents in question (which are in Chinese language), and an affidavit of Simon John Dollard, also a lawyer employed by the solicitors for the applicant who exhibited to his affidavit a copy of the current Law of the People's Republic of China on Lawyers from the Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of China website and a copy of the Lawyers Law of the People's Republic of China effective 1 January 1997, downloaded from the website of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China created by the United States Congress in October 2000. 4 The legal advisers to whom, or from whom, the communications are claimed to attract legal professional privilege in the documents in question are: (a) Mr Ng from APAC Legal (an Australian law firm); (b) Joseph Jinping Wang ("Joseph Wang"), legal affairs manager of Henan Prosper; (c) Pengeng (Ajax) Xue ("Ajax Xue") and Arno Erhu Liu, corporate legal staff of Henan Prosper; (d) Mr Li, a lawyer from Henan Gia Tai (a law firm); (e) Austin Zhang of the law firm of Mossack Fonseca & Co ("Mossack Fonseca"), based in Shenzhen, China and various named staff said to have been working under his supervision; and (f) the Hong Kong law firm, Tonis Group Limited. 5 The parties were not in dispute about the general principles which govern legal advice privilege. In AWB Ltd v Cole (No. 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30 at [44] there is a helpful summary of the principles which, relevantly, include the following matters: (a) for a communication between a lawyer and his or her client to qualify for advice privilege the communication must be confidential, the legal adviser must be acting in his or her professional capacity and the communication made, or the document brought into existence, for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice; (b) the party claiming privilege carries the onus of proving that the dominant purpose that led to the making of the confidential communications was to enable the legal adviser to give, or the client to receive, legal advice; (c) the purpose for which a document is brought into existence is a question of fact that must be determined objectively. Evidence as to purpose from the maker of the document or the person who authorised or sought it may be received but is not conclusive; (d) the existence of legal professional privilege is not established merely by the assertion that privilege applies or that communications were undertaken for the purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice; (e) in the ordinary case, where the communications take place between a client and his or her independent legal advisers or between a client's in-house lawyers and those legal advisers, proof of those facts alone will provide a sufficient basis for a conclusion that legitimate legal advice is being sought or given; (f) the concept of legal advice is of broad compass and includes all communications relating to, and arising from, the normal lawyer-client relationship involving the provision of legal advice or legal services, but does not extend to advice that is purely commercial or of a public relations character; (g) legal professional privilege is capable of attaching to communications between a salaried legal adviser and his or her employer provided that the legal adviser is consulted in a professional capacity in relation to a professional matter and the communications are made in confidence and arise from the relationship of lawyer and client; (h) in the absence of a formal or express retainer, the existence of all lawyer-client relationships can be implied or inferred; and (i) the Court has power to examine documents over which legal professional privilege is claimed and, where there is a disputed claim, the Court should not be hesitant to exercise such a power. 6 The following other principles are also relevant in the present case: (a) legal professional privilege extends to communications between a party and the party's professional legal adviser, if confidential and made to or by the adviser in his or her professional capacity and with a view to obtaining or giving legal advice or assistance, even if the communications are made through agents of the party and the solicitor or either of them: see Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675; Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 at 2; (b) a confidential communication prepared by a third party, or prepared by the client and provided to a third party, will attract privilege (regardless of that party's relationship with the client) provided that the communication was prepared and made with the dominant purpose of the client seeking and obtaining legal advice from the client's lawyer: Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; (c) where information is passed by the lawyer or client to the other as part of a continuum aimed at keeping both informed so that advice may be sought and given as required, privilege will attach: Balabel and Another v Air India (1988) Ch 317 at 330; (d) legal professional privilege attaches to communications between a client and his or her foreign lawyers: Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185 at [62], [198]-[215]; and (e) legal professional privilege does not apply to a lawyer-client communication where legal assistance has been sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud: The Attorney-General for the Northern Territory of Australia v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; Commissioner of Australian Federal Police and Another v Propend Finance Pty Limited and Others (1997) 188 CLR 501; Lock, in the matter of Cedenco JV of Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] FCA 1306 at [86]. 7 It was submitted for the applicant that the Court could decide the privilege claims in favour of the applicant on the evidence without looking at the documents. It became apparent, however, that the privilege claims in respect of some of the documents could not be determined without an examination of those documents. In the end I examined all of the documents. 8 In summary, the privilege claims raise the following matters for consideration: (a) whether the applicant has established that the communications were undertaken, or the documents brought into existence, for the dominant purpose of giving or obtaining legal advice; (b) whether, insofar as the communications were made through a third party, the third party was an agent of the applicant for the purposes of communicating with the lawyer to obtain or receive the advice; and (c) whether, insofar as the legal advice was given by, or sought from, a foreign lawyer, the applicant has established that the person from whom the advice was sought, or was given, is a qualified lawyer and the advice was provided or sought from that person in that capacity. 9 Although the Commissioner's written submissions addressed the principle that legal professional privilege does not apply to a lawyer-client communication where legal assistance has been sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud, such a consideration does not bear upon the privilege claims made in this case. Not only was there nothing in the evidence to provide any foundation for the Commissioner to make a submission that the exception may apply in this case, the Commissioner did not even suggest a basis for considering that the exception may have relevance in the present case. It is not for the Court to trawl through the documents to identify for itself whether there may be a basis for the exception to apply and the submission was advanced without any proper basis for putting it forward.