Consideration
70 Relying on the test of invalidity summarised by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 230 that "if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever come to it, then the courts can interfere" does not require the Court to determine the soundness of the decision maker's opinion; it is sufficient if the opinion expressed is one reasonably open to that person (The Council of the City of Parramatta v Pestell (1972) 128 CLR 305). There is a distinction between where there is a jurisdictional fact that must be proved to the Court's satisfaction and where what is in issue is not a jurisdictional fact but the decision maker's opinion as to the existence of that fact (Corporation of the City of Enfield v Development Assessment Commission and Another (2000) 199 CLR 135).
71 There is no dispute that in the area where White Cypress Pine proliferated there were trees which were greater than three metres high and that these trees were removed. It is not unreasonable, therefore, in a Wednesbury sense, for the decision maker to have formed the opinion that at least the trees in that area that were greater than three metres high were not covered by the exemption in Sch 4 to the Western Lands Regulation. That is not to say, of course, that trees of less than that height could not be cleared.
72 The position is not quite so clear in respect of the Buddah community. On this aspect of the case it is necessary for the Court to decide whether the assessment made by Mr Mazzer, upon which the delegate relied, was so unreasonable that it gives rise to the invalidity of the decision to issue a notice. Mr Cunningham may well be right in respect of his approach to the test of whether the predominant species are "woody weeds". But that is not the question the Court is required to answer. In making his determination the decision maker had before him the opinion of Mr Mazzer, together with the field work data upon which his opinion relied.
73 In the circumstances, the Court holds that it was open for Mr Wise to form an opinion that native vegetation had been cleared on the subject land. Although Mr Slack-Smith may have formed the view that he, at least, had obtained an "in principle" approval to clear the land or that he held the belief as a consequence of representations made to him by Mr Atkinson and Mr Smith that he was entitled to regard the clearing as exempt from the provisions of the NVC Act, nevertheless the issue is not free from doubt.
74 It is not disputed no development consent contemplated by s 21(2)(a) of the NVC Act was in force at the relevant date. Section 47 requires only that the Director-General be satisfied that any native vegetation has been cleared in contravention of Pt 2, which contains s 21. The Director-General's delegate became satisfied that the requirements of s 47(1)(a) had been established on the basis of equivocal advice from those persons reporting to him. Nevertheless, the degree of equivocation expressed was not such that it must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the decision to issue a notice was so unreasonable that it should never have been made in the Wednesbury sense.
75 That is only the first step. It does not resolve the question of whether the form of the notice was susceptible to challenge on the grounds that its terms are unreasonable, uncertain, based upon an irrelevant consideration or in excess of jurisdiction. To this point the Court has determined only that it was not unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense for a decision to be made to issue a notice. Whether or not the decision was right is a matter that may ultimately have to be determined in the appeal proceedings commenced in the class 1 jurisdiction of the Court when it will be open for the Court to determine as a matter of fact whether or not a certain species predominates or was predominant. That is not a matter that falls for final determination in these proceedings. It could be otherwise if there was no evidence to support the decision made on behalf of the Director-General, but that is not the case.
76 It is fundamental to the Court's decision that s 47 authorises the issue of a notice in circumstances where the Director-General is "satisfied". Accordingly, I repeat in case it has not already been made clear that the question to be answered when the Court is asked to review the decision is whether or not the decision made by the Director-General was unreasonable in the sense that no reasonable decision maker could have made it. The question of whether the Director-General was correct to decide that native vegetation had been cleared in contravention of Pt 2 of the NVC Act only falls to be decided where the person aggrieved by the decision to make an order or to give a direction appeals against the decision to this Court pursuant to s 48 of the NVC Act.
77 The claimed oral and written approvals from DLWC officers could not, in the context of s 47, be regarded as a development consent for the purposes of s 21(2)(a). The decision of any officer of the department for any other purpose cannot, unless it can be construed as a response to a development application, be regarded as a development consent. Nor can any so-called approval or advice that consent is not required waive a requirement for development consent or give rise to an estoppel. A development consent is defined in s 4 of the NVC Act and means "development consent under Part 4 of the EP&A Act". In Brickworks Limited v The Council of the Shire of Warringah (1963) 108 CLR 568 Windeyer J held that whether a development consent had been granted was a question of fact. The council in that case said that it had consented. His Honour said that if, notwithstanding this, it could somehow be said that it did not in fact consent, then an estoppel seemed to arise. That is not the present case. His Honour went on to say at p 557 that there is no doubt about the principle that estoppel by representation cannot prevent the performance of a statutory duty or the exercise of a statutory discretion. The requirement to obtain consent cannot be waived (R v East Sussex County Council; Ex parte Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 58; Ex parte Hernes Estates Pty Ltd; Greater Wollongong City Council and Another (1967) 14 LGRA 102 at 108 and Wyong Shire Council v Associated Minerals Consolidated Ltd and Another [1972] 1 NSWLR 114 at 142).
78 Judging from the arguments generated from both sides of the bar table it is apparent that the use of the words dominant and predominant respectively appears to create more problems than it solves. The argument ranges from whether the words are used in the plain ordinary English meaning according to dictionaries or whether a technical meaning gleaned from scientific publications is intended. It is apparent that the experts cannot agree on what is the appropriate test to determine what is dominant or predominant. I agree with Mrs Kelly, who appears on behalf of the respondent, that clearly there is no single "scientific" or "technical" meaning used in relation to vegetation classification. It is not appropriate for the Court to find whether lawful clearing has also been carried out but it is clear that opinions can differ and that the decision made by the delegate of the Director-General was not so unreasonable in the circumstances that it should be found to be unlawful.
79 Another ground for holding that a decision is "manifestly unreasonable" is that the decision maker has failed to give adequate weight to a relevant factor of great importance or has given excessive weight to a relevant factor of no great importance (Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others (1985-1986) 162 CLR 24). Here again, of course, the Court needs to be careful in judicial review proceedings not to substitute its own decision based upon a perceived preference for a converse result. It is difficult from the material in evidence to make any determination in regard to the weight given to the matters raised in the report documents. Three of the matters set out at [56] of these reasons are summarised in the Recommendation Report under the heading "Community Opinion" as follows:-
There have been no reports of news reports, newspaper articles or radio programs regarding the clearing of vegetation on "Muttabun". However, there is certainly community awareness regarding the clearing. This is mainly due to the fact that opal prospectors regularly traverse the area of the clearing. It is therefore important that appropriate action be implemented. This action will, most likely be circulated through the mining, lessees and general community.
80 Although arguably it may fit within objects (a), (b), (f) and (g) in s 3 of the NVC Act, it is difficult to see the direct relevance of the above consideration. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of what weight Mr Wise actually placed on this material at the moment of decision, even though it was clearly before him at the time. There is no report of his consideration. For the same reason the Court is not able to find that the decision was made for an improper purpose (Thompson and Others v The Council of the Municipality of Randwick (1950) 81 CLR 87 at 105-6), namely to accommodate an asserted, and allegedly incorrect, community perception that compliance action must be seen to be taken by the respondent.
81 The applicants seek to confine the category of directions that may be made in a notice issued pursuant to s 47 to the matters listed in s 47(2).
82 The use of the word "may" in legislation usually implies a choice in the sense that, given its ordinary meaning, it confers an enabling and discretionary power. The word conveys potential and is never, in itself, significant of any obligation (Julius v Oxford (Bishop) 49 LJ QB 585; 5 App Cas 235 per Lord Selbourne). Moreover, it is defined in s 9 of the Interpretation Act 1987 as being an indicator that the "power may be exercised or not, at discretion". Subsection (2) confers a discretion to direct any of the types of work described in (a), (b) and (c) but also, in my opinion, has the effect of defining, by way of limitation, the categories of specified work contemplated by subsection (1). The discretion to issue a notice in writing is unfettered provided the Director-General is satisfied that any native vegetation has been cleared in contravention of Pt 2 but as a matter of construction the discretion to direct particular types of work is confined to the types permitted by subsection (2)(a), (b) and (c).
83 Pursuant to s 47(4) a person who does not comply with a s 47 direction is guilty of an offence and liable to a fine and, in the case of the continuing offence, to a further penalty for each day the offence continues. Furthermore, if a person fails to comply with a direction the Director-General may authorise any other person to enter the land and carry out specified work and recover the cost which, while remaining unpaid, is a charge on the land. It is in the context of a criminal sanction and the default remedies that lie with the Director-General that the certainty and reasonableness of the direction must be considered.
84 The provisions in the Direction for the control of noxious weeds and pest animals and property maintenance create a hierarchy whereby the applicants are exposed to the sanctions imposed by s 47 for failure to comply with the Direction over and above any sanctions which apply under the Rural Land Protection Act, the Noxious Weeds Act, the Rural Fires Act, the NVC Act in its other respects and the NP&W Act. In the Court's view, none of these requirements are justifiable and are unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. It is the Court's view that Pt 6 and Pt 7 of the Direction (except 7.3) are demonstrably unreasonable and therefore void but nevertheless severable (The Melbourne Steamship Company Limited v Moorehead (1912) 15 CLR 333 and Pyneboard Pty Ltd and Others v Trade Practices Commission and Bannerman (1982) 39 ALR 565). The remaining parts of the Direction will not operate in some other way to produce a different result in the absence of the severed conditions.
85 Only the parts of the Direction that require work to be done in positive terms can survive the challenge to validity.
86 The provisions contained in Pt 5 of the Direction for Domestic Stock Management and Fencing in the Remediation Areas are sufficiently clear and certain to be maintained. The Court is satisfied that they constitute directions to carry out work and that the work relates to rehabilitation of the land cleared. It is not unreasonable, in the Court's opinion, to expand the target of the Direction to cover land immediately adjoining the cleared area if, for example, the objective is to maintain the survival of and connectivity with the remnant vegetation adjoining the cleared areas.
87 I have included condition 7.2 to be severed from the Direction. It provides that the lessee shall not undertake any other clearing in the Remediation Areas except in accordance with the NVC Act and after consultation with the Resource Compliance Manager. This provision is not a provision that involves the carrying out of specified work in a specified manner and within a specified time and accordingly does not fall within the ambit of authority of s 47. Moreover, it adds the further layer of consultation with the Director-General's Resource Compliance Officer which in itself creates a control beyond the statutory provisions of the NVC Act. The consequence of deleting condition 7.2 is that condition 3.3 is not allowed to remain for the same reasons.
88 I nevertheless allow condition 7.3 to remain on the basis that the requirement of the Resource Compliance Manager to control the regrowth of Buddah does involve specified work in a specified manner although the express time, methods and manner and extent of the clearing is left for future determination. This does not fall foul of the principles enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Mison and Others v Randwick Municipal Council and Others (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 as explained in Winn v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife and Ors [2001] NSWCA 17, unreported, particularly by the Chief Justice in the latter case. Other conditions, such as condition 7.4, which provide the lessee shall not cultivate, crop, plant or harvest any seeds or plants or spray any substances or undertake any work to improve pasture are prohibitions rather than a direction to carry out specified work and therefore are outside the ambit of s 47.
89 Whether or not the applicants are entitled to raise the failure of the Director-General to afford procedural fairness in the interests of natural justice is clarified by the judgment of Hope JA in Cox & Hazel Pty Ltd v Gidney [1981] 1 NSWLR 468 at 472 where His Honour gave consideration to the effect of the decision of the High Court in Twist v The Council of the Municipality of Randwick (1976) 136 CLR 106. Jacobs J pointed out In Twist at p 119 that "Whether or not an order made without an opportunity to be heard will be wholly invalid depends on the legislative provision read in the light of the nature of the subject matter and the provisions for review". His Honour regarded the wide provision for an appeal as indicating a contrary legislative intention where the appeal is to a judicial body in the fullest sense of that term. The circumstances in Twist are almost completely identical to the present. In that case, pursuant to s 317B(5) of the Local Government Act 1919 an owner who had received an order to demolish a building pursuant to s 317B was entitled to appeal to the District Court against the making of the order. Jacobs J did not think that "it would at all accord with the legislative intention that an owner should be able to ignore rights of appeal of the kind given…and instead rely on an absolute invalidity in the order which a council had made". Accordingly, in his view, it was not the legislative intention that an order, subject to appeal, should be able to be treated for all purposes as void and to no effect upon the grounds that the principle of natural justice had not been observed. Although Hope JA in Cox & Hazel did not think that the judgments in Twist were intended to deal with cases where the alleged invalidity arises otherwise than by reason of the application of the rules of natural justice, they nevertheless apply to the ground raised by the applicants in this case, namely the claim that they were not afforded procedural fairness before the order was made.
90 Other complaints about conditions which the applicants have contended are harsh, unreasonable or oppressive do not provide an independent ground for invalidity. Those complaints are directed to the issues of merit that are not to be decided in these class 4 proceedings.
91 The Court is not prepared to set aside or declare the whole Direction to be void but it is prepared to declare that condition 3.3, the whole of Pt 6 and conditions 7.1, 7.2, 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6 are invalid. They are, in the Court's opinion, capable of being severed.
92 The Court makes the following declaration:-