Singh v The Owners Strata Plan 11723 & Ors

Supreme Court of NSW|2013-09-12|Before: Slattery J, White J

Background - $1893.26 in unpaid strata levies trigger litigation 24The background to the parties dispute commences in August 2010. This short summary does not include a full account of all the litigious steps Mr Singh took to undo or prevent: first, the entry of the money judgment against him; then, the sequestration order bankrupting him; and finally, the sale of his properties by his trustee in bankruptcy. Those steps are the main basis for the Applicant's Vexatious Proceedings Act application and they will be described in detail below in the section titled "Mr Singh's litigation history 2010 - 2013". This section just contains an overview of this period. 25Mr Singh and his wife, Ms Sarbjit Kaur, used to be the registered proprietors of two properties: a property in Harris Park, NSW ("the Harris Park Property"); and a property in Rutherford, NSW ("the Rutherford Property"), together referred to in these reasons as "the Properties". The First Defendant, the Owners Corporation, is the Owners Corporation of the Harris Park Property, an apartment complex. 26On 6 August 2010 the Owners Corporation commenced proceedings in the Local Court of New South Wales against Mr Singh and Ms Kaur, seeking to recover unpaid levies of $1,893.26 for the strata scheme's administrative and sinking funds, together with interest and costs. The total amount of the claim, including costs and interest, then was $2,472.88. 27On 6 May 2011 the Owners Corporation obtained default judgment against Mr Singh and Ms Kaur. After adding additional accumulated costs and interest, default judgment was entered for an amount of $14,251.68. 28On 9 September 2011 the Owners Corporation filed a creditor's petition against Mr Singh and Ms Kaur based on the 6 May 2011 default judgment. 29On 5 April 2012 Federal Magistrate Smith made a sequestration order against the estates of Mr Singh and Ms Kaur and appointed the late Paul Desmond Sweeney and the Applicant to act jointly and severally trustees of the bankrupt estates of Mr Singh and Ms Kaur. 30Although Ms Kaur initially defended the Owners Corporation's claim in the Local Court, once a sequestration order was made against her she filed a statement of affairs and cooperated with the Applicant in his capacity as her trustee in bankruptcy. She was not involved in Mr Singh's subsequent appeals from the sequestration order. And she is not a party to these proceedings. 31After he filed a Bankruptcy Application with the Land Property Management Authority, on or about 26 October 2012 the Applicant became the registered proprietor of the Properties. 32On 12 November 2012 the Applicant commenced proceedings seeking possession of the Harris Park Property. On 12 February 2013 default judgment was entered in favour of the Applicant and a writ of possession issued. On 9 April 2013 Mr Singh was evicted from the Harris Park Property. 33The Applicant has now exchanged contracts for sale of the Properties. But those contracts have not yet been settled, because the Applicant does not have in his possession the certificates of title for the properties. To obtain those certificates of title the Applicant commenced proceedings in this Court, seeking production of the certificates from Mr Singh and Ms Kaur or, failing that, an order requiring the Registrar-General to issue new certificates. At the time of the hearing of the present application those other proceedings were not yet resolved. The Applicant did not rely on Mr Singh's conduct in relation to those certificate of title proceedings as part of his Vexatious Proceedings Act application. 34Mr Singh's multiple proceedings in the Federal Circuit Court have already led to that Court preventing him from filing further legal process without leave. On 9 August 2013 in proceedings commenced by Mr Singh in the Federal Circuit Court his Honour Judge Driver made the following order against the Mr Singh: "No further application relating to the sequestration orders made by this Court resulting in Mr Singh's current bankruptcy or the administration of his bankrupt estate be accepted by filing in this Court except by leave of the Court." 35There is no evidence before me that since that order was made Mr Singh has filed further process in the Federal Circuit Court.

Vexatious proceedings - Applicable Legal Principles 36All Mr Singh's conduct in commencing allegedly vexatious proceedings took place after the commencement of the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 ("the Act") on 1 December 2008. This case does not raise any issue about whether, when making an order, the Court may take into account conduct occurring prior to the commencement of the Act: see for example Attorney General v Chan [2011] NSWSC 1315 at [42], [43] and [44] per Adamson J. 37The Act, s 8 authorises the Court to make orders in relation to a person, if the Court is satisfied, that the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. The section relevantly provides: "8 Making of vexatious proceedings order (1) When orders may be made An authorised court may make an order under this section (a vexatious proceedings order) in relation to a person if the court is satisfied that: (a) the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia, or (b) the person, acting in concert with a person who is subject to a vexatious proceedings order or who is referred to in paragraph (a), has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an authorised court may have regard to: (a) proceedings instituted or conducted in any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted before the commencement of this section), and (b) orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including orders made before the commencement of this section). (3) An authorised court must not make a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person without hearing the person or giving the person an opportunity of being heard. (4) Orders may be made on court's own motion or on application An authorised court may make a vexatious proceedings order of its own motion or on the application of any of the following persons: (a) the Attorney General, (b) the Solicitor General, (c) the appropriate registrar for the court, (d) a person against or in relation to whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings, (e) a person who, in the opinion of the court, has a sufficient interest in the matter. ... (7) Orders that may be made by Supreme Court The Supreme Court may make any one or more of the following vexatious proceedings orders in relation to a person: (a) an order staying all or part of any proceedings in New South Wales already instituted by the person, (b) an order prohibiting the person from instituting proceedings in New South Wales, (c) any other order that the Court considers appropriate in relation to the person...." 38It is at least implicit in the Vexatious Proceedings Act, s 3 that the Supreme Court of New South Wales is an "authorised Court" empowered to make s 8 orders. 39The orders sought by the Applicant rely on s 8(7)(b): orders prohibiting the institution of further proceedings. 40The Court's power to make a s 8 order is discretionary: the Court "may make an order" under the section. Before exercising this statutory discretion the Court must be relevantly satisfied, under s 8(1), of three elements. These are that the person: (1) has "instituted or conducted"; (2) "vexatious proceedings"; and (3) the person has done so "frequently". It is not contested that all the proceedings the Applicant relies upon in his case were conducted "in Australia". The law in relation to each of these elements has developed by judicial exegesis of this legislation. 41To "institute" proceedings has a broad meaning under the Act. It covers both civil and criminal proceedings and proceedings before courts and tribunals. The term to "institute" proceedings is defined in the Act, s 5:- "5 Instituting proceedings (1) In this Act, institute, in relation to proceedings, includes: (a) for civil proceedings-the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started against or in relation to a party, and (b) for proceedings before a tribunal-the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary before proceedings can be started before the tribunal, and (c) for criminal proceedings-the making of a complaint or the obtaining of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged offender, and (d) for civil or criminal proceedings or proceedings before a tribunal-the taking of a step or the making of an application that may be necessary to start an appeal in relation to the proceedings or to a decision made in the course of the proceedings. (2) A reference in this Act to instituting proceedings includes a reference to instituting: (a) proceedings generally, and (b) proceedings in relation to a particular matter, and (c) proceedings against or in relation to a particular person, and (d) proceedings in a particular court or tribunal." 42The concept of "conducting" proceedings needs no separate explanation. It covers every step a party may take to further existing litigation. 43Each of the two components of "vexatious proceedings" requires separate analysis. First, the term "proceedings" is defined inclusively in the Act, s 4 in the following way:- "4 Meaning of 'proceedings' In this Act, proceedings includes: (a) any cause, matter, action, suit, proceedings, trial, complaint or inquiry of any kind within the jurisdiction of any court or tribunal, and (b) any proceedings (including any interlocutory proceedings) taken in connection with or incidental to proceedings pending before a court or tribunal, and (c) any calling into question of a decision, whether or not a final decision, of a court or tribunal, and whether by appeal, challenge, review or in another way." 44Importantly "proceedings" under the Act includes all interlocutory and appellate action taken in connection with existing proceedings: s 4(b). Thus the Act counts an interlocutory application or an appeal as separate "proceedings". In ordinary language an appeal or an interlocutory application would not readily be described as separate proceedings. But such process is defined this way in the Act. 45This extended definition of "proceedings" means that the Court can have regard to baseless interlocutory applications or appeals in deciding whether to make a s 8 order: Attorney General v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008 ("Wilson") at [15]. The scope of what the Court may take into account within "proceedings" is wide. It includes repeated oral applications with no proper basis, and it includes the manner in which a person speaks or acts in the courtroom: Wilson at [16]. 46The Act separately defines which types of "proceedings" will qualify as "vexatious proceedings". This is provided for in the Act, s 6:- "6. Meaning of 'vexatious proceedings' In this Act, vexatious proceedings includes: (a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and (b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and (c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and (d) proceedings conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose." 47The Court may decide whether or not a proceeding is "vexatious" having regard to the findings and result in the proceedings under consideration: Wilson at [22]. And, the Court may have regard to the way the person has conducted himself or herself in the proceedings before the Court, including the way the defence is conducted in answer to the very proceedings brought for the orders under the Act, s 8: Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Gargan (No. 2) [2009] FCA 398 ("Gargan (No. 2)") at [12], per Perram J. 48The categories of vexatious proceedings provided for under the Act, s 6(a) to (d) are linked. Because of the linkage between them it is convenient to consider together paragraphs 6(a) "abuse of process" and paragraphs 6(c) "without reasonable ground". Proceedings may constitute an abuse of process regardless of the personal intention, motive or state of mind of the litigant: Attorney General v Shaw [2004] WASC 280 ("Shaw") at [22]. 49What amounts to an abuse of process is insusceptible to a formulation comprised of closed categories: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales (2006) 226 CLR 256; [2006] HCA 27 ("Batistatos") at [9]. But an abuse of process can be defined inclusively. The concept includes: the pursuit of proceedings that have no prospects of success or no real prospect of resulting in a remedy of substance but which involve: (1) unjustifiable expense or use of judicial resources, Attorney General v Crocker [2010] NSWSC 942 ("Crocker") at [17], per Fullerton J; (2) the pursuit of concurrent proceedings for substantially the same relief, or the pursuit of fresh proceedings after a remedial defeat in previous proceedings (Crocker at [17]); (3) the determination to persist in futile appeals in the face of repeated judicial observations that arguments were doomed to failure (Crocker at [133]); and, (4) causing others to incur legal costs in responding to hopeless applications in circumstances where the defendant has disregarded costs orders already made against him (Crocker at [134]). 50The Act's, s 6(c) definition of "vexatious proceedings" as proceedings "without reasonable ground" is gauged objectively, and not from the perspective of the litigant said to be vexatious. This approach protects courts from litigants who genuinely but misguidedly are persuaded as to the correctness of their own conduct: Gargan (No. 2) at [9]. One form of want of reasonable grounds is a failure or refusal on the part of the person instituting proceedings to understand the principles of finality of litigation: Gargan (No. 2) at [7]. Thus, proceedings that lack reasonable grounds may also constitute an abuse of process. It will often be the case that proceedings with no prospect of success, or with no real prospect of a remedy of substance will also be brought without reasonable grounds. As Adamson J explained in Pascoe v Liprini [2011] NSWSC 1484 ("Liprini") at [10], sub-paragraphs 6(b), (c) and (d) of the Act are not discrete categories, separate from s 6(a), because each of sub-paragraphs (b) - (d) "could properly be regarded as an abuse of process of a court or tribunal". 51Paragraphs 6(b) and (d) of the Act also represent related categories. They refer to the same underlying conduct "to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment". Paragraph 6(b) refers to the actor's subjective intentions, whereas sub-paragraph 6(d) does not; rather paragraph 6(d) is concerned with the effect and consequences of action rather than the motive or design for action: Liprini at [10]. Thus, the Court does not have to determine whether or not a defendant has a subjective intention to "harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment" by proceedings: only that this is the consequence of the defendant's litigious conduct. 52To enliven the Court's s 8(1) discretion the alleged vexatious proceedings must also be instituted or conducted "frequently". In Wilson at [13] - [14] Davies J adopted the approach of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Brogden v Attorney General [2001] NZCA 208 ("Brogden") in assessing whether or not allegedly vexatious proceedings are brought "frequently". The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Brogden (at 201) stated: "A litigant may be said to be persisting in litigating though the number of separate proceedings he or she brings is quite small if those proceedings clearly represent an attempt to re-litigate an issue already conclusively determined against that person, particularly if this is accompanied by extravagant or scandalous allegations which the litigant has no prospect of substantiating or justifying. The Court may also take into account the development of a pattern of behaviour involving a failure to accept an inability in law to further challenge decisions in respect of which the appeal process has been exhausted, or attacking a range of defendants drawn into the widening circle of litigation solely because of an association with a defendant against whom a prior proceeding has failed." 53It is no longer necessary for the Applicant to prove that a litigant has "persisted" in vexatious litigation before an order may be made under the Act; contrasting with the repealed equivalent provision in Supreme Court Act, s 84. But the passage in Brogden reminds that concepts such as "frequently" in the Act must be measured by more than just the counting of the number of actions brought. 54The term "frequently" has been described as "a relative term" which must be looked at in the context of the litigation being considered: Gargan (No. 2) at [7]. But considering comparative frequency in other cases where Vexatious Proceedings Act orders have been made can be useful. Examples of the institution of vexatious proceedings recurring sufficiently often to qualify as occurring "frequently" are: (1) the institution of proceedings on a monthly basis over ten years totalling 124 proceedings (Crocker at [136]); (2) instituting 14 separate Supreme Court actions in eleven years (Wilson at [46]), and; (3) instituting 37 separate applications in various courts and tribunals against a variety of defendants over a period of 3 years (Attorney General v Tareq Altaranesi [2013] NSWSC 63). 55If the proceedings relied upon to found the application are interlocutory applications, to assess the question of frequency the Court will "examine the nature of the applications, to determine whether they are simply a consequential aspect of the original proceedings or something different": Siteberg v Maples [2010] NSWSC 1344 at [32] ("Siteberg'). The Court may be more willing to conclude that vexatious proceedings are brought frequently where they are brought against the same person or involve the same subject matter or where the claim is fanciful: Siteberg at [32]. 56The exercise of the Court's s 8(1) discretion here raises special considerations. The purpose of making orders under the Act is not to punish but to protect both the public and the Court itself from vexatious proceedings, especially because the Court's "limited resources and needs must be carefully managed and protected from the expense, burden and inconvenience of baseless and repetitious suits": Gargan (No. 2) at [3]. Once the Act's s 8 discretion is enlivened, the relevant considerations are unconfined but the relevant factors will be informed by the protective purpose which the order serves: Gargan (No. 2) at [12]. 57Finally a relevant consideration in every case where a s 8(1) order is sought under the Act is the consideration that it is a serious matter to deprive a litigant of access to the courts: Wilson at [11]. If an order is made it may need to be moulded to give proper weight to this consideration; a power that the Act confers on the Court under s 8(7)(c).

Mr Singh's litigation history 2010 - 2013 58The Applicant seeks to establish that all 15 proceedings Mr Singh commenced between 23 August 2011 and 26 June 2013 are "vexatious proceedings" within s 6 of the Act. Some review is required of each one to determine whether or not the defendant has "instituted and conducted" any "vexatious proceedings", and whether he has done so "frequently". 59As authority indicates is the appropriate approach, this review of these various proceedings focuses upon a number of relevant matters: (1) the nature of Mr Singh's claim and/or conduct; (2) the judicial pronouncements at the time the proceedings were dismissed; (3) Mr Singh's attitude or perceived attitude to the rules of Court by which he was bound as a litigant in conducting those proceedings; and (4) Mr Singh's attitude or perceived attitude to his obligations to pay costs as an unsuccessful litigant: Crocker at [24]. 60The analysis at the hearing proceeded in an evidentiary framework constructed by the Applicant, who adduced material (exhibits SQ1 to SQ49, SQ2 -1 to SQ2-18 and SQ3-1 to SQ3-5) through the affidavits of the Applicant's principal witness, his solicitor, Ms Sylvia Quang. Ms Quang collated the materials in relation to these 15 proceedings. She had carriage of this matter on behalf of the Applicant and also appeared on his behalf in all the 15 proceedings. 61There may be other proceedings commenced by Mr Singh against other parties. But the Applicant has no knowledge of such proceedings. For the purpose of this application the Applicant only relied on the 15 proceedings Mr Singh had commenced against the Applicant. 62This list of 15 proceedings can be identified by the proceedings name and number. These reasons distinguish each of these proceedings by giving it a proceedings number (1 to 15) and by the date that Mr Singh originated the application. 63This section of these reasons now covers that litigation history, making findings that focus on the identified matters in respect of each proceeding. Once those findings are complete the Court considers the exercise of the Act s 8(1) discretion, based on the observations made in the course of the review, and taking into account not only the analysis of each case but also Mr Singh's conduct of the proceedings as a whole.

Three Streams of Proceedings 64Each of the 15 nominated "proceedings" for interlocutory or final relief (as defined in the Act) brought against the Applicant and now relied upon by the Applicant, was pursued by Mr Singh as part of one of the following pieces of multi-party litigation: (1)District Court proceedings 2011/271370, before Delaney DCJ (6 proceedings); (2)Supreme Court proceedings 2012/93218 before Adamson J (1 proceeding); (3)Federal Magistrates Court proceedings 2011/2032 before Federal Magistrate Smith (2 proceedings); (4)Federal Court proceedings NSD 593 of 2012 before Griffiths J (3 proceedings); (5)Supreme Court proceedings 2013/351685 before Adamson J (2 proceedings); (6)Federal Circuit Court proceedings 2013/1246 before Judge Driver (1 proceeding); (7)Federal Court proceedings NSD 1209 of 2013 before Buchanan J (2 proceedings); (8)Supreme Court proceedings 2013/194812 before White J (1 proceeding). 65These 15 "proceedings", as defined under the Act, include originating process, as well as interlocutory applications and motions. 66The Applicant has helpfully divided all the proceedings into three streams. Each stream contains litigation pursuing a similar objective. These reasons adopt the Applicant's three-stream classification: (1)Stream 1 - the Default Judgment Stream: Mr Singh's attempts to set aside the Local Court default judgment; (2)Stream 2 - the Bankruptcy Annulment Stream: Mr Singh's attempts to annul the sequestration order; and (3)Steam 3 - the Sale Restraint Stream: Mr Singh's attempts to prevent the Applicant from selling the Properties. 67Three of the proceedings overlap between two streams. Two of the notices of motion in the District Court seek both: to set aside the default judgment and to prevent the sale of the Properties. They will be discussed in Stream 1. And one Application in the Federal Circuit Court seeks that both the bankruptcy be annulled and that the sale of the Properties be stayed. This application will be discussed in Stream 2.

Stream 1 - Default Judgment Stream 68(1) Three Summons commencing an appeal from the Local Court default judgment filed on 23 August 2011, 13 October 2011, 30 January 2012 (2011/271270). On 23 August 2011 Mr Singh filed his first Summons commencing an appeal to the District Court from the 6 May 2011 Local Court default judgment the Owners Corporation had obtained against him and Ms Kaur. 69Local Court Act 2007 s 39 provides that an appeal from a judgment of the Local Court sitting in its Small Claims Division can be made to the District Court only on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or denial of procedural fairness. The 23 August 2011 Summons contained various complaints and allegations against the Owners Corporation, its strata managing agents and the Owners Corporation's solicitors but did not refer to any lack of jurisdiction or a denial of procedural fairness. When he encountered this defective process on 7 October 2011, Judge Delaney of the District Court ordered: - "That on or before 4pm 14 October 2011, the appellant is to file and serve on the respondent an amended Notice of Appeal setting how the decision appealed from shows a lack of jurisdiction by the Small claims Division or that in the hearing he has been denied procedural fairness." 70On 13 October 2011 Mr Singh filed an amended Summons. But his amended Summons was substantially the same as the 23 August Summons and it was struck out on 18 November 2011 for the same reason that the earlier Summons had been struck out. Mr Singh and Ms Kaur were again given leave to re-plead. 71On 30 January 2012 Mr Singh filed a further amended Summons. It was once again substantially the same as the 23 August 2011 Summons and was struck out once again on 2 February 2012. Mr Singh was ordered to pay the Owners Corporation's costs in the sum of $3,000.00. Mr Singh's appeal proceedings to the District Court were stayed until he paid those costs and filed a further amended Summons for appeal. He has not paid those costs. The appeal proceedings remain stayed. 72I accept the Applicant's submission that each of these three Summonses was instituted without reasonable grounds and/or was conducted in such a way to harass, annoy or cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose. The appropriate way for Mr Singh to have dealt with the default judgment was to attempt to set it aside, rather than to launch the 23 August 2012 summons in the District Court. Choosing the procedure that he did was inherently likely to cause "delay or detriment". And when given the opportunity to amend Mr Singh merely twice reissued legal process that the Court had already made clear to him was defective. This shows a persistent refusal to accept the Court's rulings. These three Summonses were in my view "vexatious proceedings" within the Act, which Mr Singh instituted and conducted. The District Court's displeasure at Mr Singh's conduct is demonstrated by the 2 February 2012 stay order against him further pursuing his appeal in that Court pending payment of the outstanding costs order of $3000.00 to the Owners Corporation. 73(2) Notice of Motion filed on 21 May 2012 (2011/271270). Despite the existence of the 2 February orders staying the appeal proceedings, on 21 May 2012 Mr Singh filed in the District Court a notice of motion seeking the following relief, apparently challenging the original default judgment in a different way: "(1) That the Local Court be directed to expedite query asked on 20 February 2012 as per direction to Plaintiff by District Court on 15 February 2012 on the amount mentioned in its default judgment dated 6 May 2011 being found incorrect so as to allow the Plaintiff to file appeal in the District Court; and (2) That otherwise allow the Plaintiff to file appeal in the District Court without waiting for query from the Local Court on amount mentioned in default judgment dated 6 May 2011 being found incorrect and verifying the amount being incorrect from documents on record". 74On 31 May 2012 the Owners Corporation filed a notice of motion seeking to dismiss Mr Singh's 21 May 2012 District Court motion. Mr Singh's motion was dismissed as a result on 8 June 2012 and Mr Singh was ordered to pay the Owners Corporation's costs. 75I accept the Applicant's submission that Mr Singh's 21 May 2012 motion was instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds, as the District Court did not have the power to direct the Local Court to "expedite a query" made to the Local Court and Mr Singh had been made a bankrupt on 5 April 2012 and lacked standing to maintain any such action: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 58. I also accept the Applicant's submission that Mr Singh's 21 May 2012 motion was an abuse of process: it was merely an attempt to circumvent by other means the existing 2 February stay orders. Mr Singh's 21 May 2012 motion was in my view "vexatious proceedings" within the Act. 76(3) Notice of Motion filed on 2 April 2013 (2011/271270). On 2 April 2013, Mr Singh filed another notice of motion in the District Court, again seeking to set aside the Local Court default judgment pursuant to UCPR 36.15, 36.16 and/or 17.7. On 8 August 2013 Judge Delaney dismissed this 2 April 2013 motion. 77I accept the Applicant's submission that Mr Singh's 2 April 2013 motion was an abuse process because of the following matters: (1) the 2 February orders staying the District Court proceedings until the payment of the Owner's Corporation costs were still in place and the costs orders had not been paid; (2) Mr Singh's earlier motion of 21 May 2012 had been dismissed by the District Court proceedings; and, (3) Mr Singh continued to lack standing to maintain proceedings as a bankrupt. 78I further accept the Applicant's submission that the 2 April 2013 motion was instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds as the District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant the orders sought; and that it was conducted in a way so as to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose. It clearly had no prospects of success. Mr Singh's 2 April 2013 motion was a "vexatious proceeding" within the Act s 6. 79(4) Notice of Motion filed on 19 June 2013 (2011/271270). On 19 June 2013, after the 2 April 2013 motion had been marked "not reached" and stood over for hearing to 8 August 2013, Mr Singh filed another motion in the District Court seeking: to expedite the hearing of the 2 April motion to a date prior to 29 June 2013; and, to stay the sale of the Properties. His Honour Judge Delaney dismissed this motion two days after it was filed, in part on the basis that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant relief to stay the sale of the Properties. 80I accept the Applicant's submission that Mr Singh's 19 June 2013 motion: (1) was instituted without reasonable ground, as the District Court did not have the jurisdiction to grant the relief it sought; (2) was an abuse process; and (3) was conducted in a way to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment to the Owners Corporation and the Applicant. The Applicant's submissions as to (2) and (3) rely in part on the overlap between the timing and the substance of this motion and Mr Singh's almost contemporaneous 4 June 2013 Federal Circuit Court application (see below in Stream 2). 81Both applications markedly overlap: (1) the affidavits supporting both applications include similar complaints and themes; and (2) the Federal Circuit Court 4 June 2013 application also sought a stay of the sale of the Properties and had been dismissed on 12 June 2013 (7 days before this 19 June 2013 application was made). The 4 June 2013 Federal Circuit Court application is described in more detail below. 82Mr Singh's 19 June 2013 motion was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act s 6. 83(5) Summons filed on 23 March 2012 (2012/93218). On 23 March 2012 Mr Singh filed a Summons in this Court attempting to transfer the District Court Proceedings to the Supreme Court pursuant to Civil Procedure Act 2005, s 140. 84On 16 May 2012 that Summons was dismissed by Adamson J: Singh v The Owners - Strata Plan No 11723 [2012] NSWSC 519. In dismissing the Summons her Honour reasoned that: jurisdiction to hear the appeal from a Local Court judgment is exclusive to the District Court (Local Court Act 2007, s 30); and, in any event, the action cannot stand because the Applicant had been deemed to have abandoned it by the operation of Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 60(3). 85I accept the Applicant's submission that because of the Court's lack of jurisdiction Mr Singh's 23 March 2012 Summons was proceedings that he instituted and maintained without reasonable grounds. I further accept the Applicant's submission that in light of the 2 February 2013 orders staying Mr Singh's District Court proceedings until he paid the Owner's Corporation's costs, the 23 March 2012 Summons was an abuse process and was instituted and/or conducted in such a way to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose. Mr Singh's 23 March 2012 Summons was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act s 6.

Stream 2 - the Bankruptcy Annulment Stream 86(6) Notices of opposition to creditor's petition filed 14 October 2011 and 8 November 2011 (2032/2011). Between 9 September 2011, when the Owners Corporation filed a creditor's petition against Mr Singh, and 5 April 2012, when a sequestration order was made against his estate, Mr Singh filed in the Federal Magistrates Court of Australia (as the Federal Circuit Court of Australia was then known) two notices of opposition to the creditor's petition: one on 14 October 2011 and one 8 November 2011. 87In both notices of opposition Mr Singh repeated his allegations on his District Court appeal from the default judgment: that he was denied procedural fairness in the Local Court proceedings; that the default judgment was incorrect; and, that the strata managing agents did not have authority to prosecute legal proceedings against him. If there were any substance in these allegations, then the appropriate course was for Mr Singh to have sought to set aside the default judgment in the Local Court and to be let in to defend those proceedings. 88On 5 April 2012 her Honour Federal Magistrate Smith found that Mr Singh's complaints had no substance, and she made the sequestration order: The Owners Strata Plan No 11723 v Singh & Anor [2012] FMCA 308. 89In her Honour's reasons she: (1) noted that the notices of opposition, and numerous affidavits and written submissions filed with them, did not include a concise or intelligible summary of the contentions relied upon (at [9]); (2) described Mr Singh's submissions as "repeated and give rise to a great deal of confusion" and making it "impossible for [her Honour] to try and address his contentions with more detail" (at [14]); and, (3) commented on Mr Singh's conduct during cross-examination by saying that "...neither I nor the witnesses could understand [Mr Singh's] questioning" (at [11]). 90I accept the Applicant's submissions that her Honour's comments tend to show that Mr Singh's notices of opposition in those proceedings have been maintained so as to harass or annoy, or to cause delay or detriment. But whilst Mr Singh's maintenance of these notices might nominally fall within the definition of "vexatious proceedings" under the Act s 6 (d), they were not proceedings "instituted" or "conducted" by Mr Singh; he seems merely to have been defending himself against the making of sequestration orders by deploying allegations and methods that were calculated to cause "delay or detriment". Mr Singh's procedural use of these notices does not, in my view, count against Mr Singh as instituting or conducting "vexatious proceedings". 91(7) Notice of Appeal filed 24 April 2012 (593/2012). On 24 April 2012 Mr Singh filed in the Federal Court of Australia a Notice of Appeal from the sequestration order Federal Magistrate Smith made. The Notice repeated most if not all of the grounds of opposition relied upon before Federal Magistrate Smith. 92On 16 October 2012 Griffiths J struck out each of the appeal grounds relied on by Mr Singh in the Notice of Appeal as an abuse of process: Jagjit Singh v Owners Strata Plan No. 11723 (No 3) [2012] FCA 1121. 93His Honour described Mr Singh's notice as deficient: in failing to establish any arguable grounds of appeal; in failing to identify any appealable error; and/or being embarrassing in law. And His Honour further recorded that (at [9] - [17]): (a)On 4 October 2012, the day before the scheduled hearing of the Owners Corporation's amended notice of objection to competency, Mr Singh forwarded to the Court registry a medical certificate stating he was unfit to return to work until 7 October 2012 and asked the Court to inform the Owners Corporation; (b)Mr Singh was informed by the Court that he would be required to apply for an adjournment on 5 October 2012 but failed to appear; (c)On 12 October 2012, Mr Singh filed a document entitled 'Documents not received as per Court directions' which was not served on the Owners Corporation; (d)On 12 October 2012, Mr Singh forwarded to the Court registry a second medical certificate stating the he would not be able to return to work until 15 October 2012, which was not served on the Owners Corporation; (e)Mr Singh failed to appear at the hearing on 15 October 2012. 94I accept the Applicant's submission that the 24 April 2012 appeal proceedings were: instituted or pursued without reasonable ground; and/or, conducted in such a way to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for other wrongful purpose. Griffiths J's findings make clear that the 24 April 2012 appeal proceedings did not have a proper basis. In my view the 24 April 2012 appeal proceedings were instituted and pursued without reasonable ground and were "vexatious proceedings" within the Act. 95(8) Interlocutory Application filed 3 August 2012 (593/2012). On 3 August 2012, after the Notice of Appeal from the sequestration order was filed but before it was determined by Griffiths J, Mr Singh filed in the Federal Court of Australia an Interlocutory Application seeking orders that the Owners Corporation provide to him 'assessment certificates' and if such certificates were not provided that the sequestration order be set aside. 96Griffiths J dismissed this 3 August 2012 application on 14 August 2013. His Honour stated that there was no utility in granting the orders sought as the 'assessment certificates' did not exist, or had already been provided to Mr Singh: Jagjit Singh v Owners Strata Plan No 11723 (No 2) [2012] FCA 900. 97I accept the Applicant's submission that the 12 August 2012 application was commenced without reasonable grounds and/or was conducted in such a way to harass or annoy, or to cause delay or detriment. In my view will the 12 August 2012 application was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act. 98(9) Application for leave to amend the notice of appeal dated 25 October 2012 (593/2012). On 25 October 2012, after the grounds of appeal in his 24 April Notice of Appeal were struck out by Griffiths J, Mr Singh sent to the Registry of the Federal Court an email described as 'Amended Grounds Notice of Appeal'. This email was treated by the Federal Court's Registry, perhaps rather generously, as an application for leave to amend the grounds of appeal. 99On 26 October 2012 Griffiths J dismissed both the application for leave to amend and the 24 April Notice of Appeal: Jagjit Singh v Owners Strata Plan No 11723 (No 4) [2012] FCA 1180. 100In his reasons Griffiths J made the following findings and comments: (1)Seven 'grounds of appeal' contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal attached to the email largely reflected the grounds of appeal which had already been struck out his Honour (at [15]); (2)The amended grounds of appeal contained lengthy and largely intelligible narrative which caused confusion and did not assist in determining the grounds of appeal relied upon by Mr Singh (at [19]); (3)Mr Singh was invited in oral submissions to identify the amounts which were allegedly incorrect the creditor's petition and default judgment but his answers were unintelligible and illogical (at [19]); (4)Mr Singh gave the impression that "he expected the Court to in effect conduct a detailed review of the correctness of the amounts in the relevant document" (at [19]); (5)Mr Singh had suggested he was prejudiced and distracted by the "large number" of interlocutory applications filed by the respondent. But the truth was that Mr Singh filed two interlocutory applications and the Owners Corporation had filed two interlocutory applications (at [34]); (6)Mr Singh had failed to comply with the Court rules and the Court's directions in the proceedings (at [41] and [46]]); and (7)Mr Singh's conduct not only caused prejudice to the Owners Corporation but also to other litigants in the Court's list who wished to have their appeals heard and determined (at [55]). 101I accept the Applicant's submission that Griffith J's findings and comments assist, and indeed in my view found, the inference that the 25 October 2012 email or "application" was instituted without reasonable grounds and/or was conducted in a way so as to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose. I conclude that Mr Singh's 25 October 2012 email or "application" was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act s 6. 102(10) Application filed on 4 June 2013 (1246/2013). On 4 June 2013 Mr Singh filed in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia an Application seeking annulment of his bankruptcy and interim orders restraining the Applicant from selling the Properties. 103That application was not served on the Owners Corporation or the Applicant. Mr Singh nevertheless attempted to proceed with the application on an urgent ex parte basis in the Federal Circuit Court's Duty List. But his Honour Judge Driver adjourned the application to 12 June 2013 and ordered Mr Singh to serve the application on the Owners Corporation and the Applicant. 104On 12 June 2013 his Honour Judge Driver: dismissed the 4 June 2013 application for interim relief with costs; ordered that no further steps be taken in relation to the bankruptcy annulment application of the same date without leave of the Court; and, his Honour also listed the Application on 9 August 2013 for further directions: Singh v Owners of Strata Plan 11723 [2013] FCCA 506. 105In his reasons his Honour Judge Driver noted that the allegations relied upon by Mr Singh in support of his applications referred to grounds which had already been agitated before the District Court and the Federal Court: allegations of fraud against the Owners Corporation; and an alleged discrepancy in the judgment debt and/or creditor's petition (at [5], [9] and [12]). His Honour adjourned the application to a date, after Mr Singh's District Court appeal against the default judgment was finally resolved, so that the 4 June 2013 application could be considered in light of the outcome of the District Court proceedings. 106On 9 August 2013, a day after his Honour Judge Delaney dismissed Mr Singh's District Court's appeal motion, his Honour Judge Driver: dismissed the bankruptcy annulment application; and ordered that the costs of the Owners Corporation be paid from Mr Singh's bankrupt estate and for the Applicant's costs to be costs in the administration of that estate. 107I accept the Applicant's submission that: Mr Singh's affidavit in support of the 4 June 2013 application was substantially the same as his affidavit filed on 2 April 2013 in the District Court Proceedings; and, that in the 4 June 2013 application Mr Singh did not raise any new matter which could have led to the annulment of the bankruptcy order. 108I further accept the Applicant's submission that Mr Singh's 4 June 2013 application to the Federal Circuit Court of Australia: to the extent that it was seeking an injunction against the sale of the Properties, was instituted without reasonable grounds and/or conducted in a way so as to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve other wrongful purpose. And, to the extent that it was seeking annulment of existing bankruptcy orders, was also instituted without reasonable grounds, and was an abuse of process. 109I conclude that Mr Singh's 4 June 2013 application was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act s 6.

Steam 3 - the Sale Restraint Stream 110(11) Notice of motion to set aside default judgment filed on 18 March 2013 (2013/351685). On 18 March 2013 Mr Singh filed in this Court a notice of motion to set aside default judgment for possession of the Harris Park Property. At that point a writ for possession of the Harris Park property had issued but Mr Singh was not evicted until 9 April. 111This 18 March 2013 motion was not served on the Applicant. Mr Singh attempted on 26 March 2013 to proceed ex parte on the motion before Registrar Bradford. But the Registrar adjourned the motion to 3 April 2013, so that the Applicant could attend. 112On 3 April 2013 Registrar Bradford dismissed the 18 March 2013 motion and ordered Mr Singh to pay the Applicant's costs. 113Although Mr Singh's 18 March 2013 motion contained general complaints against the Owners Corporation, I accept the Applicant's submission that the motion and its supporting evidence did not explain the delay in filing a defence or, list any genuine grounds on which Mr Singh could defend the Applicant's claim for possession, were the writ for possession to be set aside. 114I accept the Applicant's submission that because of its lack of proper grounds Mr Singh's 18 March 2013 motion was instituted without reasonable grounds and/or conducted in a way so as to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve other wrongful purpose and was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act. 115(12) Notice of motion to set aside default judgment filed on 4 April 2013 (2013/351685). On 4 April 2013 Mr Singh filed a further notice of motion to set aside the judgment for possession. On the same day at an ex parte hearing Deputy Registrar Brown made orders staying the execution of the Applicant's writ of possession over the Harris Park Property scheduled for 9 April 2013. And the Deputy Registrar ordered that the 4 April 2013 motion be served on the Applicant. 116On 5 April 2013 the Applicant filed a Notice of Motion seeking to set aside the 4 April orders. Adamson J heard this motion on 9 April in the Common Law Duty List. On the same day her Honour set aside the 4 April orders and dismissed Mr Singh's 4 April 2013 motion with costs. 117I accept the Applicant submission that Mr Singh's 4 April 2013 motion was instituted without reasonable grounds, was an abuse process and/or was conducted in a way so as to harass, annoy, cause delay or detriment, or to achieve other wrongful purpose. It did not demonstrate any proper basis to set aside judgement for possession and in my view was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act s 6. 118(13) Application for leave and extension of time to appeal filed on 27 June 2013 (1209/2013). Mr Singh was evicted from the Harris Park Property on 9 April 2013. In June 2013 he pursued three separate applications to prevent the sale of the Properties by the Applicant. Two of those applications were formulated as interim relief in the proceedings relating to the default judgment and the bankruptcy order. They have already been described above: the 4 June 2013 Application in the Federal Circuit Court was dismissed on 12 June 2013 by Judge Driver (proceedings (10) above); and, the 19 June Notice of Motion in the District Court was dismissed on 21 June 2013 by Judge Delaney (proceedings (4) above). 119On 27 June 2013 Mr Singh filed in the Federal Court of Australia an Application for leave to appeal, and an extension of time to appeal, from Judge Driver's 12 June decision. 120On 24 July 2013 Buchanan J dismissed the 22 June 2013 Application, holding that the Mr Singh had not shown any error in his Honour Judge Driver's 12 June decision and that in any event Bankruptcy Act 1966, s 37(2) would not permit the Court to suspend the operation of the sequestration order: Singh v Owners Strata Plan 11723 [2013] FCA 714 at [16]. 121His Honour noted that in his application Mr Singh relied upon matters, which had been ventilated repeatedly and decided against him (at [16] and [21]). 122I accept that the Applicant's submission that Mr Singh's 27 June 2013 application was instituted without reasonable grounds and was an abuse of process. It contained nothing new and identified no error in Judge Driver's 12 June decision. I conclude that Mr Singh's 27 June 2013 application was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act. 123(14) Interlocutory Application filed on 3 July 2013 (1209/2013). On 3 July 2013, after the 27 June 2013 Application for leave and extension of time to appeal was filed, but before it was dismissed by Buchanan J, Mr Singh filed in the Federal Court of Australia an Interlocutory Application seeking orders which would have the effect of staying the sale of the Properties. 124Mr Singh's affidavit supporting the 3 July 2013 Application was substantially identical to the material he had used in his previous applications and motions seeking to stay the sale of the Properties, all of which had previously been dismissed. 125The 3 July 2013 Application was listed for hearing before Buchanan J on 10 July 2013. At that hearing his Honour informed the parties that the Court would not make the orders sought on the Interlocutory Application, if the leave to appeal sought in the 27 June 2013 Application were not granted; and he reserved his decision. As already explained, leave to appeal was refused by his Honour after the hearing on 24 July 2013. And so there was no need for Buchanan J to further consider the interim relief sought by Mr Singh in the 3 July Application. 126I accept the Applicant's submission that the 3 July 2013 Application was instituted without reasonable grounds and was an abuse of process. In my view it was "vexatious proceedings" within the Act. 127(15) Summons filed on 26 June 2013 in these proceedings. Mr Singh commenced these proceedings on 26 June 2013 by Summons seeking an injunction against the sale of the Properties. And they were dismissed on 28 June 2013: Singh v Owners, Strata Plan 11723 & Ors [2013] NSWSC 872 per White J. 128In dismissing the Summons White J held: - "...it is an abuse of process for [Mr Singh] to apply to this court for an injunction to restrain the trustee in bankruptcy from exercising his powers as trustee, where that matter was before the Federal Circuit Court, and would be properly before the Federal Court on an application for interim relief in support of the appeal. " 129I accept the Applicant's submission that these proceedings were instituted without reasonable grounds and were an abuse of process. White J's reasons for decision make the assessment that the 26 June 2013 Summons was an abuse of process quite clear. In my view this Summons was also "vexatious proceedings" within the Act.

Has Mr Singh frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings? 130In my view Mr Singh has instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings "frequently". Mr Singh has commenced 14 vexatious proceedings in about two years from August 2011 until July 2013. This well qualifies as "frequently" under the Act. Indeed I accept the Applicant's submission that in making this assessment the Court can and should take into account the fact that by June 2013 Mr Singh was actually increasing the rate of his commencement of vexatious proceedings. Four out of fifteen proceedings relied upon were instituted in that month. The tide of vexatious proceedings only seems to have been stemmed at about the time that the current motion was filed and then served on Mr Singh.

Should the Court exercise its discretion and make an order under s 8? 131Should the Court make an order under the Act s 8? In addition to the factors that the Applicant points to in relation to Mr Singh's conduct of each of the 15 proceedings (14 of which the Court has now found to be vexatious proceedings), the Applicant further submits that the Court should in exercising its discretion under s 8 of the Act take into account circumstances relating to the Applicant's position as the trustee of Mr Singh's and Ms Kaur's bankrupt estates. Those circumstances are that: (1)Mr Singh's conduct of proceedings shows an inability or refusal to accept finality in litigation; (2)Because of Mr Singh's attempt to re-litigate issues the Applicant has been required to commence and defend litigation to properly perform his duties as trustee in bankruptcy causing delay and costs; and (3)Mr Singh's further re-litigation attempts will continue to reduce any possible surplus to both himself and Ms Kaur out of their bankrupt estates. 132I accept that these are factors to be taken into account here. And I accept the Applicant's submission that unless the Court exercises its discretion and makes the requested orders it is likely that Mr Singh will continue to institute or conduct vexatious proceedings. In my view that is a very powerful inference in this case and gives firm grounds for making the orders sought. 133The above analysis of Mr Singh's past institution of vexatious proceedings together with the discretionary factors the Applicant identifies, makes a strong case for the Court to make s 8(7) order under the Act prohibiting him from instituting further proceedings. Indeed his Honour Judge Driver has already made a similar order prohibiting acceptance from Mr Singh of any application relating to his bankruptcy. 134The analysis shows Mr Singh's various proceedings involve many of the ingredients of abuse of process: unjustifiable use of judicial resources, a determination to persist with futile appeals in the face of repeated judicial observations that proceedings were doomed to failure; and causing others to incur legal costs. 135Moreover, Mr Singh has instituted 14 such proceedings against the same parties in a little under 2 years, which in my view qualifies as "frequently". Subject to the limitation discussed in the next paragraph, I am satisfied that an order under s 8 of the Act should be made against Mr Singh.

The width of the prohibition on commencing proceedings 136On the evidence before me, Mr Singh seems to have gone through life until now without being involved in major litigation. Then in August 2011 a single dispute over strata levies led him, within less than two years, to launch a forest of litigation. 137Keeping Mr Singh's situation in mind, the order on this application should be moulded to give proper weight to the fact that it is a very serious matter to deprive a litigant of access to the courts. This Court has a power to make any necessary adjustments to the orders: the Act s 8(7)(c). 138The Court raised with Ms Quang at the hearing that it may be appropriate for any prohibition under s 8 restricted Mr Singh only from commencing proceedings against the Applicant and the Owners Corporation (and not other parties). These two parties have been the exclusive objects of his litigation so far. The Second Defendant is now deceased and there is therefore no need to include him in the order. Ms Quang on behalf of the Applicant indicated that such an order would be suitable from the Applicant's perspective. 139And this is the order that I will make. There seems to be no immediate danger of Mr Singh commencing litigation against any one other than the Applicant and the Owner's Corporation. If that proves to be wrong, any other persons affected make seek wider orders. It is not necessary to stay any existing litigation: all Mr Singh's litigation has already been dismissed.

Conclusions and Orders 140In the result I have decided to grant the orders the Applicant seeks under s 8(7) of the Act, against Mr Singh. I am satisfied that he has instituted and conducted vexatious proceedings frequently in a period of about two years. The circumstances of these actions warrant the Court exercising its discretion to make s 8(7) orders. The only qualification to these orders is in relation to the width of the prohibition on commencing proceedings: the orders will be limited to commencing proceedings against the Applicant himself and the Owners Corporation. 141In the result the Applicant has been successful. Costs normally follow the event. Mr Singh elected not to appear in these proceedings. I will make an order for costs against Mr Singh. 142Accordingly, the Court orders that: (1)The Plaintiff is prohibited from instituting proceedings against the First Defendant and the Third Defendant in New South Wales without the leave of the Court; (2)The Plaintiff shall pay the Third Defendant's costs of the motion.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 04 November 2013

Judgment 1The named plaintiff in these proceedings, Mr Jagjit Singh, was declared bankrupt on 5 April 2012. Mr Singh commenced these proceedings by Summons filed on 26 June 2013. In the Summons he sought relief in relation his bankruptcy and to restrain the sale of two properties by Mr Singh's trustee in bankruptcy, the Third Defendant. 2The Summons was dismissed by White J in the Equity Duty list, two days after it was filed, on 28 June 2013: Singh v Owners, Strata Plan 11723 & Ors [2013] NSWSC 872. On its dismissal White J said (at [16]) that he "could see no proper basis" for restraining the sale of the properties, and (at [15]) that "it may be doubted" whether Mr Singh can still maintain any of his other claimed causes of action due to his bankruptcy. 3These proceedings are the last in a flurry of litigation Mr Singh has pursued since August 2011 in both New South Wales and Federal courts. These actions attempted to remedy what Mr Singh perceived were injustices to him arising out of: (1) proceedings commenced by the First Defendant, The Owners Strata Plan 11723 ("Owners Corporation") in August 2010, to recover from Mr Singh unpaid strata levies of $1,893.26; (2) subsequent bankruptcy proceedings commenced by the Owners Corporation against Mr Singh, when the strata levies remained unpaid and when judgments in the Owners Corporation's favour remained unsatisfied and, (3) the efforts of the Third Defendant, Mr Singh's trustee in bankruptcy, to sell Mr Singh's properties after he was declared bankrupt. 4Before the proceedings were dismissed on 28 June 2013, the Third Defendant, Mr Terry Grant Van Der Velde, filed but was unable to present a notice of motion seeking to prohibit Mr Singh under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, s 8 from commencing any more proceedings in this State without the leave of the Court. It is clear from White J's reasons that his Honour was not asked to deal with this extant motion on 28 June, which remains undetermined. The motion was listed before me for hearing on 12 September 2013. The proceedings remain on foot for this limited purpose. These reasons henceforth will refer to the Third Defendant, Mr Van der Velde as "the Applicant". 5Separately on the Applicant's motion he seeks to remove the First and Second Defendants as parties to these proceedings. The Second Defendant, the Applicant's co-trustee in Mr Singh's bankruptcy, has died. And the Applicant says that the First Defendant, Owners Corporation, is not a necessary party to these proceedings. 6But the Court does not need to deal with this second part of the Applicant's motion. The proceedings have otherwise been dismissed. The part of the proceedings that remains, the Applicant's motion, only seeks relief against Mr Singh. The existing proceedings have already been dismissed as against these other defendants. 7Though served with legal process for this application, Mr Singh did not appear at the hearing. 8Ms Quang appeared for the Applicant and provided the Court with helpful submissions and a convenient summary of the various proceedings Mr Singh had commenced.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (12 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (17)