Singh v Owners Strata Plan No. 11723

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The background to this matter is set out in my earlier judgment reported as Singh v Owners Strata Plan 11723 [2012] FCA 538. Mr Singh's appeal against Smith FM's decision is scheduled to be heard in the November sittings of the Full Court. There is also an objection to competency pending in respect of that appeal. 2 By an undated interlocutory application the applicant moved the Court for certain relief, as set out in appendix A to that application. Relevantly, the relief sought was that the respondent provide the applicant with assessment certificates in respect of the amount of the default judgment obtained in the Local Court, as well as in respect of a figure of $5000.62, which is an amount included in the creditor's petition. The applicant further sought an order that if the said certificates were not provided, the sequestration order made by Smith FM be set aside. 3 An affidavit was read by the respondent opposing the application. The affidavit was sworn by Ms Sylvia Quang, a solicitor employed by the respondent's solicitors. Ms Quang was cross-examined by Mr Singh, who represented himself. He asked Ms Quang various questions relating to her knowledge of the existence of assessment certificates in respect of costs the subject of both the default judgment and the separate figure which appears in the creditor's petition. 4 As to the first matter, Ms Quang gave evidence that the only assessment certificate of which she was aware was the document dated 6 May 2011 issued by the Local Court of New South Wales which indicates that a default judgment in the amount of $14,251.68 had been obtained and was the subject of an order made by the Local Court. The default judgment as entered also included an amount of $7463.05 in respect of what is described as section 80 legal expenses. I understand the reference to section 80 to be a reference to the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 (NSW). 5 A copy of the orders made by the Local Court, dated 6 May 2011 was provided to Mr Singh under cover of a letter dated 18 July 2012. Otherwise, Ms Quang was not able to take the matter any further as far as any assessment of costs the subject of that default judgment is concerned. As to the second amount which appears in the creditor's petition, Ms Quang's evidence was to the effect that she had no knowledge as to whether or not there was any assessment of those costs in the Local Court and consequently she was in no position to advance the matter any further or to provide to the applicant any assessment certificate as sought by him in his interlocutory application. In all these circumstances, I have no choice but to dismiss the interlocutory application. 6 When I asked Mr Singh to address whether he had any basis for resisting a costs order which followed the event, he indicated that he felt that he had not had an opportunity to make submissions to me on the substance of the interlocutory application. Even though I thought that I had provided that opportunity, I gave him a further opportunity to say whatever he wished to say to me, relevant to his interlocutory application. He then made a number of submissions which went to the substance of his wider complaint and his objections to the making of the sequestration order by the learned Federal Magistrate. 7 In my respectful opinion, Mr Singh said nothing further of relevance going to the issue as to whether or not I should make the orders sought by him in his interlocutory application. Those orders go to a particular and discrete matter, namely, whether or not there are assessment certificates appertaining to the two figures in question and whether the respondent should provide copies of the same. Having regard to the evidence of Ms Quang, it is clear that there is no utility in making the orders that are sought because, based on that evidence, there are either no assessment certificates, or to the extent that there is a "certificate" that is relevant to the first matter, a copy has previously been provided to Mr Singh under cover of the letter dated 18 July 2012. 8 For all these reasons, the interlocutory application should be dismissed and the applicant ordered to pay the respondent's costs of that interlocutory application. I certify that the preceding eight (8) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Griffiths.