Singh v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

1. The amended notice of appeal filed 23 January 2019 be dismissed.
2. The appellant pays the first respondent's costs to be assessed failing agreement. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

REEVES J: 1 This appeal concerns the expression "that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to: (a) the application for the visa". That expression appears in the "public interest criteria 4020" which the applicant was required to satisfy under clause 820.226 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). 2 The facts of this appeal are set out at [3]-[23] of the primary judgment and do not require repeating. 3 In Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Dela Cruz (1992) 34 FCR 348 at 352-354 (Black CJ, Davies and Neaves JJ) a Full Court of this Court identified the following three principles which, it considered, applied to the construction of the expression presently under consideration in a similar context in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth): (1) that the word "material" requires "no more and no less than that; the false particular must be of moment or of significance, not merely trivial or inconsequential"; (2) that a "statement will be relevant to that purpose if it may - not only if it must or if it will - be taken into account in making a decision under the [Migration] Act as to the grant of the visa or entry permit in respect of which the statement is made"; and (3) that the expression had to be assessed objectively. 4 I am not persuaded by the appellant's submissions that there is any good reason to depart from these principles in this matter. Specifically, as to (c) above, the appellant accepts that the statement he made about the paternity of the child was objectively false. As to (b) above, he also accepts that that statement may have been taken into account by the Tribunal in making its decision on the grant of the visa he sought. 5 The appellant attempted to avoid this conclusion by contending that the statement was nonetheless equivocal. Even if it was, I consider it still fell within the principle in (b) above. And, in any event, given what was said by the primary judge at [52] of the primary judgment, I do not consider the statement could be regarded as equivocal. 6 For these reasons, I do not consider there is any merit in the sole ground raised by the appellant's amended notice of appeal. Accordingly, the orders should be: