Ground 3: Alleged error in relying on breach of conditions of earlier visa
19 Ground three concerns the Tribunal's finding that Mr Singh failed to comply with the requirements of his first visa by not undertaking study at the level required by the visa. Two aspects are raised by the ground. First it is said that the Tribunal did not explain the requirement and what the consequence of its breach entailed. This is an allegation of procedural unfairness.
20 In the grounds before the primary judge there was a complaint of an alleged failure to comply with s 359AA of the Migration Act. Section 359AA provides that the Tribunal may give orally clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the decision under review. The section then further provides the steps to be taken to ensure that the applicant for review understands the relevance of the information and has an opportunity to respond, if the power is exercised. However, the ground before the primary judge was expressed in generic terms. It alleged a failure by the Tribunal to provide 'any of the provisions, evidence, regulations, and facts which were taken into consideration while affirming the decision of the delegate'. There was no reference to any particular information (such as the failure to comply with the original visa) that had been raised orally and in respect of which there was an alleged failure to comply with s 359AA.
21 The primary judge dealt with the ground in the generic way in which it had been advanced concluding that there was no information that caused the procedural fairness requirements to be engaged: Singh v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 1675 at [28]-[29].
22 The difficulty with the manner in which the ground is reformulated on appeal is that it now raises a complaint about the reasoning concerning the alleged failure to comply with the requirements for the first visa. This is to raise a new ground. The nature of the breach is not evident from the Tribunal's reasons. It is not evident from the materials that were before the primary judge as to the basis for the Tribunal's conclusion or the manner in which it was raised with Mr Singh.
23 Mr Singh appeared in person. The Court has a duty to explain the procedural requirements to a litigant in person so as to ensure that the litigant has sufficient information about the practice and procedure of the court to ensure a fair hearing: Hamod v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375 at [309]-[311], quoted with approval in SZRUR v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCAFC 146; (2013) 216 FCR 445 at [37]; and Chetcuti v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 112 at [103]. See also SZVCP v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 24; (2016) 238 FCR 15 at [36]-[38].
24 In those circumstances, I indicated to Mr Singh in the course of the hearing that he might apply for an adjournment for the purpose of seeking to present the evidence that might support this ground. However, I indicated that he would need to show that the adjournment would serve some purpose in the sense that there was an expectation that a ground of review might be raised which could support the relief sought in the appeal.
25 Mr Singh explained that he accepted that he had not complied with the earlier visa because he had not undertaken a course of study at the required degree level. He also accepted that that the issue of compliance with the requirement had been raised with him by the Tribunal at the 'interview' which I took to be a reference to the oral hearing. In those circumstances, I indicated to Mr Singh that I formed the view that no purpose would be served by an adjournment to put on further evidence. I did so for the following reasons.
26 It is not suggested that the Tribunal was wrong in the conclusion it reached that Mr Singh breached his earlier visa. Nor does Mr Singh identify any matter that would provide an explanation for the breach. He accepts that the matter was raised orally with him in the course of the hearing. In those circumstances, there is no suggestion that further evidence might support a claim to procedural unfairness. Further, even assuming there had been a breach of procedural fairness there is no possibility of jurisdictional error because there was no submission to be made as to the matter of earlier compliance.
27 In addition, the ultimate conclusion by the Tribunal was to the effect that Mr Singh did not intend to stay in Australia temporarily. I accept the submission by counsel for the Minister that the Tribunal's conclusion depended upon Mr Singh's reason for applying for the visa rather than a view as to whether he would undertake a different form of study to that required by any visa (being the nature of the non-compliance noted by the Tribunal). In all those circumstances, it has not been demonstrated that providing an opportunity for further evidence would assist in advancing an arguable basis for a claim that any denial of procedural fairness would rise to practical injustice. Even if Mr Singh had been deprived of an opportunity to respond concerning the matter whether he undertook studies at the required level when in Australia on an earlier student visa then that opportunity could not realistically have resulted in a different decision: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA [2019] HCA 3 at [38], [45] (Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ).
28 The second part to ground 3 is a complaint that any breach of the law had been 'condoned' by operation of law when subsequent visa applications were granted without any complaint being raised as to earlier non-compliance. There is no such principle that would apply to prevent the Tribunal from considering past non-compliance in dealing with the present application. The primary judge was correct to dismiss that aspect of the ground.
29 Therefore, leave to raise the first part of ground 3 should be refused and the ground should otherwise not be upheld.