D THE RELEVANT LAW
24 It is necessary first to set out the relevant provisions. Section 443A of the Corporations Act provides:
(1) The administrator of a company under administration is liable for debts he or she incurs, in the performance or exercise, or purported performance or exercise, of any of his or her functions and powers as administrator, for:
(a) services rendered; or
(b) goods bought; or
(c) property hired, leased, used or occupied, including property consisting of goods that is subject to a lease that gives rise to a PPSA security interest in the goods; or
(d) the repayment of money borrowed; or
(e) interest in respect of money borrowed; or
(f) borrowing costs.
(2) Subsection (1) has effect despite any agreement to the contrary, but without prejudice to the administrator's rights against the company or anyone else.
25 Section 443B provides:
Payments for property used or occupied by, or in the possession of, the company
Scope
(1) This section applies if, under an agreement made before the administration of a company began, the company continues to use or occupy, or to be in possession of, property of which someone else is the owner or lessor, including property consisting of goods that is subject to a lease that gives rise to a PPSA security interest in the goods.
General rule
(2) Subject to this section, the administrator is liable for so much of the rent or other amounts payable by the company under the agreement as is attributable to a period:
(a) that begins more than 5 business days after the administration began; and
(b) throughout which:
(i) the company continues to use or occupy, or to be in possession of, the property; and
(ii) the administration continues.
(3) Within 5 business days after the beginning of the administration, the administrator may give to the owner or lessor a notice that:
(a) specifies the property; and
(b) states that the company does not propose to exercise rights in relation to the property; and
(c) if the administrator:
(i) knows the location of the property; or
(ii) could, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, know the location of the property;
specifies the location of the property.
(4) Despite subsection (2), the administrator is not liable for so much of the rent or other amounts payable by the company under the agreement as is attributable to a period during which a notice under subsection (3) is in force, but such a notice does not affect a liability of the company.
(5) A notice under subsection (3) ceases to have effect if:
(a) the administrator revokes it by writing given to the owner or lessor; or
(b) the company exercises, or purports to exercise, a right in relation to the property.
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), the company does not exercise, or purport to exercise, a right in relation to the property merely because the company continues to occupy, or to be in possession of, the property, unless the company:
(a) also uses the property; or
(b) asserts a right, as against the owner or lessor, so to continue.
Restrictions on general rule
(7) Subsection (2) does not apply in relation to so much of a period as elapses after:
(a) a receiver of the property is appointed; or
(b) under an agreement or instrument under which a security interest in the property is created or arises:
(i) the secured party appoints an agent to enter into possession, or to assume control, of the property; or
(ii) the secured party takes possession, or assumes control, of the property;
but this subsection does not affect a liability of the company.
(8) Subsection (2) does not apply in so far as a court, by order, excuses the administrator from liability, but an order does not affect a liability of the company.
(9) The administrator is not taken because of subsection (2):
(a) to have adopted the agreement; or
(b) to be liable under the agreement otherwise than as mentioned in subsection (2).
26 Section 447A(1) provides that:
(1) The Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate in relation to a particular company.
27 As Finkelstein J explained in Silvia v FEA Carbon Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 515; (2010) 185 FCR 301 (at 304 [10]), the rationale behind s 443B is clear. The administrator of a company under administration is the company's agent: s 437B. At common law, an agent would not be liable for rent due under a lease entered into by his principal, whether or not the rent fell due before or after his appointment, unless, by his conduct, the agent has adopted the lease.
28 This had been thought to be unacceptable in respect of property which the administrator used during the administration in circumstances where s 440C places a bar on an owner or lessor taking possession of his property without the administrator's consent or the Court's leave. Accordingly, if the administrator allows the company in administration to continue to use leased property for the purposes of the administration, it was thought only fair that the administrator be personally liable for the rent.
29 The administrator, however, is given a "period of grace" or decision period, namely five business days within which to investigate the company's affairs and decide whether or not he wishes to avoid liability to pay rent. If so, the administrator must give notice: s 443B(3).
30 As Finkelstein J noted in Silvia v FEA (at 304 [12]-[13]), often five business days will not be enough time in which to conduct the necessary investigation to decide whether the administrator thinks it is best to retain or give up possession of leased property. For this reason, subsection (8) allows the Court to excuse the liability imposed by s 443B to pay rent after the initial grace period.
31 The principles governing the Court's power to extend the notice period under s 443B(3) were conveniently summarised by Markovic J in Strawbridge (Administrator), in the matter of CBCH Group Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) (No 2) [2020] FCA 472, where her Honour referred to Finkelstein J's observations in Silvia v FEA and noted (at [39]):
Section 447A(1) of the Act also gives the Court ample power to alter the operation of s 443B(2) and (3) of the Act: see Re Mothercare Australia Ltd (admins apptd) [2013] NSWSC 263 at [6]. Alternatively, s 443B(8) gives the Court an additional power to alter the operation of s 443B(2) and (3): see Silvia v FEA Carbon Pty Ltd (admins apptd) (recs and mgrs apptd) (2010) 185 FCR 301; [2010] FCA 515 (Silvia v FEA) at [13]. The usual rationale behind the extension of the five business day period in s 443B(2) and (3) or the exercise of the power in s 443B(8) is because the administrator has had insufficient time to conduct the necessary investigations to decide whether he or she thinks it best to retain or give up possession of leased property …
32 As Beach J explained in Algeri, in the matter of WBHO Australia Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2022] FCA 169, it is well established that s 447A confers power on the Court to make orders limiting the administrators' liability. Section 447A has broad application where to make orders would serve the objects of Pt 5.3A. Further, in terms of the Court's discretion under s 443B(8), that discretion is wide, but it must be exercised judicially and having regard to the impact on creditors (see Wells Fargo Trust Co, National Association (as trustee) v VB Leaseco Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2020] FCA 1269 (at [169] per Middleton J)).
33 In that case, Beach J further observed (at [25]) that courts have granted extensions of the decision period which have been greater than or equal to the period sought by the Administrators here.