(v) the use of the Mat would promote health; and
(vi) Australian and other Government approvals of the Mat provided endorsement of the capacity of the Mat to influence health.
6. Each of the second respondent, Akihiko Misuma, the third respondent, Robin Han, and the fourth respondent, Mark Scotte, was knowingly concerned in, and a party to, the contraventions by GW of ss.57, 61(1) and 61(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 referred to in declarations 2, 3 and 4 above.
7. The sixth respondent, Lucille Orr, was knowingly concerned in, and a party to, the contravention by GW of s.61(2) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 referred to in declaration 4 above.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
8. GW be restrained from, by itself its servants or agents, in trade or commerce, engaging in conduct of the kind described in declarations 2, 3, 4 and 5 above.
9. Each of the second respondent, Akihiko Misuma, and third respondent, Robin Han, be restrained from, in trade or commerce, being knowingly concerned in, or a party to, conduct by GW of the kinds described in declarations 2, 3 and 4 above.
10. The following respondents pay in the following proportions the applicant's costs of this proceeding:
(i) the first respondent, GW 60%;
(ii) the second respondent, Akihiko Misuma 20%;
(iii) the third respondent, Robin Han 20%.
11. The applicant have leave to move by notice of motion for orders for compensation under s.87(1A) and (1B) of the Trade Practices Act 1974."
11 The contraventions relevant for present purposes are those referred to in orders 2 and 3. In each case, the court declared that there had been a statutory contravention by inducing persons to do certain things by representing to them that they would receive commissions or by holding out to them the prospects of earning commissions.
12 These orders reflect the purpose and intent of the respective sections. The aim of s.57 is, clearly enough, to shield members of the public from attempts to persuade them to enter into transactions of a certain kind under which they will, in expectation of rebates, commissions or other benefits, assist in the introduction of prospective customers. The legislative policy works on the premise that such transactions should not be undertaken by corporations and, therefore, that people should not be put into a position in which they may effect introductions and thereby receive rebates, commissions or other benefits. In the particular circumstances considered by Lindgren J, future payment of commissions to members of Giraffe World (or a representation as to such payment) was an element of the course of conduct found to be unlawful. The illegal conduct consisted, in part, of drawing persons into introducing further potential purchasers by promise of reward. If the reward were to be given, the statutory purpose of ensuring that corporations do not, by creating an expectation of that reward, induce persons to solicit participation by others would be defeated. I am of the opinion that s.57 should be seen as impliedly precluding both the giving and the receiving of rebates, commissions and other benefits of the kind central to the success of the conduct the section makes it unlawful for corporations to undertake.
13 The same analysis seems to me to hold good in relation to s.61. A core element of the conduct engaged in in contravention of s.61(1) was an inducement consisting of or contributed to by a representation as to prospect of future reward. The section aims to preclude the effectiveness of such inducements and must therefore be taken to indicate that the prospect of reward activating the inducement is not to be effectuated by the giving of the reward.
14 There is in each section an objective of protecting the public. Rendering ineffective the inducement by which the wrongdoer seeks to beguile persons into soliciting further persons to participate is an essential element of the protection, with the result that the giving of the reward the inducement foreshadows must be denied in order to ensure that the inducement is in truth ineffective. Only if any purported contractual right of the potential recipient of the reward is rendered inoperative as a source of recovery is the statutory objective achieved.
15 Little is, I think, to be gained by any extensive analysis of the case law on the effect of statutory illegality upon contracts. The basic principle is that regard must be had to "the true effect and meaning of the statute" (St John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd [1957] 1 QB 267 at 286) and to "the language used and to the purpose of the statute" (Archbolds (Freightage) Ltd v S Spanglett Ltd [1961] 1 QB 374 at 390). Adopting that approach, I consider the position in this case to be that the effectiveness of contracts to pay commissions the promise or foreshadowing of which enlivens an inducement sought to be precluded by s.57 or s.61 is so inconsistent with the attainment of the purposes of the section as to indicate a legislative intention that such effectiveness is to be denied.
16 I therefore consider the submissions made by both the liquidator and the ACCC with respect to meeting of claims for commissions to be correct.
17 I must next deal with the separate question in relation to "refunds", that is, claims by persons who paid one or more of the purchase price of the Ion Mat, the $50 "membership application fee" and the $300 "membership fee". These were sums paid by members of the public as, in effect, a price for the opportunity to obtain (or, at least, to have the chance of obtaining) the benefits by way of commission and the like that were represented as available through participation in the illegally promoted schemes. By and large, people paid these moneys without receiving anything in return (except the physical Ion Mat item apparently of no real worth) and, for reasons I have already explained, must be regarded as having no enforceable claims to any commissions they may consider themselves to have earned.
18 Neither expressly nor by implication, it seems to me, can the Trade Practices Act provisions be seen as precluding claims by persons seeking to recover "refunds". It will, I think, be a matter of the liquidator's turning his mind to each claim for a "refund" and dealing with it according to the particular circumstances. If the liquidator is satisfied that, on ordinary contract and unjust enrichment principles, the claimant has shown grounds for recovery, then a refund should be made. A positive view might perhaps not be formed where a particular person had in fact received commissions (albeit commissions of the kind to which my earlier observations relate) and thereby enjoyed some quid pro quo for the outlay of the sums in respect of which a refund is sought. Such a case might be viewed differently from one in which the person concerned had received no real value from the outlay of the sums in respect of which a refund was sought. For present purposes, the point is that the Trade Practices Act provisions should not be seen as affecting in any way the decision whether a refund claim should be met.
19 The specific questions asked by the liquidator should, in my opinion, be answered as follows: