81It will by now be clear that I am satisfied that the maximum twelve (12) month period agreed to in Clause 17.3(a) of the MEP Deed was reasonable when the agreement was made. It is a different question however, whether, in the particular circumstances of this case, I should grant injunctive relief for the whole of that twelve (12) month period.
82I have reached the view that Mr Warburton should be sidelined for the balance of 2011 but no longer. During that period, Seven can be expected to negotiate and finalise, and Mr Warburton will have no knowledge of, Seven's terms of trade for calendar year 2012 for four of the major media buying groups and its terms of trade for the financial year 2011/12 for Group M. What is more, in Mr Warburton's absence, Seven can be expected to revise and renew its 2012 terms of trade for most of its major direct clients. Since the conclusion of the hearing, it has finalised the terms on which it will, for the period 2012-2016, share in the broadcast and other rights offered by the AFL. In addition, the knowledge that Mr Warburton may have had before 2 March 2011 concerning Seven's budgets and financial forecasts will become virtually extinct. So will his knowledge, if any, of the terms of trade and particular contractual arrangements for individual advertisers. He will, I am satisfied, have no material recollection of those matters by 1 January 2012. And by that date, the information on which any such knowledge was based will have become inevitably and progressively stale, even obsolete.
83I have already adverted to some of the underlying facts on which I have relied to reach these conclusions. But I should elaborate on their major features and set out more detailed findings of fact. The negotiations that Group M will undertake with all broadcasters for the financial year 2011/12 are occurring now (April and May) and can be expected to be finalised by June. The negotiations that the other four agency buying groups will undertake with all broadcasters for the year 2012 will take place between September and November. They are generally finalised by December to take effect in the new year. These negotiations resolve the headline terms of trade. They include the base rates and the discounts to those rates, the share of the buying group's total spend that will be directed to the particular broadcaster and other incentives that may be offered. Subsequent negotiations may deal with more minor detailed terms and conditions which are often very similar from year to year.
84The effect of my orders will be that from 2 March 2011 Mr Warburton will have no knowledge during 2011 of Seven's strategy, objectives and negotiations in its dealings with all of the agency buying groups relating to the future. Nor will he have any knowledge of the terms of trade which Seven actually concludes with those buying groups for the forthcoming periods - for the financial year 2011/12 for Group M and for the calendar year 2012 for the other four groups.
85If Mr Warburton becomes the chief executive officer at Network Ten from 1 January 2012, his retained knowledge of Seven's arrangements with the burying groups, if any, will only be historical. It will be limited to that which existed during the financial year 2010/11 for Group M and that which existed in the calendar year 2011 for the other four buying groups. By 1 January 2012, he will not know of Seven's current arrangements. The knowledge which he did have will have been superseded. The understandable concern of the plaintiffs' witnesses was Mr Warburton's knowledge of Seven's current trading terms. It is obvious that his knowledge of current terms could give a competitor a significant advantage and might enable the competitor to better the terms offered. But any reasonable risk will be obviated by my orders. As I have said, by January 2012, Mr Warburton will not have any knowledge of Seven's then current arrangements with the agency buying groups.
86I do not think that the position will be materially different in relation to Seven's direct advertisers. Some clients who place advertising through agency buying groups, also negotiate contracts with Seven. And some clients contract directly with Seven and do not use the agency buying groups. One client uses agencies that do not form part of the five agency buying groups. The contribution of these advertisers to SMG's sales revenue is, in any event, secondary to that of the five agency buying groups, whose contribution, as I have mentioned, is said to be approximately 85%. More fundamentally, there was really no evidence supporting the likelihood that by January 2012 Mr Warburton will continue to have any material knowledge of Seven's then current arrangements with any particular direct advertiser. The argument to the contrary assumes that the arrangements that were in place before 2 March 2011 with that advertiser will be unchanged in January 2012, and that in January 2012 Mr Warburton will have retained the knowledge of those arrangements that he had before 2 March 2011. I do not think such a case has been established. It is true that the negotiations with direct advertisers are generally conducted on an annual basis. And they usually do not commence until the agency buying contracts have been concluded. But there was no convincing evidence of the likelihood that any particular material contract might be unresolved between January and March 2012; let alone that Mr Warburton could be expected realistically to recall its pre-March 2011 terms or take advantage of his knowledge. Certainly there was no sufficient evidence to justify an injunction beyond 1 January 2012 on that score alone.
87Nor do I think that , beyond 1 January 2012, there could be any realistic concern about customer and client connection or staff connection or knowledge of budgets, forecasts and strategies. The customers are Seven's not Mr Warburton's. They will go wherever they receive the best terms. This is not the sort of industry where senior executives like Mr Warburton carry their employer's customers in their back pocket. As to staff, the evidence did not support any conclusion that staff members would necessarily follow Mr Warburton to Network Ten or elsewhere because of their respect for his personality or ability and the connection which they may have formed with him at Seven. The evidence satisfied me that Seven's staff members will make up their own minds by reference to what is best for them. An injunction against Mr Warburton until 1 January 2012 will ensure that there is sufficient distance between any connection with staff that may have existed prior to 2 March 2011, and Mr Warburton's future employment. As to his knowledge of budgets, forecasts and strategies, this is affected by the point in time during the year when Mr Warburton's employment relationship came to an end, when the mutual relationship of trust and confidence ceased, and when the flow of information stopped. I have set out my factual findings in paragraph [82] above.
88A final word is appropriate about the AFL broadcast rights package. I referred to it in paragraph [82] above. During the hearing, Mr McWilliam expressed the confident opinion that the package would be finalised by the time of the AFL grand final in September 2011. In fact, it was finalised on 28 April. Among other things, this tends to confirm the views I have reached about the likely re-negotiation of most of Seven's relevant commercial arrangements during the balance of calendar year 2011 while Mr Warburton is sidelined.
89The plaintiffs nonetheless attempted to further advance their case in relation to the AFL rights package. Some weeks after the conclusion of the hearing, they sought to adduce further evidence to rely on the fact that the recent agreement between Seven and the AFL contemplates the sub-licensing of broadcasting rights to other parties who could include Network Ten. In fact, this was already contemplated in a joint bidding agreement between Seven and Network Ten which was referred to during the hearing. The plaintiffs then sought to contend that the possibility of negotiations between Seven and Network Ten in relation to the sub-licensing of AFL broadcast rights for the 2012-2016 period, was a further reason for restraining Mr Warburton until at least March 2012. However the proposed fresh evidence and submissions in support of this contention were heavily suppositional. They depended on the proposition that any such negotiations had not yet commenced, but if they did, they might not conclude until March 2012 when the first AFL match, for which Seven has the rights, will be played. A foundation for the risk justifying a restraint until March 2012 was said to be that Mr Warburton "may" have an idea of what Seven in its own right had been prepared to pay for the AFL rights.
90I do not accept that these matters are capable of making any material difference to my assessment of what is appropriate as a matter of discretion in the particular circumstances of this case. And I will not grant leave to the plaintiffs to re-open their case to adduce further evidence from Mr McWilliam. They did not, in fact, make any formal application to do so. These matters could have formed part of the hearing before me which concluded four weeks ago. Accepting Mr McWilliam's evidence at the hearing, the topic of sub-licensing negotiations between Seven and Network Ten after September 2011, was a potentially relevant matter that could have been explored, if it were thought prudent to do so. As it is, the specific factual contentions that underlie this new submission have not been put to Mr Warburton. And Mr McWilliam has not been cross-examined on these issues. In any event, I am not satisfied that, on the issue of possible negotiations over sub-licensing of the AFL broadcast rights, there is or will be a material difference from the plaintiffs' perspective between a restraint until 1 January 2012 and a restraint until 2 March 2012. The matters raised are part of the mix that makes a restraint until 1 January 2012 reasonable. But they do not go far enough to justify a further restraint until 2 March 2012. In the exercise of my discretion, I am not prepared to allow the plaintiffs to re-open their case. Even if I were prepared to do so, the proposed untested evidence of Mr McWilliam does not persuade me that the result should be any different.
91For all of those reasons, I do not think that the restraint on competition contained in Clause 17 of the MEP Deed will continue to serve any legitimate protectable interest after 1 January 2012. The plaintiffs will not, in my view, suffer any detriment after that date necessitating the grant of an injunction for the full twelve (12) month period until 2 March 2012. I propose to decline injunctive relief beyond 1 January 2012. The discretion to limit or withhold injunctive relief has been frequently recognised in the context of applications to enforce restraints of trade: John Fairfax Publications Ltd v Birt [2006] NSWSC 99 at [45]; Otis Elevator Co Pty Ltd v Nolan [2007] NSWSC 593 at [26] - [29]; Tullettt Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Purcell (supra) at [88] - [96]; and Provident Financial Group plc v Hayward [1989] 3 All ER 298 (CA). In the events which have happened, having regard to the actual circumstances, as distinct from those which may have been contemplated when the MEP Deed was entered into, a restraint for the full twelve (12) month period would be unnecessary and excessive.
92I add that the same findings of fact may well also support the application of Section 4(1) of the Restraints of Trade Act, 1976 (NSW). However, I will not dwell on the issue because neither party developed submissions about the scope or construction of Section 4(1), let alone its application to the particular facts. And it is not necessary for the resolution of the issues in dispute. I will nonetheless observe that the language of Section 4(1) is enigmatic in its brevity and the explanation in Orton v Melman [1981] 1 NSWLR 583 (McLelland J) is neither entirely clear nor, pending an appellate decision, necessarily the last word on the subject. However, there are at least suggestions in Tullett Prebon (Australia) Pty Ltd v Purcell (supra) at [55] that Section 4(1) may be utilised in circumstances such as these to read down a restraint to the extent that it is excessive in its application to the circumstances of the particular breach.