© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2002] SASC 160
Supreme Court of SA
2002-06-21
Debelle J
Original judgment source is linked above.
For the reasons which follow I was wrong to allow Dr Cornwall to be questioned on the statements he had made in the Legislative Council. I have, therefore, put his answers from my mind and have not in any sense had any regard to them at any stage whatsoever in reaching my conclusions in these reasons. There was a wealth of other evidence in support of the conclusion I have later reached that Dr Cornwall was guilty of misfeasance in a public office. I have dismissed the other claims against Dr Cornwall.
It is important to note also that many of the questions and answers to which objection was taken proved to be quite inconclusive and hence were of no probative value. Others dealt with matters which were proved in other ways. It must also be noted the questions concerning what Dr Cornwall had said in the Legislative Council were but a very small number of the hundreds of questions the plaintiff asked Dr Cornwall in cross-examination. There were only a very small number of questions concerning proceedings in the Parliament which elicited any evidence of probative value and, I repeat, I have had no regard to them.
Ms Panagiotidis did not object to the Hansard record of proceedings in the Legislative Council being tendered so long as the only purpose was to prove what had been said on a particular occasion. That is consistent with authority: Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369, 373. I have quoted some of those Hansard records in these reasons. I have done so only to state the history of the matter and for no other purpose. I have made no other use of them.
I have had no regard at all to the answers given by Mr Sumner to questions to which objection was taken. They were very few in number. The answers had no probative value. In any event the plaintiff withdrew one of her claims against Mr Sumner and I have dismissed her only other claim against him.
Ms Panagiotidis did not expressly object to any use being made of the Hansard for the purpose of drawing inferences from what was said or done in the House. I have taken the view that the Hansard record of the parliamentary proceedings cannot be relied on for the purpose of drawing any inferences.
I set out my reasons for the above conclusions.
In the Court of Appeal in New Zealand in Television New Zealand Ltd v Prebble [1993] 3 NZLR 513 at 518 Cooke P listed occasions when consistently with the privilege, evidence can be led. Such evidence is admissible provided it is used consistently with the parliamentary privilege in the following circumstances.
1. To prove material facts, such as the fact that a statement was made in Parliament at a particular time, or that it refers to a particular person: Hyams v Petersen [1991] 3 NZLR 648, 656; New South Wales Branch of the Australian Medical Association v Minister for Health & Community Services (1992) 26 NSWLR 114.
2. For the purpose of proving that a Government decision was announced in Parliament on a particular day: Roman Corporation Ltd v Hudsons Bay Oil & Gas Co Ltd (1973) 36 DLR (3d) 413.
3. In order to establish that a member of Parliament was present in the House and voted on a particular day: Forbes v Samuel [1913] 3 KB 706.
4. To establish that a report of parliamentary debates accords with the debate itself and is fair and accurate and therefore attracts qualified privilege in the law of defamation.
5. For the purpose of interpreting statutes. Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3; [1993] 1 All ER 42 is an example.
However, as Sir Robin Cooke then noted, "beyond that point the question becomes more difficult".
Blackstone noted in his Commentaries (17th Ed (1830) Vol 1 at 163):
"......... whatever matter arises concerning either House of Parliament, it relates ought to be examined, discussed, and adjudged in that House to which it and not elsewhere."
In Stockdale v Hansard [1839] EngR 139; (1839) 9 Ad & E 1; 112 ER 1112 Lord Denman CJ said (at 114) "whatever is done within the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place. For speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous to the public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity" and Patteson J noted (at 209) "that whatever is said or done in either House should not be liable to examination elsewhere". The inability to examine anything said in the Parliament was reaffirmed by Anderson J in Holding v Jennings [1979] VicRp 29; [1979] VR 289 at 291 in these terms:
"It is clear law that no proceedings, either civil or criminal, may be taken Parliament, and a member is not examinable outside Parliament concerning against a member of Parliament for anything said or done by him in anything said by him in Parliament; see ex parte Wason (1869) LR 4 QB at 573; Bradlaugh v Gossett (1884) 12 QBD 271 at 275; Stockdale v Hansard [1839] EngR 139; (1837) 9 Ad & E 1; Dillon v Balfour (1987) 20 LR Ir 600; Blackstone, 1 Com 163; R v Creevey [1813] EngR 254; (1813) 1 M & S 273; Chubb v Salomons (1852) 3 Car & Kar 75."
In R v Murphy (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 at 33 - 38, Hunt J permitted cross-examination of witnesses on their prior statements made to a Parliamentary Committee. That decision was disapproved in Prebble and I do not follow it. Other decisions suggest that statements in the House cannot be questioned in any form at all.
In Church of Scientology of California v Johnson-Smith [1972] 1 QB 523 it was held that the privilege denied reference to parliamentary statements by a member to support the plaintiff's claim that the member's defamatory statements outside Parliament had been motivated by malice thereby negating the defence of qualified privilege. Again reliance was placed on the inability to examine in any place statements made in the Parliament (at 529):
"What is said or done in the House in the course of proceedings there cannot be examined outside Parliament for the purpose of supporting a cause of action even though the cause of action itself arises out of something done outside the House. In my view this conclusion is supported both by principle and authority."
Similarly in R v Turnbull [1958] TASStRp 18; [1958] Tas. SR 80 at 83 the Crown was not permitted to rely on statements made in the Parliament as evidence in the criminal prosecution of a former State Treasurer for corruption. In R v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 it was held that evidence of what the accused had said in Parliament was inadmissible for the purpose of establishing that he had lied to Parliament as corroborative evidence of official corruption.
In Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [1988] FCA 24; (1988) 19 FCR 223 at 230 Beaumont J took a wide view of the privilege and was not prepared to allow use of what had been said in the Parliament for the purpose of proving that the Commonwealth was not ready and willing to proceed with a contract:
"On behalf of the applicant it is submitted that the tender of the extract from Hansard does not offend s 16(3) because it is for the limited purpose of proving that the Senator made a statement in Parliament in which he admitted having the conversation alleged. It is true that, before the enactment of s 16, it was permissible to use Hansard for the limited, but non-contentious, purpose of proving that a member of Parliament was present in the House on a particular day. According to the memorandum explaining the operation of s 16(3)(c), this is still a legitimate approach. This would accord with the language of s 16 and with its apparent purpose, that is to say, that a member of Parliament should be able to speak in Parliament 'with impunity and without any fear of the consequences': per Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam [1978] HCA 43; (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 35. Where, as here, the subject-matter of the passage from Hansard is contentious in that it is sought to be used to impugn the conduct of the Senator, in the context of a denial by the respondent of any impropriety, it is almost inevitable that the tender of Hansard would lead to an examination of the circumstances in which the Senator came to make the statement and that this would further lead to an attempt to assess the credibility of this evidence and to compare it with other evidence already given. Such an examination, in a contentious area, cannot be reconciled with the complete freedom of speech envisaged by the Bill of Rights and the Act."
In Rost v Edwards [1990] 2 QB 460 at 475 it was held that the privilege prevented evidence being led on the question whether a member had been appointed and then de-selected from a parliamentary committee. In that case the member himself a plaintiff was not wishing to question what had occurred in the House but simply to ask the jury to draw an inference from what had occurred.
Courts have always been sensitive to the rights and privileges of Parliament and the constitutional importance of Parliament retaining control over its own proceedings: Rost v Edwards at 467; Prebble at 336. However, some of the decisions mentioned above seemed to take the principle a long way. For example, it is difficult to see how the intended use of the proceedings in Parliament in Rost v Edwards would in any respect have impaired the privileges of its members. I adopt with respect the remarks of Doyle CJ in Rann v Olsen [2000] SASC 83; (2000) 76 SASR 450 at 473 that the principle of non-intervention cannot be pressed too far and that it must be applied with a mind to its purpose and in a discriminating fashion. An unilateral application of the principle has the capacity to cause hardship. The decision in Church of Scientology v Johnson-Smith is an example. The member was not being sued in respect of something said in the Parliament. Is a plaintiff to be denied a remedy for a defamatory statement made outside the Parliament on an occasion of qualified privilege because it is not possible to rely on something said in the Parliament which might be conclusive evidence of malice? As the Privy Council noted in Prebble at 336 three issues must be balanced, the need to ensure that the legislature can exercise its powers freely, the need generally to respect freedom of speech, and the interests of justice. In Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1983) 78 FLR 449 at 453, Blackburn CJ expressed how the courts could comply with the privileges of Parliament in these terms:
"I think the way in which the Court complies with Article IX of the Bill of Rights, and with the law of the privileges of Parliament, is not by refusing to admit evidence of what was said in Parliament, but by refusing to allow the substance of what was said in Parliament to be the subject of any submission or inference. The Court upholds the privileges of Parliament not by a rule as to the admissibility of evidence, but by its control over the pleadings and the proceedings in Court."
The purpose of the principle is to enable members to speak with impunity and without fear of the consequences: Sankey v Whitlam (supra) and to ensure the courts do not become embroiled in the political controversies which question as to the exercise of parliamentary privilege typically involve: Prebble (supra); Egan v Willis [1998] HCA 71; (1998) 195 CLR 424 per Kirby J at par 131. There may, therefore, be room at least for allowing questions which seek to do no more than clarify what a member meant when using a certain expression and for allowing inferences to be drawn when an action is brought in respect of something done or said outside the Parliament. These are matters which as Blackburn CJ said in Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation can be controlled by the court.
However, I do not think it necessary to determine these issues in this action. I will take a cautious approach and disregard answers to questions which inquired as to what had been said or done in the Parliament.
It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that Dr Cornwall's statements in the Legislative Council were the political expression of his executive acts. Two obvious examples are the decision to establish the Review Committee and the decision to accept the recommendation of the Review Committee to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. The fact that he announced those decisions in the Legislative Council does not mean that the decisions cannot be examined. The executive act can be examined but the statements in the Legislative Council cannot nor can any inference be drawn from those statements.
In order to gain a full appreciation of the issues, it is necessary to note some events as far back as 1981. However, it is unnecessary to go into the detail of the period 1981 to 1984. The main events occurred in 1985, 1986, 1987 and, in particular, in May to August 1987. There are two main themes. The first concerns the funding of women's shelters and the political agitation by the shelters for increased funding. Those events explain why the review of women's shelters was undertaken. The second relates to the decision to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter and to the allegations made about the Shelter. The latter are the critical issues.
Hereafter, these reasons begin with a brief note about women's shelters and the circumstances of the Christies Beach Shelter. They turn to funding issues before 1985 and then to the events in 1985, 1986 and 1987. They then examine some of the events following the decision to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. That completes the resumé of the facts. Some of the facts are then examined more closely because of their relevance to the issues raised by some of the causes of action. The reasons then turn to examine the particular causes of action on which the plaintiff relies and deals with each of them.
In the early to mid 1970s, women's shelters began to be established throughout Australia. They were a response by women to the need to provide assistance to women and children who were the victims of domestic violence. The movement was well established by 1980. The shelters were initially self-funded though they also received small grants from government. Later, more substantial funding was provided by government. Shelters were first established in South Australia in 1974. In South Australia, they were funded by Commonwealth and State Governments through the Department of Community Welfare.
In the 1980s, the women's shelters had formed a committee called the "Women's Shelters Advisory Committee". It was commonly referred to as "WSAC" and has been mentioned earlier. The evidence does not show whether it had a constitution. It is apparent that WSAC comprised at least one representative from each shelter. It usually met once a month to discuss common problems. It was also an active lobby group for women's shelters. The plaintiff was a long serving member of WSAC.
At times there were divisions among the women's shelters. One divisive issue was a proposal in the latter part of 1984 to establish a service for migrant women to be called the "Migrant Women's Emergency Support Service ("MWESS"). The majority of shelters did not support the proposal, seeing it as a means by which funding might be diverted from them. At a meeting of WSAC on 21 June 1985, four shelters, Port Augusta, Mount Gambier, Whyalla and the Western Area Women's Shelter, were expelled from WSAC because of their support for the migrant women's service. These four shelters formed their own group called "Shelter Women's Action Group". The migrant women's service was established by February 1985 at Woodville. It continued to be a bone of contention between the shelters until about October 1986 when the Administrators of all shelters held a combined meeting to protest about funding issues. The plaintiff had been one of those who had been active in the opposition to MWESS and the expulsion of some shelters from WSAC and her opposition led to ill-feeling between her and Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Blake.
A women's shelter had existed at Christies Beach since 1975. Initially, it was a small voluntary organization. It later acquired premises from the South Australian Housing Trust ("the Housing Trust") and received government funding. On 8 November 1976 an association called "Women on the Move Inc" was incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1956 and it operated the Shelter. On 9 June 1982 the association changed its name to "Christies Beach Women's Shelter Inc.". For the purposes of this action, it is not necessary to refer to events at the Shelter prior to the appointment of the plaintiff as Administrator in 1981.
Although after June 1982 the Shelter's letterhead clearly stated that the association was called "Christies Beach Women Shelter", the Department rarely addressed it by its correct name. Even the letter dated 11 August 1987 from Dr Cornwall to the Shelter informing it that funding had been withdrawn did not use its correct name.
The Shelter was run by a management committee. The management committee employed the staff. The management committee was elected at each annual general meeting of the association. The constitution of the Shelter permitted up to six employees to be on the management committee but required the number of non-employees to exceed employees by at least one. The constitution required the management committee to meet at least every two months. Quite often, the management committee met monthly. Minutes of all annual general meetings of the Shelter, as well as meetings of the management committee, were kept. The officers of the incorporated association were the chairperson of the management committee, a secretary and treasurer, all of whom had to be members of the management committee. From 1985 to 1987, the secretary of the association was Ms Helen McSkimming. The constitution provided for an auditor to be appointed at each annual general meeting.
The plaintiff remained Administrator of the Shelter from her appointment in 1981 until 4 September 1987. From 26 November 1986 until 4 September 1987 she was on sick leave and received worker's compensation and, during that time, Ms McSkimming was acting Administrator.
In October or November 1981, a dispute arose between the plaintiff and some of the members of the management committee of the Shelter. The plaintiff resigned orally but then withdrew her resignation shortly thereafter. This led to friction with some members of the management committee who resigned on 21 November 1981.
In 1982 and 1983 the plaintiff studied for the degree of Bachelor of Social Administration at Flinders University. This was a two year full-time course. She undertook the course with the consent and approval of the management committee of the Shelter.
In September 1983, the Department wrote to the Christies Beach Shelter expressing concerns about certain issues and seeking a meeting. The Shelter and the Department met on 4 October. It was an important meeting. Later in these reasons I set out what occurred at the meeting.
In 1981 the Shelter occupied two dwellings at 1 and 3 Fletcher Drive, Christies Beach which it rented from the Housing Trust. Those premises became inadequate and unsuitable for the Shelter's activities. After negotiations with the plaintiff and other representatives of the Shelter, the Housing Trust agreed in November 1982 to provide two dwellings to the Shelter at 5 and 7 Damian Court, Christie Downs in place of the dwellings at Fletcher Drive. It was necessary for a number of matters to be arranged before the Shelter could occupy the new premises. Ultimately, it moved to the new premises in July 1983. The new premises were officially opened one year later on 18 July 1984 by The Honourable Justice Evatt, then Chief Justice of the Family Court.
The Shelter paid rent to the Housing Trust for those premises. Events associated with the move to Damian Court became an issue between the Department and the Shelter in October 1983. At that same time, two other issues arose between the Department and the Shelter concerning receipts for rent paid to the Housing Trust and study leave taken by the plaintiff. These three issues were discussed with the Department at the meeting on 4 October 1983 mentioned in the last paragraph but one. I will deal later with what occurred at the meeting.
The Shelter also rented from the Housing Trust three houses called "halfway houses". Those houses were used to provide accommodation for women after they had left the Shelter and while they were waiting for accommodation to be provided by the Housing Trust. The Shelter let the halfway houses from the Housing Trust and sublet them to the women.
As already mentioned, funding for women's shelters was provided by the Commonwealth and State Governments and the funds were distributed by the Department. The arrangements by which the two governments contributed varied from time to time.
Before the end of each financial year, each shelter was required to submit to the Department its request for funding for the next financial year. The requests were, in reality, ambit claims rather than a structured budget submission. Funds were allocated to each shelter by the Department. The funds allocated varied from shelter to shelter. There is no clear evidence on what basis the Department decided how much should be allocated to each shelter. A Departmental document states that in 1982 a formula was established. But that formula was not proved. It is not critical for the issues in this action. Some shelters also received financial support from other agencies. For example, Bramwell House received some support from the Salvation Army. Most shelters depended entirely on government grants. The Christies Beach Shelter depended wholly on government funding.
The shelters were required to submit to the Department at the end of each quarter a financial statement showing the expenditure in the previous three months. At the end of each financial year, each shelter was required to submit to the Department an audited statement of its income and expenditure for that year.
Some shelters spent within their annual grant. Some spent more. Those shelters where spending exceeded the allocation asked the Department for additional funding and, generally speaking, received it. The annual grant was paid in quarterly instalments. Shelters requiring additional funding usually made their requests for those funds before the end of each quarter in the form of an advance against the next quarter's funding.
The evidence suggests, and I find, that the Department did not prescribe the level of services that any one shelter should provide. Not even requests for additional funds to supplement spending by a shelter would cause the Department to examine the level of services provided at the shelter and consider whether the shelter should continue to provide all of those services. Without the additional funding, a shelter would be forced to close. In this context, it is relevant to note that there was no evidence of any service provided by the Christies Beach Shelter which ought not to have been provided nor is there evidence of any service it was not providing.
In 1981 and 1982 the Christies Beach Shelter essentially spent no more than its annual grant. In 1983 it began to spend more than had been allocated to it and that practice continued until July 1986. When it was known that it was about to run out of funds, one of its staff would contact the Department and seek additional funding. The additional funds would usually be provided. On some occasions, the Department would make some enquiries before paying the extra funding. This excess of income over expenditure was called a "deficit". The use of the word "deficit" implies a budget and an excess of spending over that budget. It is wrong to infer that there were set budgets. Instead, there were set grants as already explained. Requests for funding were made in the manner described. The term "deficit" meant no more than spending in excess of the amount allocated to a shelter.
Christies Beach was not the only shelter to incur a deficit. At 1 July 1983, six out of the eleven shelters then operating had deficits in excess of $2,000. They were:
Hope Haven $5,245
Port Augusta $4,452
North Adelaide $3,727
Christies Beach $3,702
Para Districts $3,480
Western Areas $2,679
At 1 July 1985, six shelters had substantial deficits. They were the same six shelters, save that Port Lincoln had replaced the Western Areas Shelter.
At 25 November 1986, five of the 13 shelters then operating had substantial deficits. The following table lists those shelters, the deficits, and their funding allocation for the year ending 30 June 1986, the year in which the deficit was mainly accumulated.
Bramwell House had a deficit of a negligible amount. Three shelters, Port Augusta, Christies Beach, and North Adelaide, had been in deficit for the years 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986. Hope Haven was in deficit in 1984, 1985 and at 30 June 1986 but its deficit had been cleared by 25 November 1986.
At least two of the shelters which had accumulated deficits in 1986 were politically vocal and active in seeking additional funding for shelters. They were the shelters at Christies Beach and North Adelaide. The philosophy at Christies Beach was to provide a range of support services to women with the object of enabling them to be more self-reliant. Assistance to women included advising in relation to litigation in the Family Court and in other courts, obtaining accommodation, obtaining legal advice, and obtaining medical advice. Christies Beach agitated for greater funding to provide these and other services. Christies Beach and other shelters were politically active and that political activity enabled them to secure more funding in the form of payments to cover deficits. In all the agitation by the Christies Beach Shelter, by other shelters, and by WSAC, the plaintiff was prominent.
As just mentioned, the Christies Beach Shelter was in deficit for the year ended 30 June 1984. Two financial officers of the Department visited the Shelter on 23 February 1984. They met Ms McSkimming and Ms Underdown. The meeting followed a request by the Shelter for additional funding. The only record of this meeting are two notes prepared by an officer of the Department. One note does not record the purpose of the meeting but it is clear from the note that it concerned financial issues and the reasons for the Shelter continuing to be in deficit. The last portion of the Departmental note includes the following:
"The Shelter realizes that any further advance of funds at this stage will only delay the deficit problem until the end of the year. We have the impression that whatever they need they just go out and purchase, with no consideration of the funds available. They raised the question of W.E.S.P. funds and were told that no funds would be available until a Cabinet decision in Canberra was made. It was pointed out that if W.E.S.P. funds become available they probably would be distributed by 30/6/84. ...
Following the meeting we were given a guided tour of the premises. This consisted of two three bedroom houses with new lounge suite in each. All bedrooms had matching new pine bunk beds (including trundle beds), with matching linen and curtains. Helen pointed out that bettor (sic) curtains were needed for the lounge rooms of both premises.
The meeting was held informally and was quite amicable."
A second note of the meeting dated 23 February stated that the purpose of the visit was "to clarify some aspects of (the) shelter's financial return as at 31 December 1983 so that the overall financial position is clearer, and to look at current and projected financial position in view of this Department's concern about the deficits". A memorandum prepared by Ms Heath and dated 2 March identified some causes of overspending. It recommended payment of some expenses but excluded capital expenditure.
Another visit to the Shelter was made by two officers of the Finance Section of the Department on 13 March 1985. Ms Heath had a large part in organising the visit. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the Shelter's financial position. There were two causes for the visit. The first was that accusations had been made to the Department regarding financial mismanagement. As the Departmental note of this visit records "this information cannot be acted upon as the persons do not wish to make formal complaints". The second reason was that the Shelter had recently requested an advance of $10,000 because it had used all its funds. The Departmental note commented on the visit as follows:
"The visit did not reveal any major reasons for the shelter's current financial problems. The shelter staff stated that the problem is simply that this Department does not give them sufficient funding to cover their expenses. (The total allocation for 1984/85 is $133,350.) There were some concerns regarding the number of staff paid which were not shown on the wages schedule submitted to the Department and also the fact that no entries had been made in the shelter's cash-book for March. No attempt was made to conduct a detailed audit of the shelter's books.
Although there are still some concerns regarding the financial administration of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter, their current funding situation still needs to be addressed. The fact remains, however, that there is only $33,300 (i.e. 1/4) of the 84/85 allocation remaining and any advance will have to come from this. Ms. Helen McSkimming from the shelter is expecting to collect a $10,000 cheque from the Department today (Wednesday)."
The Department decided to advance the $10,000 requested by the Shelter.
As the Review Committee stated in the Report, the Department's supervision of shelter expenditure could have been more appropriate and the Department's practice of paying advances on top of the quarterly grants contributed to the practice of deficits being incurred. In about May 1985 the Auditor-General conducted a review of the methods employed by the Department to control the financial operations of women's shelters. The Auditor-General reported to the Department by letter dated 5 June 1985. He noted that the Department had failed to exercise sufficient financial control and supervision. He recommended a greater degree of monitoring of financial expenditure by shelters. The letter reads:
"A review of the methods employed by the Department for Community Welfare to control the financial operations of Womens' (sic) Shelters was conducted recently.
The objectives of the review were to determine whether -
- all funds were distributed to shelters in accordance with approvals and were properly brought to account;
- expenditure of those funds was adequately monitored by the Department as being responsible and in accordance with approved grant conditions.
The review revealed that although funds are properly distributed and debited, inadequate control is exercised by the Department over the expenditure of those funds by shelters.
Factors which led to this conclusion are as follows:-
: quarterly financial returns submitted by shelters are not all forwarded promptly or analysed by the Department to ensure that funds are spent responsibly and in accordance with approved purposes;
: two out of six shelters examined were in a very poor financial position as at 31 March and could expect to be $19 000 and $20 000 in deficit by 30 June. The remainder could expect to achieve as near as practical a balanced result.
: although action was taken by the Department in relation to the two shelters mentioned (Port Augusta and Christies Beach), it came far too late to allow financial recovery within the 1984/85 funds allocation;
: some shelters are using funds to purchase major capital items in contravention of grant conditions.
In summary, the Department has failed to exercise financial control on a continuous basis which has contributed to -
: financial deterioration in two shelters to an unacceptable level;
: expenditure of some money on items outside the scope of the grant conditions;
: the problem of either financing deficits at 30 June or carrying them into 1985/86 and aggravating financial viability in that year.
As a result of the review, it is recommended that -
: the Department take immediate steps to identify shelters with financial problems and provide the advice and assistance necessary to achieve financial viability;
: consideration be given to the financing of deficits which will exist in some shelters as at 30 June 1985;
: a system of continuous financial monitoring be implemented to ensure that funds supplied to shelters are expended in a responsible manner and only for approved purposes.
The matters referred to above have been discussed and agreed with the Acting Senior Project Officer and the Finance Officer and your comments would be appreciated."
It is not my purpose to be critical of the Department or its officers. I refer to these facts only to explain the funding issues which form a background to the events leading to the Report and its recommendations. The Department was faced with some women's shelters, including Christies Beach, who took a broad view of their role and who, through their political activities, secured extra funding through payments of deficits. The political activity continued until July 1987. It continued notwithstanding the introduction of the SAAP Program to which I now turn. The introduction of the SAAP Program led to a great deal of political agitation by women's shelters. I will examine that after describing the SAAP Program.
Late in 1984 the governments of the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories agreed new funding arrangements for women's shelters and some other forms of welfare assistance to commence on 1 January 1985. It was to be called the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program ("SAAP"). It was conveniently, if tautologically, called the "SAAP Program". The Commonwealth Government and the relevant State or the Northern Territory jointly provided the funding for the SAAP Program. The position in relation to the Australian Capital Territory was not proved and is not relevant to the issues in this action.
The SAAP Program was authorised by the Supported Accommodation Assistance Act, 1995 (Cth) ("the SAAP Act") which came into operation on 15 May 1985. That Act authorised the Commonwealth Government, first, to make an agreement with each of the States and the Northern Territory in the form prescribed in the schedule to that Act by which the SAAP Program was established and, secondly, to fund the program. The agreement was executed by the Commonwealth and the State of South Australia. I will call it "the SAAP Agreement". The operation of the agreement was retrospective to 1 January 1985 so that it was possible for funding of the program to begin on 1 January 1985.
The stated aim of the SAAP Program, as identified in the SAAP Agreement, was to provide a range of supported accommodation and related support services to assist men, women, young people and their dependants, who were either permanently homeless or temporarily homeless as a result of crisis, and who needed such assistance to move towards independent living where possible and appropriate. The program was to be sensitive to a number of problems including domestic violence. The program envisaged provision of accommodation and related support services through such means as refuges, hostels, halfway houses and day centres. It was intended to encourage self-help. The program was established to assist three groups in the community through three separate sub-programs. They were:
(1) Youth Supported Accommodation Program which was intended to provide supported accommodation and related support services to young people who were homeless;
(2) Women's Emergency Services Program (sometimes called either "WESP" or "Women's SAAP"), which was intended to provide supported accommodation and related support services for women and women with dependant children escaping from intolerable domestic circumstances or other crisis situations; and
(3) General Supported Accommodation Program which was intended to provide supported accommodation and related support services for homeless men, women and their dependants who were permanently homeless or who were temporarily homeless as a result of crisis.
Funding was to be provided by annual grants which in South Australia were administered by the Department. The Commonwealth Minister was invested with a discretion as to the amount to be granted to each State and the grant could be made on such terms and conditions as were specified in the SAAP Agreement: s 5(1) and s 5(2) of the SAAP Act. Those terms and conditions were expressed in the SAAP Agreement and, in particular, in cl 8 which, as will be seen, provided for guidelines to be established for the administration of the program.
The administration of the program was in the hands of the States which, by cl 8(9) of the SAAP Agreement, were given "maximum autonomy and flexibility" in undertaking that administration consistently with the SAAP Agreement and guidelines. The guidelines expressly stated that one of the principles of the SAAP program was joint decision-making between the relevant governments. The guidelines, therefore, listed a number of decisions which had to be made jointly by Commonwealth and State or Territory Governments. A decision not to continue to provide funding to a shelter or to withdraw funding had to be made jointly by the relevant Commonwealth Minister and the relevant State or Territory Minister: see cl 8 of the SAAP Agreement.
Clause 8(7) of the agreement provided for a joint review of the program in each State. It is in these terms:
"The Commonwealth and each State shall jointly review the State's program at such times and in such manner as are agreed upon by the Commonwealth Minister and the State Minister."
Clause 8(7) is to be compared with cl 9 which provided:
"The Commonwealth and the States shall commence a joint evaluation of the States' programs not later than 30 June 1987."
One of the issues in this action was whether the Review Committee was acting pursuant to cl 8(7), cl 9, or some other authority. I will return to that issue.
The administration of the SAAP Program was effected through the Department. In addition, there were advisory committees. The first was the Program Advisory Committee, which gave general advice on policy and the allocation of funding. The plaintiff and Ms Joan Balendran, the Administrator of the North Adelaide Shelter, were both members of that committee. In addition, there were three committees which reported to the Program Advisory Committee. Those committees represented each arm of the SAAP Program. Thus, there was a Youth SAAP Advisory Committee, a Women's SAAP Advisory Committee, and a General SAAP Advisory Committee. These committees were charged with the task of making recommendations to the Program Advisory Committee on policy and funding issues for their respective programs. Each shelter had a representative on the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee and the plaintiff represented the Christies Beach Shelter.
The guidelines pursuant to the SAAP Agreement were prepared and published. The SAAP Agreement required the guidelines to be published in the Commonwealth Gazette. Mr Stanley, who appeared for the Commonwealth defendants, drew attention to the fact that there was no proof of publication in the Gazette. Even if they were not published in that way, the plain fact is that both the Commonwealth and State expected compliance with them. Nothing turns on the fact that they may not have been published in the Gazette. It is necessary to note only some provisions of the guidelines.
As already mentioned, the guidelines required that a number of decisions be made jointly. Thus, decisions to approve new services, to increase or reduce funding significantly to a service, or to withdraw funding from a service had to be made jointly by the relevant Commonwealth and State Ministers. Decisions as to administration had to be made by the State Minister: see cl 9 of the guidelines. As will be seen, the condition requiring that a decision to withdraw funding should be a joint decision was the reason why Dr Cornwall had to consult with Senator Ryan concerning the decision to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter.
Clause 10 of the guidelines spelled out the conditions of a grant of funds under the SAAP Program. They were:
"• funds are to be used only for the purposes for which they have been approved;
• access is to be provided to Commonwealth-State/Territory officers. Such access is to be in consultation with the particular service provider and in accordance with procedures developed by the relevant advisory process and agreed by the State and Commonwealth (these procedures might include nominating particular officers and might be detailed in sub-program guidelines);
• provision of regular data to contribute to the development of needs-based service provision and to evaluation of projects and sub-programs. This data is to be the subject of consultation with service providers;
• provision of appropriate audited financial statements on at least an annual basis;
• provision of other information necessary for the effective administration of the program as requested by the Commonwealth and/or States/Territories following consultation with service providers. Such requests would not include confidential information which may identify clients/residents."
The guidelines contemplated that each State or Territory might issue additional guidelines. The Department published its own guidelines called "Administrative Guidelines". For present purposes, it is sufficient to note the effect of some provisions in paragraph 2 of those guidelines.
1. The SAAP Program provided a salary grant at a standard level. Payment of a salary below the standard required approval of the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee. There was no provision as to payment above the standard level. Services had to keep details of time worked, salary payments and deductions: para 2(a).
Operating costs should not exceed the amount of the annual grant. Where this cannot be achieved, cost restraints should be established: para 2(b).
Specific purchase grants are generally paid for equipment or for establishment grants: para 2(c).
4. Financial Undertaking, payments and financial statements
(i) Recurrent grants are conditional upon receipt of the Financial Undertaking. It should be signed by an authorised Management Committee office holder.
(ii) Payment for the first quarter is normally made in the first week of July of each year and the remaining quarterly payments are made during the week prior to the commencement of each quarter.
(iii) A quarterly financial return is required.
(iv) An audited financial statement is required annually: para 2(d).
Generally speaking, the guidelines accorded with the administrative practice in past years. What was new was the requirement for shelters to sign a financial undertaking. That requirement was consistent with cl 11(c) of the SAAP Agreement. It was to become a bone of contention between the shelters and the Department.
The proposal to introduce the SAAP Program was known to shelters in late 1984. Its introduction was opposed by most shelters who perceived that it might lead to a reduction in funding. They were concerned that they might lose additional funding because an umbrella program with three objectives might dissipate funds from the women's sub-program. The shelters also saw the SAAP Program as shifting the emphasis from shelters as places providing assistance to women who had suffered domestic violence by the provision of accommodation and services to enable them to resume their place in the community, to one merely providing accommodation for women who were homeless for whatever cause. They believed that the services would be cut and that the shelter movement was under threat because funds would be diverted to other programs. Opposition to SAAP was not confined to South Australia but existed also in other States. The shelter movement maintained a national profile and there was communication between shelters in different States.
Notwithstanding the introduction of the SAAP Program, some shelters continued to be in deficit and, in particular, the four shelters already named, Para Districts, North Adelaide, Port Augusta, and Christies Beach. On 14 November 1985 Ms Vardon, the Chief Executive Officer of the Department, went to Canberra to seek funds to pay out the deficits. This meeting appears to have been a forerunner to arrangements between the Department and the Commonwealth for payment of deficits which were put in place in June and July 1986 to which reference will be made shortly. Political agitation for increased funding to all shelters continued.
In about the middle of 1985, Dr Cornwall became Minister of Community Welfare. He held the dual portfolios of Minister of Health and of Community Welfare. As Minister of Community Welfare he was confronted with the issues concerning funding for shelters and the fact that some shelters were continuing to incur deficits and seeking additional funding. I also find that he became aware of the political activity of the plaintiff and others in the women's shelter movement. It is unnecessary to descend to details. It is sufficient to note that by May 1986 issues were coming to a head.
From May 1986 to October 1986 a series of events occurred which culminated, on 22 October 1986, with Dr Cornwall's decision to appoint the Review Committee. One important feature of the events of that period concerns the requirement that shelters execute the financial undertaking required by the SAAP Program. That, and other issues, caused the women's shelter movement to be particularly political, vocal and active.
In May 1986, about half of the shelters were in deficit. At that time, Rosemary Wighton sent a minute to Dr Cornwall in which she proposed that savings achieved in other areas be applied to fund the deficits, but pointed out that the Commonwealth Minister, Senator Grimes, would have to approve the proposal. She also informed Dr Cornwall that there was no guarantee that shelters would agree to sign the financial undertaking and that shelters were still unhappy with the level of funding and salary levels under the SAAP Program. An internal departmental memorandum dated 2 June 1986 shows that, by then, Cabinet had agreed to fund the deficits subject to certain provisos, one of which was that no advances over and above payments of quarterly grants should be made. On 6 June 1986 Dr Cornwall wrote to Senator Grimes seeking his approval to a joint decision to discharge the deficits of the shelters. The letter identified the causes of the deficits.
"It has been established, however, that the deficits from January 1 1985, have been caused by factors such as:
- Shelter management committees under-estimating operating costs,
- Long Service Leave payments not previously provided for,
- increased level of service or activity in the Shelters, thereby increasing operating costs,
- workers paid on the highest salary increment whereas salary grants only provide for the lowest increments,
- Irene Shelter relocating premises at an estimated cost of $20,000,
- unexpected costs, for example, replacement of motor vehicles.
The elimination of the deficits will be a once-only arrangement and will be contingent upon the shelters signing an appropriate undertaking to operate within available funds."
The total amount of the deficits at all shelters was estimated to be $88,700 as at 30 June 1986. Dr Cornwall proposed that the arrangement to pay deficits should occur once only and that payment of the deficit of a shelter should be conditional upon the shelter signing the undertaking to operate within its grant. At 30 June 1986 eight of the 13 shelters in South Australia were in deficit. Those eight shelters included Christies Beach. In June 1986, a number of shelters, including Christies Beach and Irene Shelter, were paid advances of the next quarter's funding to enable them to continue to operate.
By letter dated 2 July, Senator Grimes agreed to Dr Cornwall's proposal to pay out the deficits. The relevant part of the letter was in these terms:
"In your letter of 6 June 1986 you have sought my joint approval to the re-allocation of 'savings' in HPSG to eliminate deficits accrued by Women's Shelters. While I have given my approval to the use of funds for this purpose I am disturbed that SAAP funded services have been allowed to operate in a manner that has resulted in these deficits accruing.
- the level of approval being to a maximum of $88,700 (with the actual level being advised to me once it is known),
- the administrative and accounting practices of the services involved being jointly reviewed by officers of our departments,
- the services involved and all SAAP services signing agreements that include a requirement that they operate within available funds.
In respect of the final condition outlined above I assume that this would simply require modification of the existing agreement required by the guidelines between your department and service providers." (Original emphasis).
Dr Cornwall agreed with these terms. Thus, the requirement that shelters sign the financial undertaking was agreed by both Commonwealth and State Governments. The third of those conditions is relevant to the status of the Review Committee, an issue which is examined later in these reasons.
The financial undertaking was to be an agreement between the Department and each named service under the SAAP Program. Thus, in the case of the women's shelters, there was to be an agreement between the Department and each shelter. The original version of the undertaking listed a series of conditions on which funding to shelters was to be provided. Some of the conditions were:
• Clause 1 - That the Department was to decide whether to provide funding in the financial year ending 30 June 1987 and was to have absolute discretion whether to fund a shelter in ensuing years.
• Clause 3 - Money granted to a shelter for a specific approved purpose was only to be spent for that approved purpose provided that in any one financial year up to $1,000 could be transferred from one approved purpose to another.
• Clause 4 - That the shelter would comply with Clause 10 of the SAAP Guidelines. (The terms of Clause 10 are set out above.)
• Clause 7 - That the shelter would advise any change in its aims or objectives.
• Clause 10 - The undertaking would be determined on any breach and all monies were to be repaid to the Department.
Obviously, the terms rigorously bound shelters to adhere to the grant paid and not to incur a deficit.
Condition 3 was to be the source of a good deal of dissension by the shelters. It was in these terms:
"Unless the Department otherwise agrees, the moneys given to the Organisation by the Department under clause 1 hereof shall, if provided for a specific purpose, only be expended by the Organisation for that specific purpose (e.g. for salaries or for the salary of a particular person), or, if not provided for a specified purpose, shall only be expended by the Organisation for the purposes specified in clause 7 of the Commonwealth-State/Territory Guidelines for S.A.A.P., provided that the organisation shall be entitled, without applying to the Department for approval, to transfer funds from one specific purpose to another approved specific purpose to a maximum of $1,000 in any one financial year so long as such transfer does not result in expenditure exceeding the total funds provided by the Department."
At least one shelter (Para Districts) signed the undertaking deleting the proviso. The significance of the deletion did not seem to be appreciated by either the shelter or the Department. Plainly, the deletion of the proviso meant that a shelter was more strictly bound than if the proviso had been included, that is to say, the shelter had no capacity at all to transfer any funds from one approved purpose to another. I mention this because, when it ultimately came to sign the undertaking on 24 July 1987, the Christies Beach Shelter also deleted the proviso. As will be seen, the Department attempted to place some reliance on that fact. The deletion of the proviso may have been perceived by shelters as a symbol of defiance. However, the truth was that it was an empty defiance since a shelter which signed the undertaking and deleted the proviso was more strictly bound to adhere to its grant.
From July to October 1986, there was a good deal of debate, between the shelters on the one hand and the Department and Dr Cornwall on the other, concerning the obligation of the shelters to sign the undertaking. Broadly speaking, there were two main issues. The first concerned the fact that shelters were being required to sign such a document. Some saw this obligation as a barrier to gaining increased funding for shelters. Shelters were seeking additional funding to pay higher salaries to staff and to meet other costs of labour such as long service leave, as well as seeking additional funding for operating costs. They also sought funding for purchase of capital items. In the months July to October 1986, the other major source of contention was the requirement in the undertaking limiting the amount which could be transferred from one approved purpose to another. The following paragraphs note the course of events between the shelters and Government.
On 15 September, some shelters agreed to an amended form of the undertaking. The amended form of the undertaking was called "the Financial Agreement" or "the Agreement". Save for amendments to cls 3 and 10, the amendments were of no great moment. They were:
1. Clause 3 was amended to allow $1,000 per quarter to be transferred from one line to another. This enabled up to $4,000 per annum to be transferred in this way.
2. A sentence was added at the end of cl 3 in these terms:
"The Department undertakes that it will enter into negotiations with the Organisation if the Organisation advises the Department that it seeks the Department's approval under this clause."
This was no doubt included to assure the shelters that the Department would listen to requests to transfer more than $1,000 per quarter from one line to another.
3. Clause 8 was amended but it is not necessary to stay with that amendment.
4. Clause 10 was amended by inserting the words "subject to the rules of natural justice". Thus, the Department could not determine the Agreement for breach without giving the shelters an opportunity of being heard.
There were other minor amendments, but it is unnecessary to refer to them.
However, notwithstanding the amendments, some shelters still refused to sign. Others signed either the undertaking or the Financial Agreement. Some signed more quickly than others. The Shelter at Para Districts signed the undertaking deleting the proviso and saying that it had signed the undertaking under duress. Others also complained that they had signed either the undertaking or the Financial Agreement under duress. The failure of some shelters to sign either the undertaking or the Financial Agreement was stated by Dr Cornwall to be one reason for appointing the Review Committee. Ultimately, the shelters at North Adelaide and Christies Beach were the only shelters that refused to sign either document and they both held out until July 1987.
The narrative which follows sets out some of the detail of the opposition to the signing of either the undertaking or the Financial Agreement between July and October 1986 and notes the redrafting of the Agreement. It shows the level of political activity before the Review was announced and the coverage of that activity in the press. It shows that a number of shelters were opposed to the undertaking and the Financial Agreement. It demonstrates issues between shelters and Government. The plaintiff was actively and in a public manner involved in this political activity along with others such as Ms Joan Balendran, the Administrator of the North Adelaide Shelter.
At its meeting on 3 July 1986, the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee discussed deficits and the signing of the financial undertaking. It was noted that, while the program did not fund the acquisition of capital items such as washing machines, shelters would continue to be in deficit. The meeting expressed dissatisfaction with the terms of the proposed undertaking.
In a minute dated 21 July to Dr Cornwall, Ms Wighton identified issues concerning the undertaking which had been raised by the shelters. They were
(1) that the salary levels were too low, an issue which she saw as being essential when addressing the issue of deficits; and
(2) shelters sought to be able to move funds from one line in their budget to another to a maximum of $5,000. The Department was prepared to allow $1,000 only.
Ms Wighton recommended that the issue be addressed by salaries being funded at CO5 level, a level less than that which was sought by shelters. Dr Cornwall approved the minute. The Department sought to implement Ms Wighton's recommendations, as approved by Dr Cornwall, in a letter to the shelters dated 28 July 1986. The letter restated that deficits would be funded only if the undertaking was signed. It stated that the limit on the amount which would be transferred from one line to another would be $1,000 and not $5,000 as sought by the shelters. The letter recognised the problem of salaries but suggested that they be paid at CO5 level, adding that the Department believed that an independent assessment of salaries was required if higher salaries were to be paid and recommending that shelters seek an industrial award. The letter reiterated the conditions imposed by Senator Grimes for the payment of deficits, namely,
- that services sign an agreement to operate within available funds.
The shelters were not satisfied with the Department's proposal and continued their opposition to signing the undertaking.
By this time, the shelters were receiving legal advice from Ms Ann McLean on the terms of the undertaking. At a meeting on 11 August, the shelters reaffirmed their opposition to signing the undertaking. By a minute dated 15 August, Mr Bicknell informed Dr Cornwall of that fact. He predicted that the matter would come to a head because two shelters, Para Districts and North Adelaide, had asked for advances against their funding for the next quarter. They sought $20,000 and $15,000 respectively. In that minute, Mr Bicknell warned Dr Cornwall of a "confrontation" with those two shelters in the following week and suggested that the shelters would be supported by other shelters.
On 16 August, Dr Cornwall sent a minute to the Premier informing him of the refusal of the shelters to sign the undertaking. He said that he had instructed the Department to make no further payment to any shelter until the undertaking had been signed. He informed the Premier of the fact that two shelters (obviously Para Districts and North Adelaide) were seeking advances and alerted him to the fact that political action was a possibility if the shelters were not paid.
It seems that the issues being raised by the shelters were not falling on deaf ears. On 18 August 1986, Mr Bicknell wrote to the Department of Community Services in Canberra requesting funding for purchases of minor items of a capital nature, such as vehicles, refrigerators and washing machines. The Commonwealth Department replied in a somewhat non-committal manner in September 1986.
On 18 August, Ms Vardon added her voice on the question of signing the undertaking in a minute to Dr Cornwall. She recited the history leading to the accumulation of deficits and reminded Dr Cornwall that the Commonwealth had agreed to pay $88,700 to off-set deficits of shelters as at 30 June 1986 on condition that the undertaking was signed by the shelters. In effect, she reiterated most of Mr Bicknell's minute of 15 August.
On 18 August, the Department sent a letter signed by Mr Bicknell to all shelters requiring the undertaking to be signed. This was in response to Dr Cornwall's direction referred to in the minute to the Premier. In an attempt to compel the shelters to sign the undertaking, the Department stated that no further funding would be made available until the undertaking had been signed. The relevant parts of the letter were in these terms:
"This note is to remind you that no further advances or payments will be made to Shelters until the Financial Undertaking has been signed.
The Minister believes that Shelters have had adequate notification and consultation concerning the Undertaking and that the signing of this Undertaking is a reasonable request in regards to the expenditure of public money.
I remind you that $88 700 has been made available by SAAP to fund Shelter deficits to enable the Shelters to continue on a firm financial footing for the remainder of the 1986/87 financial year. The payment of this money is, however, dependent on the signing of the Financial Undertaking."
As will be seen in a subsequent letter dated 15 September 1986, the Department did not adhere to the condition in the first paragraph. Funding continued to be provided to those shelters which had not signed the undertaking. There was a difference between what was being said by the Department and what was being done.
On 20 August, the Para Districts Shelter signed the undertaking but only after it had deleted the contentious proviso. In its letter to the Department dated 21 August which enclosed the undertaking, the shelter said that it had signed the agreement "under duress". It is clear that the document was signed by the shelter in order to avoid having to close its doors. The shelter expressed its concern as to the manner in which the Department demanded the signing of the undertaking. Mr Bicknell's evidence, which I accept, was that the Department accepted the document notwithstanding the deletion of the proviso because it was anxious to fund deficits. There was a degree of inconsistency in the manner in which the Department accepted the deletion of the proviso from some shelters but not, as will be seen, from Christies Beach in July 1987.
On 24 August, Dr Cornwall issued a press release which became the subject of a report on the front page of The Advertiser on 25 August under the heading "Women's Shelters $88,700 in red as Govt withholds funding". The article referred to the fact that the shelters were required to sign the undertaking before receiving further funding. Dr Cornwall was quoted as stating that shelters had to be accountable for their expenditure and that shelters would not receive their next allocation of funds until they had signed the undertaking. He also announced that additional funding was being provided to shelters, the allocation being $6.73m. for the next financial year compared with about $5m. in the year just past. The press article quoted Ms Balendran as stating that the government was withholding advances until shelters signed the undertakings which have, she said, "many problems in them".
On 25 August, the same day as the article appeared in The Advertiser, representatives of shelters met Mr Bicknell and Mr B Selway, who was then a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor's Office. The purpose of the meeting was to negotiate the terms of the undertaking. In a minute dated 26 August and prepared by Mr Bicknell, Ms Vardon reported to Dr Cornwall that the main objection at the meeting was to the clause limiting the amount which could be transferred from one line to another to $1,000. She said that another meeting was being arranged and that she believed that most shelters were ready to sign the Agreement. She reported that some shelters objected to signing under duress. She also noted that Dr Cornwall had agreed to increase the amount which could be transferred from one line to another from $1,000 to $3,000 and that, pending negotiations on the terms of the Agreement, shelters in urgent financial difficulties would receive fortnightly payments. As will be seen, North Adelaide and Christies Beach were to receive funding by continued fortnightly payments until August 1987.
The article in The Advertiser on 25 August led to members of the Legislative Council asking Dr Cornwall questions in the House on 26, 27 and 29 August. The questions and answers prompted other exchanges between members which, at times, became unruly. On 26 August, Dr Cornwall repeated his view that shelters should be accountable and the reasons for requiring shelters to sign the Agreement. He also announced that he had instructed the Department to increase the amount which could be transferred in any one year from operating costs to salaries to $3,000. He informed the Council that shelters were to receive funding on a fortnightly basis. I mention the events in the Parliament as a matter of narrative only.
On 27 August 1986, The Advertiser published an article concerning funding of women's shelters under the heading "Clouds over shelter funding". It had been written by Mr Mike McEwen. The sub-heading to the article read:
"An SA Government ultimatum on funding for women's shelters has opened up old wounds on the issue".
The article included comments by Ms J Balendran, the Administrator of the North Adelaide Shelter, by the plaintiff, by Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon. After quoting Ms Balendran's comments on the requirement that the shelters sign the Agreement, the article continued:
"Others are less circumspect, describing the proposed undertaking as 'odious', 'offensive' and 'this little Hitler's decree' ".
Later, the article quoted the plaintiff at length.
"Dawn Rowan, a spokeswoman for the Christies Beach women's shelter, is outspoken on the 'imposition of this odious undertaking document' by a government she sees as unsupportive and unappreciative of the shelter workers' efforts.
'Shelters are run on a shoestring budget and their work is possible only because of the dedication of staff willing to work 80 hours of unpaid overtime under conditions of extreme stress.
'It is offensive of the Government to be imposing even more stress and difficulty on us instead of doing something to help us,' she says.
'Christies Beach runs a service with 5.5 people, 24 hours a day, which would require 13 workers under normal Public Service conditions.
'On 1984 figures it cost $250 to keep one person for one day in a public hospital, $180 for the same person in government residential care and $10 to keep one person for one night in a women's shelter.
'Government budget advisers have been out here to try to give us financial guidelines and they go away scratching their heads and asking how we do it.
'Well, how we and the other shelters do it is by working long, unpaid hours of dangerous, stressful work, under conditions that most people would find debilitating.
'And the Government has the gall to be imposing a carelessly conceived, oppressive document on us to stop us running up small deficits. In effect, they are saying stick to the inadequate budget we are giving you, or close down for part of the year.
'Their claims about funding increases are wrong. We are not 36 p.c. better off over the past two years, as Dr Cornwall claims, we are in fact 40 p.c. worse off than we were five years ago.'
Dawn Rowan's anger is reflected in other shelters, where the Government's attempt to put a responsible face on its welfare expenditure is biting into workers' own salaries."
The publication of this article led to more questioning of Dr Cornwall in the Legislative Council on 27 August. In the course of one answer, Dr Cornwall referred to the comments of the plaintiff as published in the article in The Advertiser. His answer began with these words:
"That was a very long preamble before we got to the point: we went through Mike McEwen's feature and eventually arrived at Hope Haven. I make it very clear that I agree with Sue Vardon. On all the evidence available to me, I think the quality of the care, support and counselling in women's shelters in South Australia is the best in the country. That has never been in contention. Overall, I repeat that the quality of care, counselling and support in womens shelters in South Australia is very good, and I want that clearly on the record.
Secondly, the Hon. Ms Laidlaw referred to a statement by Dawn Rowan, who claimed that the shelters were 40 per cent worse off now than they were five years ago. I might say that Ms Rowan was one of the few people, relatively, who were named in the article. In the style of this particular journalist, there were very many unnamed sources. I was described by unnamed sources as being a number of things, including a 'little Hitler'. That is just not what responsible journalism is about."
"Dawn Rowan's statement is wrong and it is untrue - and there is an end to it. I really do not know why Ms Rowan chooses to use these tactics. Her statement is patently wrong. I do not like having to say that in this Parliament or anywhere else, but I am perfectly happy to repeat it outside the Parliament. What Ms Rowan said with regard to funding of womens shelters in this State is wrong."
He then went on to elaborate upon the answer. In his answer he also referred to action taken by the Department in relation to the Hope Haven Women's Shelter adding:
"I would not want anyone to think that the concerns that are specifically about Hope Haven apply across the board. I cannot repeat too often that they do not. I repeat yet again that I agree completely with Sue Vardon that the general standards of accommodation, particularly in relation to care, support and counselling in South Australian women's shelters are the best in the country."
He finished a long answer by returning to the issue of accountability of shelters saying:
"... quite obviously, the Federal Government as well as the State Government is insisting on some formal lines of accountability. I believe that is perfectly respectable and responsible. I think it is most regrettable, knowing that we will ultimately arrive at agreement, that a small but significant number of women who had to fight for every penny that they got when the sheltered programs were less well established still seem to consider it necessary to create and get involved in some sort of public dog fight."
In answer to questions in the Council on 29 August, Dr Cornwall repeated his view that shelters had to be accountable for their spending. Again, I mention these matters as narrative only and draw no inference. In the ensuing narrative there are a number of references to what was said in the Parliament. They are all included only as narrative. I have drawn no inferences from them.
On 29 August, Dr Cornwall met representatives from the women's shelters to discuss issues relating to the Migrant Women's Shelter. The representatives from women's shelters included the plaintiff and Ms Balendran. There is no evidence that anything concerning the execution of the Agreement occurred at that meeting.
On 11 September, representatives of the Department of Community Welfare met representatives of the shelters to negotiate the terms of the Agreement. Henceforth, it was called "the Agreement" or "the Financial Agreement" but was occasionally still referred to as "the undertaking", not only by shelters but also by Departmental officers. The plaintiff did not attend the meeting. The representatives of the shelters included their legal adviser, Ms McLean. The Department was represented by Mr Bicknell, Ms Meredyth Taylor and Mr Selway. The meeting agreed the form of the Financial Agreement. The cap on the amount which could be transferred without approval was $1,000 per quarter, effectively $4,000 per annum. Shelters were permitted to apply for approval for larger amounts to be transferred. The Department reported the outcome of the meeting to Dr Cornwall on 16 September. By letter dated 15 September, the Department sent the Financial Agreement to the shelters for execution. The letter included the following paragraph:
"The final document should be signed as soon as possible, or at the latest by 26th September, and returned to Rod Foran (SAAP Finance Officer) so that second quarter payments can be made. This will also mean that deficit payments can be allocated to individual shelters."
Funding was provided to shelters who signed the Financial Agreement. Despite the fact that the Financial Agreement had been resolved at a meeting on 11 September, some shelters, including Christies Beach and North Adelaide, were still not prepared to sign it. North Adelaide's refusal to sign continued notwithstanding that Ms Balendran, the Administrator of that shelter, had been present at the meeting on 11 September.
On 18 September, Dr Cornwall, in answer to a question in the Legislative Council, said that an amended Agreement had been prepared and that all differences had been resolved.
Another issue which, to use Mr Bicknell's words, exacerbated a difficult situation in August to October 1986 concerned what were called SAAP expansion funds and Dr Cornwall's desire to fund a new shelter called "Judith House" for sexually abused young women. Expansion funds were intended both to assist expansion in existing shelters and to provide new services in areas of high need. Judith House was perceived by Dr Cornwall as a service in an area of high need. On 25 September 1986, a meeting of the Program Advisory Committee considered how the expansion fund of $698,000 for the year ending 30 June 1987 should be allocated among the three SAAP programs. The committee recommended the following allocation:
The committee was aware that Dr Cornwall intended to establish Judith House as a new shelter. The committee had earmarked $100,000 for that project. The women's shelter representative on the Program Advisory Committee had opposed the recommendation because it would leave only $76,000 to be divided between the thirteen shelters. Thus, of the total sum of $698,000, only 25 per cent was being provided to women's shelters and, of that, the greater part was allocated to the establishment of Judith House. Dr Cornwall was informed of these events including the opposition of the women's shelter representative in a minute recommending the proposals. He approved the recommendation the same day.
The decision of the Program Advisory Committee prompted a strong response from the women's shelters. It was voiced in a letter dated 30 September written to Dr Cornwall by Joan Balendran on behalf of all shelters. The letter protested that funding to women's shelters was being reduced, asserting that, when women's shelters joined SAAP, they received 47 per cent of the pool of funds but that had dropped to one-third and it was now being suggested that it should be reduced to 25 per cent. The letter also protested the diversion of funds to Judith House. The letter asked that one-third of the SAAP expansion funds remain for women's shelters.
The Departmental briefing note to Dr Cornwall informed him that, although women's shelters had originally received 40 per cent of the SAAP expansion funds, that did not imply a continuing commitment by SAAP to maintain their funding at that level.
It is clearly not necessary for the purposes of this action to determine whether either the shelters' demands or the response from Dr Cornwall and his Department were reasonable. It is sufficient to note that the women's shelters were actively agitating for increased funding and that they disagreed with Dr Cornwall's proposals. In addition, the issue of expansion funds was an issue contributing to what was, as Mr Bicknell described, and I find, quite a tense time in October 1986 so far as Dr Cornwall and women's shelters were concerned. I have identified two major issues causing controversy. There were others. It is not necessary for the purposes of this action to note them all. They all contributed to the tense times in October.
Some time earlier, the Christies Beach Women's Shelter had written to Dr Cornwall inviting him to attend their annual general meeting to be held on 20 October 1986. On 29 September, he declined the invitation because of other commitments. The invitation is relevant, not because Dr Cornwall declined it, but because it indicates the willingness of the Shelter to be visited even when issues were being vigorously debated with the Minister. The Shelter wanted to show the Minister the reality and difficulties in running a shelter.
Thus, at the beginning of October 1986, there were several issues concerning SAAP on which strong points of difference were being voiced between the shelters and Dr Cornwall. They included
• the fact that some women's shelters did not wish to be part of SAAP;
• the requirement that women's shelters should sign the undertaking which, by October, was being called the Financial Agreement;
• the perceived reduction in expansion funds for women's shelters; and
• the funding of the establishment of Judith House from the limited expansion funds.
The position deteriorated thereafter. All of these issues were, from time to time, being reported in The Advertiser and often on the front page as a lead story.
The issue of the allocation of SAAP expansion funds continued to be a point of contention between Dr Cornwall and shelters. On 2 October 1986, the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee met. Its membership included representatives of all women's shelters. The meeting directed its chairperson, Ms Judith Healy, to write to Dr Cornwall protesting the decision of the Program Advisory Committee, pointing out that it was contrary to a promise made by Dr Cornwall in the course of remarks in the Legislative Council on 27 August 1986 that about $200,000 would be available to shelters as expansion funds. The letter which was dated 7 October also protested against the proposal to establish Judith House using $100,000 of that sum of $176,000. Dr Cornwall's response was to restructure the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee to remove representatives of women's shelters. On 20 October 1986 he wrote to Senator Grimes seeking his concurrence in that decision. In that letter he asserted that the terms of reference of the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee were "unworkable and require change". He said that the Program Advisory Committee should no longer have the responsibility to make recommendations on the allocation of funds and an inter-departmental committee comprised of equal members of the State and Commonwealth Departments should undertake the process. The terms of reference for the sub-program committees would also be changed. In this way, shelter representatives were removed from the Program Advisory Committee and their numbers reduced on the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee. As will be noted shortly, Dr Cornwall went to Canberra on 21 October to meet Senator Grimes. I find that at that meeting they agreed to the restructuring of the committee. In a letter to Ms Healy dated 27 October, Dr Cornwall informed her of his decision to restructure the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee.
"I have decided that the Women's S.A.A.P. Advisory Committee should be restructured to the same format as the Youth and General S.A.A.P. Committees.
I have taken this decision in consideration of the fact that the Committee is clearly too large to be workable, and that meetings develop into bitter arguments.
Despite the significant increase in funds available to S.A.A.P. programmes over the last three years, the Women's Committee does not appear to have recognised the need for new services which is a significant component of the overall aims of S.A.A.P.
I thank you for the effort you have put into chairing the Committee."
The effect of the decision was to reduce the representation of women's shelters on the committee. That letter was written five days after Dr Cornwall had announced his decision to establish the Review Committee.
On 6 October, Dr Cornwall wrote to Senator Grimes with his proposals for the allocation of funds based on the Program Advisory Committee's decision on 25 September. Senator Grimes replied by letter received by Dr Cornwall on 16 October 1986. In that letter he expressed concern that the funding for Judith House had been accorded a high funding priority and that the funding was proposed to be taken from the allocation to women's SAAP and not from the Youth SAAP funding. He asked that the decision be reconsidered.
At some time in October, Dr Cornwall wrote to Senator Grimes responding to that letter. Dr Cornwall pressed the recommendation as to funding and the recommendation that Judith House be established and funded out of the women's SAAP funds. The tendered copy of the letter is undated. I find that there was an exchange of correspondence which resulted in Dr Cornwall going to Canberra on 21 October to confer with Senator Grimes on issues relating to the administration of the SAAP Program.
One further event in early October 1986 needs to be mentioned because it was to be a cause of further dispute with women's shelters. That event was the naming of Dr Cornwall as "Father of the Year" by the Lions Club of Adelaide.
On 17 October, a meeting of all shelters was held in Adelaide to discuss what the minutes called the "current funding crisis" and to plan strategies to deal with government. The meeting was not only attended by Administrators but, as well, by many staff. The strategies discussed involved a number of forms of political agitation. The meeting was chaired by the plaintiff. Only one shelter was not represented. It was Whyalla and Judith Blake, its Administrator, had sent an apology. It seems that by this time the split in WSAC had been repaired. Strategies to attract increased funding for shelters were discussed. One such strategy was that shelters should accumulate large deficits. The meeting was aware that Dr Cornwall had been named "Father of the Year" by the Adelaide Lions Club. The meeting resolved to call for the withdrawal of that award. Following the meeting, a letter was written seeking a meeting with Mr Bicknell and representatives of the State and Commonwealth Departments to discuss funding difficulties.
The meeting was reported on the front page of The Advertiser on the next day, 18 October. The article was headed "Call to drop Cornwall as father of the year". The article began:
"Representatives of SA's 12 women's and children's shelters want the Minister of Community Welfare, Dr Cornwall, dropped as SA Father of the Year because of 'his treatment of the needs of the State's battered and abused children'.
The call was made at a historic meeting of the shelter representatives in Adelaide yesterday."
The article was accompanied by photographs of the plaintiff and Ms Dawn McMahon who had founded the first women's shelter in South Australia. The article included remarks made by Ms Balendran and the plaintiff. The plaintiff's remarks were reported in this way:
"The Administrator of the Christies Beach women's and children's shelter, Ms Dawn Rowan, challenged Dr Cornwall's statement in Parliament on October 9 that 'women's shelters are now relatively well-established'.
'We urge Dr Cornwall to spend 24 hours in one of SA's women's shelters to see just how established we are - we struggle the whole time,' she said."
Ms Balendran was reported as having said that, by cutting funds to shelters, the Minister "was neglecting thousands of children, who were helped by SA women's and children's shelters". The prominence given in this article to the call for the withdrawal of the nomination of Dr Cornwall as Father of the Year angered him. I do not rely on the remarks he made in the Legislative Council four days later to which I shall refer in a moment. The evidence shows that his annoyance was apparent to some officers in the Department, in particular, Mr Bicknell. His evidence in this trial showed that it still angers him.
As already mentioned, on 21 October Dr Cornwall went to Canberra to confer with Senator Grimes. The visit was reported in the press. The press article was not tendered. Remarks made the next day by Ms Laidlaw, a Member of the Legislative Council, when asking Dr Cornwall a question, suggest that Judith House was one reason for the visit as well as the constitution of the SAAP committees. She said:
"Yesterday, the Minister visited Canberra to speak with the Minister for Community Services in an effort to seek more money for emergency accommodation for adolescents and families. I register the disappointment of groups that have spoken to me since reading an announcement in the paper yesterday that the Minister's journey to Canberra was confined to those interests and did not include the needs of women's shelters. I acknowledge the acute need for youth and family shelters, but believe that the needs of shelters to cater for the needs of women and children should not be compromised in the process. From recent statements in the media it has become clear that the Minister is on a campaign to repeatedly deny that women's shelters have been harshly treated under his stewardship in respect of allocation of new funding (and I emphasise new funding) this financial year.
Repeatedly, he dismisses funding statements made by the women's shelters as distorting the facts, although I have confirmation that figures used by the women's shelters have been confirmed by the Minister's departmental officers. Why is the Minister determined to pursue a campaign to dismiss and denigrate the current needs of shelters catering for women and children? I suggest that a more fitting approach for a person recently nominated as Father of the Year would be to campaign for emergency funding for shelters not only for adolescents and families, and that such a campaign should not be at the expense of the legitimate needs of shelters for women and children."
In the course of a quite lengthy answer, Dr Cornwall announced that the Women's SAAP Advisory Committee would be reduced in size. He then announced that he was about to review the administration of women's shelters. Both announcements were made at a relatively early stage in the answer. Dr Cornwall also referred in his answer to the meeting of representatives of women's shelters on 18 October which had been reported in The Advertiser as an "historic meeting". The Hansard record reads:
"The Hon. J.R. CORNWALL: My colleague Don Grimes and I agreed in discussion yesterday that that situation was unworkable and untenable and will not be allowed to persist. First, the committee structure for the women's shelters will be altered. Apropos of this historic meeting that they held last week, let me tell honourable members that they have been holding historic meetings where they all come together on a regular basis for years. Furthermore, each representative who has attended those meetings has been paid at my expense. So much for the historic meeting!
The Hon. J.R. CORNWALL: At the taxpayers' expense, quite right. They have each and every one of them been paid. I might also say that at least one women's shelter has received a quite adverse auditor's report. We will no longer tolerate a situation where an administrator of a shelter forms a small management committee and then, of course, they decide at what rate they should pay themselves: they decide that they can break the rules and pay cash on termination instead of time in lieu.
The Hon. J.R. CORNWALL: I am about to review the administration of the women's shelters generally - that is the action that I am taking. We are going to have a bit of accountability. That is why I insisted, again with the Federal Minister's support, that they should sign agreements. We are going to have accountability. The other thing is, of course, that we are not going to any longer have a situation where they are taxpayer funded to all come together. They will have nominees to that subcommittee just as the youth subcommittee has and the general shelters have.
The general shelters, let me say, are for families and children. There is a general shelter at the park (sic) for families and children in real distress which operates on an annual budget of $38 000 a year in one of the most depressed areas of metropolitan Adelaide. As against that, the women's shelters are operating on average budgets of between $160 000 and $200 000. Does Miss Laidlaw, champion of the needy, seriously suggest that there should not be a priority given to those sorts of family shelters in 1986? Let her stand up and not be some sort of political opportunist in the matter. She is lining up with this small number of bully girls to stand over the program and say that we cannot give money to teenage girls who have been sexually abused; she is lining up with those people to attempt to stand over me to say that we cannot make youth a priority."
In his evidence Dr Cornwall admitted that the reference to "bully girls" included the plaintiff. Dr Cornwall again used the expression "bully girls" on 23 September 1987 when answering questions in the House of Assembly Estimates Committee. Dr Cornwall confirmed that, on that occasion, he was again referring to the plaintiff. However, I have no regard at all to these statements because of the privilege of Parliament.
The announcement of the proposed review was reported in an article in The Advertiser on 23 October. The plaintiff did not then give any particular attention to the proposal.
The question of a review of women's shelters had not been the subject of any Departmental recommendation to Dr Cornwall before he made the announcement in the Legislative Council. I accept Mr Bicknell's evidence that there had been no mention of the review in the Department before Dr Cornwall's announcement and that it had only been mentioned in the letter from Senator Grimes dated 2 July 1986. I find that Dr Cornwall was stung into announcing the review by the events of October 1986 and, in particular, the public criticism of him by shelters. However, the review would have been conducted in any event. It will be recalled that one of the terms in Senator Grimes' letter dated 2 July 1986 in which he had agreed that the Commonwealth would fund the payment of deficits was that the administrative and accounting practices of services be jointly reviewed by officers of the Commonwealth and State Departments. I find that the review was instituted for that reason. It was simply announced a little earlier than might have been intended. The review was intended to be a review of the management and administration of all shelters. I find that it was not intended to examine any one particular shelter. I later examine the status of the Review Committee and its implications for the issues in this action.
Not until some three weeks later did any Departmental minute on the intended review come into existence. It is a minute dated 13 November from Ms Wighton to Dr Cornwall as Minister. The minute recommends:
"That a Review Committee, chaired by Mrs Judith Roberts, assisted by an independent consultant, conduct a review of the administration of Women's Shelters in South Australia, to be completed by 31/1/87."
The minute proposed a committee of five persons including Mrs Roberts and Ms Harrison Anderson as the independent consultant. Its terms of reference were as follows:
"1. To review the administrative practices of Women's Shelters in South Australia with particular reference to:
2. To review the management structure of Women's Shelters in South Australia, in particular, the composition and role of Committees of Management and their capacity to effectively and efficiently manage the staff and resources allocated by the State and Commonwealth Governments.
3. To review the extent to which Shelters fulfil their objectives as established under the S.A.A.P. guidelines."
Dr Cornwall approved the recommendation on 14 November 1986.
Earlier in October, the Port Lincoln Shelter had signed the Agreement. On 21 October, the shelter wrote to the Department to state that it no longer considered itself bound by the Agreement. The shelter said that the Agreement had been signed "in the mistaken belief that this shelter would receive an appropriate level of funding". The letter protested a lack of consultation to reach a workable compromise on funding. Other shelters who had signed the undertaking or the Financial Agreement sent similar letters to the Department at that time.
On 24 October, a meeting of WSAC was held. Those present expressed concerns as to funding and discussed continuing the opposition to SAAP.
On 31 October, another meeting of Administrators and staff from all shelters was held. It was, in effect, a continuation of the meeting begun on 17 October. Whyalla attended on this occasion but apologies were received on behalf of three country shelters, namely, Mount Gambier, Port Lincoln and the Riverland. The meeting discussed, among other things, opposition to the proposal of Dr Cornwall to restructure the SAAP Advisory Committee and continued political action on funding issues.
When the Review Committee was appointed, eight of the thirteen shelters had signed the Financial Agreement. The five shelters which had not were Christies Beach, Irene, North Adelaide, Mount Gambier, and the Riverland Shelter. Of those five, Christies Beach, Irene, and North Adelaide had deficits. Christies Beach and North Adelaide (and presumably Irene) were receiving funding on a fortnightly basis. As already mentioned, some shelters sought to withdraw their consent to the Financial Agreement. They did not in the end do so. Others, such as Para Districts and Port Lincoln, had protested that they had signed "under duress". The Riverland Shelter signed the Financial Agreement in January 1987. Its letter sending the Financial Agreement to the Department said that the Agreement had been signed "under duress". It had not received any funding since September 1986.
Late in October 1986, Senator Grimes wrote to Dr Cornwall with a proposed compromise on the funding issue. The letter is undated but, as its contents show, it was written after the meeting in Canberra. He confirmed that the shelters would be paid the deficits totalling $88,700 and proposed, among other things, that the cost of Judith House be allocated in another way to enable the full amount of $176,000 to be available for women's shelters. He sought Dr Cornwall's consent to the proposal. This letter does not mention the announcement of the Review Committee. As will be seen, that is mentioned in a later letter. I therefore find that the two main issues discussed in Canberra on 21 October were the funding issue and the composition of SAAP committees, but not the establishment of the Review Committee.
On 5 November 1986, Mr Bicknell rang and spoke to one of the staff at the Christies Beach Shelter and left a message which was recorded in the Shelter's message book. He said that no advances would be made until the Agreement had been signed. He said that Dr Cornwall was not pleased with the attitude of the Christies Beach Shelter and added that Dr Cornwall was being difficult because of the "Father of the Year" issue. He said that the Shelter should think about signing the Agreement. On 7 November, Mr Bicknell again rang the Shelter reminding it that it had not signed the Agreement. On that occasion he said that six shelters had not signed the Agreement at that date and four had asked to withdraw their signing of the Agreement.
On 5 November 1986, the Christies Beach Shelter requested an advance of $19,000 from its funding for the next quarter (1 January to 31 March 1987) to enable it to continue its operations until 31 December. Ms Wighton reported the request to Dr Cornwall in a minute noted by him on 11 November 1986. In that minute she also reported that the Christies Beach Shelter had not signed the Agreement. Dr Cornwall endorsed the minute and directed, among other things, "Christies Beach is to be paid fortnightly pending the outcome of the proposed review". Henceforth, until August 1987, both the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters were funded by fortnightly payments.
Three days later, on 14 November, Dr Cornwall approved Ms Wighton's minute recommending the establishment of the Review Committee and the persons to comprise the Committee. On the same day, Dr Cornwall received another letter from Senator Grimes in which Senator Grimes approved, among other things, the funding allocations under SAAP and the revised structures for the SAAP Advisory Committees. The approved funding enabled Judith House to proceed but at a later date. Plainly, Dr Cornwall had already written in response to Senator Grimes' letter in late October. By some means, perhaps in Dr Cornwall's letter, Senator Grimes had learned of the establishment of the Review Committee. In his letter, Senator Grimes approved the establishment of the Review Committee. He asked that an officer of his Department be on the Committee. He said:
"I commend your decision to undertake a review of the administration of the womens shelters in South Australia. This review will hopefully not only result in the more efficient administration of the shelters but also of SAAP services generally, as well as put to rest the often inaccurate press statements concerning the SAAP funding of these shelters.
In view of the joint funding nature of SAAP might I suggest that an officer of my Department be involved in the process, if not already included, whether by membership of any steering review committee established or by participating in drafting the terms of reference for the consultant. This would accord with one of the specific conditions placed upon the provision of funds for the elimination of the WESP deficits in my letter of 2 July 1986, namely that, 'the administrative and accounting practices of the services involved being jointly reviewed by officers of our departments'."
As will have been noticed from Ms Wighton's minute of 13 November, the membership of the Review Committee was wider than had been proposed by Senator Grimes in his letter of 2 July 1986. His proposal had required that the review be conducted by officers of the respective Commonwealth and State Departments.
On 26 November, Dr Cornwall announced the membership of the Review Committee. He did so by a Ministerial Statement in the Legislative Council. He did not name all members of the Committee. Those named by him were Mrs Roberts as chairperson, Ms Colleen Johnson, Ms Judith Blake, and Ms Harrison Anderson as consultant. He stated also that the other members of the Committee would be a representative from the Department of Community Services and a representative from the Department of Community Welfare. At some later date which was not proved, it was decided that the representative of the Department of Community Services was to be Ms Robyn King and the representative from the Department was to be Ms Jan Lowe.
The announcement of the membership of the Review Committee caused the plaintiff considerable distress. Her evidence, which I accept, was that she was devastated by it. She perceived that her previous antagonism with Mrs Roberts would inhibit any capacity for her to represent the Shelter and to justify its work. She was disappointed that Ms Blake was a member because she did not believe that Ms Blake was an appropriate person to represent shelters since she had a different philosophy on the administration of shelters from most of the other Administrators. The plaintiff believed that it would not be a fair review. The next day she took sick leave. It is clear that she had a nervous breakdown. She was away on sick leave for the rest of 1986 and much of 1987. She did not return to work because the withdrawal of funding caused the Shelter to terminate her employment in late August 1987.
Ms Anderson began her work in late November. However, as she said in evidence, work did not start in earnest until January 1987. At some time before 2 December 1986, Ms Anderson together with Mrs Roberts and Ms Wighton met Dr Cornwall. The purpose of the meeting was to brief her as to her work and why the review was being held. The Review Committee was aware that the Minister had directed that the resources of the non-government welfare unit were available to assist it. The Department provided secretarial and other assistance. Officers of the Department at all levels provided information and answered questions.
The first meeting of the Committee was held on 2 December 1986. It was, very much, a preliminary meeting to acquaint the Committee with the issues. The only record of that meeting which now exists is a set of handwritten notes taken by Ms King. She recorded that all members of the Committee, including Ms Jan Lowe, were present. In addition, two employees of the Department were present. They were Mr Peter Bicknell and Ms Meredyth Taylor. Ms King noted that Mr Bicknell provided "pro-tem advice on background" and described Ms Taylor as "Secretariat". Mr Bicknell briefed the Committee on the factors which had led to the review. According to Ms King's note, those factors were
He referred to the dispute with women's shelters about signing the Financial Agreement and noted that Christies Beach "resolutely refused to sign agreement - has made little difference to Christies who are receiving fortnightly payments (now using January '87 funds). Cornwall concerned that recurrence is not possible". In her evidence, Ms King said that the Christies Beach Shelter was mentioned as an example. I accept that evidence because Christies Beach was then one of five shelters which had not signed the Agreement. Her note also states:
"Intended to review shelters in general rather than in particular: attempt to get some principles of operation and accountability."
Ms King's note is that four issues were identified, namely,
I accept Ms King's note as an accurate record of what occurred at the meeting. It accords with Mr Bicknell's recollection. When giving her evidence, Ms King gave the impression of being a person who would take care in preparing such notes. It will be noticed that issues were being discussed broadly. There was no suggestion that any one shelter required particular investigation.
The Review Committee kept minutes of its meetings. However, copies of minutes of only two other meetings now exist, the meetings held on 7 and 29 January 1987. As already noted, it is a curious fact, to say the least, that no other records of the work of the Review Committee now exist.
According to Ms King's notes, the next meeting after the meeting on 2 December was to have been on 19 December. Some witnesses doubted whether a meeting had been held on 19 December. Nothing turns on whether a meeting was in fact held on 19 December. I find there was no meeting on that date because the minutes of the meeting of 7 January record that the minutes of the meeting on 2 December were confirmed, but there was no mention of a meeting on 19 December.
The absence of any minutes or other records means that there is no record of the number of meetings held by the Committee or the dates on which they were held. The only assistance as to the date of meetings is to be found in the diaries of Mrs Roberts for 1986 and 1987, which suggest that meetings were possibly held on the following dates:
1987 7 January
29 January
23 February
25 March
2 April
6 April
12 May
9 June
22 June
No witness had any independent recollection of what occurred at any of these meetings or the dates of the meetings or on how many occasions the Review Committee had met. No member had any real recollection of the meeting on 2 December.
The Review Committee had originally been asked to complete its report by 31 January 1987. The Committee secured two extensions of this deadline. The first was to the end of February 1987 and the second until the end of March 1987. Obviously, an extension was granted until June 1987 but there is no documentary evidence of that. Nothing turns on the fact that the extensions were asked for or granted.
The meeting on 2 December was the only meeting attended by Ms Lowe. Although she had been appointed to the Review Committee as the representative of the Department of Community Welfare, she took no further part in the work of the Committee after 2 December. At some time between 2 December and the next meeting of the Committee on 7 January 1987, Ms Lowe was replaced by Ms Wighton. There is no minute or other document recording why or when this change in the composition of the Committee was made or approved. Neither any member of the Review Committee nor Dr Cornwall nor Mr Bicknell was able to explain why this change occurred. I find it difficult to accept that none of those witnesses could recall the reasons for this change in the membership of the Committee. There was no suggestion that Ms Lowe was either unwilling or unable to continue as a member of the Committee. She was a relatively senior officer and thus a suitable appointment. Dr Cornwall described her as a competent person. I find that Ms Wighton wished to be actively involved in the work of the Committee and she decided that she would replace Ms Lowe as the Department's representative and arranged for that to be effected.
By letter dated 9 December and signed by Mrs Roberts, all shelters were informed of the review and the membership of the Review Committee. The Terms of Reference were attached to the letter. The letter invited submissions. The letter also stated that it may be necessary to extend the period of the review and expressed an intention to report to the Minister by the first week in March 1987. Two paragraphs in this letter read:
"Written submissions from Shelter personnel - both staff and Management Committees - are most welcome and can be forwarded to me C/o. the Non-Government Welfare Unit, Department for Community Welfare, Box 39, Rundle Mall Post Office, Adelaide. To enable the Committee to give due consideration to written submissions, we would appreciate it if any input you wish to make reaches us by January 20th. Please contact Harrison Anderson on 213 3367 (Tuesdays and Wednesdays) if you need to negotiate an extension.
Feedback from consumers - past or present - of Shelter services is also very welcome. A poster briefly detailing information about the Review is enclosed. We would be grateful if you would display this prominently, as it is no easy matter to make contact with consumers."
The plaintiff complains that the Review Committee did not adhere to its stated objective of obtaining "feedback from consumers" of shelter services. When the Review Committee visited the Christies Beach Shelter on 11 February 1987, the staff at Christies Beach had arranged for women, who had used the Shelter or were using the Shelter, to be present to speak to the committee. I accept the evidence of Ms McSkimming and Ms Lachlan that members of the Review Committee did not provide any opportunity for discussion with those women.
The narrative which follows has an obvious emphasis upon the Christies Beach Shelter and the activities of Dr Cornwall, the Department, and the Review Committee so far as they relate to the Christies Beach Shelter. Plainly, that is a consequence of the fact that this action concerns that part of the Report which dealt with Christies Beach and its consequences for the plaintiff. It is a consequence also of the fact that most of the documents tendered deal with the Christies Beach Shelter and the Review Committee.
By letter dated 15 December, Ms McSkimming wrote on behalf of the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter to Dr Cornwall. The letter was in these terms:
"Members of this committee who had seen the article expected that at our recent Management Committee meeting (December 9), the shelter would have full details of the Review for their consideration, including membership, terms of reference, time frame of operation etc. We are very dissatisfied that this information was not available, particularly at this time of the year as we would not meet during January. It now appears that the Review will be nearly completed before this committee has an opportunity to fully consider its brief. (At the time of writing on December 15, this shelter has still received no correspondence on the matter.)
We are alarmed also to read in the Advertiser article of an 'unnamed shelter' which had been referred to as being of particular concern. This type of unspecified reference is most undesirable, as it raises questions of all shelters and affects their credibility within their own support groups and communities. Such innuendo only serves to undermine the high standing of the majority of shelters, built up after many years of responsible and dedicated service provision.
This committee is also concerned about the process of the appointment of members of the Review committee. Shelters were not consulted about the membership structure, nor invited to nominate a person to represent the shelter's view. We consider the Department's appointment of one shelter administrator to be totally inappropriate in such a process.
This committee believes that the Review will highlight the enormously successful work done by women's shelters with grossly inadequate funds. We are looking forward to working with the Review committee, and demonstrating our accountability in all facets of our service."
The reference in the letter to an "unnamed shelter" is to Dr Cornwall's statement on 22 October, when he mentioned that an unnamed shelter had received an adverse auditor's report for the year ended 30 June 1986. That shelter was Port Augusta. On 7 January 1987, a member of Dr Cornwall's ministerial staff wrote to Ms McSkimming acknowledging receipt of the letter of 15 December and said that a response would be sent in due course. However, there was no further response to the Shelter's letter of 15 December.
The Christies Beach Shelter was not the only shelter to express concern as to the manner in which the Review Committee had been selected and as to the manner in which it was intending to carry out its work. In a letter dated 5 February 1987 to Mrs Roberts written by Ms McSkimming as Secretary of WSAC, a number of concerns were expressed on behalf of other shelters.
"I am writing following a recent Women's Shelters Advisory Committee meeting to advise you of our concerns regarding the Review.
This committee cannot accept that such a Review will not be visiting all shelters. Each shelter is an autonomous body, with an independent management committee, and across the range of services in South Australia there is a broad perspective of philosophies, operating methods and management structures. We are most concerned that the report will be in general terms which will allude to 'some' shelters, or 'most' shelters, and that it will not specify which issues are related to which shelters. We consider it absolutely vital that each shelter is visited, fully assessed, and individually documented.
WSAC also feels that the time span allowed is totally inadequate for a general review. The consultant has spent no more that (sic) a couple of hours in any one shelter, in which it is impossible to become fully familiar with each shelter. Management needs to be considered as an integral part of the way in which a shelter operates.
We are also critical of the way in which the Review committee was formed. Contrary to Peter Bicknell's view that we declined to nominate, we in fact received no notification of the formation of the review until approached by the media for comment. We were not at any stage asked to give suggestions of an appropriate shelter membership. We do not consider that Judith Blake is representative of all shelters; nor that any one person could successfully represent the views of a diverse range of shelters.
We look forward to your response on these matters."
The letter was not answered until 13 April when Mrs Roberts also responded to a letter from WSAC dated 12 March which had asked that the Committee make its report available to shelters for comment before it was released to the public. WSAC also asked that copies of interviews of shelters be made available to it. Mrs Roberts' reply was to state, quite correctly, that the "release of any fact pertaining to a review commissioned to the Minister would only be authorised by the Minister" and invited WSAC to contact Dr Cornwall's Ministerial Assistant, Ms Pengelly. The evidence suggests that the matter stopped there. Mrs Roberts' letter did not address the issues in WSAC's letter of 5 February.
The second meeting of the Review Committee was held on 7 January 1987. Copies of the agenda and minutes of the meeting still exist. The minutes show that Christies Beach was one of the first six shelters to respond to the letter inviting submissions. The minutes suggest that the Committee was making a study of shelters generally and did not intend to deal particularly with any one shelter. The meeting resolved to publicise the review by a press release. A press release was issued on 8 January.
Invitation from Christies Beach to the Committee
By letter dated 16 January, Ms McSkimming wrote on behalf of the Christies Beach Shelter to Mrs Roberts. Given the criticisms that were made of the Christies Beach Shelter, it is important to recite the terms of this letter. It clearly demonstrates the willingness of the Shelter to participate in the review and be examined by the Committee.
"I was requested at a recent Management Committee meeting to write to you regarding the current Review of our shelter.
As you are no doubt aware, this shelter has been struggling over the past few years to maintain its services on increasingly inadequate funds. We believe we have very effectively and efficiently continued to function as a fine-tuned and comprehensive service for women and children fleeing from domestic violence. We are confident that the current review process will support the work we do, in light of very severe budget restraints.
This committee feels that it is important that all members of your committee are fully aware of these problems if they are to contribute to the report. We would very much like to invite your full committee to visit this shelter in February, so that these issues can be fully discussed in much more specific terms. We look forward to hearing from you to arrange a suitable time for such a visit."
The Shelter did not receive any written reply to that letter. However, on 19 January, Ms Anderson visited the Shelter alone and, on 11 February, she again visited the Shelter, on that occasion accompanied by Mrs Roberts and Ms Johnson.
The Christies Beach Shelter was represented at the meeting on 19 January by Ms McSkimming as acting Administrator, Ms Staiff, Ms Lachlan, and other members of staff. The plaintiff was not present. She was still on sick leave. Dr Baum, the chairperson of the management committee, was not present. Ms Anderson, Ms McSkimming, Ms Lachlan, and Ms Staiff all gave evidence as to their recollection of the meeting. Where it conflicts, I prefer the evidence of the three witnesses from the Shelter to that of Ms Anderson. Ms Lachlan had made notes of the meeting as it was proceeding. Ms Anderson said that she also made notes but that those notes have disappeared together with all of the other records of the Review Committee.
Ms Anderson had a long list of questions which she intended to ask at all shelters she visited. The list is Appendix V to the Report. It is a long list of questions. Although the list is 28 paragraphs, a number of paragraphs ask more than one question. Ms Anderson asked the questions on her list. That is confirmed by Ms Lachlan's notes which, in many respects, mirror Ms Anderson's list. The questions were of a general nature directed to the administration and financial management of the Shelter. It is curious that Ms Anderson did not ask questions on some other issues. However, this is not the place to explore that issue. Ms Anderson said that the visit lasted about three hours, though the witnesses from the Shelter said it was about one and a half to two hours. I find that it was about two to three hours. Whether it was two or three hours is of no real consequence. The important fact is that the visit was relatively inconsequential. In the course of the meeting Ms Anderson mentioned the Financial Agreement. She did not advise the Shelter to sign it. It was not her place to do so. She simply asked what was the Shelter's response to it and what problems the Shelter saw with it. Ms Anderson did not make any suggestion that the financial management of the Shelter was inadequate. The fact that the visit was inconsequential is confirmed by the minutes of the meeting of the management committee of the Shelter held on 9 February. The only issues identified in the minute were
• employment conditions for staff including lack of contracts;
• lack of documentation in the form of timesheets; and
• questions as to the financial expertise of members of the management committee.
The management committee of the Shelter, at its meeting on 9 February, agreed that it would keep timesheets if so requested.
In the course of the meeting, Ms Anderson had asked to be supplied with some records. By letter dated 29 January, the Shelter sent records of the experience of each member of the staff at Christies Beach, the years of service, and a note of the sick leave taken by staff in 1986. Ms Anderson's evidence was that she had asked for more information. The witnesses from the Shelter deny that and say that the shelter provided all that had been requested. I accept the evidence of the Shelter witnesses.
The next meeting of the Review Committee was held on 29 January 1987. A copy of the minutes of that meeting still exists. All members of the Committee, except Ms King, were present. Ms Anderson was also present. The minutes record an apology on behalf of Ms Meredyth Taylor, who was not actually a member of the Committee, but I do not think anything turns on that. Among items noted by the Committee was the invitation from the Christies Beach Shelter for the Review Committee to visit the Shelter and a document prepared by Ms Anderson as a standard form of questionnaire. I find that Ms Anderson decided to use that questionnaire after her visit to Christies Beach. The minutes do not record any report as to the number of shelters which had been visited by then. The Committee decided to respond to the invitation from Christies Beach that all members of the Review Committee visit by sending Mrs Roberts, Ms Johnson and Ms Anderson. There is nothing in the minutes of this meeting which in any respect comments adversely on Christies Beach in consequence of Ms Anderson's visit. Ms Johnson's evidence was that Ms Anderson gave an oral report concerning her visit to the Shelter and her evidence did not suggest that Ms Anderson commented adversely on the Shelter. I find Ms Anderson had not formed an adverse view of the Christies Beach Shelter as a result of her first visit. Had she done so, it would have been recorded in the minutes or reported orally to the meeting.
Ms Roberts, Ms Anderson and Ms Johnson visited the Christies Beach Shelter on the morning of 11 February 1987. There was a dispute as to the time spent on this visit. That is not a question which is critical to the issues in this action. However, I find that the visit lasted about one and a half hours, shorter than the estimates of Ms Roberts and Ms Anderson. There were disputes also as to the matters discussed. I find that the issues which were raised were discussed on a general basis. Nothing was said which caused the representatives of the Shelter present at the meeting to have any concerns. There might have been some questions about TOIL records but, as the Shelter's management committee had at its meeting on 9 February decided to implement them if requested, that could not have been an important issue.
The management of the Shelter had asked residents to attend the meeting and a number were present. I find that though the residents wished to express views, the Review Committee gave them no real opportunity to do so. This was inconsistent with the Review Committee's expressed position that it sought the views of residents, past and present, who had used the services of shelters. One cannot know what those residents would have said because there is no evidence on that topic. However, had the members of the Review Committee listened to those women, they might have formed a more favourable impression of the Christies Beach Shelter than they ultimately did. That is apparent from the results of police investigations to be mentioned later. At the conclusion of the visit, the Review Committee briefly visited a halfway house close to the Shelter.
I find that there were no allegations of financial mismanagement or other allegations of misconduct put to the Shelter representatives at this meeting nor did anything then occur which gave rise to a particular concern on the part of the Review Committee about the management or administration of the Shelter.
The next meeting of the Review Committee was held on 23 February 1987. An agenda exists for that meeting as well as Ms Anderson's report to the meeting. Although no minutes of the meeting exist, I find that the meeting occurred. Ms Anderson's report to the meeting mentioned the visit to the Christies Beach Shelter in one line. There is nothing in her report which even hints at any problems at the Christies Beach Shelter. I find, therefore, that the visit to the Shelter was not controversial. That finding is reinforced by the reference to the visit in the minutes of the next meeting of the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter. The visit by the Review Committee was noted but there is nothing to suggest that anything controversial occurred. Rather, the minutes complained that the Review Committee either did not indicate or was not prepared to indicate an understanding of the philosophies of the Shelter and the way in which it dealt with its clients and had questioned the need to be a 24 hour service. The minutes also complained that the comments from residents were discounted.
There was no other direct communication between the Review Committee and the Christies Beach Shelter thereafter. No record of any kind exists as to the dates of other meetings of the Review Committee or the proceedings at those meetings apart from the diaries of Mrs Roberts which record meeting dates only. The only evidence whether there were other meetings was given by the surviving members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson. The evidence is sketchy. Obviously, it is not possible for them to clearly recall specific dates or events of this kind which happened some 14 years earlier.
The next document which identifies any event in the work of the Review Committee is a minute from Ms Wighton to Dr Cornwall dated 22 April 1987 headed "Briefing orders re Women's Shelters Review". It reads:
"A series of events including accumulated deficits by three shelters since 1981/82 and the resistance by most shelters to signing a financial agreement with the government prompted the Minister of Community Welfare to announce an independent review of:
1. The administrative practices of Women's Shelters in South Australia with particular reference to:
2. The management structure of women's shelters in particular, the composition and role of Committees of Management and their capacity to effectively and efficiently manage the staff and resources allocated by the State and Commonwealth Governments;
3. The extent to which shelters fulfil their objectives as established under the SAAP guidelines.
The Review Committee is comprised of Judith Roberts (Chairperson), Colleen Johnson (Executive Director, Management Services, S.A.H.C.), Robyn King (Senior Assistant Director, Commonwealth Department of Community Services), Judith Blake (Executive Officer, Y.W.C.A. Whyalla and Administrator, Whyalla Shelter). Harrison Anderson, an independent consultant has been employed for the duration of the review.
Considerable consultation has occurred during the review. This included, visiting all shelters, contacting and seeking comments from other community Agencies and individuals referring to or likely to be receiving referrals from shelters and receiving feedback from consumers.
A final draft of the review report is currently before the Minister and Review Committee members for consideration. The report recognises that the majority of South Australian Women's Shelters are well managed facilities with dedicated and compassionate staff and responsible management. As the level of funding in this area has increased so too have the expectations of government administrators for professional standards in the areas of management administration, service delivery and evaluation of programs.
The recommendations contained within the report propose guidelines for government administrators, management committees and shelter staff which should resolve the deficit problem and allow the shelters to be administered more efficiently, have greater control of their resources and be more accountable."
It will be noticed that the penultimate paragraph states that the final draft of the report "is currently before the Minister and Review Committee members for consideration". The rest of that paragraph and the following paragraph appear to be, and I find them to be, a summary of the report as it then existed. It is apparent that the report dealt with management and administration of shelters in a general way and did not single out any individual shelter for special mention. Dr Cornwall had no recollection whether a draft report was then before him. Despite having no recollection of a draft, he said that he had no hesitation in saying that Ms Wighton's minute was wrong. I find that Dr Cornwall is in error. That is confirmed by a minute from Ms Wighton dated 11 May which also refers to Dr Cornwall receiving two reports. It is too improbable that Ms Wighton would have erred twice. There was a final draft and it had been drawn to his attention.
The members of the Review Committee could not throw much light on the content of the final draft. Two drafts of the report have been located in the files kept by the Commonwealth Department of Community Services. They were drafts which had been given to Ms King. One is clearly an early draft and could not be the report to which Ms Wighton's minute refers. The other draft which is Exhibit P644 is quite substantial. The tenor of the draft is consistent with the description of the draft in Ms Wighton's minute and it is expressed in terms which are consistent with that description. In her evidence, Ms King could not be certain that Exhibit P644 was the draft mentioned in the minute. She acknowledged that she could not be certain when Exhibit P644 had been compiled. Given that Ms Wighton's minute does not mention the Christies Beach Shelter nor any other shelter by name, and that the description of the draft in the minute accords with the substance and tenor of Exhibit P644, I find that Exhibit P644 was the draft to which Ms Wighton's minute refers. If it is not, it is at least a document very close in time to it and accords with the general tenor of that report.
I find that, as at 22 April, the intention of the Review Committee was to publish a report of a general kind which would not criticise any one shelter. However, that intention changed in the next few days and, by 12 May, it had been decided to include a section critical of the Christies Beach Shelter. I will first recite the events and later examine the reasons for this change.
Cornwall Promises to Meet Christies Beach and North Adelaide
When noting the events which led to the decision to criticise the Christies Beach Shelter, it is also important to compare and contrast the position of Christies Beach with that of the North Adelaide Shelter during the period 1 May to 11 August 1987. During the first few months of 1987, the funding issues persisted for the shelters at both Christies Beach and North Adelaide. Both had not signed the Financial Agreement. Both were continuing to be funded by fortnightly payments. Both were still in deficit. Both wanted to resolve the problems of funding and the signing of the Financial Agreement. They sought a meeting with Dr Cornwall to resolve these issues. The request was contained in a letter dated 17 February 1987 from WSAC which had been signed by Ms Joan Balendran, which was in these terms:
"We are writing on this occasion to seek an appointment with you, at your earliest convenience, to discuss funding difficulties.
Two of our members; namely the Women's Emergency Shelter at North Adelaide and the Christies Beach Women's Shelter have to date indicated to your department and office their reluctance to sign the 'Agreement' which is mostly due to their apprehension regarding present levels of funding and future possible levels of funding.
Several other members have signed the 'Agreement' under duress and have sought to retract their signatures. Some of these shelters received a small increase in funds following our campaign last year. The 2 Shelters with a large turnover and good record of assistance to victims of violence received no increase for the 1986/87 year (except for inflation).
These 2 Shelters in particular and some of the other members are concerned about their inability to keep within the funds allocated to them this year.
The Agreement, to some extent, does imply that Shelters should aim towards keeping within stated government allocations. It has been relayed to us on numerous occasions by Mr. Peter Bicknell, Ms. Meredyth Taylor and Ms. Harrison Anderson that 'you do not have to keep within your budget,' 'you can run into a deficit' ' we would not be able to make you sign something which said (or implied) you would not be able to incur a deficit.'
We were of the understanding that the whole purpose of drafting and signing an Agreement was to properly account for public funds and it was originally seen by The Government as a means of restricting growing deficits in the Women's Shelters. We therefore feel we need to meet with you to get this situation clarified for once and all.
We have said often, we understand the need to sign an 'Agreement', however, our funding potential was greatly reduced last year due to other government priorities which has made some of us very wary about doing so. The lack of funding in the Women's Shelters is now CRITICAL - particularly for North Adelaide and Christies Beach Women's Shelters. With no sign of extra funds in sight, unnecessary anxiety prevails.
We are eager to resolve the matter of both the Agreement and FUNDING.
We hope you will agree to a meeting with a small group of our representatives with this aim in mind." [Emphasis as in original.]
The tenor of the letter is conciliatory. On 26 February 1987, Ms Pengelly, Dr Cornwall's Ministerial advisor on community welfare, replied stating that "the Minister will be pleased to meet with a small group of your representatives soon after he has received the report" from the Review Committee. She promised to contact Ms Balendran in the near future regarding this appointment. However, she did not do so. The promise was reiterated on 15 May by the Department in circumstances to which I will refer in a moment. However, the promised meeting was not held.
On 6 May, Mr Bicknell had contacted both shelters to give them an opportunity to sign the Agreement. Both refused. Ms Wighton reported this in an undated minute. Remarks in a later minute from Ms Wighton to Dr Cornwall dated 11 May 1987 (a Monday) makes it clear that this minute had been written on 8 May. The minute was noted by Dr Cornwall on 8 May. Ms Wighton reported the response of both shelters to the invitation to sign the Agreement in these terms:
"The Manager, Non-Government Welfare Unit, contacted both shelters on 6/5/87 to inform them of this situation and give them the opportunity to sign a Financial Agreement. Ms Joan Balandran, North Adelaide, said that they are refusing to sign 'until the Shelter meet with the Minister to gain funding assurances' and to discuss the Women's Shelter Administrative Review. Ms Helen McSkimming also supports this view and in addition, said that you had indicated that the Shelter would be funded on a fortnightly basis until the Review was completed."
The reference in that paragraph to the meeting with the Minister is plainly a reference to the meeting promised in Ms Pengelly's letter of 26 February. The minute concluded with the following recommendation:
"Consistent with (a) the recommendation of the Review of Administration of Women's Shelters, and, (b) Senator Grimes' conditional approval, it is recommended that both shelters be informed that once their 1986/87 allocations are advanced, no further payments will be made until a Financial Agreement is signed." [Original emphasis.]
"Seen. I wish to meet with Ms. McSkimming and Balandran as soon as I have discussed the report with H. Anderson and Judith Roberts. Next payment (fortnight) to be made in the interim."
In a letter to the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters dated 15 May, Mr Bicknell repeated that Dr Cornwall would meet Ms McSkimming and Ms Balendran when he had seen the Report.
Before leaving the events of 6 and 8 May, it is necessary to refer again to Mr Bicknell's telephone call to the Christies Beach Shelter on 6 May. The Shelter had a book in which telephone messages were noted. It records Mr Bicknell's call on 6 May. He spoke to Ms McSkimming. She made this note.
$19150 in hand deficit Comm. Govt. - only if sign undertaking. Review nearly finished. Next fin year - difficult into next year. If pay deficit - O.K. for into next July.
Taking away from criticism in Review if sign undertaking. Get back by Friday Peter or Meredyth."
Mr Bicknell was reiterating that the deficit would be paid only if the Christies Beach Shelter signed the Financial Agreement. This is but one instance of officers of the Department referring to the Financial Agreement as the undertaking. One question is what is the criticism to which Bicknell referred? Was it simply criticism of financial mismanagement or was it the unsubstantiated allegations? Mr Bicknell had seen a list of unsubstantiated allegations which had been prepared by Ms Anderson and had been shown to the Minister on 4 May. Mr Bicknell would have learned of the allegations from either Ms Wighton or Ms Anderson or both. He would therefore have been aware of those allegations when he spoke on 6 May to Helen McSkimming. I find, therefore, that the word "criticism" referred to the unsubstantiated allegations. I find that he hinted that Christies Beach would be criticised in the Review Committee's report but that the criticism would be withdrawn or reduced if the Shelter signed the Financial Agreement. In his evidence, Mr Bicknell acknowledged that he said something to that effect. It was a clear threat to the Shelter.
On 15 May 1987, Mr Bicknell wrote on behalf of the Department to Ms McSkimming at the Christies Beach Shelter. The letter enclosed a cheque for $7,000, being the funding for the next fortnight. This is the letter in which Mr Bicknell reiterating Dr Cornwall's promised meeting. The letter withdrew the offer to sign the Financial Agreement pending the meeting with the Minister to discuss funding. The letter was in these terms:
Funding will continue on a fortnightly basis until the Minister of Community Welfare has fully considered the implications of the Review Report. The Minister will then meet with you, as previously agreed, and discuss issues related to funding and the Agreement.
Pending these considerations the offer for your shelter to sign the Financial Agreement is hereby withdrawn."
It will be noticed that the letter conveys the effect of Dr Cornwall's endorsement made on 8 May on the minute he had received from Ms Wighton that day. The letter states in the clearest terms that Dr Cornwall intended to meet Ms McSkimming to discuss issues relating to funding and the Financial Agreement. On 12 May, Ms Pengelly had written a minute to Mr Bicknell confirming that the meeting would be held. The promise to meet and the fact that the fortnightly payments continued was likely to have allayed any concern on the part of the management committee at Christies Beach which might have resulted from the final paragraph of the letter. That was in fact the evidence of Ms McSkimming and Dr Baum. I find that it did allay any concerns about not signing the Financial Agreement. In addition to allaying any concerns, the withdrawal of the offer meant that the shelters were unable to sign the Agreement. The means to do so had been withdrawn.
A letter in the same terms as the letter dated 15 May to Christies Beach had been sent to North Adelaide on the same day. Thus, clear and unequivocal promises had been made to both shelters that the Minister would meet representatives of both shelters once the Review Committee had reported. The meeting would discuss issues related to funding and the Agreement. The meeting was never held. I will return to that issue.
It should not be thought that during these months the staff of Christies Beach were neglecting the management and administration of the Shelter. Steps were being taken to improve the Shelter's premises. There is no suggestion that services were not being provided to women during this period. In addition, other issues were being attended to by the Shelter such as arrangements concerning long service leave and discussions with the Minister concerning the collection of data for the SAAP Program. The issue of data collection was not particularly contentious. However, additional funding was sought for the purpose.
I return to the events which led to the Report's criticism of the Christies Beach Shelter.
A meeting had been arranged for 1 May between Dr Cornwall, Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson. The meeting did not proceed as Ms Anderson was unable to attend because of a bereavement in her family. The meeting was re-arranged for 12 May. The previous meeting of the Review Committee had been held on 6 April. Obviously, at some time after that meeting, Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson had decided to seek a meeting with Dr Cornwall. According to Mrs Roberts' diary, the next meeting of the Review Committee was also to be held on 12 May. It appears that it was held after the meeting with Dr Cornwall.
On 4 May, Dr Cornwall had been informed of allegations concerning the Christies Beach Shelter. They were listed in a document prepared by Ms Anderson which was handed to him that day.
On 11 May 1987, Mrs Roberts sent a note to Ms Wighton. The memorandum had been prepared by Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson. It read:
"Issues to be discussed with the Minister at 11.30 a.m., Tuesday May 12th. (G.R.E.). Interview will be attended by Judith Roberts and Harrison Anderson.
1. Long-standing allegations about administrative malpractice and professional abuses at the Christies Beach Women's Shelter.
- implications for the report (i.e. what action the Department might be prepared to take and, therefore, how best the report could suit the purpose.)
* Memo regarding the allegations has been prepared.
- implications for the tenor and style of the report.
e.g. (a) in general terms, as initially directed, without naming any shelters,
(b) naming shelters and adding more detail (apart from historical context material).
Both of the above approaches have certain advantages according to the chosen mode of release."
("G.R.E." is a reference to the Guardian Royal Exchange Building where the meeting was to be held.) The comment "*Memo regarding the allegations has been prepared" is a reference to the memorandum prepared by Ms Anderson and see by Dr Cornwall on 4 May. There is no evidence when Ms Wighton saw that note. It is reasonable to infer from its contents that it was intended that she should see it before the meeting with Dr Cornwall on 12 May. I find that she did.
In the course of her evidence, Mrs Roberts asserted that the Review Committee was independent of the Department. This memorandum belies that evidence. In the paragraph which is numbered 1, the expression "the purpose" in the phrase how best the Report could suit the purpose plainly refers to the Department and its purpose. In other words, Mrs Roberts is asking Ms Wighton how the Report could serve the purposes of the Department.
On the same day, 11 May 1987, Ms Wighton sent a minute to Dr Cornwall concerning the review. It reads:
"As I reported to you last Friday there has been some delay in finalizing this review due mainly to dissatisfaction in the balance of the draft earlier submitted to you. In addition Ms. Harrison Anderson has had a death in her family and has been unable to work on the revised report for nearly 2 weeks.
At my last meeting with Judith Roberts and Harrison Anderson I relayed to them your message that you were not happy to receive two completely separate reports:
1. A bland blue print for the future with little evidence of shelters' mismanagement, and
2. A detailed account of financial inaccuracies in the shelters handling of money.
I suggested to them that the way to handle this difficult matter was to present to the Minister a full report containing all the information that should be put to the Minister as a result of the review; and that after you have read it you would decide for yourself which sections could be made public and which sections might need to be kept confidential.
It does seem likely that some of the details of strange financial behaviour may not be able to be substantiated in a court of law and might therefore need to be handled differently from the body of the report.
Another slight difficulty is the necessity to have a unanimous endorsement by the Review Committee of the financial report. There is no doubt in my mind that the shelters will exploit any indication of disagreement between members of the Review Committee.
Judith Roberts and Harrison Anderson and I will be meeting you at 11.30a.m. Tuesday, 12th May to discuss these particular matters." [Original emphasis.]
It was seen by Dr Cornwall on 11 May. It will be noticed that Ms Wighton again refers to a draft report which had been submitted earlier to Dr Cornwall. This is further confirmation of the fact that Dr Cornwall had received a draft report. The reference to "the balance of the draft earlier submitted to you" suggests that Dr Cornwall may have received the draft in more than one part. It is unnecessary to resolve this question. It does not appear to affect the issues in this action.
The meeting with Dr Cornwall took place on 12 May 1987. No record of this meeting was proved. No one present could recall whether any note or other record of the meeting was made. If Ms Anderson had made a note, it would have been destroyed along with all other records of the Committee that she handed to the Department. The evidence shows, and I find, that those present at the meeting included at least Dr Cornwall, Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton, Ms Anderson, and Ms Pengelly. According to Dr Cornwall's diary, he had another appointment at noon. I find that the meeting occupied at least one half hour. The meeting discussed the allegations. It was also decided there should be one report and that the allegations concerning Christies Beach should be included in it.
The meeting also discussed withdrawing funding from Christies Beach. Dr Cornwall said that he would have been surprised if it had not been discussed and the evidence shows that it was. Mrs Roberts had prepared a memorandum dated 12 May 1987 addressed to Dr Cornwall. I find that it was handed to Dr Cornwall at the meeting. Mrs Roberts' memorandum reads:
"Regarding requests for advances made by Christies Beach and North Adelaide Women's Shelters:
In accordance with the confirmed recommendations of the Review Committee regarding the payment of advances, I recommend that no future advances be made in respect of predictable expenditure (i.e. ordinary operating costs).
In particular, advances should not be made across financial years as this effectively results in those shelters receiving more money than they have been granted for that year."
Neither Mrs Roberts nor any other member of the Review Committee could satisfactorily explain how Mrs Roberts had authority to make these recommendations. There is nothing in the Committee's Terms of Reference which expressly give that power. The recommendations are remarkably similar to those in Ms Wighton's minute to Dr Cornwall dated 8 May.
I find that at the meeting of 12 May it was decided to withdraw funding from Christies Beach, not immediately, but at a later time. Dr Cornwall said that it had only been decided to make contingency plans against the day when funding might be withdrawn. I reject that evidence. I will state the reasons for these conclusions a little later.
As soon as she returned from the meeting, Ms Wighton instructed Mr Bicknell to seek advice from the Crown Solicitor whether there was sufficient evidence to initiate legal action against the Christies Beach Shelter. She informed him that she was doing so at the direction of the Minister. Her instruction to Mr Bicknell was contained in a handwritten note dated 12 May which read:
"The Minister has asked us to contact the Crown Solicitor and get an early opinion about whether we have enough material about Christies Bch Shelter (financial and in reltn (sic) to harassment) to initiate legal action. He wants to get this moving without delay so that he has some idea by the time he receives the final Review in two weeks or so. Could you please prepare the paper work for the Cr. Sol?"
On the same day, the Department began to make enquiries to find alternative accommodation for a shelter in the southern suburbs of Adelaide. The enquiries were directed to the South Australian Housing Trust. The Housing Trust kept a file concerning the Christies Beach Shelter. A file note reads:
"How's this for a bombshell! I've just been advised in confidence that DCW is considering taking steps to defund Christies Beach Women's Shelter due to financial mismanagement, poor treatment of clients etc. I was asked if Trust would assist with alternative accommodation if defunding proceeds and a new Management Committee is formed. I advised that we would help but stressed that we did not want to be seen to be taking sides in what is really a DCW/DCS administrative matter and would therefore not take steps to evict CBWS from the five properties they lease from the Trust, if they continue to pay rent and operate a service."
The note was written by Mr David Cunnew and, though addressed to the Acting Assistant General Manager, found its way to Mr Paul Edwards, the General Manager of the Housing Trust.
Another file note a few days later in the Housing Trust file records a conversation with Mr Bicknell. The note comprises a series of short phrases. It is clearly a record of a conversation with Mr Bicknell. It reads:
- Examination by C'mee - headed by Judith Roberts.
- C/Beach under close scrutiny - Corp Affairs also involved.
Cmee reports to MCW near future - inefficiency, poor admin, apart from one shelter more than compensated for by vol. Work (good will) commitment of staff-
C/Beach - serious breaches of law (Criminal Law & Assoc Inc Act). MCW → Chief Sec & MCA to take action in concert. MCW writing to MCS rec. defunding.
Personal allegations about conduct of administrator.
Financial - poor records - over expended - Staff benefiting directly from Shelter funds.
MCW feel CBWS no longer safe place for women & children.
Timing - MCW to meet & discuss allegations with F. Baume (sic) - encourage transfer of existing facilities to new c'mee. Fall back in the event of a 'lock out'."
The author of the note could not be identified. The note is not dated but it is clear that it was written before another note dated 27 May to which I refer in the next paragraph. The note does indicate that an officer of the Department had provided full information concerning the proposed report to officers of the Housing Trust. Mr Bicknell said that he could not remember that conversation. He agreed, however, that there was urgency. He said that he and his staff would have been stressing to the Housing Trust that the Department would like to find out where it stood as urgently as possible. His evidence was that the Housing Trust was making contingency plans in case the Minister decided to withdraw funds from the Shelter. I reject that evidence for the reasons I will give in a moment. In addition, this note and the note in the next paragraph speak of an intention to withdraw funding very soon. Mr Bicknell's evidence was that the persons in the non-government welfare unit who, on 12 or 13 May would have been aware of these matters, were Ms Wighton, Ms Adrienne Summers, Ms Meredyth Taylor, and himself.
The Housing Trust file also includes a confidential memorandum dated 27 May from Mr Halkett, the Acting Assistant General Manager, Housing Services to Mr Edwards, the General Manager of the Housing Trust. It reads:
"You will recall David's note of a couple of days ago re Christies Beach Women's Shelter.
Contact today from D.C.W. and John Luckens indicates that Mr. Cornwall is going to move this week and that the allegations are extremely serious! They have asked for us to provide an alternative facility should they need to set up a new Shelter overnight. I have pointed out the obvious difficulties and said that at best we might be able to find a pair of double units somewhere around Mitchell Park as a temporary measure. I have assured them of the best possible co-operation and I suspect that 'bricks and mortar' will be the least of their worries."
I find that "David" refers to David Cunnew, who had written the first file note. Mr John Luckens, who is mentioned in the second paragraph of this confidential memorandum, was the Ministerial Advisor to the Minister for Housing. Mr Bicknell had dealings from time to time with Mr Halkett. He could not remember whether he had spoken to him on 27 May. Whether it was Mr Bicknell or someone else who spoke to Mr Halkett does not matter. It is clear that an officer from the Department of Community Welfare had passed on this information. The Housing Trust had at least two properties ready by 27 May.
Mr Bicknell had made an appointment to see Mr Philip Jackson, a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor's office, on 14 May. The meeting had been arranged in consequence of Ms Wighton's instruction on 12 May. Ms Summers went with him to that meeting. Mr Bicknell took with him a list of allegations and a file relating to those allegations. Mr Jackson advised that the Department should withdraw the offer to sign the Financial Agreement from both the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters. It was pursuant to that advice that Mr Bicknell had sent the letter dated 15 May mentioned above to Christies Beach withdrawing the offer to sign the Financial Agreement but promising the meeting with the Minister.
The Departmental file contained two handwritten notes. The notes are not dated. It is not clear whether they are one document or two related documents. Mr Bicknell identified the handwriting as being that of Ms Adrienne Summers. The notes record steps to be taken prior to the withdrawal of funding from Christies Beach and persons who would need to be contacted in respect of particular matters associated with the withdrawal of funding. I find that the notes were made either during the meeting with Mr Jackson or shortly before or after it and are clearly a plan of intended action. Mr Bicknell said that he would have discussed the matters mentioned in those notes with her.
On 19 May, Mrs Roberts spoke with Ms Anderson. On 21 May, Mrs Roberts spoke with Ms Pengelly. On 22 May, Mrs Roberts had lunch with Mrs King. No one could clearly recall what occurred at those meetings and I pass over them.
On 26 May, Mr Bicknell and Mr Jackson met Dr Cornwall. Mr Bicknell believed that it was probable that Ms Vardon and Ms Wighton were also present at the meeting. I find that they were as the issues being discussed were very important. The only document which refers to this meeting is a minute to Ms Pengelly prepared by Mr Bicknell. The document is undated but the content of the minute indicates that it would have been written after Mr Bicknell had seen Mr Jackson on 14 May and before the meeting on 26 May. By this time, all files had been given to Mr Jackson in the Crown Law Office and he was ready to advise. It reads:
"In preparation for meeting with the Minister on 26/5/87 all files and available material has been sent to Mr Phil Jackson from Crown Law. Mr Jackson is expecting to gain the Minister's advice at this meeting but has been unable to prepare a written opinion at this stage.
The attached list of allegations and concerns was compiled by Ms Anderson and seen by the Minister on 4/5/87. I have provided this list to Mr Jackson and suggested that it would provide an appropriate checklist for discussing the allegations with the Minister.
Attached also is a chronological summary of allegations and various statements and summaries which the Minister might find useful in evaluating the nature of the evidence."
The chronological summary and other documents referred to in the last paragraph could not be located. Presumably, they are some of the documents which have been lost or destroyed. Mr Bicknell's recollection is, and I find, that there were discussions about the allegations against the management and the staff at Christies Beach, that Mr Jackson gave advice to Dr Cornwall who then decided to refer the allegations to the police and to the Corporate Affairs Commission for investigation.
I find that the meeting on 26 May discussed the issues concerning Christies Beach. No record of this meeting was proved. However, on 29 May Ms Vardon sent a long minute to Dr Cornwall. This is an important minute. Because of its importance and because it was not the practice for Ms Vardon to draft minutes to Dr Cornwall, I find that it was prepared by Ms Wighton. That finding is consistent with the evidence of Mr Bicknell. Despite its length, it is desirable to set it out in full:
RE: WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY SHELTER, CHRISTIES BEACH
The Department has been concerned for some time about management practices and administration of the Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach together with complaints alleging unprofessional behaviour of certain staff at the shelter. The Committee Reviewing the administration of Women's Shelters, which has received further allegations in the course of its work, has conducted enquiries and reviewed the files of the Department. The Committee has brought to the Department's attention a number of matters of serious concern. These concerns involve poor administrative practices over several years and allegations of serious professional misconduct made by certain clients and staff of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, and by other workers in the district. The allegations and other information have been made available to the Crown Solicitor's Office, who advise that further investigation is warranted and recommend that investigations should be requested from the Commissioner of Police (to investigate allegations of physical and emotional abuse) and the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs (to investigate allegations of mis-appropriation of assets and other practices which may be in breach of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985).
As mentioned above, the Department has for some time been seriously concerned about the lack of accountability and poor management practices of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach. They have continuously overspent their budget and have not been prepared to undertake proper budgetary and accounting procedures so as to ensure proper care is taken of the government funds. The shelter has continually refused to sign a financial undertaking, which undertaking would bind the shelter to spend government funds for the purposes for which they were granted. Their failure to sign the financial undertaking is a serious breach of the Commonwealth/State Guidelines and, together with their failure to respond adequately to the Department's request for proper accounting practices and their long-standing deficits, are the basis for the Department now recommending that funds be withdrawn from the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, as of 30/6/87.
The Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, has considerable assets, the majority of which have been purchased with government funds. These include a vehicle and various items of equipment and furnishings. The buildings and fixed assets are the property of the South Australian Housing Trust. The equipment and furnishings etc are the property of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach and the Department has received legal advice that the disposal or transfer of such assets is the prerogative of the Management Committee, or, in the event of the organisation winding up, on a vote of 2/3 of the members of the Association.
It would clearly be in the best interests of the clients for there to be a smooth transfer of all equipment and property to a new iterim (sic) Management Committee to be appointed to run the service for a 12 month period to allow all matters to be settled and a new Management Committee to be established. To this end, it is the Department's intention that, should a decision to defund be accepted, a meeting be urgently convened with Dr Fran Baum, Chairperson of the Management Committee, to inform her of the seriousness of the situation and seek her co-operation in effecting a smooth transfer.
The employment status of current staff is the responsibility of the current Management Committee who would need to act appropriately, according to the information and finances available to them. The Department's officers are prepared to assist the Committee, if requested, to minimise the impact on staff, bearing in mind that certain investigations are to be undertaken which may have various implications for one or more staff members.
To effect the smoothest possible transition, the Department will provide an interim service through Crisis Care and will appoint a Senior Project Officer, located with Crisis Care, to act as interim administrator of the new service. This person will be responsible for the establishment of whatever interim service is needed to ensure the needs of the clients are met during the interim period.
The Department and the South Australian Housing Trust have several houses available for accommodating women and children and will make other necessary arrangements, eg., furnishings.
1. That the Police Commissioner be requested to undertake investigations into allegations of possible misuse of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach funds, violent behaviour and intimidation by Ms Dawn Rowan, Administrator, Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach.
2. That the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs be requested to undertake investigations into the affairs of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, to ascertain whether or not there have been breaches of the Associations Incorporation Act.
3. The SAAP funding for the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, be suspended as of 30/6/87 and that the concurrence for this de-funding be sought from the Minister of Community Services.
4. That the Department make interim arrangements to provide an alternative service for clients of this shelter.
5. That Dr Baum, Chairperson of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, be informed of the situation and steps be taken to secure the assets for the future use of women and children, victims of domestic violence.
6. That an interim Management Committee be set up immediately for the purpose of establishing the new centre and giving oversight to the management of the service, and that up to 3 months funding, from the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, be made available at the discretion of the Department."
It was seen by Dr Cornwall the same day. He endorsed the minute approving recommendations 1 and 2. He added two directions to the Department. They were first, that fortnightly funding to Christies Beach should continue pending the final recommendations of the Review Committee or further information. The second was to ask his officers to ensure that officers of the Commonwealth Department of Community Services briefed their Minister.
The fact that Dr Cornwall did not accept the recommendation to withdraw funding after 30 June is not inconsistent with my finding that on 12 May it had been decided to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter in the near future. As already mentioned, Dr Cornwall had to wait for the report of the Review Committee to be completed. He did not know when that would occur. Only then, could he, as a matter of political reality, seek the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister to the decision to withdraw funding. So far as recommendations 4, 5, and 6 are concerned, the evidence shows that the interim arrangements to provide an alternative service were well advanced by 29 May.
On 29 May, Dr Cornwall sent one minute to the Chief Secretary and another to Mr Sumner, the Minister for Corporate Affairs. The minutes were in similar terms but it is desirable to set out each. They request investigation of the staff at the Christies Beach Shelter by the police and the Corporate Affairs Commission.
RE: ALLEGATIONS, WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY SHELTER, CHRISTIES BEACH
I have recently appointed a Committee to review the administration of Women's Shelters in South Australia. While that Committee has yet to hand down its report, I have received information with respect to the operation of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, which gives me cause for great concern. Allegations of conduct which may constitute criminal behaviour on the part of members of staff have been made. Accordingly, I ask that you arrange for the Commissioner of Police to make available sufficient officers to enable a thorough investigation to be undertaken into these allegations.
In the first instance, contact should be made with Ms Harrison Anderson, a consultant to the Review Committee, who could provide further information.
I am concerned that some women who have provided information to the Review Committee have indicated that they are in fear of their safety and that Ms Anderson herself has expressed similar concerns to me. This factor should be borne in mind when the investigation is being carried out and I would ask that all possible protection be afforded to Ms Anderson and other persons assisting in the investigation.
The Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach is operated by an Association incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985, and I have also requested the Minister of Corporate Affairs to arrange for the Corporate Affairs Commission to undertake an investigation for the purposes of the Act, as there are allegations of financial mis-management by the Association. Because of this there should be liaison between the two agencies in the conduct of the investigation."
The minute of the Minister of Corporate Affairs, Mr Sumner, was in these terms:
RE: REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION : WOMEN'S AND CHILDREN'S EMERGENCY SHELTER, CHRISTIES BEACH
I have recently appointed a Committee to review the administration of Women's Shelters in South Australia. While that Committee is yet to hand down its report I have received information with respect to the operation of Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach, which gives me cause for great concern. Allegations have been made that indicate that staff may have been using funds of the incorporated association for their own purposes. As employees may also be members of the Management Committee, breaches of Sections 55 and 58 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 may have occurred. Difficulties have been experienced in obtaining properly audited accounts. This suggests that the association may be in breach of Section 222 of the Act.
The Shelter is operated by an Association incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985, and I request that you arrange for the Corporate Affairs Commission to undertake an investigation for the purposes of that Act.
In the first instance, contact should be made with Ms Harrison Anderson, a consultant to the Review Committee, who could provide further information.
As there are allegations of conduct that may constitute criminal behaviour on behalf of members of staff I have requested that investigations be undertaken by the Commissioner of Police. It is therefore important that the two agencies liaise in the conduct of the investigation."
On the same day, that is on 29 May, Ms Vardon complemented her Minister's actions by writing letters to the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs asking each to investigate the allegations. The letters were in almost identical terms. The only difference was in the fourth paragraph where Ms Vardon mentions the Minister to whom Dr Cornwall had written. I set out only the letter to the Commissioner of Police which was in these terms:
"The Minister of Community Welfare, the Hon. John Cornwall recently appointed a Committee to review the administration of women's shelters in South Australia. During the time of the review, the Minister has been made aware of allegations that staff of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter at Christies Beach may have been using funds of the incorporated association for their own purposes.
I am writing to request that you undertake investigations into allegations of possible misuse of the Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter, Christies Beach funds, violent behaviour and intimidation by Ms. Dawn Rowan, Administrator of the Shelter. I am also writing to the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs to request that he investigate the Shelter to ascertain whether or not there have been breaches of the Associations Incorporation Act.
I will arrange a full briefing for your staff at your convenience. We are anxious that the Shelter is not made prematurely aware of the investigation before it has been co-ordinated with all the appropriate agencies. I will ring you to discuss this matter further.
The Minister has written to the Chief Secretary seeking an official police investigation and to the Minister for Corporate Affairs seeking an official investigation into possible misuse of funds of the incorporated association.
Papers relating to this matter are attached for your information."
I find that the minute dated 29 May deals with matters which were discussed at the meeting on 26 May. I do so notwithstanding that it does not purport to be a record of that meeting and concludes with recommendations to Dr Cornwall. There is an earlier example of a minute being prepared after the event. It is Ms Wighton's minute of 14 November 1986 recommending that a Review Committee be established, a minute written some three weeks after the announcement of the establishment of the Committee. I find that this is another minute written after the event. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that on 29 May, the same day as the minute was written, Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon made their respective requests for investigations by the police and the Corporate Affairs Commission. The Department knew of Dr Cornwall's intentions because of what had transpired at the meeting on 26 May. Obviously, the minutes from Dr Cornwall to the Chief Secretary and to the Minister for Consumer Affairs were sent with the minute of 29 May. It is therefore apparent that the Department knew that Dr Cornwall wanted these investigations to be made and sent the minutes for his signature. They were signed on 29 May. To put the matter shortly, so much occurred on 29 May that the plain probability is that it had been discussed and decided on 26 May.
I find also that the recommendations reflect what action the meeting had decided would be taken in respect of Christies Beach. However, it was plainly not possible to implement everything at that stage. For example, Dr Cornwall had to wait for the Report of the Review Committee to be completed. He did not know when that would occur. In addition, he knew that he had to seek the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister to the decision to withdraw funding because the SAAP Guidelines required that a decision to withdraw funding from an existing shelter had to be a joint decision of the Commonwealth and State Ministers. Clearly, he could not seek that concurrence until the Report had been completed and was ready for publication. That was the political reality. That was why he was prepared to approve recommendations 1 and 2 which enabled the investigations of the Shelter to proceed, but he did not approve the withdrawal of funding and instead directed that funding by fortnightly payments continue.
Although Dr Cornwall did not approve recommendations 4 and 6, the evidence clearly shows that interim arrangements to provide an alternative women's shelter were quite well advanced at this stage. Women were being approached in late May to act as the chairperson of the management committee of a new shelter and by the end of May the Department knew that the Housing Trust could provide alternative accommodation. The funding of the new shelter could be provided when required. Ms Vardon's evidence was the Department could not act contrary to a ministerial direction. However, the arrangements had already been put in train and Dr Cornwall did not endorse the minute in a way which either countermanded what had been done, or prevented the Department from continuing to pursue the arrangements.
Dr Cornwall's evidence was that even at 29 May he was hoping that the Christies Beach Shelter would sign the Financial Agreement. He said that was why he did not accept all of the recommendations. He said that no decision had been made to withdraw funding either at the meeting on 12 May or on 26 May, although it was under consideration. He added that the arrangements for alternative accommodation were only contingency plans. I do not accept that evidence for the reasons which follow.
At the meeting on 12 May it had been decided to include the unsubstantiated allegations and other criticisms of Christies Beach in the Report. The only logical reason for doing so was that it was intended to withdraw funding from the Shelter. If funding was to be withdrawn, it was unnecessary to include the allegations. I find that on 12 May Dr Cornwall decided that he would, in due course, withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. That decision was confirmed at the meeting on 26 May. The reason why Dr Cornwall did not endorse the recommendation to withdraw funding in the minute of 29 May was that he knew that he had to wait for the Report of the Review Committee. It was clear to all that the decision to withdraw funding and to establish a new shelter could not finally made until the Report, which contained his reasons for withdrawing funding, was ready for publication and Dr Cornwall had the concurrence of his federal counterpart. The only decision which remained to be made was when the decision to withdraw funding would be announced. The events which followed the meeting of 12 May might be consistent with a decision to make contingency plans against the day when funding might be withdrawn, but they are more consistent with the fact that the meeting on 12 May had decided to withdraw funding. The conclusion that Dr Cornwall made his decision in May is reinforced by the fact that after 29 May, the Christies Beach Shelter was treated in a way quite different from the shelter at North Adelaide. The conclusion is also confirmed by Ms King's evidence that arrangements for a shelter to replace the Christies Beach Shelter were being made before she signed the report. In addition, Dr Cornwall was going overseas on 8 July. He wanted the matter resolved before he left. There was no evidence of any meeting before he left on 8 July with either the Department or the Review Committee after the meeting on 26 May nor of any documents in which he decided to withdraw funding. Dr Cornwall met Mrs Roberts, once in June and once in July, but she had no authority in relation to funding. That points to the conclusion that he decided on both 12 May and 26 May that he intended to withdraw funding subject to the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister. Finally, as Mr Vardon said at this time, it was clear that the Christies Beach Shelter had no intention of complying with the financial constraints which the Department required (which plainly included signing the Financial Agreement) and the Department had come to the end of the road.
The police and the CAC responded quickly to the requests of Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon of 29 May. On 2 June Ms Anderson and Mr Bicknell met police officers and officers from the CAC. Dr Cornwall's Ministerial advisor, Ms Pengelly was also present. The only record of this meeting is a minute from Mr Bicknell to Ms Vardon which bears two dates, 11 June and 12 June. The relevant part reads:
On 29/5/87, the Minister of Community Welfare wrote to both the Chief Secretary and the Minister of Corporate Affairs requesting investigations into allegations relating to the Christies Beach Women's Shelter and Ms Dawn Rowan, the Shelter's Administrator.
On 2/6/87, Ms Harrison Anderson, Ms Wendy Heath, Ms Ann Pengelly and Mr Peter Bicknell met with senior officials of the Corporate Affairs Commission and the Police. Ms Anderson and Ms Heath gave detailed statements and provided available documentation on allegations. Ms Pengelly and Mr Bicknell stressed the importance of the matter to the Minister, especially the allegations of threats and harassment to clients.
After hearing the allegations and reading the documentation available at that time, the Police and Corporate Affairs investigators' response can be summarised as follows -
(1) Further investigation would be undertaken initially by more careful reading of the files and written letters and statements.
(2) Corporate Affairs requested comprehensive documentation from DCW files of all records and reports relating to Christies Beach.
(3) The Police stated that, on the basis of the available written material and the statements of Ms Harrison and Ms Heath, they would not be in a position to proceed further at that stage. They would be prepared to reconsider this in the light of:
[b] further evidence becoming available (especially substantiated complaints), or
[c] criminal offences being uncovered through the Corporate Affairs investigation to which they would be a party.
(4) Officers of the Corporate Affairs Commission understood to undertake further investigation under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985. They expressed concern however, that the majority of the allegations related to events prior to June 1985 and would therefore be considered in respect to the previous Act which they considered was weak in many respects and had not proven to be an adequate basis for prosecution."
Ms Vardon sent the minute immediately to Dr Cornwall who read and noted it on 12 June. He added an endorsement in these terms:
"D.G. asked to request Police Commissioner to reconsider information/allegations re behaviour of the Administrator, Christies Beach."
This direction to Ms Vardon to ask the Commissioner to reconsider the information was directed at the plaintiff, in contrast with his earlier letter to the Chief Secretary which had asked that the staff of the Shelter be investigated. The intention to target the plaintiff is apparent also in the first paragraph of the minute.
Mr Bicknell's minute was not the first occasion on which Dr Cornwall had been advised that the allegations might not have substance. In a minute to Dr Cornwall dated 10 June 1987 and read by Dr Cornwall the same day, Mr Bicknell informed him that on 11 June the investigation of the financial management of the Christies Beach Shelter by CAC would begin. The minute included this paragraph:
"At this stage, it is not believed that criminal offences have been committed, although investigation of the shelter records may later provide this information. This means the investigation will proceed under the Associations and (sic) Incorporations Act."
Dr Cornwall received a third intimation that it might be difficult to obtain evidence about the unsubstantiated allegations in a minute from Ms Vardon dated 19 June and read by him the same day. The minute reported on a meeting with the Police Commissioner. It read:
"Peter Bicknell and I spoke with Mr. Hunt yesterday and went through the information that had been raised by the Review Committee and Harrison Anderson. We told him of the advice from Inspector Fricker that the evidence would be difficult to obtain. We advised him as well that Corporate Affairs was taking action.
Mr. Hunt said he would have difficulty trying to determine what sort of charges could be laid if evidence could be obtained from reliable sources but he understood the Minister's responsibility to have at least an initial investigation carried out by the police. He will arrange for all possible leads to be followed up.
Mr. Hunt will ask Inspector Fricker to arrange for Judith Roberts and others to be interviewed."
Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell could add little to what was recorded in that note, although Mr Bicknell said that he believed that the Commissioner of Police said words to the effect "that it might be difficult to establish the allegations". The minute is little more than a reminder of the earlier advice on this issue and informs the Minister that the police investigation is proceeding. Standing alone, it might have little weight. However, when read with the two previous minutes which had mentioned difficulties in obtaining evidence, it ought to have sounded a warning to Dr Cornwall to be careful in the use to be made of the unsubstantiated allegations. It is clear that it did not or, if it did, he did not heed it.
A meeting of the Review Committee was to have been held on 5 June but it was cancelled. The next meeting was held on 9 June. There was no evidence explaining the change of date. I do not think anything turns on this change in the date of the meeting.
On 8 or 9 June, an officer of the Department of Community Welfare had asked Dr Baum and Helen McSkimming to attend a meeting at the offices of the Department on 11 June with Ms Vardon. Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming both attended the meeting. When they arrived they found that, in addition to Ms Vardon, there were also present Ms Wighton, Ms King and Mr Bicknell. The only documents concerning this meeting are Mr Bicknell's minute to Ms Vardon which bears two dates 11 June and 12 June and a letter commenting on the meeting written by the Shelter on 18 June. Mr Bicknell's minute is the minute mentioned in the last paragraph but one which had reported on the police investigations. That part of the minute which dealt with the meeting on 11 June was in these terms:
On 11/6/87, the Chief Executive Officer (Ms Sue Vardon) convened a meeting of Dr Fran Baum (Chairperson, Christies Beach Women's Shelter) and Ms Helen McSkimming (Acting Administrator), Ms Wighton (Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Programs), Ms Robyn King (Department of Community Services) and Mr Peter Bicknell (Non-Government Welfare Unit).
Ms Vardon outlined the concerns of the department in respect to this shelter and the Administrator. She particularly stressed the serious nature of the allegations and the necessity for the Minister, having been informed of such allegations, to instigate proper investigation.
Ms Wighton and Ms King then explained the concerns that had arisen through the Review of the Administration of Women's Shelters relating to financial accountability, alleged mismanagement of funds and the professional conduct of the Administrator and allegations of harassment and intimidation. Mr Bicknell gave some detail to these concerns and raised their refusal to sign the Financial Agreement.
Dr Baum stated that the Management Committee had nothing to hide and would co-operate with any enquiries.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Senior Detective Russell Gibb and Company Investigator, John Guest, served notice on Dr Baum requesting that specified records be provided to Corporate Affairs by 10 am 15/6/87. Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming stated that they would comply with this request.
Mr Guest stated that, depending on what they found, their enquiries could be expected to take between 2 and 6 weeks."
The minute is reasonably accurate but does not convey the fact that the meeting was planned or the flavour of the meeting. Generally speaking, there is a reasonable degree of unanimity in the evidence concerning what occurred at the meeting. Where there is any inconsistency, I prefer the evidence of Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming because the meeting, plainly, had a grave effect on them so that the course of the meeting would be likely to be the more fixed in their recollection.
It is quite apparent that the meeting had been planned and with a degree of secrecy since Ms King was not aware of the fact that officers of the CAC would be present until shortly before the meeting. Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming were not aware that they were going to be informed of allegations or required to produce documents. All they had been told was that the meeting was to discuss the affairs of the Christies Beach Shelter.
The meeting opened with Ms Vardon giving a broad background to the reasons for the meeting and of the allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter and the plaintiff. She then left the meeting. I find that Ms Wighton then ran the meeting and that the discussion mainly involved Ms Wighton and Dr Baum. As Ms King said, she did not take an active role but left the running of the meeting to Ms Wighton.
The main emphasis of the allegations concerned the financial mismanagement of the Shelter, but some mention was also made of the allegations against the plaintiff of professional misconduct. The allegations were put in a very vague way. Dr Baum repeatedly sought details but they were not provided. She ascertained little more than that most of the allegations were not current. The Shelter's refusal to sign the Financial Agreement was mentioned. Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming were informed that the refusal to sign did not put the Shelter in a good light. This was a curious observation given that Ms Wighton must have known that Dr Cornwall had withdrawn the offer to sign the Financial Agreement and had promised to meet representatives of both the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters. The shelters had been informed of that in Mr Bicknell's letter of 15 May. It is the more curious given that Mr Bicknell was also present at this meeting. There was no suggestion that the funding of the Shelter was under threat or that there was any risk that its funding might be withdrawn, a fact confirmed by Mr Bicknell in his evidence. Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming were clearly surprised and taken aback by the allegations, the more so when the CAC officers entered and requested a long list of documents. It is clear that Dr Baum expressed the willingness of the Shelter to co-operate with the enquiry. The meeting lasted a little more than one hour.
The list of documents sought by the CAC officers was extensive. It sought the following documents for a five year period from 1 July 1982 to 30 May 1987. The documents were:
Receipt books
Cash books showing payments and receipts
Cheque butts
Bank statements for bank accounts in the name of Christies Beach Women's Shelter Inc
Bank deposit books for all accounts held by the shelter
Ledger cards
Paid creditors invoices
Employee wage records
Weekly pay sheets
Financial returns
Auditor's reports
Assets register
Committee minute book
Minutes of annual general meetings
Members' register
The request was, in effect, for all of the financial records of the Shelter over a period of five years. Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming produced the documents to the CAC officers on Monday, 15 June, four days after the request had been made. The documents filled 12 large boxes. This was a commendable response. The CAC later requested other documents and they were supplied.
I find that this meeting was not the meeting which had been recommended in the fifth recommendation in the minute of 29 May because Dr Baum was not informed of the intention to withdraw funding nor was she asked to do anything to secure the assets of the Shelter for future use. Instead, the purpose of the meeting was to assist the CAC investigation. The allegations were mentioned in a vague way for the purpose of seeking to justify the request for the documents. The propriety of this meeting is open to question but I do not stay with that issue.
On 18 June 1987, the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter wrote to Ms Vardon complaining of the way in which the meeting had been conducted and the vagueness of the unsubstantiated allegations. The relevant parts of the letter read:
"We are writing in regard to the meeting held on Thursday June 11, with several members of your Department and our Chairperson and Acting Administrator.
We have several very serious concerns about the process which was adopted in informing us of your complaints, and the manner in which, from our perspective, unsubstantiated allegations have been made.
Firstly, the committee was alarmed that the meeting was called, with no information whatsoever about what was to be discussed being given. With two days notice only, our chairperson was requested to attend the meeting by a clerical officer, and was not able to find out its purpose, although several phone calls were made and messages left in an effort to determine the substance of the meeting.
We are also most dissatisfied with the conduct of the meeting. Vague statements were made of alleged misuse of funds, but no specific numbers of complaints, nature of complaints, dates or names of informants were given to us. We were informed that these complaints were not relating to the last two years, and are aware that questions were raised several years ago which we believe were answered satisfactorily at that time. We now question why these matters have been raised again, after so many years, and why our responses which were assumingly satisfactory at that time, are now being re-examined.
We are surprised at the heavy-handed way in which the meeting was conducted. The refusal to provide us with information has left us very confused about the exact nature of the allegations. From our point of view, we are being subjected to very serious scrutiny on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations and innuendo. We are unable to respond in a meaningful way while we do not have clear documentation of the alleged improprieties.
We have no clear indication as to the nature of the matters Corporate Affairs are investigating, and feel this procedure was unnecessary, given that we have said repeatedly to various members of the Department that our books are available at any time for examination. In fact, on at least 3 occasions in the last 5 years, DCW financial officers have examined our books and been unable to find any impropriety or misuse of funds. Suggestions of police involvement also surprised us, as we see no basis for police investigation into the allegations.
The committee would have expected that there would be established procedures for an enquiry of this importance, including clear guidelines regarding documentation of interviews, verification of allegations and formal reporting of the findings. As discussed at the meeting on 11/6/87, the committee will expect a formal, written record of the outcome of the investigations.
The committee would very much welcome the opportunity to discuss these concerns with you, as we feel we need further clarification and explanation of the substance of this enquiry. Members of our committee can meet with you at a time convenient to you, but see this as a matter of some urgency. Please contact the Chairperson on 326 0433 or 224 5135 to arrange a suitable time."
I find that, to the extent that this letter refers to what had occurred at the meeting, those events did occur. The letter shows that Ms Wighton, who conducted the meeting, knew that the allegations were at least two years old. The complaints expressed in the letter were justified, particularly given the nature of the allegations and the unwillingness to give them any substance. However, the Shelter received no reply to its letter. Despite its request, no meeting was held.
On 16 June Mrs Roberts had lunch with Dr Cornwall. It was Mrs Roberts' evidence that she had lunch four to five times a year with Dr Cornwall in 1986 and 1987. She said that they had no purpose other than to meet for lunch. I find that to be a somewhat disingenuous answer. I do not accept her evidence that the issues concerning the review would not have been mentioned at that luncheon. I find that at those meetings they would discuss issues on which both were then working in one capacity or another. There is no evidence concerning what occurred at any of those meetings. Mrs Roberts also met and conferred with Dr Cornwall on 7 July, the day before he left on a trip overseas. The proximity of this meeting to the completion of the Report suggests that it was related to the Report. However, it is not possible to make any finding as to what occurred as the evidence of both Dr Cornwall and Mrs Roberts is that they could not recall what occurred.
On 22 June, the Review Committee met. This is the last meeting of the Committee recorded in Mrs Roberts' diary. I find that it was the last meeting when all members of the Review Committee were present. The evidence indicates that it was at the meeting of 22 June that the Review Committee determined upon what they believed was to be the final form of the Report. However, the Report was to undergo further amendment because of legal advice to which I will refer in a moment. But the meeting on 22 June was the last occasion at which all members of the Review Committee were present to discuss the form of the Report. I find that at that meeting they agreed upon the form of the Report as it then existed.
The letter transmitting the Report to Dr Cornwall was dated 26 June. The reader might infer that the Report had then been completed. But that was not the true position. Mrs Roberts was not then in Adelaide. On 25 June she had gone to Melbourne returning on Sunday, 28 June. The evidence shows the letter was not signed on 26 June by all members of the Review Committee.
The evidence concerning the signing of that letter is not clear. None of the members of the Review Committee or Harrison Anderson had any clear recollection when or how it was signed, or whether the letter was attached to the Report, or whether the Report was then complete. The evidence indicates that the letter was not signed at a meeting of the Committee but was circulated for that purpose. In one sense, the fact that all members of the Review Committee did not sign the Report on 26 June is of no consequence other than indicating a degree of carelessness and a lack of concern with accuracy. But it is important in another sense. As I have said, the reader might infer that the Report had been completed by 26 June but that was not the fact. Later amendments were made in consequence of legal advice and those amendments were seen and approved by only two members of the Review Committee, Mrs Roberts and Ms Wighton, and also by Ms Anderson. Neither Ms Blake, Ms Johnson nor Ms King played any further part in the preparation of the Report after the meeting on 22 June. Although they signed the letter dated 26 June believing they had approved the final report, the later amendments were made after they had signed the letter. The evidence is quite clear as to that. I turn to it.
On Friday, 26 June, Mr Selway received a request to advise the Department concerning the section in the Report dealing with the Christies Beach Shelter. The advice was required by the afternoon of Monday, 29 June. The advice had been sought by Dr Cornwall on behalf of the Department. Plainly, Mr Selway was, in truth, being asked to advise the Review Committee. The Review Committee wished to deliver the Report to Dr Cornwall as quickly as possible. It was important that they should do so because Dr Cornwall was intending to leave for a trip overseas on 7 July and he wished to have the matter dealt with by Cabinet before he left.
Mr Selway prepared the advice over the weekend. The minute of that advice was delivered to the Department on 29 June. It was handed to Ms Summers who in turn handed it to Ms Anderson. Although the advice was addressed to Ms Vardon as Director-General of the Department, it seems clear that she did not see the advice. She does not recall ever seeing it.
Privilege was waived in respect of Mr Selway's advice. He advised that the proposed publication of the Report did not give rise to liability in defamation even though the Department did not have sufficient information to prove the relevant allegations. In giving that advice, Mr Selway said that he had assumed that the allegations as to mismanagement and inadequate financial controls could be proved. He was aware that the Department did not have sufficient information to prove the allegations of improper behaviour, including theft and sexual harassment. Significantly, he assumed that malice was not present. I later find that was not the position. The advice was as follows:
"1. I am asked to urgently advise as to the possible liability in defamation if a draft report into the Women's Shelter at Christies Beach were to be published.
(a) The Minister has established a Committee to review the administration of Women's Shelters.
(b) That Committee has engaged an independent consultant to assist the Committee in such review.
(c) The Consultant has prepared the draft Report.
(d) It is proposed that the Committee will adopt the Report and forward it to the Minister.
(e) It is proposed that the Minister will submit the Report to Cabinet.
(f) It is proposed that the Minister will table the Report in Parliament.
(g) It is proposed that the Minister and Departmental officers will publish the Report to Women's Shelters and other interested bodies including the media.
3. The Report deals with various problems at the Women's Shelter. In particular:
(a) Mismanagement and inadequate financial controls. These are detailed in the Report. I assume that the particular matters identified could be proved.
(b) Allegations of improper behaviour including theft and sexual harassment. The allegations primarily relate to the Administrator. These allegations are being investigated by the police and the Corporate Affairs Commission. Without prejudging those investigations, I understand that the Department does not have sufficient information to prove any of those allegations.
4. Given the urgency of this request for advice, I will deal with the legal issues in a summary way:-
(a) In my view the Consultant has a duty to report to the Committee and the Committee has a duty to receive the Report; similarly the Committee has a duty to report to the Minister and the Minister has a duty to receive it; ditto for the Minister and Cabinet. In these circumstances, each of the Consultant, the Committee and the Minister has a qualified privilege in respect of that publication and will not be liable in defamation unless the publication was actuated by malice. I assume that malice is not present.
(b) The Minister is protected by Parliamentary privilege for anything he says or does within the Legislative Council. He cannot be sued in defamation for tabling the Report in the House.
(i) Fair press reports of the proceedings (including the Report) are absolutely privileged and the press cannot be sued in defamation (section 7 of the Wrongs Act, 1936).
(ii) Other reports of the proceedings (e.g. by the Minister or the Department) have a qualified privilege i.e. the person publishing the information may be liable in defamation if it can be shown that the publication was actuated by malice. Again, I assume that malice is not present.
(d) Publication outside of these parameters may give rise to liability in defamation.
5. Against this background, it is my view that the proposed publication of the Report will not give rise to liability in defamation even if the Department does not have sufficient information to prove the relevant allegations.
(a) Even though one may be suspicious as to the Administrator's behaviour, the Minister may wish to consider whether it is appropriate to table a Report containing unsubstantiated allegations concerning the activities of an identifiable individual or group of individuals. This has obvious implications for civil liberties. It is, however, a question relating to the Minister's Parliamentary functions and I do not advise further concerning it.
(b) The Department and the Minister have two functions in this matter:
(i) As officers of the Crown they are responsible to ensure that the laws of the State are complied with. This function has been properly discharged. The Minister has caused the allegations to be investigated by the appropriate authorities.
(ii) They are responsible for the funding of the Shelter. In this case the Shelter has refused to sign the funding agreement and is guilty of proveable (sic) financial mismanagement. Whether or not the allegations of improper behaviour are true, it is my view that there is sufficient information available to the Department to justify the cessation of further funding to the Shelter. (In the absence of an agreement, such funding is discretionary in any event.)
7. Against this background, the Minister may feel that it is unnecessary for the material tabled in the Council to contain the detailed allegations of improper behaviour. On the other hand, the Minister may feel that it is appropriate to at least refer to those allegations and to the findings in the Report of the inadequacy of the Departmental response to them so that the Parliament may be kept fully informed.
8. It is not my place to draft the Committee's Report. However, I have taken the liberty of making some draft alterations to that Report. The effect of those alterations is that the allegations of improper behaviour are referred to but are not detailed. The draft alterations are made in pencil on the copy Report herein."
As Mr Selway confirmed in his evidence, the advice given in paragraphs 6 and 7 was intended to warn Dr Cornwall as to the consequences of using parliamentary privilege to publish unsubstantiated allegations. Mr Selway did not intend to state that the Minister should not publish those allegations. Instead, his purpose was to suggest that there may be other ways of dealing with them. As the last paragraph of the advice indicates, Mr Selway had made alterations to the Report. An examination of his alterations shows that he removed some of the more extreme allegations and softened the impact of others.
On 1 July, Mr Selway met some members of the Review Committee. He does not recall how many were present. I find that not all members of the Review Committee were present. Ms King, on her own evidence, was not present. She was not informed in June 1987 that advice on the Report had been obtained. She learned that fact some time later. I find that Ms Blake was not present since the meeting had obviously been arranged hastily and she would have had to come from Whyalla. Ms Johnson could not recall the meeting. I find she was not present. The fact that neither Ms Blake, Mr Johnson nor Ms King recollect meeting Mr Selway fortifies the conclusion that none of them was present. If they had been present, they would have remembered a fact as significant as a meeting with a legal adviser at a very late stage, after the letter transmitting the Report to Dr Cornwall had been signed. It was a significant event, particularly as a small part of the Report was deleted and other parts were amended. It was so unlike other meetings of the Review Committee that each would have remembered if they had been present - even at a distance of some 14 years.
I find, therefore, that only Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton, and Ms Anderson were present. The meeting accepted Mr Selway's changes and, with his assistance, made further alterations to the Report.
It is not clear when the Report was delivered to Dr Cornwall. No-one has any precise recollection of that event. Plainly it had to be after Mr Selway had met Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson. I find that it was delivered to Dr Cornwall on 1 July 1987. That is confirmed by the events noted in the next paragraph.
On 1 July 1987, Dr Cornwall sent a minute to the Premier seeking a waiver of the 10 day rule, a Cabinet directive, which requires submissions to Cabinet to be made at least 10 days before the meeting at which they are to be considered. The next meeting of Cabinet was to be held on 6 July. That was the last meeting of Cabinet before Dr Cornwall went overseas on 8 July. He wanted to deal with the matter before he left. Dr Cornwall's minute was in these terms:
"In view of the sensitive nature of this report, I request that it be submitted to Cabinet prior to my departure overseas.
As investigation into one shelter has commenced, there is some possibility of public reaction prior to my return. I believe it is essential that members of Cabinet are familiar with the Report should this occur.
Because of the need for the Review Committee to approve the final Report and seek legal advice on the contents, it was not possible for the Report to be submitted 10 days prior to Cabinet meeting.
The 10 day rule was not waived. The minute shows Dr Cornwall's assessment that the Report might result in political agitation. The minute also proves that the Report had then been delivered to Dr Cornwall since he could not expect Cabinet to consider it unless it had been first delivered to him.
On 7 July 1987, before leaving for his trip overseas, Dr Cornwall signed a minute to Cabinet recommending that the Report be noted and be approved for tabling in the Legislative Council in August. Dr Cornwall was to return to Adelaide on 7 August and resume his parliamentary duties on Monday, 10 August. The minute was considered at a meeting of Cabinet on 10 August. The minute to Cabinet does not seek Cabinet approval for a decision to withdraw funding. That was a decision which could only be made by Dr Cornwall jointly with the Commonwealth Minister.
As already mentioned, on 7 July, the day before he went overseas, Judith Roberts met Dr Cornwall and conferred with him. Mrs Roberts could not recall what was the business of that meeting.
I have already found that Dr Cornwall had decided in May that, subject to the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister, funding would be withdrawn from Christies Beach. All that remained for him to decide was when the decision would be announced and that depended on the Report of the Review Committee being ready for publication. Only then could he seek the concurrence of his federal counterpart. By 1 July he had the Report in his hands and was ready to proceed. He wished to table the Report and withdraw funding before he left to go overseas. However, he had been frustrated in that endeavour because he could not secure a waiver of the 10 day rule. He therefore took the steps necessary to enable the matter to be placed before Cabinet as soon as he returned. That is apparent from the fact that on 7 July 1987 he had signed the minute to Cabinet recommending that the Report be noted and be approved for tabling in the Legislative Council. The signing of that minute shows he had decided when to announce his decision. There was no other point in doing so. Although the Department would, as a matter of course, continue to process matters while its Minister was overseas, that does not explain the coincidence of Dr Cornwall's return to his parliamentary duties on 10 August and the fact that the minute was before Cabinet on the very same day. I do not accept Dr Cornwall's evidence to the effect that he did not put the arrangements in place before he left. The conclusion that the timetable had been put in place before Dr Cornwall went overseas is confirmed by Ms King's report dated 5 August 1987 to the first Assistant Secretary of her Department in which she said that Dr Cornwall was "expected to return to SA on 11 August and tabling of the Report is to occur on that day or at least in that Parliamentary week". Although she was slightly inaccurate as to dates, the substance is correct. In addition, the Department took the formal steps to enable the decision to be announced. Before scrutinising those steps, it is necessary to note other events in July.
As at 1 July 1987 only two shelters, Christies Beach and North Adelaide, had not signed the Financial Agreement. The offer to sign it had been withdrawn from both. Both shelters had deficits. The Minister had promised to meet representatives of both shelters to discuss funding once the report of the Review Committee had been published. The effect of the Department's letter of 15 May was that, if either signed the Financial Agreement, the decision whether to accept it was effectively for Dr Cornwall to make.
On 6 July the North Adelaide Shelter informed the Department that it was willing to sign the Financial Agreement. According to a minute from Ms Vardon to Dr Cornwall dated 6 August 1987, the reasons given for this change in attitude were:
"(a) The shelter was faced with large rent and workers' compensation bills which could not be paid on the current $7,000 per fortnight payment.
(b) The shelter does agree with the need for a financial undertaking and has always been happy to comply with this, but initially refused to make a point on the allocation of new monies in the 1986-87 financial year. Ms Balendran stated that 'in retrospect' this was not appropriate action.
(c) Ms Balendran agreed to write to you requesting permission to sign the Agreement."
In that minute Ms Vardon recommended that the Minister accede to the request. I will return to this minute.
On or about 12 or 13 July, the Christies Beach Shelter learned that North Adelaide intended to sign the Financial Agreement. I find that the Shelter decided to sign the Agreement because it did not wish to be left out in the cold. An appointment had been made for Ms Vardon to visit the Christies Beach Shelter on 13 July but Ms Vardon cancelled the meeting at the last minute. She informed Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming that there would be no negotiations with her until after the investigations had been completed. In her evidence, Ms Vardon gave two reasons for her action. The first was that Ms Wighton had said to her that the meeting on 11 June had got nowhere and that the Shelter was going over her head anyway. That was an inadequate reason given the nature of the meeting on 11 June. Her second reason was that she shared Ms Wighton's view concerning the funding of the Shelter. Both reasons are unsatisfactory. I find that she decided not to visit the Shelter because the Department and the Minister had by then decided to withdraw funding. There was no point in negotiating as that decision had already been made.
On 14 July 1987, Helen McSkimming telephoned Ms Vardon to inform her of the Christies Beach Shelter's disappointment that the meeting for 13 July had been cancelled. She also informed Ms Vardon that the Shelter wished to sign the Financial Agreement. Ms Vardon told her that the Shelter would have to write to the Minister seeking his consent. In her evidence, Ms Vardon explained that she said this because decisions about funding could only be made by the Minister. Ms Vardon's response to Christies Beach contrasted with her response only a week earlier to the information she had received that North Adelaide wished to sign the Financial Agreement. As is apparent from the minute to Dr Cornwall of 6 August recommending that he accept the agreement signed by North Adelaide, the Department was quite receptive to it. I repeat, Ms Vardon did not wish to meet representatives of the Christies Beach Shelter because the decision had already been made to withdraw funding.
The Christies Beach Shelter decided to take up Ms Vardon's suggestion and wrote to Dr Cornwall. By letter dated 23 July 1987, the Management Committee of the Christies Beach Shelter informed him that it was willing to sign the Agreement. Their reasons for doing so were stated in the letter which read:
"I am writing on behalf of the Management Committee on the matter of the signing of the Agreement.
We received correspondence dated July 11, 1987, which explained that we would not be able to receive our one-off grant for 1986/87 which has been allocated to this shelter until the issue of the signing of the Agreement is resolved. The committee is most concerned that these funds are to be withheld, particularly those which have been allocated for a replacement van. We consider our current van, now 5 years old, to be unsafe and unreliable. During the recent Vacation Care Program the vehicle leaked considerable amounts of water into the cabin, causing children and their belongings to become damp. We are also urgently in need of the other items approved for the one-off grant. We have, in fact, already had to replace some office chairs as the old ones were extremely dangerous, and now need reimbursement of that amount.
Fortnightly funding, while allowing us to continue operating, has made it impossible for us to plan and budget our finances over any extended period, and has prevented the shelter from addressing long-term needs or replacement of major items. We are finding it increasingly difficult to manage funds efficiently in this manner.
We are therefore requesting that the offer for this shelter to sign the agreement, which was withdrawn in your letter dated May 15, 1987, be re-instated. While we are not satisfied with current funding arrangements and wish to discuss them fully with you at the proposed meeting with all shelters next month, we consider we have no option but to make this request, in order to alleviate our financial restraints and enable us to plan for the long term needs of the shelter.
We ask you to favourably consider this request. We are signing this document under extreme pressure, but in consideration of the needs of the hundreds of women and children who use our service each year in times of crisis, and for whom we provide an essential service.
A copy of the signed agreement is enclosed with this request, in anticipation of your favourable reply, as we require an urgent resolution of our financial situation."
The letter was signed by Dr Baum. It was received in Dr Cornwall's office on 27 July. Although the letter stated that the signed Agreement was enclosed, it was not the Financial Agreement but the Undertaking which the Committee had signed. In addition, the management committee had deleted the proviso to cl 3 which limited the amount which could be transferred from one budget line to another. The document was thus in the same form as the document which had been signed by the Para Districts Shelter and had been accepted by the Department in August 1986.
Shortly after, in a letter dated 27 July 1987, the North Adelaide Shelter informed Dr Cornwall that it was willing to sign the Financial Agreement and enclosed the signed Agreement. The North Adelaide Shelter did not alter the document. The letter was in these terms:
"We are writing to inform you of our willingness to sign the 'Agreement'. Please find enclosed a signed Agreement in this regard. We believe the signed Agreement between ourselves and the government will assist us to maintain our credibility and high standard of service to the Community. We believe it will assist us to get on with the job of assisting the public and accounting for the public funds we receive."
Neither the letter from the Christies Beach Shelter nor the fact that it had signed the undertaking persuaded Dr Cornwall to depart from his decision to withdraw funding. Plainly, he did not see either document until he returned from overseas, presumably on 10 August when he returned to work and not long before the Cabinet meeting. He would not have been disposed to change his mind at that late stage.
To summarise, Ms Vardon dealt with the two shelters in quite a different manner in July and August 1987. Ms Vardon was willing to deal with the North Adelaide Shelter but not with the Christies Beach Shelter because it had already been decided to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. Despite her protestations in her evidence that the Department was anxious that all shelters should sign the Financial Agreement, the proffering by the Christies Beach Shelter of the signed undertaking, albeit with the proviso deleted, did not cause anyone in the Department to seek to persuade it to sign the Financial Agreement instead. Ms Vardon's note of her telephone conversation with Ms McSkimming shows that she knew that the Shelter intended to sign the Financial Agreement. Not even knowledge of that fact caused her to ask the Shelter to sign the Agreement. Ms Vardon also relied on the fact that the Shelter had signed the undertaking and not the Financial Agreement and had also deleted the proviso. I do not accept that evidence. The fact that the undertaking bound the Shelter more strictly than the Financial Agreement, even with the proviso deleted, could not have escaped the attention of the Department. After all, the undertaking was the Department's original document. Furthermore, the Department had already accepted signed undertakings with the proviso deleted from at least two other shelters.
By a minute to Dr Cornwall dated 6 August 1987, Ms Vardon recommended that he accept the request of North Adelaide to sign the Financial Agreement. As will be seen, no such recommendation was made with respect to the Christies Beach Shelter. I will later examine the reason for this difference in attitude.
While Dr Cornwall was overseas, Mr Greg Crafter acted as Minister for Community Welfare. On 5 August Ms Vardon sent a minute to the Minister recommending that funding be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Shelter, that an interim management committee be established to run a new shelter and be funded for a period of three months, and that the Department negotiate with the existing management committee in an attempt to transfer the assets of the Shelter to the new shelter. The minute was in these terms:
That following the recommendations of the review of the management and administration of women's shelters, you approve of the defunding of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc as of 4/9/87 and that you write to the Minister for Community Services seeking his concurrence.
On 26th November last year, you announced a review into the management and administration of women's shelters in South Australia. The review is now completed and the department has prepared a detailed response to each of the recommendations. There is, however, one recommendation which requires urgent attention. The Review Committee recommended that: 'in view of the mal-administration, both historically and currently, of this shelter and in view of the uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate' SAAP funding should be withdrawn. The department concurs with this recommendation.
The department has been concerned for some time about management practices and administration of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc, together with complaints alleging unprofessional behaviour of certain staff at the shelter. The committee reviewing the administration of women's shelters received further allegations in the course of its work, conducted enquiries and reviewed the files of the department. The report raised a number of matters of serious concern. These concerns involve poor administrative practices over several years and allegations of serious professional misconduct made by certain clients and staff of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc and by other workers in the district. These allegations and other information have been made available to the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs, both of whom have instigated investigations, which are proceeding.
As mentioned above, the department has for some time been seriously concerned about the lack of accountability and poor management practices of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. They have continuously overspent their budget and have not been prepared to undertake proper budgetary and accounting procedures so as to ensure proper care is taken of the government funds. The shelter has continually refused to sign a financial undertaking, which undertaking would bind the shelter to spend government funds for the purposes for which they were granted. Their failure to sign the financial undertaking is a serious breach of the Commonwealth/State Guidelines and, together with their failure to respond adequately to the department's request for proper accounting practices and their long-standing deficits, are the basis for the department now recommending that funds be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc., as of 4/9/87.
The Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc has considerable assets, the majority of which have been purchased with government funds. These include a vehicle and various items of equipment and furnishings. The buildings and fixed assets are the property of the South Australian Housing Trust. The equipment and furnishings etc are the property of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc and the department has received legal advice that the disposal or transfer of such assets if the prerogative of the Management Committee, or, in the event of the organisation winding up, on a vote of 2/3 of the members of the Association.
It would clearly be in the best interests of the clients for there to be a smooth transfer of all equipment and property to a new interim Management Committee to be appointed to run the service for a 12-month period to allow all matters to be settled and a new Management Committee to be established. To this end the department will negotiate with the present Management Committee in an attempt to seek their co-operation in affecting a smooth transfer of assets.
The employment status of current staff is the responsibility of the current Management Committee who would need to act appropriately, according to the information and finances available to them. The department's officers are prepared to assist the Committee, if requested, to minimise the impact on staff, bearing in mind that investigations are being undertaken which may have implications for one or more staff members. Withdrawing funds as of 4/9/87 will allow the Management Committee to give staff 3 weeks' notice.
To effect the smoothest possible transition, the department will recommend to you the appointment of an interim Management Committee which will be in a position to receive the SAAP funding currently allocated to the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. The department will assist this Committee to provide a service, initially through Crisis Care, and will second a Senior Project Officer to the Committee to act as an interim administrator of the new service. In co-operation with the interim Management Committee, this person will be responsible for the establishment of a service to ensure that the needs of clients are met during this period.
The South Australian Housing Trust has several houses available for accommodating women and children and the department will make other necessary arrangements, eg, furnishings.
1. That SAAP funding for the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc be withdrawn as of 4/9/87 and that concurrence for this de-funding be sought from the Minister assisting the Minister for Community Services and Health. A draft letter is attached.
2. That an interim Management Committee be set up immediately for the purpose of establishing a new centre and giving oversight of the management of the service and that up to 3 month's funding from the funds now allocated to the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc be made available to this interim Management Committee at the discretion of the department.
3. That the department negotiate with the current Management Committee in an attempt to secure the assets for the future use of women and children, victims of domestic violence."
It will be noticed that the minute did not mention the fact that Christies Beach had signed the undertaking. Mr Crafter, as acting Minister, approved the minute. I find that Mr Crafter's involvement was merely a formality as the decision to withdraw funding had been made in May and, before leaving on his trip overseas, Dr Cornwall had on 7 July signed the minute to Cabinet recommending that the Report be tabled. Mr Crafter did not, therefore, have to make any decisions. They had already been made. He simply had the formal task of signing the minute and the letter. Thus, Ms Vardon had recommended that the Minister accept the Financial Agreement signed by North Adelaide but did not accept the undertaking signed by Christies Beach, notwithstanding that it was in the same terms as that which had been signed by Para Districts and notwithstanding that it bound the shelter more stringently than did the Financial Agreement which had been signed by North Adelaide.
On the same day, Mr Crafter signed a letter dated 5 August 1987 to Senator Ryan, the Minister assisting the Commonwealth Minister for Community Services and Health, which sought her concurrence to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter.
"I write to seek your concurrence with my decision to withdraw SAAP funding from the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc as of 4th September, 1987.
On 26/11/86 I established a review of the management and administration of women's shelters in South Australia, chaired by Mrs Judith Roberts, past Chairperson of S.A.C.O.S.S. The Committee included Ms Robyn King, Senior Assistant Director, Commonwealth Department of Community Services, and was assisted by an independent consultant, Ms Harrison Anderson.
This review was necessary because of my serious concerns about the administration of some women's shelters in South Australia, particularly their financial management and accountability.
The review found that 'the majority of South Australian women's shelters are well-managed facilities which, through the double bonus of dedicated and compassionate staff and responsible management, provide an essential service for women and children suffering the devastating effects of violence, rape, incest, homelessness and poverty.' The review, however, highlights serious concerns about the management of one shelter ... the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc.
The Review Committee, during the course of its investigation, became seriously concerned about the administration of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. The review recommended that 'in view of the maladministration, both historic and current, of this shelter, and in view of the uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate, the Review Committee recommends that funding be withdrawn'.
My Department has for some time been seriously concerned about the lack of accountability and poor management practices of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. They have continuously overspent their budget and have not been prepared to undertake proper budgetary and accounting procedures so as to ensure proper care is taken of the government funds. The shelter has continually refused to sign a financial undertaking, which undertaking would bind the shelter to spend government funds for the purposes for which they were granted. The failure to sign the financial undertaking is a serious breach of the Commonwealth/State Guidelines and, together with their failure to respond adequately to the Department's request for proper accounting practices, and their long-standing deficits, are the basis for my now seeking your concurrence with my decision that funding be withdrawn as of 4th September, 1987.
In order to minimise the effect that this decision will have on clients, it is my intention to establish an interim management committee to receive the SAAP funding currently allocated to the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. and establish an alternate service. As an interim measure, my Department will assist this committee and will second a senior project officer to the committee to act as interim Administrator of the new service. The South Australian Housing Trust has several houses available in the area and my Department will make other necessary arrangements, e.g. furnishings. This may require some non-housing capital expenditure from re-allocated savings from other areas of SAAP.
I also therefore seek your concurrence with the redirection of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. recurrent funds to a new interim management committee.
I am informed that officers of both our Departments have been monitoring these issues very closely and will continue to work together to re-establish a service in the southern areas of Adelaide as cost effectively as possible.
It is my intention to table the Review of the Management and Administration of Women's Shelters in the South Australian Legislative Council as soon as possible following commencement of the Budget Sitting on 11/8/87. In tabling the report, I wish also to announce our joint acceptance of the Committee's recommendation that funding be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc and also that a new service will be established in that area. Since this is a matter of considerable delicacy, I seek your urgent concurrence with these decisions."
That letter, like the minute signed by Mr Crafter, failed to recount the facts fully in that it did not mention that the Christies Beach Shelter had signed the undertaking with the proviso deleted and did not mention the call from Mr McSkimming to Ms Vardon on 14 July. Furthermore, the request to concur in the decision to withdraw funding was made notwithstanding that the fact that the Christies Beach Shelter had signed the undertaking which bound it more strictly than the Financial Agreement.
Dr Cornwall returned to work on Monday, 10 August. That day he attended a Cabinet meeting at which Cabinet approved his minute signed by him on 7 July recommending that the Report of the Review Committee be noted and that it be approved for tabling. The recommendation was in these terms:
4.1 The Report of the Review of the Administration of Women's Shelters be noted.
4.2 The Report be approved for tabling in the Legislative Council in August."
During the day, Dr Cornwall was briefed on developments concerning the Christies Beach Shelter. He had not had an opportunity to see the letter from the Christies Beach Shelter enclosing the signed financial undertaking before 10 August. It is reasonable to infer, as I do, that at this briefing he was informed that North Adelaide had signed the Financial Agreement. Ms Vardon's minute recommending that he accept the Agreement signed by North Adelaide was dated 6 August. Dr Cornwall approved the recommendation on 12 August, the day after he had announced that funds be withdrawn from Christies Beach. Dr Cornwall sought to justify his decision to accept the North Adelaide document and reject the Christies Beach document on the ground that Christies Beach had signed the wrong document and had deleted the proviso. For reasons I later express, I do not accept that evidence.
Dr Cornwall did not on either 11 or 12 August make any inquiry as to the progress of the investigations by the police and CAC. For reasons which appear shortly, had he done so, he would have learned that there was little, if any, evidence to support the unsubstantiated allegations.
On 11 August, Dr Cornwall telephoned Senator Ryan to seek her consent to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. Before that call, Senator Ryan had been briefed by her staff. Senator Ryan's major concern was that Dr Cornwall assure her that another shelter would be established in place of the Christies Beach Shelter. He gave that assurance. He also told her that his reasons for withdrawing funding were the failure of the Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement and its continued incurring of deficits. He did not tell her that the Christies Beach Shelter had signed an altered form of the undertaking. Senator Ryan agreed with the decision. Senator Ryan's evidence, which I accept, was that Dr Cornwall said that the matter was urgent in that he had the Report and wanted to act quickly. There was in truth no urgency. The timing was of Dr Cornwall's own choosing.
The plaintiff alleged that Senator Ryan had some antipathy towards her. I find that none existed.
Shortly after 2.15pm on the afternoon of 11 August, Dr Cornwall sought and obtained leave from the Legislative Council to make a Ministerial Statement. In the course of that statement, he summarised the Report of the Review Committee and announced that funding would be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Shelter on 4 September 1987. Referring to the shelter he said:
"During the course of its review, the committee became seriously concerned about the administration of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter. Concerns about deficiencies in financial management, unacceptable management practices and a number of unsubstantiated allegations of professional and personal misbehaviour were forwarded to me. These allegations and other information have been referred to the Commissioner of Police and the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs, both of whom have instigated investigations which are proceeding. The Review Committee further recommended that 'in view of the maladministration, both historic and current, of this shelter and in view of uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate' funding be withdrawn. In accordance with the recommendation, funding of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter will be withdrawn from 4 September 1987, and the Department of Community Welfare is making contingency arrangements for the provision of services for women and children in crisis in the southern area previously covered by the shelter."
Later that day, Ms Adrienne Summers visited the shelter and handed to the management committee a letter dated 11 August 1987 informing it of the decision to withdraw funding. The letter was in these terms:
"I have tabled the Review Report on the Management and Administration of Women's Shelters in Parliament today.
During the course of its investigation, the Review Committee had serious concerns about the administration of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. The Review recommended that -
'In view of the maladministration, both historic and current, of this shelter [Christies Beach] and in view of uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate, the Review Committee recommends that funding be withdrawn'.
I concur with this recommendation and wish to advise that funding for the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc will cease as of 4th September, 1987.
It is essential that services continue to be provided for women and children in crises and the Department for Community Welfare is making contingency arrangements for this. Officers of the Department will maintain contact with you during this period of transition."
There was a dispute whether on that occasion Ms Summers handed the management committee a copy of the Report. Ms Summers visited the Shelter again on 12 August together with Mr Bicknell. Certainly, the Shelter received a copy of the Report by 12 August. Nothing turns on this issue.
The publication of the Report in the Legislative Council was reported on at least the ABC News and other television programs on the night of 11 August. It was reported on the front page of The Advertiser on 12 August under the headline, "Christies Shelter to close over allegations".
On the evening of 12 August, two television stations broadcast reports including interviews with Mrs Roberts and a representative of the Christies Beach Shelter. The first was a report on a program called "State Affair" broadcast by Television Broadcasters Limited on what was then Channel 7 and is now Channel 10. The report took the form of an interview involving both Mrs Roberts and Dr Baum which was broadcast as the interview occurred. The second interview was broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in its program called The 7.30 Report. That report consisted of extracts of previously recorded interviews with Mrs Roberts and Ms McSkimming. In both reports a number of the unsubstantiated allegations were repeated. I will deal later with the plaintiff's claims for defamation arising out of these two broadcasts.
The decision to withdraw funding had the inevitable consequence that the Shelter had to close. Its very existence depended on government funding. It ceased operations on 4 September 1987. Its work was taken over by a different shelter and management committee at different premises. None of the staff of the Christies Beach Shelter were employed in the replacement shelter.
The Shelter attempted to get Dr Cornwall to reverse his decision but those attempts were unsuccessful. On 14 August, Dr Baum wrote a long letter to Dr Cornwall protesting that the decision to withdraw funding had been made without giving the management committee an opportunity to respond to the unsubstantiated allegations. She then set out her response to the criticisms in the Report. She asked Dr Cornwall to reconsider his decision. She followed up that letter with a telephone request to Ms Pengelly to ask the Minister to meet the management committee of the Shelter. On 20 August, Dr Cornwall met some of the management committee at the Shelter. However, he was unwilling to review his decision. The meeting, essentially, was concerned with the management of the winding-up of the Shelter. He confirmed his refusal to review his decision in a letter dated 21 August.
The staff at Christies Beach co-operated with Mr Bicknell and other officers of the staff in facilitating the transfer of the service to the replacement shelter and arranging for the transfer of residents to that shelter.
On 27 August, the management committee wrote to the plaintiff informing her of the withdrawal of funding and terminating her employment as from 4 September. Similar letters were written to other members of the staff. There was a degree of evidence concerning the financial arrangements in relation to the winding-up of the Shelter. It is unnecessary to examine them. It is sufficient to note that some financial assistance was received by the Shelter from the State Government to wind up its affairs. The incorporated association was formally wound up at a special general meeting on 17 September 1995. However, it did not operate as a women's shelter after 4 September 1987.
The decision to withdraw funding prompted protests from other shelters and other individuals. In addition, the United Trades and Labor Council wrote to Dr Cornwall. I will refer to these later. After the Shelter had closed, members of the staff of the Shelter other than the plaintiff wrote letters to politicians complaining of the decision and seeking compensation. Ms McSkimming wrote a number of letters in 1987 and 1988. None of the letters resulted in any compensation to members of the staff. Ultimately, some members of the staff instituted legal proceedings. They agreed a compromise of their claims. The plaintiff commenced this action in June 1990.
Investigation by the CAC resulted in the prosecution of the plaintiff as well as Ms McSkimming and Ms Lachlan. Although the charges were proved, the learned magistrate found the offences to be trifling and did not record a conviction. It might be said that the investigation began with a bang and ended with whimper. Before noting those events, it is necessary to examine two prior dealings between the Shelter and the CAC.
In 1985 the Associations Incorporation Act 1956 was repealed and replaced by the Associations Incorporation Act 1985. That Act introduced new requirements for reporting by associations and came into force on 1 July 1985. The CAC had published an advertisement in the press on 5 July 1985 concerning the new requirements. It was read by Ms McSkimming. She was concerned to know whether the Shelter was reporting in the manner required by the new legislation. On the same day, she rang and then wrote to the CAC to seek further information. The CAC replied on 22 July 1985 enclosing a booklet. On receiving that letter, she purchased a copy of the Act. Thereafter, she pursued the matter with Mr Griffiths, an officer of the CAC. Her evidence was that she could not get a definitive answer to her questions. I accept her evidence.
The enquiries made by Ms McSkimming show that the Shelter had a responsible attitude in that she was seeking information and wishing to comply with the requirements of the 1985 Act. It may be that she did not fully understand what was required but the fact that she made enquiries of the CAC bespeaks a willingness to comply.
The next dealings between the Christies Beach Shelter and the CAC concerned the appointment of the Shelter's auditor. The management committee of the Shelter had appointed a Ms Maunder as auditor of its accounts for the year ending 30 June 1986. The annual statements, as audited by Ms Maunder, were lodged as the periodic return of the Shelter. On 13 May 1987, the CAC questioned the appointment of Ms Maunder as auditor on the ground that she did not have the prescribed qualifications. Ms McSkimming replied on 2 June 1987 stating Ms Maunder's qualifications and applying for Ms Maunder to be approved as auditor. The person to whom Ms McSkimming spoke in relation to the qualifications of Ms Maunder as auditor was again Mr Griffiths. The application was being considered by the CAC at the same time as it had begun to investigate the Shelter in response to Dr Cornwall's request. On 16 June 1987, the CAC noted that it was necessary to co-ordinate the inquiry as to Ms Maunder's qualifications with the broader inquiry into the Shelter. By letter dated 9 July 1987, the CAC informed the Christies Beach Shelter that Ms Maunder did not have the appropriate qualifications as auditor and recommended the appointment of another auditor in her place. However, the CAC did not then require a fresh audit.
In the meantime, the CAC's broader investigation of the Shelter continued. The plaintiff was interviewed by Detective Gibb on 6 August 1987 in the presence of her solicitor. Ms McSkimming and Ms Lachlan were also present and they too were interviewed. The plaintiff did not exercise her right to silence. She answered all questions, often quite fully. The questions largely concerned the Shelter's savings account in which donations to the Shelter were deposited.
On 17 August, Detective Gibb reported to the CAC that the investigation had not disclosed any evidence of criminal offences or any criminal misuse of funds by any person at the Shelter. It is fair to state that he was critical of some aspects of the financial processes of the Shelter and suggested reforms. However, he also reported that the plaintiff, Ms McSkimming, and Ms Lachlan had been reported for breaches of s 57(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act in respect of a Savings Bank donations account which had not been included in the periodic returns to the CAC. The results of the CAC enquiries were sent by letter from the police dated 31 August 1987 to the Department of Community Welfare. It was received by the Department on 7 September.
On 29 September 1987, the plaintiff, Ms McSkimming, and Ms Lachlan were charged on complaint with two offences against s 35 and s 57(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act. I set out the provisions in s 35 relevant to this action.
" 35. (1) An incorporated association to which this Division applies shall keep its accounting records in such a manner as will enable-
(a) the preparation from time to time of true and fair accounts of the association;
(b) the accounts of the association to be conveniently and properly audited in accordance with this Division.
(2) An incorporated association to which this Division applies shall, as soon as practicable after the end of a financial year of the association, cause accounts in respect of the financial year to be prepared and audited by a registered company auditor, a firm of registered company auditors, a member of the Australian Society of Accountants, a member of The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia or such other person who may be approved by the Commission as an auditor of the accounts of the association for the purposes of this section.
"If a member of the committee of an incorporated association fails to take all reasonable steps to secure compliance by the association with its obligations under this Act, he shall be guilty of an offence and liable to a penalty not exceeding five hundred dollars."
The first offence charged was against s 35(1) and s 57(1). It was alleged that the Shelter had failed to include the donations account in its financial records and, therefore, had failed to keep its accounting records in such manner as would enable
(a) preparation from time to time of true and fair accounts of the Shelter; and
(b) the accounts of the Shelter to be conveniently and properly audited in accordance with the requirements of the Act.
The investigation into the books of the Shelter had, therefore, found only one discrepancy. The second offence charged was against s 35(2) and s 57(1). It was alleged that the Shelter did not cause its accounts to be audited for the year ending 30 June 1986 by an authorised auditor. The charge related to the fact that Ms Maunder was not a duly qualified auditor. Given the fact that Ms McSkimming had applied for approval of Ms Maunder as auditor, this appears to be an unnecessarily vigorous response by the CAC, a view confirmed by subsequent events.
The plaintiff, Ms McSkimming, and Ms Lachlan appeared before the Christies Beach Magistrates Court on 26 October 1987 and the hearing of the complaints was adjourned to 27 April 1988. The matter resumed on that date before Mr Ackland SM. The three women pleaded not guilty. The hearing was completed on 27 April. Mr Ackland SM reserved judgment. On 1 June 1988 he delivered his judgment. He found the offences proved but held that they were trifling. He did not, therefore, record a conviction. He made no order as to costs, stating that it would be unfair to order the three women to pay costs. In his reasons, the learned magistrate said that he reluctantly reached the conclusion that the two counts had been proved, stating that they were technical offences. He noted that the prosecution had expressly stated that there was no allegation of misappropriation of funds. He added:
"In my opinion, if the allegations before me are the only substantial allegations of wrongdoing made against the defendants, the not inconsiderable amount of money spent on this prosecution would have been better spent on the women and children for whose support and protection this shelter was set up."
There was no challenge to these reasons. The magistrate's unwillingness to convict is hardly surprising, particularly given the fact that at the time the CAC commenced its investigations, Ms McSkimming was dealing with the CAC in relation to the qualifications of Ms Maunder as auditor. This was not an instance of a deliberate breach of the Act. The evidence also suggests that this had been the only prosecution ever under s 35(1) and (2) and s 57(1) of the Act.
The detailed police enquiries began on about 22 June. The officer in charge was Detective Chief Inspector Simons, as he then was. Documents had been supplied by the Department to the police. On 28 July and 4 September, police officers conducted long interviews with the plaintiff. The transcript of both interviews shows that she answered questions willingly and often quite fully. She denied the allegations put to her.
On 2 August 1987, Detective Anderson, one of the detectives involved in the investigation, sent a report to the Assistant Commissioner (Crime) of Police concerning his part of the investigation. It related to the allegations of financial mismanagement, an allegation that the plaintiff and others at the Shelter had used promises of gaining priority housing with the South Australian Housing Trust in return for sexual favours, and an allegation of doubtful counselling techniques and offensive behaviour to staff and residents of the Shelter. The detective recommended that no police action be initiated against any person in relation to the allegations. His report noted that the issue of financial mismanagement was being investigated by the CAC and he drew no conclusions in relation to that matter.
Detective Anderson commented in some detail on the allegations other than those of financial mismanagement. He said that there was no evidence to support the allegations that the plaintiff and others had used the promise of advancement on the priority housing list to elicit sexual favours. He added, "It appears extremely unlikely that such advancement is possible". In relation to the other allegations he reported that there was no evidence that counselling techniques were in any respect unlawful adding, "most ex-residents interviewed, were supportive of the Shelter staff". He did note that, whilst some witnesses were critical of the plaintiff's approach to clients and the counselling techniques, this depended on the viewpoint of the witnesses. He said:
"Many witnesses were critical of the length of time involved between the events described and the commencement of the investigation. Most were unsure of facts, because of the time lapse. Many were initially reluctant to re-open the matter at all, and much time had to be spent convincing these people of the need for them to make their views known.
It appears from many of the witnesses that Rowan is a forceful person who fights to the limit when she believes in her cause. She has been responsible for enforcing the rules by which the Shelter and associated houses are run. She is apparently a strong feminist.
These areas of activity would naturally bring her into occasional conflict with people, some of whom may have complained because of a feeling of personal animosity towards Rowan or her administration. There are many more persons who could be interviewed in relation to this enquiry, but there is no suggestion at this time, that their information would be any more fruitful than that already obtained from the enquiries made to date."
The report stated that police had interviewed approximately 60 persons during the investigation.
On 14 September 1987, Detective Chief Inspector Simons reported to the Assistant Commissioner (Crime) that there was no evidence of the commission of any criminal offences by the plaintiff or any other members of the Shelter staff. By that time, 78 persons had been interviewed. His report included the following comments on the allegations of sexual harassment, professional abuse in counselling sessions, and intimidatory tactics. His report concerned the same matters as had been the subject of Detective Anderson's report. It noted that the allegations of financial mismanagement were being attended to as part of the CAC investigation.
In respect of the allegation of advancement on the priority housing list in return for sexual favours he said:
"There is no direct evidence to support the allegation that the former Administrator Ms. Dawn ROWAN, or any other staff member, past or present, had offered sexual services in return for promotion of priority, on the South Australian Housing Trust 'Priority Housing List' ...
There is insufficient evidence to support the allegation that Ms. Dawn ROWAN, or any other staff member, past or present, had influenced the decision of the Priority Review Committee to either support an unjustified application or to decline an application which on its own merits should have succeeded. ...
The structure and composition of the Priority Review Committee, and the process of application procedures, is such that it is highly unlikely that any one person, e.g. Dawn ROWAN as the S.A.C.O.S.S. representative, could significantly favour an unjustified application or alternatively disadvantage one which should on its merits succeed ...
The majority of persons interviewed, including members of the Priority Review Committee, were supportive of the work in this area by Dawn ROWAN and other staff members and had no complaints concerning her involvement in either the application process or as representative on the Committee."
In relation to the allegations of inappropriate counselling and harassment, his report contained detailed comments which might be summarised by stating that the allegations lacked detail and were unsubstantiated or there was otherwise insufficient evidence. He noted that some of the allegations related to conduct as far back as 1982 and that there was reluctance by some to relate information concerning events which had occurred so long before. The delay also meant that many were unable to provide precise details.
On 23 September, the Commissioner of Police sent the report of Detective Simons to Ms Vardon. It was received the next day.
I have set out the comments made by the investigating officers because they represent such a different picture of the plaintiff and the staff of the Shelter from that presented in the Report. This is relevant because this kind of picture was already emerging on 2 August 1987 in Detective Anderson's report. That report was made eight days before the Cabinet meeting on 10 August. Had Dr Cornwall or any member of his staff or an officer of the Department asked the police for a progress report before the meeting of Cabinet, there is every likelihood that the enquirer would have been informed of Detective Anderson's views, even if that view was qualified by the fact that the investigations were not then complete. That would have sounded a real note of caution to the Department and Dr Cornwall. Ordinary fairness ought then to have caused Dr Cornwall to delay the release of the Report until the police investigations had been completed.
Such an enquiry may have also disclosed that Detective Gibb was reaching a similar view as to the allegations of financial mismanagement. Although his report is dated 14 August, it is likely that in the week preceding 10 August he would have had a preliminary view which could have been passed on to the Department and thence to Dr Cornwall.
When asked whether it was prudent to check the status of the CAC and police investigations before releasing the Report, Dr Cornwall replied "no" stating that the decision to withdraw funding had nothing to do with those investigations. I do not accept that answer. I reject it first because it is inconsistent with the fact that Dr Cornwall's reason on 11 August 1987 for withdrawing funding as expressed in his letter to the Shelter was the recommendation in the Report and that was based in part on the unsubstantiated allegations. Secondly, if in fact the decision to withdraw funding was unrelated to the allegations and their investigations, why were the allegations included in the Report?
Criticism of Dr Cornwall's decision to withdraw funding before the allegations had been investigated was voiced from time to time both in the Parliament and in the press. On 28 November 1987, a report appeared in The Advertiser of a resolution in the Legislative Council reported as condemning "Dr Cornwall for his peremptory and destructive action" in withdrawing funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. The article reported comments by Mr Elliott MLC and Ms Laidlaw MLC which were critical of Dr Cornwall. That report prompted letters to The Advertiser from Dr Cornwall and Mrs Roberts in reply. The letters were published on 5 December. The criticism continued to be voiced. It is apparent that staff in the Shelter had approached Mr Elliott seeking his assistance. On 6 April 1988, Mr Elliott moved that a Select Committee of the Legislative Council be established "to consider and report on the circumstances and the validity of claims made against the staff of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter which resulted in the withdrawal of funding from the Shelter". Dr Cornwall spoke in opposition to the motion. The motion was carried on 13 April.
There was a good deal of documentary evidence and some oral evidence concerning requests by the Select Committee for documents from the Department and the Attorney-General, including reports by the CAC and the police of their enquiries. I shall refer to that evidence later.
Written submissions were made by the plaintiff to the Select Committee, as well as by the staff and the management committee of the Shelter, by the Department, and by Ms Anderson. Oral submissions were made by the plaintiff and other members of the staff at Christies Beach, by Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson, and by Ms Vardon on behalf of the Department. Evidence on behalf of the Department was also given by Ms Wighton, Mr Bicknell, and Ms Heath. Former members of the staff and management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter opposed to the plaintiff also gave evidence. They included Ms Oxenham and Ms Neverauskas.
The submission by the Department betrayed an unwillingness to accept the police report concerning their investigation of the unsubstantiated allegations. The submission sets out the allegations at some length. It does not indicate that there were few complainants. Although it refers to the police finding that no sufficient evidence existed, it does not set out the summaries of the state of the evidence quoted earlier in these reasons, which give quite a different picture.
The Select Committee reported on 11 April 1989. Its report is a helpful review of the events leading to the publication of the Report and of the nature of the unsubstantiated allegations and the background to them. The Committee expressed its concern that the unsubstantiated allegations were included in the Report and were used as a basis for recommending the withdrawal of funding. It concluded, after its investigation, that many of the allegations on pages 65 - 66 remained unsubstantiated. It condemned "in the strongest possible terms" the use of the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report. The Committee made a number of recommendations including recommendations to avoid the recurrence of such use of unsubstantiated allegations. It is unnecessary to set out the terms of the recommendations.
The publication of the report of the Select Committee prompted further protestation about the publication of the allegations and the withdrawal of funding. The former staff of the Shelter pressed claims for compensation. They included requests by the former staff of the Shelter, other than the plaintiff, for reinstatement. They wrote to the then Minister, the Deputy Premier and other Members of Parliament, both State and Federal. Other members of the public wrote enquiring as to the outcome and suggesting that the staff be compensated. The Department recommended that compensation be refused. In April 1989 Cabinet decided that compensation should not be paid.
Some of the staff of the Shelter then sought the assistance of the Ombudsman. Their complaint was that the Department had failed to give the Shelter and its staff adequate opportunity to respond to the unsubstantiated allegations. On 9 June 1989, the Ombudsman wrote to Ms Vardon, as the chief executive of the Department, listing the individual complaints and seeking an explanation from the Department. Ms Vardon replied on 11 July. It is unnecessary to comment on the letter except to note two things. The first is that it is one of a number of documents which stated that the reason for the decision to withdraw funding was not the unsubstantiated allegations but the Shelter's failure to sign the Agreement and its accumulation of deficits. The second is that, although the letter informed the Ombudsman that the Shelter had failed to sign the Financial Agreement, it failed to tell him that the Shelter had on 23 July 1987 written to the Minister with a signed copy of the undertaking with the proviso deleted. The Departmental statement that the Shelter failed to sign the Agreement was, strictly speaking, correct but the full facts would have been more fairly presented by referring to the Shelter's letter of 23 July.
On 15 November 1990, the Ombudsman sent his draft report on this matter to the Department for its comments pursuant to s 18(4) of the Ombudsman Act 1972. The report was critical of the Department in not recommending to the Minister that he give the Shelter an opportunity to respond before deciding to withdraw funding. However, he relied on the information in the Department's letter and concluded that, even if it had been heard, the Shelter would have had its funding withdrawn. As all of the staff other than the plaintiff had obtained other employment, he did not recommend payment of compensation.
The Ombudsman's conclusion that, even if the Shelter had been heard, the decision to withdraw funding would still have been made, is open to question. I am not satisfied the Ombudsman had all of the facts before him. I have already referred to the fact that the Department's letter did not present all facts. Furthermore, if the Shelter had been heard, the issues relating to the signing of the Financial Agreement may have been resolved, particularly given the degree of capitulation expressed in the Shelter's letter dated 23 July. Furthermore, as Ms McSkimming said, the Shelter was then minded to sign the Financial Agreement, given that North Adelaide had also decided to do so. However, it is unnecessary to determine this question. The issue for decision in this action is, not whether the Minister was correct in withdrawing funding from the Shelter, but concerns the use made of the unsubstantiated allegations, both in the Report and by the Minister.
The Department responded to the draft report by letter dated 21 November 1989. The response included a clear indication that the Departmental decision not to give the Shelter an opportunity to be heard resulted from Dr Cornwall's instruction and the fear of a political response by the Shelter described in the Department's letter as a "political outburst".
Ultimately, the Ombudsman decided not to proceed because he could not identify any practical remedy. He did, however, inform Ms Vardon that he believed that the Department had failed to act in two ways which were unreasonable and unjust, namely,
"(1) The Department's failure to advise formally and fully the management committee of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter of the concerns which the Department held about the operations of the Shelter. Because of this the Shelter was denied the opportunity to respond to those concerns.
(2) The Department's failure to advise the management committee of the Shelter that a likely or possible consequence of the concerns held by the Department and of the Shelter's failure to sign the financial agreement was that the Shelter would have its funding withdrawn."
He informed Ms McSkimming of his decision by letter written on the same day. His annual report for the year ending 30 June 1990, restated the views he had expressed in his letters of 1 May.
I have referred to the reports of the Select Committee and the Ombudsman as events which occurred prior to the institution of this action. They are part of the history and I refer to them simply as part of that history. I do not rely on the conclusions stated in the respective reports.
Reference has already been made to a meeting on 4 October 1983 between officers of the Department and the Christies Beach Shelter. It is necessary to note the issues discussed at that meeting as the events of that meeting and its outcome bear upon the issues in this action.
On 16 August 1983, the Department had received an audit of the Shelter's financial return for the quarter ended 30 June 1983 which was qualified in these terms:
"I was unable to verify the nature of 25 payments due to the absence of supporting vouchers, receipts or other documentary evidence."
In that same month, the Department received complaints about other defects of the administration of the Shelter. In addition, on 25 August 1983, Crisis Care, a unit of the Department of Community Welfare to which women went for urgent help and which referred women to shelters, had stated that Christies Beach had been refusing referrals since 11 July 1983, when it had moved premises. On 25 August, Ms Heath, who was then acting Adviser on Women and Welfare, referred these matters to her superior officer.
In consequence, the Department decided to meet the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter to discuss three issues. On 15 September 1983 it wrote seeking a meeting and identifying the three issues in these terms:
"1. Queries regarding the current admission practices to the shelter, specifically as this Department's Crisis Care Unit has advised that no referrals have been accepted from that Unit since 11 July 1983.
2. The failure of the shelter's administration to provide a satisfactory audit statement detailing expenditure procedures.
The Shelter agreed to the meeting which was held on 4 October 1983. The Department was represented at the meeting by Mr Lewis, the Director, Community and Planning Services, of the Department who was obviously a senior officer in the Department, Mr Graham Billett, a senior finance officer, and Ms Heath. Ten members of the management committee of the Shelter were present. Four of the management committee were also staff and included the plaintiff. The Shelter responded to the Department's concerns. Other action was taken after the meeting. The Department's concerns and the Shelter's response are set out in minutes of the meeting which were signed on behalf of both the Department and the Shelter. Those minutes are Exhibit P4 and they are annexed as Appendix 2 to these reasons.
By December 1983 all three issues had been resolved to the satisfaction of the Department so that, on 14 December 1983, Mr Cox, the then Director-General of the Department, wrote to the Shelter stating that the issues had been clarified and that the objectives of the meeting on 4 October 1983 had been achieved. The letter included the minutes of the meeting which were described in the letter as "the report" of the meeting. The relevant part of the letter reads:
"It is clear from the report that the objectives of the meeting were achieved:
1. The queries regarding admission practices were satisfactorily resolved.
2. The issues regarding the audited statement were clarified and an audited statement was subsequently received by the Department.
3. The issue concerning study leave provisions was clarified.
I wish to thank the Management Committee for its assistance in this matter."
Clearly, the issues were resolved to the Department's satisfaction.
The Christies Beach Shelter complained at a meeting of WSAC and, through it to the Minister, that the meeting on 4 October had been held, calling it "an intimidatory investigation". It expressed the view that the three issues were trivial and could have been resolved "by other less intimidatory means". Ms Heath was present at the meeting of WSAC on 28 October. The response of the Shelter does appear to be overstated, since the only means by which the Department could ascertain the facts was to meet representatives of the Shelter. Perhaps it could have been done more informally through Shelter staff in the first place. It is unnecessary to decide what was the most appropriate means. My only purpose is to point to this matter as one of the instances of hostility which the Christies Beach Shelter perceived Ms Heath held towards it.
The minutes of the meeting of 4 October are quite detailed. They were seen by Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson in the course of their work. I find that Ms Wighton had seen them and knew of them at the time of the review. Obviously, Ms Heath had seen them, and I find she also knew of them at the time of the review.
I deal with each of the three issues discussed at the meeting.
As already mentioned, the Shelter had moved to new premises at Damian Court, Christies Beach on 11 July 1983. It did not report the actual date of the move to the Department until 2 September. It should have done so more quickly. However, since at least November 1982, the Department was aware of the intended move and had been reminded of it in May 1983. Ms Heath, herself, had seen a minute from the Department of Housing in May 1983 referring to the move.
On 11 July 1983, the Shelter had informed Crisis Care that it would not take referrals because of the move for the period 11 July to 17 August. On 25 August, Crisis Care informed Ms Heath that the Shelter was still not taking referrals. On 6 September, Crisis Care informed Ms Heath that the Shelter had advised on 25 August that the Shelter was available for referrals but was fully occupied at that time and that it was still fully occupied as at 9 September. The Department raised these issues with the Shelter. Another issue concerned an allegation that the Shelter was being discriminatory in accepting referrals.
At the meeting on 4 October, the Shelter informed the Department that it had been operating throughout the move and had housed residents. It added that it had been fully occupied from 17 August. The Shelter also stated that the only women who were refused admission were women who were drunk or psychiatrically disturbed. It added that the Shelter did not discriminate against those without children. All of this is noted in the minutes of 4 October and, as mentioned already, the Department was satisfied with the explanation.
It seems that in 1983 the Shelter submitted to the Department audited accounts for each quarter as well as audited annual accounts. The Christies Beach Shelter had submitted its audited accounts for the quarter ending 30 June 1983. The auditor reported that the accounts represented a true and fair view of the transactions for that period subject to the following qualification:
"I was unable to verify the nature of 25 payments due to the absence of supporting vouchers, receipts or other documentary evidence."
The Department expressed its concern with the qualified audit and with the fact that the audit of the Shelter's annual return had not been received, despite two written requests in August and September 1983. The Department already had the qualified audit of the Shelter's return for the quarter ending 30 June 1983.
At the meeting, the Shelter explained that it could account for the 25 payments. Of those, 23 were payments to the Housing Trust for rent by the Shelter for housing accommodation for which it had receipts. The remaining two payments were for stamps ($13.00 each). The Shelter had sought a meeting with the auditor but he had declined. The Shelter informed the Department that it intended to change its auditor.
After the meeting, the Shelter explained the position to the auditor. Ms Heath, herself, spoke to auditor's secretary who informed her that the auditor had made a mistake. Ultimately, an unqualified audit was issued. At its annual general meeting on 25 October 1983, the Shelter resolved to change its auditor. Ms Heath was present by invitation at that meeting. Thus, the issues were resolved to the Department's satisfaction. What had initially appeared to be a serious matter was satisfactorily explained.
In 1982 and 1983 the plaintiff had been granted study leave by the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter. She then undertook a course of study for the Bachelor's Degree in Social Administration at Flinders University. The Department believed that the plaintiff was a full-time student to the detriment of her work at the Shelter and while being paid as Administrator. At the meeting on 4 October 1983, the Shelter explained that the study involved two subjects each of two to three hours in each week with two and a half days per week on placement. Flinders University had approved her placement at the Shelter. The plaintiff had worked as Administrator while not at the University and was available for 24 hours in each day. The minutes of the meeting of 4 October record that the management committee of the Shelter was satisfied that the plaintiff was performing her duties as Administrator "satisfactorily and that there was no conflict between her study and work requirements". In his letter dated 14 December 1983, Mr Cox stated, "the issue concerning the study leave provisions was clarified". The statement that the issues had been clarified is not, of course, a statement that the Department was satisfied, but it is clear that the Department did not think that there was cause to intervene. It must be added that staffing of the Shelter was, strictly speaking, an issue for the management committee, not the Department.
The Minister, then Mr Crafter, was informed of the outcome of the Department's enquiries. A minute to him from Mr Cox dated 15 December says, "the issues were clarified and resolved to the satisfaction of the Department". The minute from Mr Cox attached three letters addressed to the three women who had raised these matters with the Department. The letters were in the same terms and informed them that "the issues had been raised with the management committee and all issues fully considered".
Before examining whether the plaintiff has proved the various causes of action, it is necessary to examine some aspects of the decision to withdraw funding, the use made of the allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter - both unsubstantiated and other allegations - and the reasons for the decision to use them. Aspects of the decision to withdraw funding are examined first. They are
the denial of natural justice, which refers also to warnings to Dr Cornwall about whether the allegations could be substantiated.
That is followed by comments on the allegations against the Shelter. It deals with
the fact that they were used to single out the Christies Beach Shelter;
the failure of the Review Committee to state the whole truth when charging misconduct at the Shelter;
the fact that nothing exculpatory of the Shelter was stated;
the failure of the Review Committee to assess the allegations;
the fact that the failure of Christies Beach to sign the Financial Agreement was not given as a reason for recommending the withdrawal of funding; and
The next section notes that the Review Committee had not originally intended to include the criticisms of Christies Beach in its Report and examines why it decided to include the criticisms. That requires a comparison to be made between the Christies Beach Shelter and other shelters, not because it is intended to examine whether the decision to withdraw funding was justified, but because it assists in understanding why the allegations were include in the Report. The section concludes by examining the reasons of Dr Cornwall and the Review Committee for including the unsubstantiated allegations.
The decision to withdraw funding was made by Dr Cornwall in consultation with Senator Ryan. Despite some remarks in Dr Cornwall's evidence, it was not a Cabinet decision but a Ministerial decision made under the SAAP Agreement. The only decision made by Cabinet was to approve two recommendations made by Dr Cornwall, namely,
(1) that the Report of the review of the administration of women's shelters be noted; and
(2) that the Report be approved for tabling in the Legislative Council in August.
That decision was made by Cabinet on 10 August 1987. The minute does not mention the proposal to withdraw funds. There was no evidence that the question of withdrawing funds was discussed at Cabinet. The recommendation to withdraw funding is, of course, on page 76 of the Report but Dr Cornwall does not refer to it in his minute. In other words, he did not seek Cabinet approval for his decision to withdraw funding.
The Christies Beach Shelter was denied natural justice. It is a fundamental rule of law that, generally speaking, when an order or decision is to be made which will deprive a person of some right or interest or the legitimate expectation of a benefit, he is entitled to know the case to be made against him and to be given an opportunity of replying to it. The reference to "right or interest" in that rule must be understood as relating to personal liberty, status, preservation of livelihood and reputation, as well as proprietary rights and interests. These principles were restated in Kioa v West [1985] HCA 81; (1985) 159 CLR 550 per Mason J at 582. The principles have been consistently applied since and it has been suggested that it is more appropriate to call them rules of procedural fairness. The principles are subject to a contrary statutory intention but there is no statutory provision which qualifies the operation of the rule in the circumstances of this case.
The Christies Beach Shelter was operated by an incorporated association. Its funding depended entirely on government grants. For more than eight or nine years it had received annual grants supplemented when necessary to offset deficits. The grants had been received from the South Australian Government through the Department of Community Welfare and the State Government had also received funds for this purpose from the Commonwealth Government. Although it is clear that all shelters had been informed that future funding of deficits would not be made until the Financial Agreement had been signed, both the Christies Beach and North Adelaide shelters continued to receive fortnightly payments. Given the recurrent nature of its funding, the Christies Beach Shelter was entitled to be heard before its funding was withdrawn. It had a legitimate expectation that it would at least continue to receive ordinary funding. Although the Shelter knew that future funding depended on the signing of the Financial Agreement, it had continued to be funded on a fortnightly basis since November 1986 notwithstanding that it was refusing to sign the Agreement. The fact that fortnightly payments had continued for more than six months gave it a legitimate expectation that it would be heard before any decision was made to withdraw funding completely. The very existence of the Shelter depended on government funding and the continued receipt of the fortnightly payments. The withdrawal of funding would cause the Shelter to close. It was, therefore, entitled to be heard before its funding was withdrawn: see Banks v Transport Regulation Board (Vic) [1968] HCA 23; (1968) 119 CLR 222; FAI Insurances Ltd v Winneke (1982) 151 CLR 342. Any doubt about the entitlement to be heard was removed by the express promise made on behalf of Dr Cornwall on 20 February 1987 and repeated on 15 May that he would meet representatives of the Christies Beach Shelter and the North Adelaide Shelter to discuss funding: R v Liverpool Corporation; ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association [1972] 2 QB 299; Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629 and Cole v Cunningham [1942] ArgusLawRp 77; (1983) 49 ALR 123. In other words, by reason of Dr Cornwall's promise, the Christies Beach Shelter had an actual expectation, as well as the legitimate expectation provided by the common law rule, that it would be heard before funding would be withdrawn. Without relying on it, I simply note, in passing, that denying the Shelter a hearing was contrary to cl 10 of the Financial Agreement. As the Christies Beach Shelter had not signed that Agreement, it could not expect to get the benefits of it.
Apart from the common law rules as to natural justice, ordinary principles of fairness required that the Shelter, its management committee and staff, be heard before allegations, as serious and as grave as these allegations of personal and professional misconduct, were made available to the public. They were allegations which had the capacity to tarnish severely, if not entirely destroy, reputations and make it extremely difficult to find employment. This was certainly the experience of the plaintiff. There was nothing in the funding programme which required that they not have that opportunity. Given that it had been decided to instruct the police and CAC to enquire into the allegations, the publication of that part of the Report concerning Christies Beach could have been delayed. The funding to Christies Beach could have continued on a fortnightly basis until the results of the investigation were known. I do not accept Dr Cornwall's evidence to the contrary.
In cross-examination, Dr Cornwall was asked why, before he published the Report, he did not keep his promise to meet representatives of the Christies Beach Shelter to discuss funding. He could not give a satisfactory answer. One reason he gave was that he had run out of time. As the timing was his own, this explanation was particularly unsatisfactory. His timing also gave him little opportunity to make enquiries as to the progress of the investigations by the police and CAC. As noted already, had he made enquiries, Dr Cornwall would, in all likelihood, have learned that there was very little, if any, substance to the allegations that he was about to table in Parliament.
As mentioned earlier, the decision to publish the allegations was made notwithstanding clear warnings that it might be difficult to substantiate them. The first was on 11 May 1987 when Ms Wighton informed Dr Cornwall in a minute that "some of the details of strange financial behaviour may not be able to be substantiated in a court of law". She then suggested that they be handled differently from the body of the Report. That advice was given before the police and CAC had been requested to conduct enquiries on 29 May. This advice is significant in that it is given by a very senior officer in the Department and it shows that she then had misgivings as to the quality of some of the unsubstantiated allegations. That fear was restated after a preliminary meeting with the police and CAC on 2 June, when Mr Bicknell informed Dr Cornwall in an undated minute, but seen by Dr Cornwall on 10 June, that "at this stage, it is not believed that criminal offences may have been committed, although investigation of the shelter records may later provide this information". In another minute dated 12 June 1987 and seen by Dr Cornwall on the same day, Mr Bicknell informed Dr Cornwall that the police had said that, on the information then to hand, they would not be able to proceed further but would reconsider it in the light of further examination of materials and further evidence becoming available. The minutes also stated that officers of the CAC had concerns whether a prosecution would be successful. Dr Cornwall's response was to request the Commissioner of Police "to reconsider information/allegations re behaviour of the Administrator, Christies Beach". It was, of course, legitimate for Dr Cornwall to ask the police to make further enquiries. But it is clear that, on the basis of the preliminary information then available to them, the police had said that the evidence was weak. In addition to these warnings, Ms Vardon had expressed a degree of caution in her minute to Dr Cornwall of 19 June in which she reported that the Commissioner of Police had said that "he would have difficulty trying to determine what sort of charges could be laid" but would proceed to conduct the enquiries.
Notwithstanding the warning from Ms Wighton on 11 May, Dr Cornwall, nevertheless, instructed that the allegations be included in the Report. Notwithstanding the later warnings, he decided to publish them before the investigations had been completed. This was plainly a shocking breach of ordinary principles of fairness. It was also an extraordinary abuse of parliamentary privilege to publish the allegations under the cloak of that privilege knowing that they were being investigated and before the results of the investigation were known. But it is for the Parliament, not the court, to discipline such breaches. The Shelter, its staff and the management committee were condemned not only without any trial but before the investigations had been completed.
I turn to examine some aspects of all of the allegations made in the Report against the Christies Beach Shelter, both the unsubstantiated allegations and those asserted to be fact.
The recommendation to withdraw funding in the final paragraph of this section of the Report contains several grounds. It falls into two parts. The first is maladministration, both historic and current, of the Shelter. The second is uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate. The maladministration refers to the alleged instances of financial mismanagement and mismanagement of personnel. The reference to the uncertainty of services being available is a reference to the allegation that, in July to September 1983, the Shelter had not been open, a fact confirmed by Ms Anderson. In her evidence, Ms Anderson asserted that it also referred to the amount of TOIL taken by staff at the Shelter. She suggested in her evidence that, because TOIL was used by staff to cope with the stress of their employment, there was an uncertainty as to whether staff were available at the Shelter to give service to clients of the Shelter. But it is apparent from her answers that Ms Anderson had no real knowledge that the Shelter had not been adequately staffed at any time and was relying on assumptions and on unsubstantiated allegations. Instead of questioning staff at the Shelter, she was prepared to rely on the assumptions and unsubstantiated allegations. I do not accept her evidence that she asked the staff at the Shelter on 19 January 1987 detailed questions about these issues. The questions on that day were only asked in a general way and did not descend to specifics, a fact confirmed by Ms Lachlan's notes of that meeting. The reference to the uncertainty as to whether services were appropriate can only refer to the unsubstantiated allegations concerning personal and professional misconduct listed earlier in the Report on pages 65 and 66. Furthermore, the absence of TOIL records hardly constitutes sufficient ground to withdraw funding.
It will have been noticed that there is no express reference in the last paragraph to the Shelter's refusal to sign the Financial Agreement. If the refusal is mentioned at all, it can only be in the expression "maladministration, both historic and current", presumably as an instance of current maladministration. Some members of the Review Committee gave evidence that one important reason for the recommendation to withdraw funding was the refusal of the Christies Beach Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement. If that evidence is correct, it is an extraordinarily oblique way in which to refer to a matter as significant in the administration of women's shelters, as the signing of the Financial Agreement undoubtedly was in 1986 and 1987.
The Review Committee was at pains in the introductory paragraphs on page 64 to single out the Christies Beach Shelter as a shelter quite unlike other shelters. The third and fourth paragraphs emphasise that what follows in the Report is "peculiar" to the Christies Beach Shelter and does not reflect the position in other shelters. From the outset, the Christies Beach Shelter was put in a class of its own.
The litany of allegations against this Shelter is so long that the reader would quickly form the impression that the staff at the Shelter were not fulfilling their proper role. The unsubstantiated allegations on pages 65 and 66 of the Report covered many, if not most, of the aspects of the work at a women's shelter. It was a long list of grave charges. The litany of allegations suggested that there may have been many complainants. However, an examination of the documents recording these allegations which were tendered in the trial shows that the actual complainants were relatively few in number. The Department had kept a file of complaints marked "DCW 42/001/10-Complaints". It is not clear whether that was a file of complaints about all shelters or only about the Christies Beach Shelter. That file was not tendered. However, I believe that all the documents concerning allegations about the Christies Beach Shelter were tendered. An examination of those documents shows:
• that there were no allegations made after February 1985;
• that there were eight letters containing allegations;
• that of those eight letters, two letters refer again to earlier allegations by the same person so that there are effectively six sets of written allegations;
• that one of the eight letters is anonymous, although it does mention a person who could be contacted;
• that the remaining allegations are contained in notes made by Ms Heath. As Ms Heath was not called, it is not possible to know how many persons made allegations to her. It seems to be about 12 but, of those, two are following up complaints already made in letters;
• that some did not wish to present a formal complaint; and
• that few of the allegations were mentioned or drawn to the attention of the plaintiff or any other person at the Christies Beach Shelter.
The Department's submission to the Select Committee suggests that the Committee had the Department's file of complaints. The Select Committee's analysis of the complaints is, broadly speaking, consistent with the above analysis. I mention this only for the purpose of finding that I am satisfied that I have seen all of the complaints.
The Department had investigated some of the allegations. The meeting on 4 October 1983, which has already been mentioned, was one such investigation and the issues were resolved to the satisfaction of the Department. On another occasion, Ms Heath, on behalf of the Department, investigated two complaints made in 1983 by persons who I will call "H" and "O". Ms Heath's notes of her investigations and other documents prepared by her concerning them, show that the allegations made by O were unfounded as to the main thrust of the complaint, although some things might have been better managed. The views of the Shelter were corroborated by persons at independent agencies. The documents then show that Ms Heath informed O that the Shelter had acted reasonably. Ms Heath's notes show that the allegations made by H, which in substance concerned the provision of housing, were denied by all of the staff at the Shelter as well as by a volunteer worker. It is quite apparent that the fault did not all lie with the Shelter or its staff. The fact that both allegations were essentially unjustified is clear on the papers. The Review Committee knew or ought to have known of all of the matters mentioned in this paragraph but failed to mention them in its Report. What is surprising is that Ms Heath referred them to Ms Anderson notwithstanding that some issues had been resolved.
An examination of the letters of complaint and Ms Heath's notes also shows that in some cases the allegations came from people who had had disagreements or differences of opinion with the plaintiff. In some cases, the plaintiff may well have been at fault. In one instance she appears to have turned on a former colleague with unjustified vigour because of a difference of opinion. But, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff was at fault in her personal conduct vis-à-vis those who disagreed with her or complained of her management style, an examination of the documents shows that in some instances the allegations represented little more than differences of opinion on management issues or on the philosophy of running a shelter. Others voiced disapproval of the plaintiff's counselling techniques, an area where there may well be reason for reasonable differences of opinion. The Review Committee ought to have reached those conclusions or at least sounded a warning about relying on unsubstantiated allegations.
In addition, the Review Committee did not examine the quality of service provided at the Shelter, nor did it report on it. To the extent that the Report contains allegations of financial, sexual and professional misconduct, it is a collection of allegations made of relatively few complainants which were at least three years old in 1987. No effort was made by the Review Committee to assess whether others held the same view about the Shelter. The evidence shows that the Shelter operated in premises which were furnished and well regarded. The quality of its services was well regarded. The evidence shows that the Shelter and the plaintiff enjoyed a good reputation with other agencies such as the South Australian Housing Trust, the Department's Office at Noarlunga, Mr Aulthuizen, who had been the manager of the southern metropolitan region of the Department, and the Department of Social Security. Mr Aulthuizen was quite impressed with the quality of the services provided. The inquiries made by the police show that the overwhelming majority of clients of the Shelter were satisfied with the services offered at the Shelter. All this reinforces the conclusion that the Review Committee and Ms Anderson in particular were not discerning in the way they dealt with the unsubstantiated allegations. Ms Anderson admitted that her investigations of the unsubstantial allegations were cursory. It is apparent that a few enquiries by Ms Anderson outside the Department and those who had made a complaint would have caused some questioning of the force of the allegations. The Review Committee was content to take the allegations at face value.
The evidence in this trial showed that the Review Committee knew more about some of the allegations contained in the Report, allegations which they asserted to be fact, than is stated in the Report. Put simply, the Review Committee failed to tell all it knew. It failed to tell the whole story. In the result quite a misleading picture is given of some of the allegations. There is a remarkable indifference to truth in the Report, the more remarkable because the Review Committee examined the files of all shelters, including those relating to the Christies Beach Shelter. It is also remarkable because, in the case of some of the allegations included in the Report, Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson had seen documents, such as the minutes of the meeting on 4 October 1983 which is Appendix 2 to these reasons, which outlined a Departmental investigation of the allegations and which stated that the matters had been resolved to the satisfaction of the Department. However, the fact that those matters had been resolved is not stated.
I list the instances of misstatements of the truth. The passage in the Report containing a misstatement is quoted in bold typeface and the true position then noted.
The first misstatement appears on p 64 of the Report. It reads:
"It is evident that the Christies Beach Shelter has frequently come to the attention of senior management in the Department and to the responsible Ministers - State and Federal - over a period of about five years because of deficiencies in financial management, unacceptable management practices and because of unsubstantiated allegations of professional and personal misbehaviour."
There was some evidence that the Christies Beach Shelter had, on occasions, come to the notice of senior management in the Department over the period of five years preceding the Report. But that did not place Christies Beach in a position different from some other shelters such as North Adelaide, Port Augusta, Hope Haven and Para Districts. Christies Beach was one of a number of shelters which had come to the notice of senior management. However, there was little evidence that it had frequently come to the notice of the State Minister. If it had, so had some other shelters. That inaccuracy may be an instance of carelessness. However, the evidence clearly shows that it was not frequently before the Federal Minister as to any of the issues itemised in the concluding words of that paragraph. The Shelter came before the Federal Minister as a shelter identified by name only in August 1987 and this would have been known to the Review Committee. It is hardly surprising that no attempt was made at the trial to justify the allegations in this paragraph.
The next misstatement occurs in the unsubstantiated allegations listed on page 65:
"Operating costs used to augment salaries without the authorisation of the Department."
There was simply no evidence to support this allegation, a fact confirmed by Mr Holmes, a chartered accountant called on behalf of the State defendants. The sting of this allegation is the greater because of the reference on page 68 to the fact that the Administrator of the Shelter was paid at AO-1 level, which includes the comment that "it is not clear ... whether the shortfall is made up in some other way, e.g. from operating costs or from other income". The true position was that the Christies Beach Shelter remained within its budget for salaries and did not supplement salary payments from funds from operating costs. This too was an allegation which could have been easily checked by the Committee, which had the services of finance officers of the Department available to it. One document which should have put the Committee on enquiry was pages 139 and 140 of Exhibit P117 which mentions the source of funding of salaries. If the check did not establish the truth of the allegation, the Committee should not have made it.
I turn to the allegations on pages 66 and 67 of the Report.
"Auditors have been changed often and on one occasion an auditor was obliged to qualify his report with a statement that twenty-five (25) payments could not be accounted for as no vouchers, receipts or other documentation was presented."
It would have been more correct to say that auditors were changed in all but one year from 1981 to 1986. But I have no desire to be pedantic on that issue. The misstatement of truth is far more fundamental. The rest of the sentence is accurate as far as it goes but it tells a good deal less than the full story, a story which, I find, was known to Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson. The latter part of the sentence misrepresents the overall position. When standing alone and without further examination, the bald fact that auditors were often changed is likely to give rise to concern. However, when all the facts are examined, that concern dissipates. The history of the auditors at the Christies Beach Shelter is as follows. In 1981, Mr Neverauskas was the Shelter's auditor. His daughter was a member of the management committee. At the meeting of the management committee of the Shelter on 5 May 1982, his letter of resignation was received. The letter was not proved. It may have been lost. At the meeting of the management committee of the Shelter on 7 July 1982, his daughter resigned. She had had differences of opinion with the plaintiff. The resignations of Mr Neverauskas and his daughter were, I find, related. A new auditor was appointed. He was Mr Esdale, who completed the audits for the 1982 and 1983 financial years. Because of his mismanagement of the 1983 audit which has already been mentioned, Mr Esdale was replaced as auditor by a Mr Evans. Given the mishaps in relation to the 1983 audit, the decision to replace him was quite understandable. Mr Evans audited the accounts for the financial years ending 1984 and 1985. At the annual general meeting of the Shelter in October 1985, it was suggested that a woman should be appointed as auditor. It was resolved to appoint Ms Helen Maunder if she was willing to do so and was acceptable to the Department. The resolution also stated that if she was not able to conduct the audit, Mr Evans would be reappointed. Ms Maunder was willing. There seems to have been no objection from the Department. She completed the 1986 audit. In October 1986, the Shelter resolved at its annual general meeting to reappoint her as auditor for the ensuing year but, as already noted, the CAC determined that she was unqualified to conduct the audit. Thus, there were four auditors appointed in respect of six financial years. There were reasons for replacing auditors and those reasons were entirely understandable. The fact that auditors were changed was not indicative of either financial mismanagement or a desire to avoid auditing scrutiny. However, the true facts were not disclosed in the Report. The mere statement "auditors have been changed often", when stated in the context of financial mismanagement, carries the clear innuendo that the Shelter changed auditors either to avoid auditing scrutiny or criticism, or because the auditor refused to comply with requests of the Shelter, or because there was something to conceal, or because the management of the Shelter was corrupt. In truth, none of those were the reasons for the change of auditors. The Review Committee knew the true facts but, instead, chose to make a statement which concealed the true position and so presented a more sinister picture.
The misstatement concerning the 25 receipts is even more reprehensible. There was material before the Review Committee which disclosed that the Department had investigated this question in October 1983. That material is the document which is reproduced as Appendix 2. Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson had seen it. I find that Ms Wighton had also seen it and knew of it. Similarly, they would have also been aware that on 14 December 1983 Mr Cox, the then Director-General of the Department, had written to the Shelter to advise that the issue had been "clarified" and noting that the Shelter had received an unqualified audit. The failure to recount the full position indicates at least a reckless indifference to the truth and, at worst, a deliberate intent to paint the Shelter in the worst possible light. Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson asserted in their evidence that this statement about auditors was included because the Committee disagreed with the Department's conclusion. Their assertion does not withstand the slightest scrutiny. When all facts are known the picture appears to be quite different. They could have disagreed with the Department and given reasons but they did not do so. They did not adduce evidence at the trial to justify the statement in the Report because, I find, they could not.
"Difficulty and delays in obtaining adequate financial statements at times."
This statement is quite unspecific as to the number of occasions in which difficulty or delay was experienced by the Department in relation to adequate financial statements. However, the use of the expression "at times" suggests that there were quite a number of occasions. As will be seen, that was not the true position. The particulars supplied by the defendant members of the Review Committee demonstrate that only two occasions were identified. Further and better particulars of this assertion were given as part of the plea of justification. They are in these terms:
"(a) as at 15 August and 14 September 1983 no audited statement for the financial year 1982/83 was received by the department;
(b) on 16 August 1983 the department received a financial return for the quarter ended 30 June 1983, which was qualified by the auditor. The shelter was advised on 13 and 15 September 1983 that that statement was unsatisfactory and that an audited statement for the financial year ended 1982/83 had not been received;
(c) a meeting was held on 4 October 1983 between representatives of the department and the shelter, at which time the matter of the qualified audit was discussed between them and the shelter undertook to take steps to obtain another audited statement;
(d) the department communicated with the shelter on 30 September 1983, 12 October, 14 October and 17 October 1983 seeking a properly audited statement for the quarter ended 30 June 1983 and for the financial year 1982/83. An audited financial statement for the financial year 1982/83 was received by the department on 20 October 1983;
(e) the department contacted the shelter on 14 February and 22 February 1985 about not having received a financial return for the period ending 31 December 1984;
(f) on 27 February 1985 the department confirmed with the shelter that it had not yet received the quarterly return for the period ending 31 December 1984;
(g) on other dates which are now unable to be specified due to the effluxion of time, departmental officer(s) were obliged to request that the shelter forward properly completed outstanding quarterly and annual financial statements to the department."
Paragraphs (a) to (d) deal with the same issues as were the subject of the qualified audit report for the year ending 30 June 1983 and were dealt with by the Department at the meeting on 4 October 1983 and were then resolved.
It is apparent that pars (e) and (f) refer to the same set of financial returns. It should be noted that the uncontroverted evidence is that in a series of telephone calls Ms McSkimming told an officer from the Department that the statement had been sent on 23 or 24 February 1985. There is no evidence that the statement had not been received in the Department in late February. I find that it was. There is no dispute that the Shelter may have been late.
There is no evidence as to the matters alleged in particular (g), a fact confirmed by the final submissions of counsel for the State defendants.
The position then is that the Shelter might not have cleared matters up as quickly as it should have in 1983 but the matter was ultimately cleared up to the satisfaction of the Department and, in 1985, was late in supplying its return. Thus, it has been proved that there were only two financial statements which were late. The Shelter was required to provide quarterly financial statements as well as annual financial statements, a total of at least four in each year. Thus, for the years 1981 to 1987, the Christies Beach Shelter would have supplied at least 28 statements and only two of those have been proved to be late. These facts were capable of being readily checked by the Review Committee. They are not compelling evidence of continuing financial mismanagement. Thus, the statement "difficulty and delay in obtaining adequate financial statements at times" is misleading as to the frequency of such occurrences.
The next misstatement occurs on page 67 of the Report:
"In February 1986 Christies Beach received an additional $17,271 (through SAAP) backdated and paid to the end of the third quarter. Despite these additional funds, the shelter still required an advance of $20,000 at the end of the financial year. At the beginning of the Review, Christies Beach had a deficit of $19,150."
This is one of a number of statements made about the Shelter which the report states are "clearly peculiar" to the Christies Beach Shelter. To the extent that this passage states that the payment of $17,271 in February 1986 was peculiar to this Shelter, it is manifestly wrong. The clear innuendo is that this was a payment made to Christies Beach alone and that no other shelter received a like payment. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Committee knew the true position. It was that the payment was made by letter dated 3 March 1986 and was as part of the grants to all shelters under the SAAP Program. Other shelters received grants at about the same time. The balance of the paragraph is correct.
The next misstatement is to be found on page 68 of the Report. It reads:
"At the time the shelter shifted premises, the shelter was inoperative for a protracted period. Crisis Care had received advice from the shelter that they would not be accepting referrals from 11/7/83 to 25/8/83. This came to the attention of the Department through Crisis Care which was unable to make referrals there from 11/7/83 to 4/10/83 (the date of one of the visits to the shelter by departmental personnel)."
The clear meaning of this paragraph is that the Shelter was closed from 11 July 1983 to 25 August 1983, a period of about six weeks. The innuendo of the third sentence, when read with the first sentence which introduces the topic, is that the Shelter was not operating until 4 October 1983 when officers of the Department visited the premises. I have already found that the Shelter continued to operate throughout the time when it moved from its old premises to the new premises at Damian Court. Soon after the move to Damian Court, the Shelter was fully occupied. For that reason, it was unable to take any referrals in the period 9 July 1983 to 16 September 1983 and remained full thereafter until 4 October 1983. These issues had been discussed at the meeting with the Department on 4 October 1983 and had been noted in Exhibit P4. The Department was satisfied that the Shelter had been fully occupied. In his letter dated 14 December 1983 to the Shelter, Mr Cox said that the questions regarding admission practices had been "satisfactorily resolved". There was clear evidence before the Review Committee that the Shelter had not been inoperative and sound reasons why Crisis Care had been unable to make referrals to it. Thus, in this paragraph the Review Committee not only failed to state the true facts which were known to it, but also failed to state that the matter had been satisfactorily resolved with the Department. Here again, the Review Committee knew the true position which was set out in Exhibit P4 and other documents, including Mr Cox's letter of 14 December 1983, stating that the matter had been "satisfactorily resolved". In other words, the Review Committee knew the true facts but chose to make a statement which concealed the true position. The full facts show a position quite different from that stated in the paragraph. I find that the Review Committee was again reckless with the truth. It was, of course, open to the Review Committee to reach a different conclusion from that reached by the Department. However, it could only do so if evidence existed. The members of the Committee could not point to any other evidence. In truth, there was simply no evidence to support the conclusion that the Shelter had been inoperative for the stated period. In other words, it was simply not possible for the Committee to reach a different conclusion from that which had been reached by the Department. What this paragraph in the Report shows is that the Review Committee was simply not prepared to face the objective facts in relation to the Christies Beach Shelter. Those objective facts got in the way of the picture they wished to present and so they were not stated.
The following misstatement is found on page 72 of the Report:
"Finance Officers then visited the shelter on 11/3/85. No detailed audit was carried out then or on any other visit to the shelter, despite instruction to do so. However, certain financial and accounting practices were noted. For example, not all paid staff appear on the wages schedule submitted to the Department; no entries had been made in the March cashbook. No satisfactory explanations of excessive expenditure were put forward."
The finance officers who visited the Christies Beach Shelter on 11 March 1985 made a written report of their visit. It was followed by a minute prepared by a senior finance officer to the Director-General. The visit had been made because the Shelter had sought $10,000 by way of additional funding having used all its existing funding. The minute to the Director-General stated
"The visit did not reveal any major reasons for the shelter's current financial problems. The shelter staff stated that the problem is simply that this Department does not give them sufficient funding to cover their expenses. (The total allocation for 1984/85 is $133,350.) There were some concerns regarding the number of staff paid which were not shown on the wages schedule submitted to the Department and also the fact that no entries had been made in the shelter's cash-book for March. No attempt was made to conduct a detailed audit of the shelter's books."
In the minute, as well as in the written report, it is clearly stated that, in the Shelter's view, the Department was not providing adequate funding. The statement "no satisfactory explanations of excessive expenditure were put forward" means either that the Shelter could not explain the excessive expenditure or that the explanation given by the Shelter was not satisfactory to the Review Committee. In view of this ambiguity, I am not prepared to find that the Committee had misstated the position. However, while the bald statement "no entries have been made in the March cashbook" is a correct transcription of what had been reported to the Department by its finance officers, it conveys an inaccurate picture of the true position. The Shelter then employed a bookkeeper, Ms Jan Underdown. She did not work full-time. She wrote up the cashbook on a weekly or fortnightly basis. The evidence is not clear which of the two it was. It is quite apparent that the visit made by the DCW officers on 11 March 1985 was made before Ms Underdown next wrote up the cashbook. This was the only instance when it was reported that the cashbook had not been written up. There is no evidence that the cashbook for March 1985 had not eventually been written up. This was an incidence of the Review Committee simply restating an allegation concerning the Christies Beach Shelter without making any independent assessment of the force of the allegation or conducting any independent investigation. The true facts could have been readily ascertained. A simple examination of the cashbook would have sufficed. It is an incidence of the willingness of the Review Committee to state anything to the detriment of the Shelter.
What is striking about the manner in which the Review Committee has dealt with the Christies Beach Shelter in this Report is that anything in the Departmental records which might be at all exculpatory of the Shelter or which might present a balanced picture concerning the Shelter has not been included. The Committee did not include in the Report material of which it was aware which might contradict or qualify an allegation. On several occasions the full story has not been told with a consequence that an entirely misleading statement is made about the Shelter. The Report displays a remarkable indifference to the truth. It unfairly states the facts. There was no reason why the Committee could not state all relevant facts where it knew them. Misstatements of truth occur too often to be the result of mere carelessness.
The willingness of the Review Committee to include, without any kind of critical examination, any allegation to the detriment of the Christies Beach Shelter, is positively demonstrated by some unsubstantiated allegations which were deleted from the Report on the advice of Mr Selway given on 29 June 1987. His advice is set out in the above narrative. Those allegations included the following:
"Examples of alleged harassment of ex-residents included:
- rubbish thrown through a child's bedroom window,
A moment or two's reflection would cause even a jaundiced observer of the Christies Beach Shelter to conclude that the allegations are quite extreme and wonder whether the allegations might refer to persons other than the management or staff of the Christies Beach Shelter. One of the possible groups of persons who might have caused that harassment would have been former partners of the former residents. The fact that the Review Committee was prepared, after receiving Mr Selway's advice, to exclude these extreme allegations does not affect the conclusion that the fact that they were originally included indicates a willingness to publish anything detrimental to the Shelter. It also indicates a failure to assess the allegations, a topic to which I now turn.
The Review Committee and, in particular, Ms Anderson as its consultant, was in a position to make some judgement as to the reliability of some of the allegations. The effect of the evidence of Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson was that they lacked the resources to make any kind of investigation or even assessment of the allegations. This echoed a statement on page 69 of the Report that "the Review Committee was unable to assess the accuracy of all allegations received by the Department" and that it was not its mandate to investigate them. This evidence was unconvincing. The Review Committee had been established to review, among other things, the administrative practices and management structures of women's shelters. Its task required it to analyse information brought to it or other information it ascertained. It had to weigh the material placed before it, determine what action should be taken, and make recommendations to the Minister. If it did not, it was simply collating information. Clearly, its task required more than that. Indeed, the evidence of both Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson belied this somewhat disingenuous excuse. They recognised that the Review Committee's task was to assess the information. They asserted in their evidence that they believed that the Review Committee could disagree with conclusions reached by the Department. For example, they asserted that they had disagreed with the Department's conclusions that it was satisfied that the complaints had been satisfactorily resolved after its meeting with the Shelter on 4 October, 1983. In this way, they admitted their task required them to assess material. When asked why the Review Committee referred to the qualified auditor's report, Mrs Roberts said that the Review Committee "was not comfortable with the comments and responses" by the Department on that matter. The Committee had investigated the matter, she said. But her answer shows that the investigation was superficial. Neither she nor Ms Anderson nor any other member of the Committee had spoken to the auditor involved. There was, therefore, no reason for the Committee to disagree with the Department's conclusion. There was no reason why it should not state all the relevant facts and assess the allegations which had been made.
Ms Anderson's evidence also belies the excuse of inability to assess the allegations. A few questions to her demonstrated that she knew that the number of complaints were few. Not even that fact was stated in the Report.
The complaint of a lack of resources is also inconsistent with the fact that the resources of the Department were made available to the Review Committee. Many of the allegations as to financial matters could have been examined for the purpose of testing whether the allegations had substance. The Committee had the Department's files available to it. Those files contained a good deal of financial information. What information was not included could have been supplemented by inquiry of the Department's accounting officers, whose services were also available to the Review Committee.
In relation to the allegations as to personal misconduct, it was clearly difficult for Ms Anderson or the Committee to verify some of the unsubstantiated allegations because, in some cases they required a degree of investigation more appropriately conducted by the police or other like authority. Nevertheless, it behoved the Committee at least to make some assessment of the force of all of the allegations. The brief review I have made of the allegations under the heading "Few Complainants" demonstrates that it was possible to assess the force of most of them. Furthermore, no weight seems to have been given to the fact that the greater number of allegations had been concerning conduct which occurred some four years before the Report was published. The Committee could at the very least have subjected the unsubstantiated allegations to the kind of scrutiny conducted by the Select Committee. It could have mentioned dates. It could also have made enquiries of others such as officers in agencies with whom the Shelter frequently dealt. The evidence suggests they would not have been critical of the Shelter. The Housing Trust, for example, held a high opinion of the Shelter and its staff. The Committee not only failed to subject the allegations to any kind of scrutiny but also repeated a number of them in a way which did not state the full facts.
There are too many instances of facts being incorrectly stated to enable the conclusion that they are the result of carelessness. I reject the evidence that the allegations concerning the auditors and the Shelter being closed for a long period in 1983 were included because the Review Committee had reached a different view. The facts which would have been known to the Review Committee do not allow such a conclusion. At the very least the full facts should have been stated. What was stated gave an entirely misleading and inaccurate picture. The failure to include many dates does not inform the reader that most of the allegations related to matters which by July 1987 were more than four years old. This must have been known at least to Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson. Ms Wighton had informed Dr Baum at the meeting on 11 June that the allegations referred to matters "several years ago". Ms Anderson had seen the documents. As Ms Vardon said, the Minister and the Review Committee knew they were old allegations. I find that the Review Committee was entirely reckless with the truth and, on occasions, deliberately failed to set out all the facts. I find it was decided to include everything that could tell against the Shelter. Nothing exculpatory was to be mentioned. I find that the allegations were collated by Ms Anderson with the assistance of Ms Heath and that Ms Wighton made Ms Heath available for that task. I also find that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson knew what material was available. It is clear from the evidence that Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King relied on Ms Anderson to acquaint them with all facts relating to the allegations and that neither Ms Anderson nor Mrs Roberts nor Ms Wighton informed them of all of the facts and, in particular, did not show them either Exhibit P4, the minutes of the meeting of 4 October 1983, or the letter from Mr Cox stating the matters discussed at the meeting had been satisfactorily resolved. I find that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson deliberately misstated the true position concerning the Christies Beach Shelter.
The Unsubstantiated Allegations Not Originally Included
The Review Committee's Terms of Reference had been drafted in a way which pointed to a general review of management and administrative practices. There was nothing which required the Committee to report on individual shelters. The evidence shows that the initial work of the Committee was directed only to management and administrative practices of shelters. The kinds of questions which were asked of shelters were quite general in nature, dealing with such matters as the nature of the records kept, management structure, relationship with other agencies such as police, local community service organizations and the Department, staff development and their response to and views upon the Financial Agreement. The kinds of questions which were asked are listed in Appendix V of the Report. It is manifestly clear that the Committee was not descending to specific details of day-to-day management. The list in Appendix V contains 28 pages of questions or topics for discussion. Some of those paragraphs have more than one question. If the experience at Christies Beach is any guide, Ms Anderson did not stay particularly long at any one shelter. Her visit to Christies Beach on 19 January 1987 lasted about two to three hours. That time would not have permitted anything more than a rather superficial examination of each topic. Certainly, no one topic could have been investigated in any detail. The evidence of Ms McSkimming and Ms Lachlan, which I accept, confirms that. All other shelters were visited once. The evidence is not clear but it seems that Christies Beach was the only shelter visited twice. However, that visit was in response to a request from the Shelter that all members of the Review Committee visit the Shelter. That visit was shorter than the initial visit by Ms Anderson. Again, it gave no opportunity to examine issues in detail. All this points to the Committee intending to report in a general way on management and administrative practice.
The fact that the original intention was to deal with administration and management in a general way is confirmed by Ms King's notes of the meeting on 2 December 1986. It is also confirmed by Ms Anderson's reports to the Review Committee at its early meetings. Those reports pointed to a general review of administration and management issues without any shelter being especially mentioned. In addition, her written report of her first visit to the Christies Beach Shelter did not raise any concerns about the Shelter. I find that, had there been any, she would have mentioned them, even if in a very summary way.
Positive evidence of the fact that the Review Committee had originally approached its task in a general way is contained in Ms Wighton's description of what she called "the final draft" of the Report in her minute to Dr Cornwall dated 22 April 1987. It is quite apparent from her description of the contents of the Report, and in particular its recommendations, that the Report dealt broadly with administration and management and did not descend to criticism of individual shelters. She described the recommendations in these terms:
"The recommendations contained within the report proposed guidelines for government administrators, management committees and shelter staff which should resolve the deficit problem and allow the shelters to be administered more efficiently, have greater control of their resources and be more accountable."
The fact that this was the draft of the intended report in mid-April is confirmed by Exhibit P644. I have already found that Exhibit P644 is either the draft to which Ms Wighton referred in her minute or a draft which is very close in time to it and accords with the general tenor of what was regarded in April 1987 as the final draft.
However, at some time between mid-April and 11 May, at least Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson had decided to discuss with Dr Cornwall the manner in which the allegations against Christies Beach should be handled. This was to result in the inclusion of the section in the Report which dealt with Christies Beach. It is apparent from Ms Wighton's minute to Dr Cornwall dated 11 May 1987 that some kind of document containing the allegations against Christies Beach had been prepared. That was the document prepared by Ms Anderson which was seen by Dr Cornwall on 4 May. Ms Wighton's minute of 11 May, when combined with Mrs Roberts' note to Ms Wighton of 11 May 1987, indicates quite clearly that one matter to be discussed with Dr Cornwall was not whether a report about Christies Beach should be prepared but whether that report was to be included in a report prepared in response to the Terms of Reference or in a separate report. In other words, the issue which was to be discussed with Dr Cornwall on 12 May was, not whether a report should be written about the allegations concerning Christies Beach, but whether that report should be included in the main report or in an additional report. I find that at the meeting on 12 May, Dr Cornwall directed the Review Committee to include the allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter in the main Report.
It is clear that it was decided at the meeting on 12 May to include the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report as well as the other criticisms of the Christies Beach Shelter. In this section of the reasons I will refer to both the unsubstantiated allegations and the other criticisms as "the allegations". I have already found that at this meeting it was decided to withdraw funding from the Shelter, the timing of the announcement to depend on the completion of the Report, its tabling in Cabinet, and the obtaining of the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister as required by the guidelines for the SAAP Program. I set out further reasons for these conclusions.
Dr Cornwall's evidence was that he directed that the allegations be included in the main Report and not in a separate report because, as a matter of practical politics, no other course was open. I do not accept Dr Cornwall's evidence that the allegations could not have been the subject of a separate report. The effect of his evidence was that the political reality was that the content of the separate report would have been leaked and there would have been questions in the Legislative Council about the Report. I reject this explanation. If, as he suggested, the existence of a separate report became known and questions were asked about it, the obvious answer would be that he had withdrawn funding because of the failure to sign the Financial Agreement, the continued incurring of deficits, and the refusal to be accountable. In doing so, he could have referred to his earlier statements in October 1986 and at other times of the need for accountability. He could then have added that in the interest of fairness it had been necessary to refer the matters contained in the other report to the police for investigation. He could then have added that he would inform the House of the outcome of those investigations. I find that Dr Cornwall's reasons for saying that it was not practical for a separate report to be prepared were not held by him at the time and they are an attempt at an ex post facto justification for his actions. I add that Mr Sumner said that the allegations as to misappropriation of funds, and sexual and personal misconduct should not have been included in the Report. He added that it was not politically impracticable to exclude them from the Report.
When one stands back and compares the position of both the North Adelaide and Christies Beach Shelters in May 1987, compares the position of Christies Beach with both the Hope Haven Shelter and the shelter at Port Augusta at that time, reviews the events of May to August 1987, and examines the asserted reasons for the decision to withdraw funding, it becomes apparent that Dr Cornwall had decided to withdraw funding at the meeting on 12 May and that the allegations were used in order to single out the Christies Beach Shelter as being different from the other shelters and to silence any political opposition to the decision. The evidence allows no other reasonable explanation for the manner in which the Christies Beach Shelter was treated differently from the other shelters I have just mentioned. I set out the reasons for that conclusion below, first comparing the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters and then comparing the Christies Beach Shelter with other shelters. It is also necessary to examine what occurred on 12 May and to examine the justification Dr Cornwall gave at various times for the decision to withdraw funding.
At 1 May and until the latter part of July 1987, the position of the shelters at Christies Beach and North Adelaide vis à vis the Department was, broadly speaking, the same. The following have already been identified.
• Both had not signed the Financial Agreement and both were still refusing to sign it. Their conduct was plainly political and was perceived as such by both the Department and Dr Cornwall. Dr Cornwall was aware that the Christies Beach Shelter incurred deficits as a political statement.
• Both shelters had been accumulating deficits for a number of years.
• Both shelters were being funded on a fortnightly basis.
• Both shelters, and in particular their respective administrators, Ms Rowan and Ms Balendran, had been very active in the political process, especially when voicing opposition to the SAAP Program and the requirement to sign the Financial Agreement.
• Dr Cornwall had informed both shelters that he would meet Ms McSkimming, who was acting Administrator of Christies Beach, and Ms Balendran to discuss their financial position and demands once the Report had been published.
Notwithstanding these similarities, the Department and Dr Cornwall were willing to accept the Financial Agreement signed by North Adelaide but not the undertaking signed by Christies Beach. The reasons which were given by Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon were that the Christies Beach Shelter had not signed the Financial Agreement but had signed the undertaking and in addition had deleted the proviso. Both added that the tenor of the letter which enclosed the signed undertaking indicated that the shelter would continue to incur deficits. Their evidence does not withstand scrutiny. I do not accept it for the following reasons.
First, I have already mentioned my general dissatisfaction with their evidence.
Secondly, a reading of the letter from 23 July from Christies Beach Shelter to Dr Cornwall shows that it is capitulatory in tone. The text of the letter is set out above in the recital of the facts leading to the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. It must be remembered that the Shelter, with North Adelaide, had been holding out against signing either the undertaking or the Financial Agreement for almost 12 months. The whole tenor of the letter indicates a defeated shelter compelled to make overtures for compromise because it needed funds to enable it to survive. It could not even wait until the promised meeting with Dr Cornwall. In this context, it is relevant also to remember that the deletion of the proviso from the undertaking strengthened the terms of the undertaking.
Thirdly, Christies Beach did not want to be left out in the cold. Its main ally in opposition to the signing of the Financial Agreement had been the North Adelaide Shelter but it had decided to sign. It would have been plain to the Christies Beach Shelter that it could not maintain the political campaign alone and unassisted by any other shelter. Its political position had been undermined by the fact that all other shelters had signed the Financial Agreement.
Fourthly, as both Mr Bicknell and Ms Vardon emphasised in their evidence, the Department was anxious that all shelters should sign the Agreement. As is apparent from the letter of 23 July, the Christies Beach Shelter believed it was signing the Agreement. In several places, the letter refers to the Agreement and in the closing paragraph states, "the signed agreement is enclosed". At the very least, the Department could have pointed out that the incorrect document had been signed and invited the Shelter to sign the correct document. Ms Vardon's note of her telephone conversation with Mr McSkimming shows that she knew that the Christies Beach Shelter wished to signed the Financial Agreement. The capitulatory tenor of the letter dated 23 July suggested that the Shelter would have signed the Agreement. To express this reason another way, if the evidence of Mr Bicknell and Ms Vardon is correct, that the Department was anxious to have all shelters sign the Financial Agreement, the Department would have pointed out to the Christies Beach Shelter that it had signed the wrong document and invited it to sign the correct document. Alternatively, their evidence is not correct and the decision to withdraw funding had already been made and was irreversible. I find that the latter is the true position. The offer to sign had been withdrawn so that, even if the Christies Beach Shelter had proffered an unamended form of the Financial Agreement signed on behalf of its management committee, it would have been rejected. At that stage, there was simply no intent or desire in either Dr Cornwall or the Department to treat with the Christies Beach Shelter. That is confirmed by the fact that Ms Vardon cancelled her meeting with the Shelter which was to have been held on 13 July 1987. It is for these reasons that I also reject Dr Cornwall's evidence that he was hoping that Christies Beach would sign the Agreement.
Another factor to consider is that the promised meeting with the shelters would have provided an opportunity for Ms Vardon or some other senior officer in the Department or even Dr Cornwall to put to the Christies Beach Shelter in some more particularised way the allegations against it. It would have provided an opportunity for the Shelter to be given some kind of hearing. It is clear that it was decided not to hold the meeting because the decision had already been made to withdraw funding.
It is apparent also that by 29 May 1987, it had been decided that Christies Beach would be treated differently from North Adelaide despite the fact that both were then still refusing to sign the Financial Agreement. As Mr Bicknell said Christies Beach was the only shelter from which the Review Committee in mid-May was seriously considering recommending that funding be withdrawn.
The difference in treatment is evidenced by the fact that, despite the fact that both shelters had refused to sign the Financial Agreement and despite all the other similarities between the shelters, it was decided in May to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter only. There is nothing in the minute of 29 May which even hints at withdrawing funding from the North Adelaide Shelter. This was different from recommendations in earlier minutes, which dealt with both shelters , for example, Ms Wighton's minute of 8 May. In addition, North Adelaide had neither signed the Financial Agreement nor told the Department that it wished to sign it before 1 July when the Report was delivered to Dr Cornwall. As far as the Review Committee was concerned, if the failure to sign the Financial Agreement was the main reason for withdrawing funding from Christies Beach, why was there not also a recommendation to withdraw funding from North Adelaide?
There is also a noticeable difference in the reaction of Ms Vardon to information she received from both shelters that they wished to sign the Agreement. It is apparent from Ms Vardon's minute to Dr Cornwall of 6 August that when, on 6 July, Ms Balendran informed the Department that North Adelaide wished to sign the Financial Agreement, the request was received sympathetically. Ms Vardon's response to Ms McSkimming when she rang on 14 July to say the Christies Beach Shelter needed money and wanted to sign the Agreement was quite different. Ms Vardon told Ms McSkimming that the Shelter should write to Dr Cornwall. While that might have been consistent with Mr Bicknell's letter of 15 May, it nevertheless is quite a different response to that given to North Adelaide from whom the offer to sign had also been withdrawn. This not only shows that Ms Vardon's evidence that the Department wished Christies Beach to sign the Agreement cannot be relied on but it also demonstrates that Christies Beach was being treated quite differently. The difference in treatment resulted from the concluded decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter.
It is clear that the Christies Beach Shelter was not the only shelter with which the Department had been experiencing difficulties. That is evident from the terms of the Report. It is also established by the evidence. What is to be remarked upon is that the asserted problems at Christies Beach were akin to those existing at at least two other shelters, Port Augusta and Hope Haven, and that the financial mismanagement at Port Augusta appears to have been worse than that at Christies Beach. I deal first with the financial mismanagement at Port Augusta.
As at 27 November 1986, Port Augusta had a deficit of $34,595, the highest deficit among all shelters. It was almost twice the deficit at Christies Beach which at that time was $19,150. The reasons for the deficit at Port Augusta, as explained in the Report, were over-extension of services and inefficient administration. Management had been unsuccessful in exerting adequate financial controls. The Department rendered assistance to the shelter. A new Administrator had commenced duties in July 1986 and a new bookkeeper had been appointed. The Review Committee concluded that the organization had addressed the problems and was in "a good position to manage well".
The description of the causes of the deficit at Port Augusta reads very much like those which had caused the deficit at Christies Beach. The incurring of a deficit at Port Augusta was no recent event. Like Christies Beach, it had been increasing over a period of four years. In addition, Port Augusta had received a recent adverse auditor's report. It was a sufficiently serious report to be drawn to the attention of Dr Cornwall.
Putting the unsubstantiated allegations to one side, there is no evidence of anything which justifies why Christies Beach was treated differently from Port Augusta other than the fact that it had refused to sign the Financial Agreement. Yet, North Adelaide had also refused to sign the Financial Agreement and its funding was not withdrawn.
The problems at Hope Haven are only briefly summarised in the Report. They were administration and management of personnel and resources, service delivery, staffing, and the physical condition of the building. Since August 1984 the Department had been concerned with the standard of the premises, described as sub-standard and depressing, and the level of services provided to clients. It had concerns about its management structure. Management was perceived to be a closed shop and potential conflicts of interest existed. In May 1986, Mr Bicknell and Meredyth Taylor met the Board of the shelter and listed the problems to be rectified. The shelter was informed that its funding would be terminated if it did not remedy the position to the Department's satisfaction. The position was so poor that women were referred to other shelters and only to Hope Haven as a shelter of last resort. The residents at the shelter boycotted the child care facility and at one stage wrote to the Department listing their grievances.
The Department dealt with these problems quite directly in August and September 1986. The shelter was given an opportunity to redress the problems. The shelter entered into negotiations expressing willingness to undertake most of the requests, but also seeking funding to improve its premises. The shelter complained of being harassed. In September, the Department was obtaining legal advice as to how it could withdraw funding. The Report indicated that the issues were still being addressed in June 1987. In short, there were serious problems at Hope Haven and, although it was taking a long time to resolve them, the shelter was given a reasonable opportunity to address them. The shelter did not have a deficit and it had signed the Financial Agreement. However, those facts do not sufficiently distinguish the position to deny Christies Beach the same opportunity as was given the Hope Haven Shelter to put its own house in order. In this context, it should be noted that there was no complaint about the quality of the premises at the Christies Beach Shelter.
Dr Cornwall could not explain why such an opportunity was not given to Christies Beach. When asked why Christies Beach had been treated differently, Dr Cornwall replied that it had had at least six months to sign the Agreement and had failed to do so. There is no merit in this somewhat facile reply. It is true that the Shelter had not signed in 1986. However, it will be recalled that in February 1987, Dr Cornwall had promised to meet representatives of the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters. That promise was made in response to a request from Ms Balendran at North Adelaide to discuss funding and the Financial Agreement. The promise had been reiterated in Mr Bicknell's letter of 15 May when the offer to sign the Financial Agreement had been withdrawn from both shelters. Thus, Dr Cornwall sought to rely on the failure to sign the Financial Agreement when he himself had withdrawn the capacity of the shelters to sign it. Furthermore, the reiteration of the promise to meet would cause the shelters to have no concern about funding. Plainly, both Christies Beach and North Adelaide were entitled to take the view that there was no need to sign the Financial Agreement until at least this meeting had been held.
In its report, the Review Committee gave an explanation for the shelter at Hope Haven being treated differently. It said:
"The reasons for this different response include:
• more specific and more formally authenticated complaints over a shorter period,
• strong support by the other shelters for intervention."
These reasons also do not withstand scrutiny. The political climate was no different. The difference in personnel explains nothing. It was plainly different. In any event the management at Hope Haven, like that at Christies Beach, sought extra funding. If anything, the reference to a different management appears to be an attempt at indirect criticism of the plaintiff. The complaints concerned the matters identified above. Ms Anderson said in her evidence they were more specific and authenticated than those relating to Christies Beach. If that is so, it was a reason to exercise care before relying on the complaints about Christies Beach. It was also a reason to give Christies Beach the benefit of an opportunity to either put its house in order or to answer the allegations. The reference to support from some other shelters would suggest that there was no such support for intervention at Christies Beach. In truth, the Christies Beach Shelter had strong support from some other shelters. Ms Anderson was asked to justify the asserted differences but her evidence was entirely unconvincing and I do not accept it.
These threads come together in this way. In relation to deficits, Christies Beach was no different from at least four other shelters. It did not have the highest deficit. In relation to the failure to sign the Financial Agreement, Christies Beach was no different from the North Adelaide Shelter. In relation to financial mismanagement, Christies Beach was, it seems, no worse if not better than the Port Augusta Shelter which had recently had an adverse auditor's report sufficiently serious to be drawn to the attention of the Minister and which also had the highest deficit.
Thus, contrary to what is stated in the Report, and contrary to what Ms Roberts was to say in the course of a television programme on TVB on 12 August, the Christies Beach Shelter did not single itself out from other shelters. What distinguished the Christies Beach Shelter from other shelters was the unsubstantiated allegations only and that was no doubt why the Review Committee relied on them. But as they were unsubstantiated, they provided no basis to withdraw funding - at least not until they had been investigated and it had been established that sufficient evidence existed.
The meeting on 12 May between Dr Cornwall, Mrs Roberts, Ms Anderson and Ms Wighton, marked a turning point in the preparation of the Report and in the Department's dealings with the Christies Beach Shelter. It was a crucial meeting. As already mentioned, it was decided at that meeting that the criticisms of Christies Beach should be included in the Report. I have already found that Dr Cornwall also decided at that meeting that he intended to withdraw funding from the Shelter at some future time when the Report was ready for publication and he had secured the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister. This was confirmed at the meeting between Dr Cornwall and the senior officers of his Department on 26 May.
It is convenient to refer again to the events which followed the meeting on 12 May. It will be noticed that no similar step was being taken in relation to any other Shelter, not even North Adelaide which had not then signed the Financial Agreement. They are:
1. The allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter were included in the Report and the Report recommended that funding be withdrawn from the Shelter.
2. On 12 May, Ms Wighton sent a handwritten minute to Mr Bicknell which instructed him that the Minister wanted the Department to obtain an advice from the Crown Solicitor as to whether there was sufficient evidence to initiate legal proceedings against Christies Beach Shelter. She informed Mr Bicknell that the Minister wanted "to get this moving without delay".
3. The Department contacted the South Australian Housing Trust on 12 May 1987 asking it to find alternative accommodation for a shelter in the southern suburbs of Adelaide. On 27 May the Department informed the Trust that Dr Cornwall was going to move later that week. Although that comment was probably related to the minute of 29 May, the fact that someone from the Department provided that information indicates an intention to act.
4. The Departmental file contained two notes written by Ms Summers, a SAAP project officer in the Department. They are plainly notes of steps to be taken before funding is withdrawn. It was part of a plan for proceeding to defund the Shelter, albeit that the notes may well be notes of advice given by Mr Jackson in the Crown Solicitor's Office on steps to be taken to deal with Christies Beach.
In this context it is necessary also to refer back to the memorandum dated 11 May prepared by Mrs Roberts (in conjunction with Ms Anderson) and sent to Ms Wighton. The memorandum noted issues to be discussed with Dr Cornwall the next day. The first paragraph reads:
"1. Long-standing allegations about administrative malpractice and professional abuses at the Christies Beach Women's Shelter.
- implications for the report. (i.e. what action the Department might be prepared to take and, therefore, how best the report could suit the purpose.)
* Memo regarding the allegations has been prepared."
The reference to the memorandum in the last line is to the memorandum which had been prepared by Ms Anderson and which had been seen by Dr Cornwall on 4 May. The intention was for the Report to suit the purpose of the Department and that purpose was to close the Christies Beach Shelter and open another shelter in the southern suburbs of Adelaide with a different administration. It is not necessary to find why that decision had been made. The plaintiff suggested it resulted from a number of factors, including Ms Wighton's antagonism towards her. It might have been because the Christies Beach Shelter, and the plaintiff in particular, had for a long time been a thorn in the side of the Department. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the intention was to close the Christies Beach Shelter and open another in its place. All of these events point to a decision by Dr Cornwall that he would, in due time, withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter.
It is also apparent that, although it had been decided to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter, funding was not to be withdrawn from the North Adelaide Shelter. That is apparent from the terms of the minute dated 29 May from Ms Vardon (drafted by Ms Wighton) to Dr Cornwall which contained six recommendations. That minute is set out in full in the recital of the facts. Shortly stated, the six recommendations were:
(1) that the police be asked to initiate inquiries;
(3) that funding for Christies Beach be suspended from 30 June, 1987 and the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister be sought for that decision;
(4) that the Department make interim arrangements to establish an alternative service in the area;
(6) that an interim management committee be established for the new shelter.
Dr Cornwall approved recommendations 1 and 2. He directed that fortnightly funding continue pending final recommendations of the Review Committee, or further information. He instructed the officers of his Department to brief the officers in the Commonwealth Department of Community Services.
Unlike earlier minutes as to funding for Christies Beach and North Adelaide, this minute dealt only with Christies Beach. There was no recommendation to withdraw funding from North Adelaide. It is apparent that Christies Beach was being treated differently. The fact that Dr Cornwall required fortnightly funding to continue to Christies Beach was no more than an acceptance of the political reality. Christies Beach had been funded by fortnightly payments since mid-November 1986. It had a substantial deficit. Without its fortnightly payments, it had to close. The failure of Dr Cornwall to approve the recommendation that funding cease from 30 June 1987 is again a recognition of political reality. Before he could announce the decision, the Report had to be ready for publication, Cabinet approval to table the Report had to be obtained, and the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister had to be obtained. He did not know when the Report would be ready and the Report was plainly an essential prerequisite to seeking Cabinet approval and the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister. For those reasons, the recommendation could not then be approved. However, Dr Cornwall did take a step towards seeking the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister by directing that his Department brief the Commonwealth Department.
Recommendations 4 and 6 deal with the same topic. Recommendation 4 was already being effected because the Department had since 12 May been negotiating with the Housing Trust for alternative accommodation for a new shelter. Recommendation 6 had to wait until the decision to withdraw funding could be announced or was about to be announced.
This minute is curious because, in addition to Dr Cornwall's endorsements, it is endorsed by Ms Vardon as follows: "Approved by MCW 29.5.87". "MCW" is an abbreviation for the Minister for Community Welfare. Ms Vardon could not explain the endorsement. I find that the endorsement signified that Ms Vardon believed that Dr Cornwall gave a general approval for the proposed course of action while at the same time not giving approval of the specific recommendations for the reasons mentioned above.
In other words, by 29 May, there was little which would cause the intention to withdraw funding from Christies Beach to be reversed. The only event which might possibly achieve that result would be if Christies Beach Shelter signed the Financial Agreement without amendment. But as Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon knew, that was an extremely unlikely event because the offer to sign had already been withdrawn. In addition, Dr Cornwall had promised to meet with the Shelter after the Report had been completed for the purpose of discussing funding and, plainly, the Christies Beach Shelter was waiting for that meeting to occur.
It is apparent that, by 29 May, Dr Cornwall and those advising him had either overlooked the fact that he had promised to meet Ms McSkimming and Joan Balendran to discuss funding of their shelters once the Review Committee had reported to him or had decided not to hold the meeting. I find that it had been decided not to hold it. The fact that by 29 May it had been decided to withdraw funding from Christies Beach and not from North Adelaide suggests that it had been decided not to hold the meeting. Plainly, there would have been little to discuss with North Adelaide and, if funding had been withdrawn from Christies Beach, there was an obvious difficulty in seeing representatives from both shelters at the same time.
It will be recalled that on 5 August 1987 Dr Crafter, as acting Minister of Community Welfare, signed a minute recommending that funding be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Shelter. The terms of the minute are set out in the narrative above. Earlier in these reasons I pointed to the fact that there is no minute recommending funding be withdrawn between the minute of 29 May and the minute of 5 August as being a fact which shows the decision to withdraw funding had been made in May. The fact the minute of 5 August was the formal recommendation to withdraw funding does not call into question the conclusion that the decision to withdraw funding at some future time was made in May. It is necessary to see the minute of 5 August in its true context. Dr Cornwall had a very clear interest in the outcome of the review and any decision to withdraw funding. He had established the Review Committee and he was aware of the recommendation the Committee intended to make. I find that he wished to be involved in the process of tabling the Report and announcing the decision to withdraw funding. He was going overseas on 8 July and was not to return to parliamentary duties until 10 August. Dr Cornwall had intended to have the matter completed before he left on 8 July. It will be recalled that he had unsuccessfully sought waiver of the 10 day rule so that the matter might be dealt with before he left. Had the rule been waived, it is likely that all arrangements would have been made to enable him to announce the decision to withdraw funding before he left. As he was unable to achieve that goal, he decided that the matter should wait until he returned.
Furthermore, the decision to withdraw funding was important, it was politically sensitive, and it was likely to provoke a hostile reaction. Both the Department and Dr Cornwall were clearly aware of all three aspects of the decision. It was plainly a very critical decision. For all of those reasons, Dr Cornwall would not have delegated the decision to another Minister. I find that before he left to go overseas, he put in place the arrangements to enable the matter to be considered at the Cabinet meeting on Monday, 10 August, the first Cabinet meeting after his return. Those arrangements included the preparation of the formal recommendation dated 5 August to withdraw funding (another instance of what is, in effect, a minute after the event) and the letter to the Commonwealth Minister to acquaint the Minister with the facts and to seek concurrence with his intention to withdraw funding. To summarise. The decision to withdraw funding at some future time was formed in May. The only decision then outstanding was when the actual decision would be made and the date from which it would operate. Dr Cornwall was unable to announce his decision to withdraw funding before he left on his overseas trip. He put in place arrangements for the matter to be before Cabinet on his return and to enable him to announce their decision very shortly after the Cabinet meeting. There was, in effect, nothing for Mr Crafter to do on 5 August but to sign the minute.
There is a curious diversity of reasons given at different times by those involved in the decision to withdraw funding. An examination of those reasons assists in understanding why the unsubstantiated allegations were included in the Report. It is, therefore, helpful in determining the issues involved in some of the plaintiff's causes of action.
It is appropriate to begin by recalling the terms of the recommendation of the Review Committee:
"In view of the maladministration, both historic and current, of this shelter and in view of uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate, the Review Committee recommends that funding be withdrawn."
As already stated, there was no express mention of the failure to sign the Financial Agreement as one of the reasons for the recommendation. Given the importance of that Agreement, that is at least curious. Since at least August 1986 there had been a great deal of controversy about signing the Financial Agreement. The Department had continually pressed the shelters at both Christies Beach and North Adelaide to sign it. I find that, if it was a reason for recommending the withdrawal of funding, it would have been expressly included in the recommendations. It was too important a reason to be mentioned in some oblique way only. Plainly, the reason for not relying on the failure of the Christies Beach Shelter to sign was the fact that, when the Review Committee completed the Report, the North Adelaide Shelter had not signed the Financial Agreement. The Review Committee could not include the failure of the Christies Beach Shelter to sign the Agreement because it would hand the Shelter a political card to play in any agitation to seek to reverse the recommendation.
The only part of the recommendation which might possibly refer to the failure to sign the Financial Agreement was "maladministration". But a failure to sign the Agreement is not maladministration. It might be a poor political decision, but it is not maladministration. As her evidence to the Select Committee shows, Ms Wighton knew that the Shelter's decision not to sign the Financial Agreement was a political decision. She knew the Shelter was trying to make a political statement. I find that the Review Committee would have been aware of Ms Wighton's views. Thus, the stated reasons for the recommendation were simply maladministration and uncertainty whether the services to clients were fully available and appropriate. Maladministration did not include failure to sign the Financial Agreement. For the reasons given later, the uncertainty as to the appropriateness of services could refer only to the unsubstantiated allegations.
I acknowledge that the final paragraph on page 76, which contains the recommendation, is in one sense a summary of what is contained in the preceding pages and the failure to sign the Financial Agreement is mentioned on page 67 but that is in a paragraph which simply noted that both the Christies Beach and North Adelaide Shelters had not signed the Agreement. If a matter as significant as the refusal of the Christies Beach Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement was being relied upon as a reason for recommending the withdrawal of funding, it would have been expressly stated.
It will be recalled that in his letter dated 11 August 1987 to the Shelter Dr Cornwall expressly relied on the terms of the recommendation as the reason for his decision to withdraw funding. In the months and years which followed, he retreated from those reasons and relied to a large extent on the failure of the Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement. An examination of the Department's reasons for the decision also shows a reliance on the failure to sign the Financial Agreement. In addition, the evidence of some members of the Review Committee was that the failure to sign the Financial Agreement was a major reason for the recommendation. The absence from the Review Committee's recommendation of an express reference to the failure to sign the Financial Agreement and the later reliance on that failure causes one to ask what was in truth the real reason for the decision to withdraw funding and why the unsubstantiated allegations were include in the Report. I turn to examine Dr Cornwall's reasons and the reasons of the Review Committee.
Before doing so, it is necessary to deal with that part of Ms Vardon's evidence which was to the effect that the Review Committee and the Department were travelling along similar but parallel paths, each independent of the other. The evidence was unconvincing when given, the more so on further reflection. It entirely overlooks the fact that Ms Wighton was a Deputy Director-General in the Department responsible for the non-government welfare unit, which was responsible for shelters, as well as a critical member of the Review Committee. It overlooks the fact that Mr Bicknell was assisting the Review Committee and that he was head of the non-government welfare unit. It overlooks the fact that Mr Bicknell had rung the Christies Beach Shelter on 6 May to say that, if it signed the Financial Agreement, criticism of the Shelter would not be included in the Report. It overlooks the fact that Ms Anderson was working in the Department and receiving assistance from other officers in the Department. It overlooks documents such as Ms Wighton's memorandum of 8 May (which referred to a recommendation of the Review Committee when making a recommendation concerning payments to Christies Beach and North Adelaide) and Mrs Roberts' memorandum to Ms Wighton of 11 May (which asked how the Report could serve the purposes of the Department). It is inconsistent with Ms Vardon's evidence that Ms Wighton was the bridge between the Department and the Review Committee. I entirely reject this aspect of Ms Vardon's evidence.
I do not rely on Dr Cornwall's statement in the Parliament because of the principle of parliamentary privilege. There is abundant other evidence of his reasons.
It will be recalled that in his letter dated 11 August 1987 to the Christies Beach Shelter informing it of the decision to withdraw funding, Dr Cornwall restated the recommendation and said, "I concur with this recommendation". In another letter dated 10 October 1987 to a representative of another shelter who had written expressing concern at the decision, he effectively said that he relied on the recommendation in the Report.
However, by 23 November 1987, Dr Cornwall was adding other reasons for his decision. In a minute to the Premier attaching a draft of a letter in response to a complaint made by Ms McSkimming, Dr Cornwall gives a different set of reasons for the decision and emphasises the failure to sign the Financial Agreement. He said:
"As mentioned above, the Department has for some time been seriously concerned about the lack of accountability and poor management practices of the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. [An example of the use made in 1987 of an incorrect name of the Shelter.] They had continuously overspent their budget and were not prepared to undertake proper budgetary and accounting procedures so as to ensure proper care was taken of government funds. The shelter continually refused to sign a financial undertaking, which undertaking would have bound the shelter to spend government funds for the purposes for which they were granted. Their failure to sign the financial undertaking was a serious breach of the Commonwealth/State Guidelines and, together with their failure to respond adequately to the department's request for proper accounting practices and their long-standing deficits, were the basis for the department recommending that funds be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Women's and Children's Emergency Shelter Inc. as of 4/9/87."
The minute had obviously been drafted by the Department but it was signed by Dr Cornwall and he must accept responsibility for the stated reasons. Thus, the stated reasons have now become the failure to sign the Financial Agreement, the failure to respond adequately to requests for proper accounting practices, and the long-standing deficits. There was no mention of the unsubstantiated allegations. It might be added that there was no evidence that the Department had made requests for proper accounting practices and that the Shelter had failed to comply with those requests.
By November 1987 the police had reported that there was insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution, but the CAC had commenced its prosecution. Because the police investigations had not produced any evidence, Dr Cornwall might have been wanting to distance himself from the unsubstantiated allegations. But, I find that in this minute, he is expressing the actual reasons for his decision. Furthermore, by this time, the Christies Beach Shelter had closed and a replacement shelter had been established. There was no possibility that any political action by the plaintiff, or any other person at Christies Beach Shelter, could re-open that shelter. By this time, Dr Cornwall was in a political position which enabled him to state the true reasons for his decision.
In a letter to The Advertiser on 5 December 1987 responding to an article in that paper, Dr Cornwall again stated that one of the reasons for the decision to withdraw funding was the refusal to sign the Financial Agreement. Mrs Roberts had also written to The Advertiser in response to the same article. Both letters were published on the same day. I do not comment on the coincidence of both Dr Cornwall and Mrs Roberts responding on the same day. In his letter, Dr Cornwall had said that there was cause to justify the decision. The part of his letter dealing with the reasons for his decision was in these terms:
". The decision to defund, taken in concert with the Commonwealth, followed a review of the management and administration of women's shelters by a committee of five women, headed by Ms Judith Roberts.
. One of the principal grounds the committee recommended the defunding of Christies Beach Women's Shelter was 'the maladministration, both historic and current, of this shelter'.
. The management and administration of the shelter wilfully and persistently refused to sign an agreement - which the Commonwealth stipulated as a condition of funding and with which the SA Government agreed - ensuring the shelter would be accountable for public funds.
. I have clearly stated in Parliament and outside that there was ample justification for defunding the shelter, quite apart from unsubstantiated allegations made against persons connected with the shelter which were referred to the police and the Corporation Affairs Commission for investigation."
I find that he was asserting that the primary reasons for withdrawing funding were the refusal to sign the Agreement and financial maladministration. The unsubstantiated allegations were being relegated to the background and reduced in importance.
By 1988, Dr Cornwall's stated reasons for his decision completely excluded the unsubstantiated allegations. Because of parliamentary privilege, I do not rely on remarks he made on 13 April 1988 in the course of a speech in the Legislative Council in opposition to the motion to establish the Select Committee.
The refusal to sign the Financial Agreement was included by Dr Cornwall in his reasons for withdrawing funding in a letter to Senator Schacht dated 21 May 1988. The reasons stated in that letter were "the poor financial administration of this service and the persistent refusal to sign the financial agreement". Similar reasons were given in a press release by him on 3 June 1988 and in a letter to The Advertiser on 20 June 1988, although the latter does refer to the allegations. It is apparent from both documents that Dr Cornwall was primarily relying on the refusal to sign the Financial Agreement.
Dr Cornwall recorded his political recollections in an autobiography published in August 1989 entitled Just For The Record - The Political Recollections of John Cornwall. He referred to Judith Roberts in that book in glowing terms. He mentioned the work of the Review Committee in the following passage, again disavowing any reliance on the allegations in the Report:
"She also chaired a committee which reviewed the administration, financial management and general conduct of women's shelters in South Australia. Their report Shelters in the Storm was subsequently pilloried by a Select Committee of the Legislative Council which was established in a highly political atmosphere following the cutting of funds to the Christies Beach Women's Shelter. There were numerous allegations about the Christies Beach Women's Shelter made to the original Roberts Committee which were reported. However, they were never the basis for withdrawing funding. The money was transferred to a new management committee and a new Director was appointed because the original Christies Beach Women's Shelter Committee persistently refused to sign the agreement to meet Commonwealth and State Government requirements for financial accountability."
The comment that the allegations were not the basis for the decision to withdraw funding reiterates the effect of his remarks in 1987 and 1988 to which I have referred.
In his evidence, Dr Cornwall repeated the assertion that the decision had not been made because of the unsubstantiated allegations. When asked in cross-examination why the allegations had been included in the Report, he was unable to give a satisfactory reply. He admitted that, before publishing the Report, he realised that the publication would damage the reputation of the plaintiff and others at the Christies Beach Shelter.
It is reasonable to allow a degree of flexibility in identifying reasons for a decision. However, even allowing such a flexibility, I find that Dr Cornwall's true reasons for withdrawing funding from the Christies Beach Shelter were the failure of the Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement and the fact it had been incurring deficits. Thus, although the reasons for withdrawing funding given on 11 August 1987 in his letter to the Christies Beach Shelter were said to include the unsubstantiated allegations, they were not in Dr Cornwall's mind the true reasons. I find that Dr Cornwall's reasons for the decision to withdraw funding were the alleged financial mismanagement, the continued incurring of deficits and requests for advances, and the refusal to sign the Financial Agreement, but above all the refusal to sign the Financial Agreement. Indeed, the refusal to sign the Agreement effectively embraces all of the other reasons. Why then were the unsubstantiated allegations included in the Report and why did Dr Cornwall rely on them?
Dr Cornwall was not prepared to rely publicly on the failure to sign the Financial Agreement and the alleged financial mismanagement because he feared an intense political response from the Christies Beach Shelter, if not also from other shelters. The Department also feared the same political response. It believed the plaintiff was skilled at utilising the media. The fears of political agitation were justified. In 1986 there had been considerable controversy among the shelters concerning the SAAP Agreement and its consequences for shelters. Events in the political campaign have already been noted. Ms King described it as "a heated debate". Mr Bicknell called it "a tense time". There were, however, more compelling political reasons why Dr Cornwall and the Committee could not rely only on the alleged financial mismanagement, the continued incurring of deficits and requests for advances, and the refusal to sign the Financial Agreement as reasons to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter.
First, Port Augusta also had been accused of financial mismanagement. The allegations are summarised on page 63 of the Report. The alleged financial mismanagement at Christies Beach was clearly not as serious or at least no more serious than the mismanagement of Port Augusta, which had led to an auditor's report so adverse that it had been drawn to the Minister's attention. At the very least, the alleged financial mismanagement was no reason why Christies Beach should not be given the same opportunity as was given to Port Augusta to put its house in order.
Secondly, Christies Beach was not the only shelter which had incurred deficits. The shelters at both North Adelaide and Port Augusta had been incurring deficits for about the same length of time as the Christies Beach Shelter. Furthermore, the Port Augusta Shelter had a substantially higher deficit. Thus, there were obvious political difficulties when relying on the incurring of deficits as a reason for withdrawing funds.
Thirdly, when the Report was signed, North Adelaide was still refusing to sign the Financial Agreement. In addition, North Adelaide, like Christies Beach, was continuing to receive fortnightly funding. More particularly, Dr Cornwall had a further problem because of the promise to meet representatives from Christies Beach and North Adelaide to discuss funding when the Report had been published. There was, therefore, no compulsion for Christies Beach and North Adelaide to sign the Financial Agreement before that meeting. Plainly, there were political difficulties in withdrawing funds from Christies Beach on the grounds of its refusal to sign the Financial Agreement while not withdrawing them from North Adelaide. Each of these reasons would have given political ammunition to the Christies Beach Shelter. Viewed collectively, those reasons would have enabled it to mount a powerful case against its being singled out. The fact that North Adelaide did ultimately sign the Financial Agreement is not relevant since Dr Cornwall's decision to withdraw funding had been made before it had done so and before it had communicated its intention to do so.
Thus, briefly stated, Dr Cornwall's reasons for not simply relying on the failure of Christies Beach to sign the Financial Agreement and the associated factors and for including the unsubstantiated allegations were
1. That he and the Department were concerned about the political response to the decision to withdraw funding. They knew that the plaintiff could be politically very active and would be likely to have support from at least some of the shelters.
2. The inclusion of the unsubstantiated allegations would deflect criticism of the decision to withdraw funding. That would certainly make it very hard for the Christies Beach Shelter to protest about the withdrawal of funding, particularly as the allegations indicated that personally and professionally the staff of the shelter were not fit and proper persons to do the work.
3. No shelter could afford to defend the Christies Beach Shelter given the kind of conduct which had been alleged against it.
4. It enabled Dr Cornwall and the Department to justify different treatment of the Christies Beach Shelter from other shelters which were guilty of similar failings to those of the Christies Beach Shelter.
If the failure to sign the Financial Agreement and the associated reasons were to be the stated grounds for the decision to withdraw funding, obvious political difficulties existed. I find that the unsubstantiated allegations were included to avoid those difficulties by singling out Christies Beach. Expressed another way, if as Dr Cornwall repeatedly stated, the unsubstantiated allegations were not the reasons for withdrawing funds, there could be no other reason for including them in the Report except to distinguish Christies Beach from other shelters. In short, the Review Committee and Dr Cornwall had identified something which singled out Christies Beach as being different from other shelters. The difference was the unsubstantiated allegations, a fact which the Review Committee emphasised in the early paragraphs of that part of the Report which deals with the Christies Beach Shelter.
The inclusion of the allegations also meant that it would be extremely difficult for any member of the Shelter to mount any vigorous political campaign with the goal of reversing the decision. The difficulties in the path of such a campaign are manifest. The list of allegations was long and varied. It included at least one allegation of criminal conduct (the misappropriation of funds) and other allegations of serious personal misconduct. For those reasons, the public would be likely to view any political campaign as well as any denial of the allegations with scepticism. For these reasons, I find that the allegations were also included to silence any political dissent.
While it is true that on 12 May, Dr Cornwall directed the Review Committee to include the allegations against Christies Beach in the Report, that does not explain the tenor of the allegations or the manner in which they were expressed or the terms of the recommendation to withdraw funding. For reasons to be given later, I find that the allegations evidenced malice on the part of the Review Committee and that the persons who were actuated by malice were Mrs Roberts, Ms Anderson and Ms Wighton.
A direction to include the allegations did not require that the full facts should not be stated. In a review of this kind, all relevant facts should be fairly placed before the Minister. The direction by Dr Cornwall did not excuse the tenor of the Report nor the manner in which the allegations were expressed.
I turn to the terms of the recommendation. In their evidence the Review Committee and Ms Anderson said that the recommendation to withdraw funding was not grounded on the unsubstantiated allegations. Mrs Roberts said that the unsubstantiated allegations were not relevant to the decision to withdraw funding. Although Ms Anderson had drafted the Report, the recommendation on page 76 was drafted in committee. The decision to withdraw funding was, of course, a decision to be made by the members of the Review Committee, not her. Although she said that she agreed with the recommendation, she later said there was no need to rely on the unsubstantiated allegations. Ms Johnson's reasons for including the unsubstantiated allegations were that she believed there was an obligation to report them to the Minister. In her view, maladministration was the primary issue. Ms Blake said that the decision to withdraw funding was based on the failure to sign the Financial Agreement. Her evidence was that she had believed that the allegations had been put to the Shelter. She was clearly under a false impression. In her view, the Committee could not rely on the unsubstantiated allegations. Ms King's evidence was that there were substantial matters on which the criticisms of the Department remained valid other than the unsubstantiated allegations. Thus, it is apparent the reasons for the recommendation of the Review Committee were not based on the unsubstantiated allegations.
Thus, although the members of the Review Committee may have had separate reasons for the decision to withdraw funding, it is clear that it was not necessary for the unsubstantiated allegations to be included in the Report. Some, like Ms Johnson, said that the reasons were included for the purpose of reporting them to the Minister. For the reasons which follow, I do not accept that explanation. That was not the only way they could have been drawn to his attention. The evidence shows that Dr Cornwall had been supplied with a list of allegations on 4 May and they were discussed at the meeting of 12 May. If the intent had been merely to inform Dr Cornwall, that list would have sufficed and Dr Cornwall could have referred the allegations to the police and CAC for investigation. It was entirely unnecessary to include them in the Report or to create a separate report. The fact that the Committee recommended in the Report that the allegations be investigated and commended Dr Cornwall for arranging the investigation indicated not that the allegations should be investigated, but a desire to emphasise the reliance of the Review Committee on them.
In my view, this evidence betrays a desire by the members of the Review Committee to distance themselves now from the unsubstantiated allegations. Each admitted in her evidence that she did not know whether the unsubstantiated allegations were true or not. Some admitted that they knew that publication of them would be likely to cause loss and damage to the plaintiff and to the other members of the staff and management of the Shelter. But accepting that evidence, why were the unsubstantiated allegations included?
When the Report was being drafted, Ms Wighton would have been very much aware of the political concerns held by both Dr Cornwall and the Department. I find that she would have informed at least Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson of those concerns. I find that the unsubstantiated allegations were included because of those political concerns. In other words, at the end of the day, both those drafting the Report and Dr Cornwall held the same concerns. The reasons for including the allegations were to single out the Christies Beach Shelter. In this context, it is relevant to recall that the Report was intended to suit the purposes of the Department and those purposes were to close the Christies Beach Shelter and open another in its stead.
There is another way of considering this question. The evidence given by members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson as to their individual reasons for the recommendation was either true or it was false. If it was true, the conclusions I have reached are correct. If the reason for the decision was the refusal of Christies Beach to sign the Financial Agreement and its financial mismanagement, there was no need to include the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report. They had been drawn to the attention of Dr Cornwall before 12 May and he could then have had them investigated and taken whatever action was recommended by the investigating authority. Their evidence demonstrates that political reasons caused the recommendation to be framed as it was. If their evidence was false, it still provides no justification for the malicious way in which the allegations were stated in the Report. Nor was there any justification for including the unsubstantiated allegations in the recommendation to withdraw funding, particularly as the members of the Review Committee did not know whether the allegations were true or not.
I will now examine whether the plaintiff has proved each cause of action. In the case of the causes of action in negligence and defamation, the same cause of action is pleaded against more than one defendant and different issues exist in relation to each. It is convenient to begin with defamation. I will then examine in turn misfeasance in a public office, negligence and conspiracy. Before doing so, it is necessary to examine two issues concerning the Review Committee. The first examines the legal position of the Committee. The second examines the manner in which the Committee prepared its Report.
The legal position of the Review Committee affects two questions. The first is whether each individual member of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson are personally liable to the plaintiff. In one sense, little hangs on the determination of this question since the State of South Australia has agreed to indemnify each member of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson. The second issue concerns the vicarious liability of the State and of the Commonwealth. The determination of the legal position of the Committee will depend upon the reason why the Committee was appointed and its statutory basis. It will require an examination of both the SAAP Program and provisions of the Community Welfare Act 1972 (SA).
As already mentioned, the SAAP Program was constituted by the SAAP Act and the SAAP Agreement. Pursuant to the Act and the Agreement, the Commonwealth funded the program and the State was required to contribute to that funding: see cls 10 and 12. The Agreement contained a number of provisions relating to reviews of the program. Clause 8(7) provided for a joint review by the Commonwealth of the State's program.
"The Commonwealth and each State shall jointly review the State's program at such times and in such manner as are agreed upon by the Commonwealth Minister and the State Minister."
By cl 9, it was agreed that "the Commonwealth and the States shall commence a joint evaluation of the States' programs not later than 30 June 1987". A comparison of cl 8(7) and cl 9 makes it quite apparent that cl 8(7) refers to a review of the program in each individual State, while cl 9 refers to an evaluation of the whole program as it operated nationally. This is made clear by the location of the apostrophe in each clause and especially by the definition of "evaluation" in cl 4 of the Agreement. This distinction is reinforced by the guidelines which, in par 11, refer to a national evaluation in these terms:
"A national evaluation of the Supported Accommodation Assistance Program will be jointly undertaken by the Commonwealth-States/Territories. It will include:
· evaluation of administrative arrangements after the first year of operation; and
· evaluation of the Agreement to commence 2 years prior to its expiry."
It is apparent from the terms of the SAAP Agreement that the evaluation to which par 11 of the guidelines refers is not the kind of review contemplated by cl 8(7).
Clause 10 of the Agreement provided for approved services under the Agreement and, in addition, cl 11 stated that the Commonwealth would provide funding for other purposes. The effect of cl 11(a)(ii) is that funding is provided on condition that it be applied by the State for the purpose of meeting expenditure incurred by "participating in reviews and evaluations". Like provisions are in cls 10(6) and 13(3)(b)(iii). It must be remembered that each State also had to contribute to the SAAP Program in the manner provided in cl 12. The State's funding would be applied to approved services and other services which plainly would include a review. Thus, contributions of the Commonwealth and the States were applied to all aspects of the program including reviews.
To summarise, the SAAP Agreement required reviews of State programs and of the national program and, in the case of a review of a State's program, those reviews were funded by both the Commonwealth and the State.
Although the SAAP Agreement provided for reviews, the genesis for this review was the condition imposed by Senator Grimes for the funding of deficits incurred by shelters in South Australia as at June, 1986. His approval of funding to pay the deficits was given on four conditions. They are set out in the letter to Dr Cornwall dated 2 July, 1986 which has already been quoted. It will be recalled that one condition was in these terms:
"The administrative and accounting practices of the services involved being jointly reviewed by officers of our departments."
As the letter approved funding for women's shelters, it is apparent that the expression "the services involved" to which that condition refers are women's shelters. The context of the letter reinforces that conclusion. Thus, it was a condition of the funding of the deficits that a review of the administrative and accounting practices of women's shelters in South Australia would be conducted jointly by officers of the Commonwealth and State departments.
The question of a review was not mentioned in any of the later correspondence between Senator Grimes and Dr Cornwall which was proved until a letter written early in November 1986 which was received in Dr Cornwall's Office on 14 November, 1986. In that letter, Senator Grimes commended Dr Cornwall for his decision to review the administration of women's shelters. It will be recalled that that decision had been announced on 22 October but the constitution of the Committee had not then been decided. Senator Grimes asked that an officer of his department be included in the review. That part of Senator Grimes' letter read:
"In view of the joint funding nature of SAAP might I suggest that an officer of my Department be involved in the process, if not already included, whether by membership of any steering review committee established or by participating in drafting the terms of reference for the consultant. This would accord with one of the specific conditions placed upon the provision of funds for the elimination of the WESP deficits in my letter of 2 July 1986, namely that, 'the administrative and accounting practices of the services involved being jointly reviewed by officers of our departments'."
Dr Cornwall acceded to the request and Ms King was appointed to the Review Committee. The Review Committee therefore comprised one officer of the State department (at first Ms Lowe and later Ms Wighton), one officer of the Commonwealth department, and three other members who were not officers of either department.
The fact that the membership of the Review Committee extended beyond officers of the two departments did not, I think, cause it to be a review outside the bounds of the SAAP Agreement. That Agreement did not prescribe how a review should be conducted or the constitution of the reviewing authority. Mr Stanley, who appeared for the Commonwealth, nevertheless contended that this review was outside the bounds of the Agreement because it did not fall within cl 8(7) in that it was not a review of the whole of the State's program. I do not accept that submission. In my view, Mr Stanley reads cl 8(7) in an unduly restrictive manner. Clause 8(7) authorises joint reviews of "the State's program at such times and in such manner as are agreed" by the respective Ministers. It is clear that the Ministers are authorised to agree how extensive or restricted the review may be. That is the plain intent of that clause. To put it another way, it would be absurd to suggest that a joint review could examine the whole of the State's program but not one part of it. The power to undertake the larger review implies a power to undertake the lesser, particularly given the use of the expression "at such times and in such manner as are agreed".
Mr Stanley also relied on the fact that the Review Committee formally addressed its Report to Dr Cornwall and not to the Commonwealth. That submission too carries no force. It overlooks the fact that the State was responsible for the day to day administration of the program (see cl 8(9) of the SAAP Agreement) and the fact that the joint review could be conducted in such manner as the Ministers agreed (see cl 8(7) of the SAAP Agreement). Senator Grimes had approved the manner of the review and it included Ms King as a member. It was in every respect a joint review.
For all of these reasons, the Review Committee conducted the review pursuant to the provisions of the SAAP Agreement and was a committee established under that Agreement and the SAAP Act.
Mr Stanley also contended that the Review Committee was instead an advisory committee established pursuant to the Community Welfare Act 1972. In 1986 and 1987, s 11 of that Act authorised the Minister to appoint what the Act calls "community welfare advisory committees" and, in ss 12 and 13, the Act prescribed terms of office and procedures for such committees. It is necessary to note the provisions of all of those sections:
"11. (1) The Minister may appoint community welfare advisory committees to advise him upon matters pertaining to community welfare.
(2) A committee so appointed shall consist of a chairman and such other members as the Minister thinks fit.
(3) A community welfare advisory committee must consist of persons with special knowledge of or experience in the matters to be referred to the committee for advice.
(4) At least one of the members of a community welfare advisory committee must be an officer of the Department.
(5) The Director-General shall provide such secretarial and other services and facilities as may be reasonably required for the purposes of the committee."
12. (1) A member of a community welfare advisory committee shall, subject to subsection (2), hold office upon terms and conditions fixed by the Minister.
(2) The term of office of any such member shall not exceed two years.
(3) Upon the expiration of his first term of office, a member shall be eligible for re-appointment for one further term.
(4) The Minister may pay to the members of such a committee such allowances and expenses as he thinks fit.
13. (1) Subject to this Act, and any direction of the Minister, the procedure of a community welfare advisory committee shall be such as is determined by the committee.
(2) The chairman shall make such reports to the Minister on the deliberations of and conclusions reached by the committee as the Minister may require."
To complete the review of relevant statutory provisions, it is necessary to note s 235a:
"235a. (1) A person shall not incur any civil liability for any act or omission done by him in good faith in the exercise or discharge of his powers, functions, duties or responsibilities under this Act.
(2) A liability that would, but for subsection (1), lie against a person shall lie against the Crown."
The effect of s 235a is to shift any civil liability for any act or omission from the individual to the Crown. Thus, if s 235a applied, each member of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson were entitled to be indemnified by the Crown in right of South Australia pursuant to s 235a provided they had acted in good faith. Relying on all of these provisions, Mr Stanley contended that the members of the Review Committee were acting as an advisory committee and, as such, were indemnified from liability under s 235a. For the reasons which follow, I do not accept that contention.
If the exercise is undertaken of comparing the membership and procedures of the Review Committee with the provisions of ss 11, 12 and 13, it can be readily seen that most of those provisions are satisfied. Each provision in s 11 is satisfied in that the Review Committee was appointed by the Minister, it had a chairman, the members of the Review Committee had special knowledge of the matters referred to the Committee, at least one member was an officer of the Department, and the Director-General provided secretarial and other assistance. The provisions of s 12(2) and s 12(4) were satisfied. The provisions of s 13 were also satisfied in that the Committee did determine its own procedures, except to the extent they were directed by the Minister in May and June, 1987, and the Committee reported to the Minister. In addition, I think that the Review Committee was advising the Minister. In provisions such as this, the verb "to advise" in s 11(1) should not be given an unduly restrictive meaning. In ordinary usage, "advise" primarily means to give counsel, to give advice, or to recommend. It also means to inform or notify. See generally Macquarie Dictionary and Oxford English Dictionary. The meaning of "advise" and hence "advisory" is wide enough to include the process of examining and reporting upon an issue. There is, therefore, no reason why the expression "advisory committee" should not extend to a committee appointed to examine and report on a particular aspect of the operations of the Community Welfare Department or community welfare generally. A review of the administration of women's shelters in 1986 and 1987 was a review of an important part of the provision of welfare to the community: see s 10 of the Community Welfare Act. It was, therefore, an aspect pertaining to community welfare upon which it advised the Minister.
However, the status of the Review Committee is not to be determined by assessing whether the Committee happens to satisfy the provisions of ss 11-13. A committee such as this could be constituted pursuant to a number of different provisions. It is essential, therefore, to have regard to the manner in which it came into being and the purpose of the Committee. The events leading to the establishment of the Committee have already been mentioned. Those events show that it was intended to be a review of women's shelters and was to be conducted pursuant to the SAAP Program. The SAAP Program envisaged reviews of this kind. This Committee was appointed because the two Ministers responsible for administering the SAAP Program desired it. It was appointed under the SAAP Program to review an important aspect of that program in South Australia. Its genesis was the condition imposed by Senator Grimes on 2 July 1986 and the immediate catalyst was the perceived need for shelters to be accountable, the perception receiving a special stimulus from the political agitation in October 1986 concerning the requirement to sign the Financial Agreement. Its recommendation to withdraw funding could only be implemented by the two Ministers, Commonwealth and State, responsible for the program. The Committee reported, not under the Community Welfare Act, but under the SAAP Act and SAAP Agreement. The review was funded by the Commonwealth and the State under the SAAP Program. In every respect, the Review Committee was a committee appointed under the SAAP Program to do a task envisaged by that program, its costs were paid by both the Commonwealth and the State, and it reported to a Minister responsible for the program, and only the two Ministers responsible for the SAAP Program could recommend withdrawal of funding.
Some reliance was placed by Mr Stanley on the fact that the Review Committee was described by the Department in submissions to the Select Committee as a ministerial advisory committee and was so described by the Ombudsman in his report for the year ending 30 June 1990. No weight can be placed on either document as the status of the Committee was not a material issue in either instance. More to the point, are the annual reports of the Department for the years ending 30 June, 1987 and 1988. Both reports list advisory committees constituted under s 11 of the Community Welfare Act but the Review Committee is not included. Furthermore, Dr Cornwall did not perceive the Review Committee to be an advisory committee under the Community Welfare Act. In any event, the issue is to be determined as a matter of law and not by how the Department regarded it.
For all of these reasons, the Review Committee was not an advisory committee constituted under the Community Welfare Act.
The members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson were, therefore, functioning on behalf of both the State and the Commonwealth on this review which was funded by both the State and the Commonwealth. If the members of the Committee or Ms Anderson have committed any tort they are each individually liable. In the case of Ms King, she is liable to the plaintiff by virtue of the combined effect of s 56 and s 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): Groves v Commonwealth [1982] HCA 21; (1982) 150 CLR 113 at 121. Section 64 provides:
"In any suit to which the Commonwealth or a State is a party, the rights of parties shall as nearly as possible be the same, and judgment may be given and costs awarded on either side, as in a suit between subject and subject."
As Ms King was an employee of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth is vicariously liable for her acts or omissions. In the case of the other members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson, their individual liability becomes a liability of the Crown in right of South Australia by reason of s 10(1) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1972, the legislation in force in 1986 and 1987. Section 10(1) provided:
" 10. (1) Subject to this Act and any other Act -
(a) the Crown shall be liable in respect of any contract made on its behalf if the same manner and to the same extend as a private person of full age and capacity is liable in respect of his contracts;
(b) the Crown shall be liable in tort in the same manner and to the same extent as a private person of full age and capacity -
(i) for any tort committed by a servant, agent or other person acting in the employment, or on behalf, of the Crown;
(ii) in respect of any breach of duty that would, as between subjects, give rise to liability in tort."
The other members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson were all acting on behalf of the Crown. To put it shortly, if the members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson are each individually liable, the Commonwealth and the State of South Australia are vicariously liable for their acts and omissions and are properly joined by reason of the Judiciary Act and the Crown Proceedings Act respectively,
I turn to examine the manner in which the Review Committee worked, at least so far as it was described in the evidence. The lack of most of the Committee's documents, agenda papers and minutes hampers a proper analysis. Minutes were kept of meetings of the Review Committee but, it will be recalled, they were destroyed. Copies of minutes of only two or three meetings have been obtained from other sources.
The Department provided secretarial and other assistance to the Committee. The minutes were kept by an officer of the Department. On most occasions, that officer was Ms Meredyth Taylor. In addition, the staff of the Department was available for consultation by the Committee and Ms Anderson consulted them. Ms Anderson worked in the offices of the Department. Her work area was part of what is often called an open plan office in the non-government welfare unit, which was responsible for shelters. Her work area was close to the work area of other officers of the Department, two of whom were Ms Taylor and Ms Adrienne Summers. They were both involved in administering the SAAP Program. Ms Anderson received assistance from those officers as well as from Ms Wighton, Ms Heath, Mr Bicknell, and Mr Foran and Mr Billett, finance officers in the Department. On occasions, assistance was provided by other officers of the Department in addition to those I have named. Plainly, Ms Anderson was in a position to obtain whatever help she required from the Department. As she said she had ample opportunity to speak to other officers of the Department. Ms Anderson was close to the Department in both a physical and operational sense.
Ms Anderson met Dr Cornwall before the first meeting of the Review Committee which was held on 2 December, 1986. Mrs Roberts and Ms Wighton were also present. I accept Ms Anderson's evidence that the meeting was held for the purpose of briefing her as to the work of the Review Committee and why the review was being held.
Ms Anderson undertook some preliminary work in late 1986 but, as she said, work did not start in earnest until January 1987. The Committee met from time to time but not on a regular basis. Meetings were held at the offices of the Department. Not all members attended every meeting of the Committee. However, the evidence suggests that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson did attend all meetings. No member of the Committee or Ms Anderson had any clear recollection of how long meetings lasted. The evidence of Ms Blake and Ms Johnson indicates, and I find, that, with one exception, they lasted two to three hours. The exception seems to be the meeting of the Committee on 22 June.
Ms Blake's role in the Committee was to provide input from the point of view of shelters. Ms Johnson played a relatively minor role concerning the operation of the SAAP Program, but was a major contributor on administrative issues. Ms King represented the interests of the Commonwealth as a partner in the SAAP Program and as a provider of funding for it. Ms Wighton obviously represented the Department's interests.
Mrs Roberts worked in close consultation with Ms Anderson. With her she drafted the agenda. She led but did not direct the discussion. I accept Ms Anderson's evidence that she spent a lot of time examining documents. It is clear that Ms Anderson also worked in close consultation with Ms Wighton and Ms Heath. It was Ms Wighton who had asked Ms Anderson to assist the Review Committee as its consultant. Ms Wighton also arranged for Departmental files to be delivered to Ms Anderson to assist her in her work. Ms Wighton arranged for the Department to provide other assistance to Ms Anderson. I find that Ms Wighton gave information to Ms Anderson concerning the various allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter. Ms Heath also had a close knowledge of the allegations against Christies Beach. She had been a person to whom many complaints had been made and she had been involved in the investigation of a number of them. Ms Anderson's evidence was that she extracted the allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter from the Department's files. Many of those allegations had been seen or noted by Ms Heath. I find that Ms Heath also assisted Ms Anderson in collating the allegations. Ms Anderson said that one person she consulted was Ms Heath. It follows from the above that I do not accept Ms Anderson's evidence that she came across the allegations by chance.
According to Ms Anderson, the members of the Review Committee brought their own skills to the work of the Committee. For example, Ms Johnson prepared a document called "Administrative Guidelines" which is Appendix I to the Report. Ms Anderson described the Committee as a working committee. That is not an expression which correctly describes the work of the Committee. Although some members clearly assisted with their individual skills, the Committee relied on Ms Anderson primarily for the information which was contained in the Report. It was Ms Anderson who gathered information from the Department's files and other sources and presented it to the Committee. Ms Anderson said that documents which she had examined were copied and presented in a folder which was tabled at meetings for inspection by the Committee. The evidence of Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King does not bear that out. I prefer their evidence to that of Ms Anderson on this issue. It is clear from the evidence of Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King that the Committee received little by way of primary documents and relied on summaries presented to them by Ms Anderson. I find that the original documents were not made available to the Review Committee. To the extent that any documents were tabled, few were inspected and such inspection as did occur would have been rather desultory and of little assistance. There is no suggestion that all of the documents which she had inspected were available for the Committee's inspection. It is also plain, even on Ms Anderson's evidence, that all members of the Committee did not read all of the documents. Furthermore, the utility of tabling a bundle of documents without some kind of explanatory document is questionable. To summarise, the evidence clearly shows that Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King relied heavily on what was provided by Ms Anderson. As Ms Johnson said, she absolutely relied on Ms Anderson. The evidence also clearly shows that it was Ms Anderson who informed the Committee of the allegations against Christies Beach and that that occurred late in the course of the review. I find that it was in May 1987.
Ms Anderson prepared drafts of the Report which were circulated before and discussed at meetings of the Committee. The Committee would amend the drafts, relying on their own knowledge and understanding of issues. It appears that most of the meetings were spent discussing the form of the drafts. This, too, would have left little time for examination of any documents which had been tabled. The recommendation to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter was drafted in committee.
I also find that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson were, in effect, an executive committee of the Review Committee particularly in May and June 1987. The evidence of Ms Blake and Ms King was that those three met separately from time to time. Other evidence also shows that they met each other at times other than meetings of the Committee, although all three of them would not necessarily be present at the same time. They were the members of the Committee who had met Dr Cornwall for a briefing session late in 1986. They were the members of the Committee who met Dr Cornwall on 12 May. They were the members of the Committee who met Mr Selway on 1 July to discuss the advice he had provided. They were the members of the Committee who prepared the final draft after Mr Selway had given his advice. They had ample opportunities to meet each other. Ms Anderson and Ms Wighton would easily be able to meet at the Department's office. Mrs Roberts met Ms Anderson quite frequently. Ms Wighton's minute to Dr Cornwall dated 11 May, 1987 shows that the three of them met to discuss the format of the Report. I find that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson together shaped the form and content of the Report, Mrs Roberts through her position as chairperson, Ms Wighton as the second highest officer in the Department responsible for women's shelters, and Ms Anderson as its consultant.
The plaintiff prosecutes four claims for defamation. The first is against the members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson claiming that she was defamed in the Report. In this section of the reasons, I will refer to the members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson collectively as "the Review Committee defendants". The remaining three claims are against Mrs Roberts, the ABC and TVB in respect of the television broadcasts on 12 August 1987. I will deal later with those three claims.
It is not entirely clear from their defence whether the Review Committee defendants joined issue on the plaintiff's claim that the remarks of which she complained were defamatory and that she was identifiable as one of those who were the subject of the remarks. In their closing submissions they admitted that, although the plaintiff is not named in the Report, she is identifiable as a member of the staff and the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter and that parts of the Report could lead persons who were acquainted with her to believe that she is one of the persons to which the statements refer. They also admitted that, broadly speaking, the statements of which the plaintiff complains are defamatory in the sense that the words would tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right thinking members of society. That is tantamount to an admission that the statements are defamatory: see, for example, Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd [1979] HCA 3; (1979) 141 CLR 632 per Mason and Jacobs JJ at 638.
The Review Committee defendants, however, deny that the statements are actionable. They rely on the following defence:
• that the Report was published by Dr Cornwall in the Legislative Council and was thus published on an occasion of absolute privilege, and
• that the publication to Dr Cornwall occurred on an occasion of qualified privilege in that they had a duty to report to him and he had a corresponding interest or duty to receive the report.
It is common ground that the Report was published in the Legislative Council by Dr Cornwall under parliamentary privilege and, therefore, on an occasion of absolute privilege. That fact is relevant because it explains the circumstances in which the Review Committee reported to Dr Cornwall. All of the Review Committee defendants other than Ms King also relied on the defence of justification, pleading that the statements complained of were true in substance and in fact.
The statements in the Report which the plaintiff claims are defamatory are the following. The page references are to the pages in the Report where the statements appear. Those pages have been reproduced in Appendix 1 of these reasons where the page numbering reproduces that in the Report.
'It is evident that the Christies Beach Shelter has frequently come to the attention of senior management in the Department and to the responsible Ministers - State and Federal - over a period of about five years because of deficiencies in financial management, unacceptable management practices and because of unsubstantiated allegations of professional and personal misbehaviour'.
'Examples of unsubstantiated allegations made to the Department about deficiencies in financial management, unacceptable management practices and professional and personal misbehaviour include:
. persistent over-spending and inadequate financial recording.
. operating costs used to augment salaries without the authorisation of the Department.
. inadequate personnel records and ineffective control of personnel and resources and granting of excessively generous terms and conditions of employment.
. inappropriate personnel and financial management.
. failure to co-operate with Departmental personnel in the normal course of funding procedures.
. unprofessional, inappropriate and exploitative client counselling practices including breach of confidentiality (and claims by other agencies of inappropriate methods and subsequent need of rehabilitative counselling of some clients who have been the subject of the Shelter's counselling services).'
'Reasons given to the Department for the consistent over-expenditure were not satisfactory.'
'Poor records or no records were kept with respect to time worked, "Time off in Lieu" accumulated or taken, staff conditions, etc.'
(Referring to worker's compensation leave taken)
'This should be of grave concern to the management committee on two counts:
(1) That the way personnel are managed appears to be leading to burn-out and
(2) That their worker's compensation insurance premium will rise sharply as a result'.
'It is particularly ominous that many complainants were unwilling to make a formal complaint because of what they described as fear of intimidation.'
'No satisfactory explanations of excessive expenditure were put forward.'
'Examination of the financial records of the Shelter since 1982-83 shows a consistent pattern of over-spending regardless of the available funds. After one Departmental visit, the finance officer reported that:
"We have the impression that whatever they need they just go out and purchase with no consideration of the funds available".'
'In conclusion, this shelter's management has been characterised by persistent over-spending and ineffective control of personnel and resources. Unsubstantiated allegations call into question the quality of service delivery.'
'In view of the maladministration, both historic and current, of this shelter and in view of uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate, the Review Committee recommends that funding be withdrawn.' "
The context in which the above statements were made can be ascertained by reference to Appendix 1 to these reasons.
The plaintiff claims that the ordinary and natural meaning of those words was that the management and staff at the Shelter, including herself as the Administrator of the Shelter and as a person on its management committee, were
(d) not adequately servicing the needs of the clients of the Shelter,
(e) guilty of neglect and negligence in the running of the Shelter and in her employment in the Shelter,
(f) guilty of dishonest and dishonourable conduct, and
The plaintiff then asserts that she has been injured in her credit and reputation and has been brought into hatred, ridicule and contempt.
Notwithstanding the concession that the plaintiff is identifiable as one of those defamed and that, broadly speaking, the statements of which the plaintiff complains are defamatory, I deal with both issues at some length because like questions must be addressed when dealing with the three claims arising out of the two television broadcasts on 12 August 1987.
The traditional definition of a defamatory statement is one "which is calculated to injure the reputation of another by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule": Parmiter v Coupland [1840] EngR 168; (1840) 6 M&W 105 at 108; [1840] EngR 168; 151 ER 340 at 342 per Baron Parke. In Slayter v Daily Telegraph Newspaper Co Ltd [1908] HCA 22; (1908) 6 CLR 1 at 7, Griffith CJ said that a defamatory statement is one where the words complained of are in any degree calculated to injure the character or reputation of the plaintiff in the opinion of right thinking members of the community. More recently, Mason and Jacobs JJ defined a defamatory statement as a statement of a kind likely to lead the reader, as an ordinary person, to think less of the plaintiff: Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd at 638. The process by which one determines whether the imputation is defamatory was described by Brennan J in Readers Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb [1982] HCA 4; (1982) 150 CLR 500 at 505 - 506 in these terms:
"Where no true innuendo is pleaded and the published words clearly related to the plaintiff, the issue of libel or no libel can be determined by asking whether hypothetical referees - Lord Selbourne's reasonable men (Capital and Counties Bank v Henty (1882) 7 App Case 741 at 745) or Lord Atkin's right-thinking members of society generally (Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669 at 671 or Lord Reid's ordinary men not avid for scandal (Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 at 260 - would understand the published words in a defamatory sense. That simple question embraces two elements of the cause of action: the meaning of words used (the imputation) and the defamatory character of the imputation. Whether the alleged libel is established depends upon the understanding of the hypothetical referees who are taken to have a uniform view of the meaning of the language used, and upon the standards, moral or social, by which they evaluate the imputation they understand to have been made. They are taken to share a moral or social standard by which to judge the defamatory character of that imputation (Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818 at 833), being a standard common to society generally (Miller v David (1874) LR 9 CP 118; Myroft v Sleight (1921) 90 LJ (KB) 883; Tolley v J S Fry & Sons Ltd [1931] UKHL 1; [1930] 1 KB 467 at 479)."
See also, Hunt J in Farquhar v Bottom [1980] 2 NSWLR 380 at 385.
The Christies Beach Shelter was run by an association incorporated under the Associations Incorporation Act 1985. The Report speaks of "the Shelter". It did not identify individuals. However, the nature of the charges made against the Shelter identified aspects of its day to day operations and management.
The ordinary meaning of the words complained of in this Report would convey to the ordinary, sensible reader that the persons who managed and worked at the Shelter were guilty of financial mismanagement, unacceptable management practices, and very serious professional and personal misconduct. The allegations of professional misconduct include criminal conduct, in that the charge of misappropriation of funds is effectively an allegation of theft. The ordinary, sensible reader would form the view that the management and operation of the Shelter were wholly inadequate. Given the nature of the Shelter's activities, the reader would believe that the allegations of sexual and physical harassment, intimidation, and unprofessional and exploitative counselling, meant that the management and staff were wholly unfit to run a shelter. The list of allegations is a damning indictment of the management and staff of the Shelter, the more damning because of the comprehensive nature of the allegations. It was common practice to run shelters by a management committee and employed staff, the latter being responsible for the day to day operations of the Shelter. That was well known in the Department, in government and, of course, among women's shelters. As the Report imputed or charged those who managed the Shelter with the conduct listed in the Report, it thereby imputed or charged both the management committee and staff: cf. Hall-Gibbs Mercantile Agency Ltd v Dun [1910] HCA 66; (1910) 12 CLR 84 per Griffith CJ at 91. Thus, the plain meaning of the Report was to charge both the management committee and staff with the mismanagement and misconduct alleged in it.
The Report lists what are called "unsubstantiated allegations" as well as other charges against the management and staff. Despite the fact that they are described as "unsubstantiated", the list of unsubstantiated allegations is defamatory for the following reasons. First, the Report immediately goes on to refer on page 66 to three visits by the Department in an attempt "to clarify issues raised concerning mismanagement, inadequate financial controls and the allegations of misbehaviour". That statement immediately follows the list of unsubstantiated allegations and the reader would reasonably infer that the visits to the Shelter concerned those allegations. The outcome of those three visits is not stated. Next, the statement that the Department conducted enquiries indicates there is some substance in the allegations and that they may be well-founded. Finally, the suspicion that they are well-founded is reinforced by the recommendation to withdraw funding from the Shelter and the reasons for that decision. That is stated in the recommendation on page 76:
"In view of the maladministration, both historic and current, of the Shelter and in view of uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate, the Review Committee recommends that funding be withdrawn."
The reference to "maladministration, both historic and current" picks up all of the unsubstantiated allegations and other criticisms of the Shelter in the preceding pages. The statement of "uncertainty as to whether services to clients are both fully available and appropriate" is a clear reference to the earlier allegations as to the Shelter being closed for a long period of time and as to the personal and professional misconduct, including sexual and physical harassment and exploitative counselling, a conclusion accepted by Ms Anderson. So far as the unsubstantiated allegations are concerned, the recommendation to withdraw funding gives credence to them, notwithstanding that they are described as "unsubstantiated". That conclusion is reinforced by the last sentence on page 75 which reads, "Unsubstantiated allegations call into question the quality of service delivery". The sting of these allegations is in no respect diminished by the paragraph on page 69 that includes the comment that "the Review Committee has been unable to assess the accuracy of all allegations made to the Department" because of the credence given to them by the recommendation to withdraw funding.
Even further weight is given to the unsubstantiated allegations by the fact that the recommendation to withdraw funding is made notwithstanding that the Report states on pages 71 and 76 that the unsubstantiated allegations had been referred to the police and the Minister was waiting for the police and CAC to report the results of their investigations. In other words, the issues are so serious that it is not possible to wait until the outcome of the investigations is known. A report that does no more than state that allegations against a person are being investigated may not be capable of imputing that the person has acted in the manner alleged and may not therefore be defamatory: Mirror Newspapers Ltd v Harrison [1982] HCA 50; (1982) 149 CLR 293 per Mason J at 300; see also Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234. However, this is not an instance of a report that matters are being investigated. The Report goes well beyond that because it states that the investigations have begun. It gives credence to the investigations by the recommendation to withdraw funding. The ordinary and reasonable reader would conclude that there is a good deal of fire as well as smoke. As Lord Devlin observed in Lewis v Daily Telegraph Ltd at 285, although suspicion of guilt is something different from proof of guilt, in practice, it is the broad impression conveyed by the libel that has to be considered and not the meaning of each word under analysis. He continued:
"A man who wants to talk at large about smoke may have to pick his words very carefully if he wants to exclude the suggestion that there is also a fire; but it can be done. One always gets back to the fundamental question: What is the meaning that the words convey to the ordinary man: you cannot make a rule about that. They can convey a meaning of suspicion short of guilt; but loose talk about suspicion can very easily convey the impression that it is a suspicion that is well-founded."
To adapt the words of Lord Devlin, the recommendation to withdraw funding and, in particular, the way it was phrased conveyed the impression that there was substance in the unsubstantiated allegations.
There are other instances where the ordinary, sensible reader would infer that the Review Committee believed that these allegations had substance. First, immediately before listing them, the Review Committee was at pains on page 64 to note that there is no other shelter about which claims of this nature had been received. Secondly, on page 69, the Report stated that "the shelter's history, according to Departmental files is chequered with unresolved complaints and unsubstantiated allegations". Thirdly, the Committee gave a degree of credibility to the allegations by asserting (on page 71) that if the Department had "provided greater support to those who made allegations, few women might have either subsequently withdrawn their allegations or continued to refuse to formalise them". The clear inference in that sentence is that the allegations had substance.
The remarks of which the plaintiff complains on pages 67 to 75 of the Report are all defamatory. They charge financial mismanagement and mismanagement generally including mismanagement of personnel. They allege an inability to explain satisfactorily the Shelter's over expenditure, inadequate records, an inability to handle personnel thus causing health problems, and intimidation of complainants.
The plaintiff must prove that the defamatory statements were published about her or concerned her: Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] UKHL 1; [1944] AC 116 at 118 - 119, at 121, 123 and 124; Krahe v TCN Channel 9 Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 536 at 542; Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL [1975] HCA 6; (1975) 134 CLR 1 at 23. The defamatory statements do not identify the plaintiff by name or by title nor is there anything else in the Report which expressly identifies her. The Report defames those who are involved in the management and administration of the Christies Beach Shelter. If the plaintiff is identified, it is as one who is involved in the management, administration and day to day operations of the Shelter. For the reasons which follow, she is defamed as one of that small group of persons.
Where the plaintiff is a member of a group of persons who are defamed, the plaintiff will have a cause of action if the plaintiff can show that the persons who were acquainted with the plaintiff could reasonably believe that the statements referred to her: David Syme & Co v Canavan [1918] HCA 50; (1918) 25 CLR 234 per Isaacs J at 238; Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd at 119. Isaacs J expressed the test in these terms in David Syme & Co v Canavan at 238:
"The test of whether the words that do not specifically name the plaintiff refer to him or not is this : Are they such as reasonably in the circumstances would lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe he was the person referred to?"
As is noted by Lord Simon LC in Knupffer at 121, two questions are involved in the process of identifying the plaintiff as the person defamed. The first is a question of law - can the article, having regard to its language, be regarded as capable of referring to the plaintiff? The second is a question of fact - does the article, in fact, lead reasonable people, who know the plaintiff, to the conclusion that it does refer to her?
In determining those questions, the size of the class is usually a relevant, if not conclusive, factor: David Syme & Co v Canavan; and Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd. In addition, much will depend on the precise nature of the statement: Mann v The Medicine Group Pty Ltd [1992] FCA 524; (1992) 38 FCR 400 per Wilcox J at 403. Thus, its generality or its particularity, as the case may be, will be relevant. As a matter of practical reality, a plaintiff is more likely to succeed if a member of a small group and more likely to fail if a member of a large group. In other words, a plaintiff may succeed in proving that she is the person identified if the group referred to in the defamatory statement is so small that it can reasonably be understood to refer to any one of its members. Instances of the application of this principle are Browne v DC Thomson & Co [1912] SC 359; LeFanu v Malcomson [1848] EngR 663; (1848) 1 HLC 637; 9 ER 910; Godhard v James Inglis & Co Ltd [1904] HCA 37; (1904) 2 CLR 78.
The question is whether the ordinary, sensible reader, with knowledge of the Christies Beach Shelter and how it was run, would infer that the above extracts from the Report referred to the plaintiff: Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 1156 per Lord Reid at 1162 - 1163, where the habits of the mind of the ordinary, sensible reader are noted. A certain amount of loose thinking is assumed in that reader: Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 1156; approved in Mirror Newspapers Ltd v World Hosts Pty Ltd per Mason and Jacobs JJ (with whom the other members of the court agreed) at 641. In Mann v The Medicine Group Pty Ltd at 402 - 403, Wilcox J expressed the principle in these terms:
"[A] statement concerning members of a class generally is actionable at the instance of a member of that class only if the member is able to point to circumstances which would indicate to a reasonable reader or hearer that the statement refers particularly to him or her. A plaintiff does not discharge that onus merely by establishing that one or more people thought of the plaintiff when they read or heard the statement ..."
For the reasons which follow, the words of which the plaintiff complained are capable of referring to her and do in fact refer to her. The allegations made in the Report against the Shelter plainly refer to the staff and its management committee. This was a small group totalling 15 persons, of whom six were staff. The Report defamed each member of the staff and management committee. The plaintiff was closely identified with the Shelter. She had established a very high public profile with the Department and the Government, in other shelters and in the general community. It was widely known that she was the Administrator of the Christies Beach Shelter. As mentioned earlier, she was the public face of the Shelter. It was well known that she was one of those providing counselling. All of the allegations pointed to a failure by the plaintiff as Administrator to manage the Shelter, to manage its finances, to manage the staff and to prevent mistreatment of women seeking the assistance of the Shelter. Those acquainted with the plaintiff would reasonably believe that the allegations referred to her. In addition, as the allegations had been made against all who were associated with the operations of the Shelter, those who were acquainted with the plaintiff would reasonably believe that she was a person referred to.
I do not accept the submission that the decision in McCormick v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 485 requires a different conclusion. That case was concerned with the question whether the plaintiff was identified by a statement which referred to "one of the men". By contrast, the allegations in the Report refer to all members of the staff and management committee.
I have no hesitation in deciding that quite a number of people in the Department, in Government including ministerial advisors, in the women's shelter movement in this State, as well as past and present residents of the Shelter and some members of the general community would have identified the plaintiff as the target of the remarks complained of. The plaintiff's public profile admits of no other conclusion.
The Review Committee defendants other than Ms King pleaded that, to the extent that the words complained of were defamatory and concerned the plaintiff, most were true in substance and in fact. At the trial, they withdrew some of the pleas of justification.
The defamatory statements of which the plaintiff complains contained a number of separate and distinct imputations. It is a question of fact and degree whether a number of imputations are but separate aspects of one common imputation or constitute two or more separate imputations. In my view, this was an instance where several separate and distinct imputations effectively boil down to one, namely, that the plaintiff was entirely unfit to run the Shelter. There are, broadly speaking, three grounds on which that charge was made. They are that the plaintiff had been guilty of financial mismanagement, that she had been guilty of criminal conduct, and that she had been guilty of sexual misconduct and physical harassment of residents at the Shelter. Each of those grounds should be considered as a separate imputation because each is such a grave charge and is so different from the others. It is proper, therefore, to regard each as a separate imputation.
The Review Committee defendants simply denied that the statements were defamatory and sought to justify them. The onus was on the Review Committee defendants to justify them: Singleton v Ffrench (1986) 5 NSWLR 425 at 442 per McHugh J. Given that there is more than one imputation, these defendants must justify each: Polly Peck (Holdings) Plc v Trelford [1986] QB 1000 at 1023. Alternatively, they may succeed in establishing a partial justification, that is to say, they may justify one or more of the imputations: Becker v Smith's Newspapers Ltd [1929] SAStRp 66; [1929] SASR 469 at 471; Hadzel v De Waldorf (1970) 16 FLR 174 at 179; Woodger v Federal Capital Press of Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ACTR 1 at 27.
The particulars of the plea of justification were in these terms:
"(a) auditors of the Shelter were changed often;
(b) travel allowances to staff of the Shelter were excessive and unsupported by shelter records;
(c) the plaintiff undertook a full time two year University course whilst receiving a full salary as the Administrator of the Shelter;
(d) at the time the Shelter shifted premises, it was inoperative for a protracted period;
(e) on one occasion an auditor of the Shelter had to qualify his report with the statement that twenty-five payments could not be accounted for as no vouchers, receipts or other documentation were presented;
(f) at times the Department of Community Welfare experienced difficulties and delays in obtaining adequate financial statements from the Shelter;
(h) the Shelter frequently made requests for advances on its budget;
(i) in February 1986 the Shelter received additional funding of $17,271, backdated and paid to the end of the third quarter;
(j) at the end of the 1986 financial year the Shelter required an advance of $20,000;
(k) the shelter refused to sign the Agreement referred to in paragraphs 16 and 24(b) hereof;
(l) the Shelter kept poor or no records with respect to time worked, time off in lieu accumulated or taken;
(m) as at 11 March 1985 the Shelter had made no entries in its cash book for that month;
(n) the Administrator's salary was upgraded to AO-1 level, in excess of the salary provision in the grant of funding;
(o) by February 1985 the Shelter had spent its surplus from December, 1984 of $17,760 and required an advance on its funding allocation of $10,000;
(p) for the financial year ending 30 June 1983 the Shelter had a deficit of $3,702.07;
(q) for the financial year ending 30 June 1984 the Shelter had a deficit of $4,326.76;
(r) for the financial year ending 30 June 1985 the Shelter had a deficit of $15,025.00;
(s) for the financial year ending 30 June 1986 the Shelter had a deficit of $19,228.00;
(t) at the commencement of the Review into Women's Shelters by the Committee the Shelter had a deficit of $19,150;
(u) the ninth-named defendant ANDERSON spoke with various persons employed in community, governmental and non-governmental organizations about the Shelter and its management;
(v) in or about January, February and March 1987 the ninth-named defendant ANDERSON spoke with former Shelter residents, Shelter residents and former members of the management committee of the Shelter about the Shelter and its management;
(w) allegations related to suspected criminal offences were referred to the Chief Secretary by the first-named defendant CORNWALL by a Minute dated 29 May 1987;
(x) allegations relating to suspected criminal offences were referred to the Commissioner of Police by the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Community Welfare by letter dated 29 May 1987;
(y) officers of the Police Department carried out an investigation into the allegations referred to in subparagraphs (x) and (y) hereof from in or about June 1987 to in or about September 1987;
(z) allegations relating to suspected breaches of the Associations Incorporation Act were referred to the Minister for Corporate Affairs by the first-named defendant CORNWALL in or about May 1987;
(aa) allegations relating to suspected breaches of the Associations Incorporation Act were referred to the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs by the Chief Executive Officer of the Department for Community Welfare by letter dated 29 May 1987;
(bb) officers of the Corporate Affairs Commission carried out an investigation in to the allegations referred to in subparagraphs (z) and (aa) hereof in or about June 1987 to in or about September 1987;
(cc) on 29 September 1987 the plaintiff was charged with offences contrary to section 35(1) and 57(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985;
(dd) On 1 June 1988 Mr Ackland SM sitting at the Christies Beach Magistrates Court found the charges against the plaintiff in contravention of sections 35(1) and 57(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 proven."
Two of those pleas were withdrawn, namely, pars (b) and (c). It is readily apparent that the plea of justification is essentially concerned with financial issues.
Before examining each of those particulars, two matters must be noted. The first is that the Review Committee defendants did not seek to prove the truth of any of the allegations as to personal misconduct or criminal conduct in the Report which relates to the second and third of the identified imputations. In other words, there was no proof of or attempt to prove
• unprofessional, inappropriate and exploitive client counselling practices including breach of confidentiality (and claims by other agencies of inappropriate methods and subsequent need of rehabilitative counselling of some clients who had been the subject of the Shelter's counselling services).
Where a defendant fails to plead truth, he is taken to have admitted the falsity of the defamatory statement: Goldsborough v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1934] NSWStRp 43; (1934) 34 SR(NSW) 524 at 529 and Allworth v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1993) 113 FLR 254 at 266. I therefore find that the above allegations I have listed were falsely made.
In addition, there is no plea alleging justification of the following allegations in the Report.
• That the Christies Beach Shelter had frequently come to the attention of senior management in the Department and to the responsible Ministers (State and Federal) over a period of about five years because of deficiencies in financial management, unacceptable management practices and because of unsubstantiated allegations of professional and personal misbehaviour;
• Operating costs were used to augment salaries without the authorisation of the Department;
• Inappropriate personnel and financial mismanagement;
• Failure to co-operate with departmental personnel in the normal course of funding procedures (I add, except to the extent that it is raised by par (f) of the plea of justification.);
• Reasons given to the Department for consistent over-expenditure were not satisfactory; and
• That persons who complained to the Department were unwilling to make a formal complaint because of fear of intimidation.
At one stage in the trial, counsel for the Review Committee defendants asserted that her clients would justify the allegation that operating costs were used to augment salaries without the authorisation of the Department. Mrs Roberts sought to justify the assertion. This assertion was later withdrawn. It was admitted that the Shelter did not use funds for operating costs to augment salaries. It is appropriate to add that Departmental documents existed which suggested that the Shelter was not using funding for operating costs to augment salaries. One example is pages 139 and 140 of Exhibit P117. This is an issue which the Review Committee could have easily clarified by speaking to finance officers at the Department. This was a clear instance of an allegation being advanced without evidence. None of the above statements have been justified and are, therefore, false.
The second matter to note is that the plaintiff frankly and candidly admitted that the Christies Beach Shelter was continually in deficit, that it frequently overran its budget, and that it frequently made requests for advances on its budget. At the same time, she denied financial incompetence or mismanagement. A competent financial manager may deliberately incur a deficit in one or more years. It is necessary to examine a number of factors including the reasons for the deficit before one can conclude that the fact that a deficit has been incurred is the result of financial mismanagement. The reasons why the Shelter incurred a deficit have already been stated. The Shelter was engaged in a political campaign to obtain more funds for shelters. There was a degree of deliberate overspending for the purpose of making a political statement. The Shelter was continually agitating for increased funding. Furthermore, while the Department endeavoured to contain the Shelter within its budget, its attempts were rather less than strenuous. Indeed, when its officers examined the books of the Shelter, they were unable to identify any area of unjustified expenditure.
Paragraphs (g) to (j) and (o) to (t) of the particulars deal in one respect or another with the undisputed fact that the Shelter spent in excess of its grants and sought additional funding from the Department. There was no issue between the parties on those pleas. Essentially, the Review Committee defendants sought to prove financial mismanagement by asserting the Shelter was not accountable. But the clear fact is that the Shelter did properly account for the funds that it used. In every year, the Shelter presented audited accounts for each quarter to the Department. In all years but one, the accounts received an unqualified audit and in that one year the accounts ultimately received an unqualified audit. The Shelter, therefore, accounted for what it spent. It simply spent more than it received and had to seek additional funding from the Department. That does not automatically equate to financial mismanagement. It is not uncommon for a well-run organisation to spend in excess of its budget. The Review Committee defendants did not adduce any evidence to show that the incurring of deficits was as a result of financial mismanagement. Reference has already been made to Ms Wighton's view that the Shelter spent more than its budget as a political statement. The Review Committee defendants have, therefore, failed to prove that the deficits were incurred as a result of financial mismanagement.
I summarise the position before examining the details of the plea of justification. The Review Committee defendants have not sought to justify the imputations that the plaintiff had been guilty of criminal conduct or that she had been guilty of sexual misconduct and physical harassment of residents or of any of the imputations touching her character other than financial competence. They have not justified the second and third imputations. As to financial matters, the plaintiff admitted that the Shelter was continually in deficit but not as a consequence of financial mismanagement. There is no plea justifying those aspects of financial mismanagement listed above.
I turn to examine each of the particulars of justification. They appear below in bold typeface. In some instances, there are common facts or issues so that more than one of the pleas may be examined together. I begin with pars (a) and (e), which deal with the question of auditors.
(a) Auditors of the shelter were changed often:
In 1981 the auditor was V Neveuraskas. The following were elected to be the auditor by the management committee at annual general meetings:
S Pardey (on 25 October 1983, although J Esdale continued)
Therefore, between 1981 and 1986 inclusive, auditors Neveuraskas, Esdale, Evans and Maunder were responsible for auditing the shelter's books. Prior to 1981 there had been other auditors, for example Rutar and McGovern.
(e) On one occasion an auditor of the shelter had to qualify his report with a statement that 25 payments could not be accounted for as no vouchers, receipts or other documentation were presented.
The Review Committee defendants adduced no evidence to justify the assertion in the last sentence of par (a).
The facts concerning the change of auditors have already been examined. Between 1981 and 1986 the Shelter retained four separate auditors. As mentioned earlier, the context in which the statement "auditors have been changed often" appears in the Report causes the statement to convey the clear innuendo that the Shelter changed auditors either to avoid auditing scrutiny or criticism, or because the auditor refused to comply with the requests of the Shelter, or because there was something to conceal, or because the management of the Shelter was corrupt or incompetent. In truth, none of those were reasons for the changes. The examination of this issue earlier in these reasons clearly shows that there was nothing sinister in the fact that auditors had been frequently changed. It was not an indication of financial mismanagement. The statement that "auditors have been changed often" is but one of a number of instances in the Report where the Review Committee failed to state all of the relevant facts.
A plea of justification will succeed only if the defamatory implications are proved to be substantially true. Slight inaccuracies in detail which do not affect the substance of the charge will not prevent the success of the plea: Potts v Moran (1976) 16 SASR 284 see Bray CJ at 306. If Jakudo Pty Ltd v SA Telecasters Ltd [1997] SASC 6370; (1997) 69 SASR 440 expresses a contrary conclusion, I respectfully prefer the reasoning in Potts v Moran. But half-truths in the defamatory statement are not justifiable. The principle was explained by Lord Shaw in Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47 at 78-79 in these terms:
"It remains to be considered what are the conditions and breadth of a plea of justification on the ground of truth. The plea must not be considered in a meticulous sense. It is that the words employed were true in substance and in fact. I view with great satisfaction the charge of the Lord Chief Justice when he made the point perfectly clear to the jury, that all that was required to affirm that plea was that the jury should be satisfied that the sting of the libel or, if there were more than one, the stings of the libel should be made out. To which I may add that there may be mistakes here and there in what has been said which would make no substantial difference to the quality of the alleged libel or in the justification pleaded for it. If I write that the defendant on 6 March took a saddle from my stable and sold it the next day and pocketed the money all without notice to me, and that in my opinion he stole the saddle, and if the facts truly are found to be that the defendant did not take the saddle from the stable but from the harness room, and that he did not sell it the next day but a week afterwards, but nevertheless he did, without my knowledge or consent, sell my saddle so taken and pocketed the proceeds, then the whole sting of the libel may be justifiably affirmed by a jury notwithstanding these errors in detail.
In the second place, however, the allegation of fact must tell the whole story. If, for instance, in the illustration given, the facts as elicited show what my writing had not disclosed - namely, that the defendant had a saddle of his own lying in my harness room, and that he took by mistake mine away instead of his own and, still labouring under that mistake, sold it - then the jury would probably declare that the libel was not justified on the double ground that there were facts completely explaining in a non-criminal sense anything that was done, and the jury would disaffirm the truth of the libel because, although meticulously true in fact, it was false in substance."
A corollary is that the more general the imputation, the more difficult it will be to prove its truth: Potts v Moran (supra). A reader acquainted with all of the facts would conclude that the libel was not justified. There were reasonable explanations for the changes in auditors and the fact that auditors were changed did not justify the charge of financial mismanagement. The defamatory imputation was not substantially true and was not justified.
The assertion in the Report that an auditor had to qualify the financial statements of the Shelter (see par (e) of the particulars) was literally correct but was another instance where the defendants failed to recount all of the facts. Had the full story been recited, the reader would not have concluded that there was anything untoward, particularly if informed that the matter had been cleared up to the satisfaction of the Department more than three years earlier. Again, the defamatory imputation was not substantially true and was not justified.
(b) These particulars of justification were withdrawn at the trial.
(c) These particulars of justification were also withdrawn at the trial.
(d) At the time the Shelter shifted premises, it was inoperative for a protracted period.
The true facts have already been noted in the examination earlier in these reasons of the meeting on 4 October 1983. The Review Committee defendants failed to adduce any fresh evidence on this issue. The evidence shows that the Shelter did not cease to operate for any period in 1983. This plea of justification wholly fails.
(f) At times, the Department of Community Welfare experienced difficulties and delays in obtaining adequate financial statements from the Shelter.
I have already referred to this allegation when commenting on the inaccuracies in the Report. It is convenient to repeat much of what was said. The further and better particulars of this plea are:
"(a) as at 15 August and 14 September 1983 no audited statement for the financial year 1982/83 was received by the department;
(b) on 16 August 1983 the department received a financial return for the quarter ended 30 June 1983, which was qualified by the auditor. The shelter was advised on 13 and 15 September 1983 that that statement was unsatisfactory and that an audited statement for the financial year ended 1982/83 had not been received;
(c) a meeting was held on 4 October 1983 between representatives of the department and the shelter, at which time the matter of the qualified audit was discussed between them and the shelter undertook to take steps to obtain another audited statement;
(d) the department communicated with the shelter on 30 September 1983, 12 October, 14 October and 17 October 1983 seeking a properly audited statement for the quarter ended 30 June 1983 and for the financial year 1982/83. An audited financial statement for the financial year 1982/83 was received by the department on 20 October 1983;
(e) the department contacted the shelter on 14 February and 22 February 1985 about not having received a financial return for the period ending 31 December 1984;
(f) on 27 February 1985 the department confirmed with the shelter that it had not yet received the quarterly return for the period ending 31 December 1984;
(g) on other dates which are now unable to be specified due to the effluxion of time, departmental officer(s) were obliged to request that the shelter forward properly completed outstanding quarterly and annual financial statements to the department."
Paragraphs (a) to (d) deal with the same issues as were the subject of the qualified audit report for the year ending 30 June 1983. The whole matter was cleared up in less than three months. There was a suggestion in the evidence that the auditor was not making himself available. That does not explain why the Shelter did not resolve the matter more quickly. However, the time taken was not unduly long.
It is apparent that pars (e) and (f) refer to the same set of financial returns. It should be noted that the uncontroverted evidence is that in that series of telephone calls Ms McSkimming told the officer from the Department that the statement had been sent on 23 or 24 February 1985. There is no evidence that the statement had not been received in the Department in late February. I find that it was. There is no dispute that the Shelter may have been late on this occasion.
There is no evidence as to the matters alleged in par (g) of the further and better particulars, a fact confirmed by the final submissions of counsel for the State defendants.
The position then is that the Shelter might not have cleared matters up as quickly as it should have in 1983 but the matter was ultimately cleared up to the satisfaction of the Department and, in 1985, the Shelter was late in supplying its return. Thus, it has been proved that there were only two financial statements which were late. The Shelter was required to provide the Department with quarterly financial statements as well as annual financial statements, a total of at least four in each year. Thus, for the years 1981 to 1987, the Christies Beach Shelter would have provided at least 28 statements and only two were late. This particular is virtually a restatement of the allegation in the Report. The particular is an attempt to prove financial mismanagement. The sting lies in the expression "at times". That expression is not qualified or limited as to number. It suggests quite a few occasions. Only two have been proved out of a total of at least 28 occasions. The sting of the charge has not been answered. The Review Committee defendants have therefore failed to prove this plea of justification.
(h) The Shelter frequently made requests for advances on its budget.
As mentioned above, neither (g) nor (h) is in dispute.
(i) In February 1986 the Shelter received additional funding of $17,271 backdated and paid to the end of the third quarter.
As already mentioned, all shelters received additional funding in February 1986 as part of the SAAP Program. This statement is literally correct. For the reasons given earlier, the context in which this statement appears has the result that the statement entirely misrepresents the true position.
(j) At the end of the 1986 financial year the Shelter required an advance of $20,000.
This was correct at the time when the Review Committee delivered the Report to Dr Cornwall. The Shelter's reasons for not signing the Financial Agreement have already been examined.
(l) The Shelter kept poor or no records with respect to time worked, time off in lieu accumulated or taken.
The evidence shows that the Shelter kept some but not very complete records with respect to the detailed hours worked or time off in lieu ("TOIL") which had been either accumulated or taken. No time book was kept. Nevertheless, it had adequate pay records about which no complaint was made. The inadequate TOIL records need to be put in context. The undisputed evidence was that the Administrator and staff of the Shelter worked long hours. They were very busy. There was no such thing as a regular 35 hour week since the nature of the Shelter's services very frequently required that those services be provided after ordinary business hours. Four women who had been employed at the Shelter gave evidence. They were the plaintiff, Ms McSkimming, Ms Lachlan and Ms Staiff. I was impressed with the dedication they had to the Shelter and its welfare. It is plain that they were extremely committed to their task and were proud of the Shelter. The effect of their evidence was that in order to operate the Shelter effectively they had to work many hours overtime. If they insisted on taking all of the TOIL to which they were each entitled, the Shelter could not properly operate or more staff would have been required. They were dedicated to their work. They did not insist on working a 35 hour week. They did not take the TOIL to which they were entitled. They took some TOIL when it was convenient to the Shelter.
There is no evidence that the Shelter was not available at any time to potential clients or that the services provided were inadequate or inappropriate. The keeping of TOIL records in the context of the busy-ness of this Shelter has a somewhat pedantic and bureaucratic quality. As Ms Johnson asserted in her evidence, the issue was not relevant to the main thrust of the review. Although the Shelter did not keep adequate TOIL records, it is hardly a severe criticism of the financial or personnel management of the Shelter. It is something capable of being easily remedied. Indeed, the minutes of a meeting of the management committee of the Shelter held shortly after the visit of the Review Committee indicate that it was willing to improve these records.
The sting of the charge concerning TOIL records is on page 65 of the Report in the unsubstantiated allegations. It reads:
"Inadequate personnel records and ineffective control of personnel and resources and granting of excessively generous terms and conditions of employment."
On page 67 there is a later reference which reads:
"Poor records or no records kept with respect to time worked, 'time off in lieu' accumulated or taken, staff conditions, etc."
The sting is that, as a consequence of inadequate records, the staff were enjoying unduly generous time off. There is nothing to justify that imputation at all. The Review Committee defendants failed to justify this defamation.
(m) As at 11 March 1985 the Shelter had made no entries in its cash book for that month.
One is at first struck by what appears to be the trivial nature of this plea. Its importance does not improve when the full facts are known. Its clear purpose is to attempt to prove financial mismanagement. The attempt failed. The Shelter employed a bookkeeper, Ms Jan Underdown, on a part-time basis. Her duties included writing up the cash book. She did so on a weekly or fortnightly basis. The evidence is not clear which of the two it was but that is of no consequence. It is quite apparent that the visit by the DCW officers on 11 March 1985 was made before Ms Underdown next wrote up the cash book. This was an isolated single complaint. There is no evidence of the cash book not properly being written up on any other occasion. There is no evidence to suggest that the cash book for March 1985 was not later written up. There is no evidence that the cash book for March 1985 was not complete. The ledger of receipts and payments for March 1985 was tendered and it had been written up, I find at some time in March or April 1985. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I infer it was the cash book. This single isolated occasion is therefore not evidence of financial mismanagement. The evidence shows that Ms Anderson simply relied on a note contained in a report by the Departmental officers who visited the Shelter on 11 March 1985 and made no independent investigation or assessment of it. She admitted that she did not examine the cash book. This is an obvious instance of an allegation which could have been easily examined. It is another instance of the Review Committee simply restating an allegation concerning the Christies Beach Shelter without making any independent assessment of the force of the allegation or conducting any independent investigation. It had occurred at least four years before and there is no evidence to show that this was the position in 1987. It indicates a willingness to state anything to the detriment of the Shelter.
(n) The Administrator's salary was upgraded to AO-1 level in excess of the salary provision in the grant of funding.
The salary paid to the plaintiff as Administrator was higher than the recommended level, namely, a salary at CO5 level in the State Public Service. This was not disputed by the plaintiff. The salary had been approved by the management committee of the Shelter which was at liberty to fix salaries at what it perceived to be an appropriate level. Despite the fact that the plaintiff was paid at this level, the Shelter still remained within its budget for salaries. The Shelter exceeded only that portion of its budget allocated for operating costs. In other words, the payment to the plaintiff of a salary above the recommended salary level was not the cause of the Shelter being in deficit. In this context, it is necessary to recall the plea of justification that the Review Committee defendants at first sought to sustain but later withdrew that "operating costs used to augment salaries without the authorisation of the Department". The two pleas are obviously linked it being implied that the salary paid to the plaintiff was one cause of the need for operating costs to augment salaries. This is another example of the Review Committee being prepared to make allegations in the Report without any attempt to examine the force of the allegations. The allegations about financial mismanagement were among the main reasons for the Review Committee recommending that funding be withdrawn. Central to these allegations were the allegations that the Shelter had transferred funds to salaries from operating costs. That allegation, when read with the statement that the Administrator's salary was above the recommended level, not only indicated financial irresponsibility but also that the Administrator of the Shelter was prepared to advance her own personal interest to the detriment of the Shelter. There was no foundation in fact for that imputation.
Paragraphs (o) to (t) assert that for the financial years ending 30 June 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986 the Shelter had deficits for a stated amount and that at the commencement of the review the Shelter was still in deficit in the sum of $19,150. It is unnecessary to set out again the deficit in each year. Although there was some debate about the actual amount of the deficit, there was no serious dispute that deficits of that order had been in existence. I find that deficits of that order existed at those times. But, as already mentioned, the fact of the deficits does not, standing alone, indicate financial mismanagement and the deficits must be considered against the view held by Ms Wighton and others that the Shelter spent as a political statement. In addition, as is apparent from the narrative above, the Christies Beach Shelter was not the only shelter which had incurred deficits. More significantly, in the year ending 30 June 1987, the Shelter's spending essentially remained within budget. Although that may have been a consequence of its fortnightly funding, the Shelter demonstrated it could adhere to its budget.
(u) The ninth-named defendant Anderson spoke with various persons employed in community, governmental and non-governmental organizations about the Shelter and its management.
(v) In or about January, February and March 1987 the ninth-named defendant Anderson spoke with former Shelter residents, Shelter residents and former members of the management committee of the Shelter about the Shelter and its management.
Paragraphs (u) and (v) plead that Ms Anderson spoke with various persons in the community, Government and non-governmental organizations about the Shelter and its management, and in January, February and March spoke with past and present residents of the Shelter and with former members of the management committee. These two pleas cannot in any respect constitute justification of the defamatory imputations in the Report. The fact that Ms Anderson spoke to a number of individuals plainly proves nothing beyond the fact that she spoke to them.
Paragraphs (w), (x) and (y) plead that the allegations concerning suspected criminal offences were referred by Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon to the police for investigation and that the police investigated them. It is unnecessary to repeat those paragraphs. They do not constitute justification of any of the allegations in the Report. They prove nothing other than that the matters were referred to the police for investigation. It is curious that the pleas do not refer to the fact that, after the investigations, the police had reported that there was no evidence of the commission of any criminal offences. That fact would have been well known to Dr Cornwall and at least to Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson, if not to other members of the Review Committee.
The effect of pars (z) to (bb) is that the allegations as to suspected breaches of the Associations Incorporation Act were referred by Dr Cornwall and Ms Vardon for investigation and were investigated by officers of the CAC. Again, that is not a plea of justification but simply a plea that allegations were investigated.
Paragraphs (cc) and (dd) state that the plaintiff was charged with a breach of s 35(1) and s 57(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act and was found to have committed those offences by Mr Ackland SM in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court on 1 June 1988. None of those matters are in dispute. But here again, the full story is not told. It is necessary to recite particular (dd).
"(dd) On 1 June 1988 Mr Ackland SM sitting at the Christies Beach Magistrates Court found the charges against the plaintiff in contravention of sections 35(1) and 57(1) of the Associations Incorporation Act 1985 proven."
It will be recalled that, although he found that the charges had been proved, the learned Magistrate reached that conclusion reluctantly because there had been no misappropriation of funds and the charges constituted no more than technical breaches of the Act. He also noted that "the not inconsiderable amount of money spent on this prosecution, would have been better spent on the women and children for whose support the Shelter was set up". The plea fails to mention that the magistrate found the offences trifling and so did not convict the plaintiff. It also fails to mention that the plaintiff was not required to pay costs. Paragraphs (cc) and (dd) are correct but only so far as they go. The full story is not told. The particulars in pars (cc) and (dd) do not prove financial mismanagement.
Thus, a large number of the pleas of justification have been not proved. Those which have been proved do not establish financial mismanagement. When grouped together, all that is established is
• the literal accuracy of two comments about the auditors but, for the reasons given, they do not tell the whole story and do not prove financial mismanagement;
• that on two occasions only out of at least 28 occasions when the Shelter had had to supply financial statements, it was slow in supplying them;
• that the Shelter frequently overran its budget and requested and received advances;
• that the Shelter did not sign the Financial Agreement;
• that the Shelter paid the plaintiff at a level above the recommended level but that does not prove financial mismanagement because the Shelter stayed within its salary budget;
• that the Shelter was in deficit for four consecutive financial years and at the time when the review began;
• that the Shelter did not keep detailed TOIL records;
• that the plaintiff was found guilty of technical breaches of the Associations Incorporation Act.
When viewed as a whole, there are only two matters which are of any real moment, the continued incurring of deficits and the failure to sign the Financial Agreement. The failure to sign the Financial Agreement was bad politics but it was not financial mismanagement. The fact that the Shelter was continually in deficit and requested and received more funds, on its face, may suggest financial mismanagement. After all, if any organization is granted a certain amount of money and is requested not to spend in excess of that sum, prudence requires that the organization stay within that grant. From 1983, the Christies Beach Shelter was continually in deficit. But the fact of a deficit or series of deficits, standing alone, does not prove financial mismanagement. What has been proved is that the Christies Beach Shelter was not prepared to stay within its annual grant; that there was no satisfactory scheme of submitting budgets and allocating funds according to need; that the Christies Beach Shelter continually asked for more funds, and during those years its requests were not refused; that until 1987 funds to run the Shelter kept coming; and that the Department saw the continued overspending at Christies Beach as being part of a political campaign by the Shelter. It is also apparent from the evidence that the only large deficits were in the 1985 and 1986 years. The deficit in 1987 represented what had occurred in previous financial years. The Shelter essentially stayed within its budget in the 1986-1987 financial year. In 1986 the plaintiff was agitating for increased funding for shelters and was clearly supported by her Shelter in that campaign. It is quite clear that the Shelter, generally speaking, knew when it was about to need further funding and made requests in sufficient time to avoid being without funds. That does not necessarily prove sound financial management but it does indicate that the Shelter was aware of its financial situation and that deficits were more likely to be the result of deliberate overspending as part of a political campaign instead of resulting simply from a lack of proper financial management. More significantly, the Shelter produced audited accounts of its expenditure. There is no proof of inappropriate expenditure. As the continued incurring of deficits does not necessarily equate to financial mismanagement, the Review Committee defendants have not proved that fact. In reaching this conclusion, I have had regard to the other matters which were established but they are of minor significance. The evidence also shows that the Shelter only exceeded its annual grants in the line for operating costs. It did not exceed the line for salaries. In relation to its operating costs, the evidence shows that the management and the staff maintained standards of services and standards of furniture and equipment which might have been higher than other shelters. They were intent on providing a broader range of services than other shelters. This meant that their operating costs were higher than their grant. I repeat that officers of the Department were unable to point to areas where spending was excessive or unjustified in relation to the services which the Shelter provided. Viewed as a whole, it has not been established that the staff of the Shelter were guilty of financial mismanagement.
For all of these reasons I find that those of the Review Committee defendants who pleaded justification have failed to justify the allegations of financial mismanagement. I emphasise that this conclusion concerns only the plea of justification. At the risk of overstating the position, I repeat that the issues in this action do not concern the question whether there was cause to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. There may have been valid grounds for withdrawing funding from the Shelter. However, it is not my task to determine that question and, in any event, insufficient evidence was adduced on that issue to enable any conclusion to be drawn. That is not said critically because the issues pleaded by the plaintiff did not require this court to decide whether the decision to withdraw funding was justified.
To summarise, the plaintiff has established the following defamatory imputations:
that she was unfit to run or be employed in the Shelter;
that she was guilty of illegal conduct of the Shelter;
that she was not adequately servicing the needs of the clients of the Shelter;
that she was guilty of neglect and negligence in the running of the Shelter and in her employment in the Shelter;
that she was guilty of dishonest and dishonourable conduct; and
that she was guilty of sexual and physical harassment.
Thus, the plaintiff has proved the defamatory meanings alleged in the statement of claim and the Review Committee defendants have failed to prove the truth of the defamatory statements. The plea of justification therefore fails. The defamatory statements were false.
As mentioned earlier, the plea of justification is essentially concerned with financial matters. I add that, even if this plea had succeeded, it would have established no more than that the plaintiff had been guilty of financial mismanagement. There remained the imputations of criminal and sexual misconduct, the latter including all the allegations of personal and professional impropriety and incompetence. These imputations are the more serious charges. They were a gross calumny of the plaintiff.
I turn to the defence of qualified privilege. The Review Committee defendants plead that, to the extent that it is found that defamatory statements were published concerning the plaintiff, the matters complained of were published on an occasion of qualified privilege. They assert that the privilege arose because they were under a duty to report to Dr Cornwall having been directed by him to enquire into the matters listed in the Terms of Reference and that Dr Cornwall was under a corresponding duty to receive the Report as Minister for Community Welfare as well as being the Minister responsible for administering the SAAP Program. The Review Committee defendants plead that they acted in good faith and without malice in providing the Report to Dr Cornwall.
The Committee was discharging an administrative, not a judicial function. In no respect was it deciding issues between parties. It was simply reporting to Dr Cornwall as Minister. Its task was merely to review the administration of women's shelters. Thus, its Report did not attract absolute privilege but, as the Committee was under a duty to report to Dr Cornwall, the Report was published on an occasion of qualified privilege. This is entirely consistent with the view that at common law certain kinds of inquiries are occasions of qualified privilege. They include a Royal Commission: Douglass v Lewis (1982) 30 SASR 50, 58; an investigation by a Commissioner under monopolies legislation: O'Connor v Waldron [1935] AC 76; an inquiry by an inspector under legislation for the purpose of examining and reporting upon the affairs of an industrial assurance company: Hearts of Oak Assurance Co Ltd v Attorney-General [1952] AC 392, 405; and a Department of Trade inquiry Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1971] Ch 388, 400, 404.
A "privileged occasion" was defined by Lord Atkinson in Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309 at 334 in these terms:
"A privileged occasion is, in reference to qualified privilege, an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest or a duty, legal, social, or moral, to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. This reciprocity is essential."
The defendants, as members of the Review Committee, were required to report to Dr Cornwall in accordance with the Terms of Reference and Dr Cornwall was, in turn, under a corresponding duty to receive the Report. The Report was therefore made on a privileged occasion. There was little dispute that the Report was published on an occasion of qualified privilege. The main issue between the parties was whether the privilege was defeated by the existence of malice.
Although the Report was published on an occasion of qualified privilege, that privilege may be lost if the plaintiff proves that the defamatory statements were actuated by malice. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff: Howe & McColough v Lees [1910] HCA 67; (1910) 11 CLR 361 at 373. Malice is a particular state of mind, such as ill-will or spite towards a plaintiff, resulting in publication for an improper purpose or without an honest belief in the truth of the publication: Webb v Bloch [1928] HCA 50; (1928) 41 CLR 331 at 368; Horrocks v Lowe [1975] AC 135 at 149-151. It is a burden not lightly discharged: Horrocks v Lowe at 150 - 151. In this context, it is not essential that the defendants should be actuated by malice towards the plaintiff in the ordinary sense of personal spite or ill will. Malice may exist even though there may be no spite or desire for vengeance in the ordinary sense but the defendant is acting with an improper motive: Pratt v British Medical Association [1919] 1 KB 244 at 275 - 276. The mental state of the defendant at the time of making the defamatory statement will be inferred from the words or actions of the defendant before, after and at the time of making that statement: McKenzie v Mergen Holdings Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 42 at 51.
There are two steps in the process of determining whether malice has been proved. First, it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff has proved evidence upon which it could be reasonably found that the defendant was actuated by malice. The second is to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to establish malice: see McKenzie v Mergen Holdings at 47 - 48, 50; King & Mergen Holdings Pty Ltd v McKenzie (1991) 24 NSWLR 305 at 316.
The principles relating to malice in the contex of qualified privilege were restated by Lord Diplock in Horrocks v Lowe. Three members of the House of Lords concurred with his speech. I have had regard to the whole of his Lordship's comments. For present purposes, it is sufficient to quote the following (at 149 - 150):
" The motive with which a person published defamatory matter can only be inferred from what he did or said or knew. If it be proved that he did not believe that what he published was true this is generally conclusive evidence of express malice, for no sense of duty or desire to protect his own legitimate interests can justify a man in telling deliberate and injurious falsehoods about another, save in the exceptional case where a person may be under a duty to pass on, without endorsing, defamatory reports made by some other person.
Apart from those exceptional cases, what is required on the part of the defamer to entitle him to the protection of the privilege is positive belief in the truth of what he published or, as it is generally though tautologously termed, 'honest belief.' If he published untrue defamatory matter recklessly, without considering or caring whether it be true or not, he is in this, as in other branches of the law, treated as if he knew it to be false. But indifference to the truth of what he publishes is not to be equated with carelessness, impulsiveness or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief that it is true. The freedom of speech protected by the law of qualified privilege may be availed of by all sorts and conditions of men. In affording to them immunity from suit if they have acted in good faith in compliance with a legal or moral duty or in protection of a legitimate interest the law must take them as it finds them. In ordinary life it is rare indeed for people to form their beliefs by a process of logical deduction from facts ascertained by a rigorous search for all available evidence and a judicious assessment of its probative value. In greater or in less degree according to their temperaments, their training, their intelligence, they are swayed by prejudice, rely on intuition instead of reasoning, leap to conclusions on inadequate evidence and fail to recognise the cogency of material which might cast doubt on the validity of the conclusions they reach. But despite the imperfection of the mental process by which the belief is arrived at it may still be 'honest,' that is, a positive belief that the conclusions they have reached are true. The law demands no more. ...
Judges and juries should, however, be very slow to draw the inference that a defendant was so far actuated by improper motives as to deprive him of the protection of the privilege unless they are satisfied that he did not believe that what he said or wrote was true or that he was indifferent to its truth or falsity."
The emphasis in the last paragraph of that quotation on the onus of proof was restated (at 151) where Lord Diplock said "juries should be instructed and judges should remind themselves that this burden of affirmative proof is not one that is lightly satisfied". These principles have been consistently applied since in Australian courts: see, for example, Spautz v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506 at 520 - 521; and Barbaro v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 30 at 50 - 51.
It is clear from the above passage that qualified privilege will be defeated if the defendant did not believe what he published was true. Furthermore, if the defendant publishes untrue defamatory matter recklessly, without considering or caring whether it be true or not, he is treated as if he knew it to be false: see also Barbaro at 50 - 51. As Lord Diplock noted, a reckless publication is "generally conclusive evidence of malice". Windeyer J noted in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1966] HCA 37; (1966) 117 CLR 185 at 209 - 210 that "a reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of statements obviously defamatory may amount to malice". It follows that a failure to include material which is contradictory of the defamatory matter or which is favourable to the plaintiff is also evidence of malice: Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510 per Smithers J at 544 - 552 (especially at 544) and per Pincus J at 596 - 597. Consistently with the principle that the burden of proof is not lightly discharged, carelessness, impulsiveness or irrationality in arriving at a positive belief is not to be equated with indifference to the truth: see also Uren's Case at 210 and Barbaro at 51.
Another qualification expressed by Lord Diplock is what he called "the exceptional case where a person may be under a duty to pass on, without endorsing, defamatory remarks made by another person". Two aspects of that qualification should be noted. The first is that it is likely to be "an exceptional case". The second is that the defamatory remarks should be passed on without endorsement. This Committee had a duty to report to the Minister and, if in discharging that duty it had passed on unsubstantiated allegations without endorsing them, it would not have been guilty of malice: Horrocks v Lowe at 150. However, the Review Committee has quite unequivocally endorsed the allegations by including them amongst its reasons for recommending the withdrawal of funding and by commending Dr Cornwall for initiating an investigation of them. I refer to the earlier discussion of that issue where other endorsements of the allegations are noted. This exception does not, therefore, assist the Review Committee defendants.
In Horrocks v Lowe at 149, Lord Diplock stated that "to destroy the privilege the desire to injure must be the dominant motive for the defamatory publication". That statement does not mean that the Review Committee or any member of it could not be guilty of malice for the reason that the Review Committee was required to report to Dr Cornwall and so its dominant purpose was to report. To assert that conclusion is to elevate the qualified privilege to an absolute privilege. The fact that the Review Committee was required to report has no further consequence than that the Report was published on an occasion of qualified privilege and, as noted already, a court will carefully scrutinise the question whether the Review Committee or any member of it was recklessly or deliberately indifferent to the truth in the manner already described. In other words, it is a factor to be taken into account in determining whether the onus of proof has been discharged.
It should be added that knowledge that the publication will injure the plaintiff is not sufficient, standing alone, to establish malice if the defendant had a duty to report: Oldfield v Keogh [1941] NSWStRp 33; (1941) 41 SR(NSW) 206 at 212; Spautz v Williams at 52; Horrocks v Lowe at 149.
In the section in these reasons entitled "Aspects of the Decision to Withdraw Funding" I have already mentioned that the Review Committee knew more about some of the allegations contained in the Report than is stated in the Report; that they failed to tell the whole story in relation to a number of the allegations so that a misleading and inaccurate picture was painted; that they failed to state anything which was favourable to the Shelter or exculpatory of it; that they failed to state anything which they knew was contradictory of the allegations, clear examples being the statements about the auditors and about the Shelter being closed; and that they were reckless with the truth. There are too many instances when the whole story was not told to conclude that the failure to do so resulted from mere carelessness or irrationality. The Review Committee had all the Departmental files available to it. They could make enquiries of the Departmental staff and the Departmental staff were available to do any work which had to be done to assist the work of the Committee. In addition, when reporting the unsubstantiated allegations, there is a complete failure to mention any dates with the consequence that the reader gains the impression that the allegations refer to current matters or matters which have recently occurred. In other words, the reader would have believed that the unsubstantiated allegations had happened recently whereas by far the greater number were three or more years old. It is clear that proper enquiries were not made and, had they been made, some allegations might not have been included or at least stated in quite a different form. In my view, the Review Committee deliberately failed to set out all of the facts. It is apparent that the Committee was prepared to publish anything which was critical of the Shelter and the plaintiff, no matter that it might be of little weight, no matter what its credibility, and no matter whether they had contradictory material or material which qualified what was included. The fact that the Review Committee was presenting a report which was to be tabled in the Parliament, which was to be available to the public, and which was to be the basis of action by State and Commonwealth Ministers made it essential that what was contained in it was fairly stated. One obvious reason for that conclusion is that a report of this kind by a committee of selected persons within and without the relevant departments would be perceived as a document on which reliance could be placed. As will be seen, this was precisely what the ABC and TVB did on 12 August 1987. It is apparent that the facts about the Christies Beach Shelter were not fairly stated. I find that there is sufficient evidence that members of the Review Committee did not honestly believe that what they were stating in the Report concerning the Christies Beach Shelter was correct. Those members were guilty of malice with the consequence the qualified privilege which otherwise attached to the Report is lost. That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the members of the Review Committee who gave evidence admitted that they did not know whether the unsubstantiated allegations were true or not.
The question then arises whether all of the Review Committee defendants were guilty of malice. It will be recalled that Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King relied heavily on the information supplied to them by Ms Anderson. They did not examine original documents for that was Ms Anderson's task. The effect of their evidence is that they proceeded on the footing that the facts were being correctly placed before them. The comments in the Report about auditors and the Shelter being closed for a time are examples of how they relied on Ms Anderson to supply them the correct information. They were not aware of all of the facts. As already noted what is said in those two sections is either wrong or does not convey the whole story. It might be said they should have been more diligent in their supervision of Ms Anderson's work and that they should have asked questions for the purpose of testing the facts and propositions which she advanced. But that establishes no more than they were not as careful as they should have been in discharging their task. In the result, Ms Blake, Ms Johnston and Ms King had an honest belief in the facts as they were presented in the Report, albeit that honest belief had been formed carelessly. Applying the principles expressed by Lord Diplock in Horrocks v Lowe, they were indifferent to the truth but in all the circumstances were not guilty of malice.
However, the position is different for Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson. As mentioned earlier, they all had more extensive knowledge of the facts. Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson had seen the documents and the documents would have been seen earlier by Ms Wighton. Ms Wighton would have been aware of the true facts through her duties in the Department and through Ms Heath. I find that all of them did not have a honest belief in all the facts stated in the Report and further that they knew some of the facts were misstated or not fully stated. I find that they, in effect, targeted the Christies Beach Shelter and thereby targeted the plaintiff.
Ms Anderson as well as each member of the Review Committee who gave evidence said that they did not know whether the unsubstantiated allegations were true or not. As Smithers J noted in ABC v Comalco Ltd at 547 where a publication is intended for the information of the public on a subject of public significance, the fact that the publisher did not believe that the defamatory remarks were true might not necessarily constitute malice and destroy the privilege. In this context, that is tantamount to stating that a review committee of this kind is not guilty of malice if it does no more than pass on unsubstantiated allegations without endorsing them. I have already held that that does not assist the Review Committee.
I further find that in the case of Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson they not only failed to have an honest belief in the truth of the facts alleged in the unsubstantiated allegations but they had an improper purpose and they intended to denigrate the Shelter. They deliberately intended to paint as black a picture of the Shelter as they could. That is evidenced by the deliberate misstatements in the Report. They had a more detailed knowledge of the facts. Ms Wighton would have known about the Shelter before the review had started. What she did not know she would have learned in the course of the review. Ms Anderson gained a detailed knowledge through her work as consultant and Mrs Roberts had gained a lot of knowledge through her reading of Departmental files. The other members of the Review Committee relied on what Ms Anderson had told them. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King had the improper purpose of Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson.
Conduct of a defendant after the publication of the defamatory material may provide evidence of malice if it is probative of her state of mind at the time of publication: Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor [1928] HCA 36; (1928) 41 CLR 254 at 267-8; Horrocks v Lowe at 151. The evidence given by Mrs Roberts and Ms Anderson to the Select Committee provides further evidence of malice on their part. I will not instance every occasion when they made a malicious remark. It is sufficient to give a few examples. Reference to the transcript of their appearance in the Select Committee will indicate others. Each instance is identified by the paragraph number in the transcript of the Select Committee. Notwithstanding that they knew the results of the police investigations into the Shelter, they continually relied on and repeated the unsubstantiated allegations concerning sexual and professional misconduct. In addition, they both took whatever opportunity was available to make comments adverse to the plaintiff. Those remarks were often unresponsive to the questions being asked by the Select Committee. Instances are:
(1) Mrs Roberts informed the Select Committee that the Review Committee had explored the allegations item by item with the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelters: see pars 499-500. That was plainly false.
(2) Later (in par 561), Mrs Roberts informed the Select Committee that Dr Baum and Ms McSkimming had been informed by the Department of the content of the Report. That was obviously a reference to the meeting on 11 June. It is clear that neither Dr Baum nor Ms McSkimming were then informed of the content of the Report. Mrs Roberts' answer was plainly false.
(3) At par 539, they referred to the plaintiff's dismissal from her employment as Administrator of the Western Area Women's Shelter, when it is quite apparent from the transcript the facts were not known to them. They added that the plaintiff had changed her name, the clear implication being that she was trying to conceal something. The circumstances of the plaintiff's dismissal from the Shelter have already been mentioned. Fundamentally, the reasons lay in a difference of attitude between her and the majority of the Management Committee as to the conduct of the Shelter. The plaintiff had simply changed her name to her maiden name after she and her husband had divorced.
(4) At par 565, Ms Anderson, in a gratuitous and unresponsive answer to a question referred to the time taken by the plaintiff to study at Flinders University but she did not inform the Select Committee of the fact that the Department had investigated the matter and believed that it had been satisfactorily resolved.
(5) They both referred to the allegations concerning the auditors and the qualified audit of 25 allegedly missing receipts but did not state that the qualified audit had been satisfactorily cleared up with the Department. Mrs Roberts added inaccurately as well as gratuitously, "five auditors tore out their hair and walked away": par 602. That remark was a gross misrepresentation of the true facts. None of these remarks were necessary.
(6) In par 570 Mrs Roberts again gratuitously but falsely stated "auditors went through the records and could not get the facts" and at par 600 she said "five auditors left in despair". In par 591 Ms Anderson wrongly stated that auditors had brought to the attention of the Department some allegations about a petrol allowance. Auditors did not do so.
When combined with the repetition of unsubstantiated allegations notwithstanding the results of the police inquiries, I find these remarks are evidence of malice on their part when preparing the Report. Ms Wighton's evidence to the Select Committee does not contain evidence of malice although it is clear from that evidence that she disliked the plaintiff.
It might be evidence of malice if the defendant includes defamatory matter that is extraneous and not necessary to the fulfilment of the duty to report: Horrocks v Lowe at 151; Bellino v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1996] HCA 47; (1996) 185 CLR 183 per Brennan CJ at 201- 205. The inclusion of the irrelevant material may afford evidence of malice and can destroy the privilege attracting to the relevant parts: see also Adam v Ward at 326 - 327. The test is whether, "in all the circumstances, it can be inferred that the defendant either did not believe it to be true or, though believing it to be true, realised that it had nothing to do with the particular duty or interest on which the privilege was based, but nevertheless seized the opportunity to drag in the irrelevant defamatory matter to vent his personal spite, or for some other improper motive": Horrocks v Lowe at 151. Lord Diplock added that here, too, judges and juries should be slow to draw the inference. The question to be determined is not whether the Review Committee travelled outside its Terms of Reference, when including in the section in the Report dealing with Christies Beach and the recommendation to withdraw funding, but whether it was necessary to include the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report. The Review Committee asserted that their purpose for including the allegations was to inform Dr Cornwall about them. But in their evidence, they said that they had grounds for the recommendation to withdraw funding without having to rely on the unsubstantiated allegations. Furthermore, the Review Committee had already informed him of the allegations in a document which he had seen on 4 May 1987. It is not clear why it was necessary to give such prominence to the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report or why it was necessary to publish them at all. I have already referred to Dr Cornwall's intention in doing so. The Review Committee included the allegations in the Report on Dr Cornwall's direction. The question in the case of the Review Committee is why so much weight was attached to them and why they received so much prominence in the Report. However, it is difficult to rely on this ground as constituting malice because, at the end of the day, the unsubstantiated allegations were included at the direction of Dr Cornwall. I therefore do not rely on it.
For these reasons, I find that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson were guilty of malice with the consequence that the qualified privilege of the Report is lost in their case. The defendants, Ms Blake, Ms Johnson and Ms King, were not guilty of malice.
As this report was the product of the work of a committee, it is necessary to examine whether all members of the committee and Ms Anderson are liable as joint tortfeasors. Another question is whether the Review Committee is vicariously liable for the malice of Ms Anderson.
I deal first with the question whether the members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson are liable as joint tortfeasors. In England it has been held that, where a report published by a committee contains defamatory material and qualified privilege is defeated by malice, only those members who were actuated by malice are liable: Egger v Viscount Chelmsford [1965] 1 QB 248. In other words, the innocent members of the committee are not infected with the malice of the others. However, the position has not been conclusively resolved in Australia. In Webb v Bloch, it was held that all of the members of a committee were liable where malice existed only in a solicitor who had written a report and another member of the committee. The reasoning of Isaacs J in that case (at 363) may be based on the vicarious liability of the committee for the solicitor rather than joint liability of the committee members. In that decision, Knox CJ and Isaacs J applied Smith v Streatfield [1913] 3 KB 764, which was later overruled in Egger v Viscount Chelmsford. Later, in Jackson v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd [1966] 2 NSWR 775 at 782, Smith v Streatfield was said to be good law in Australia in light of the decision in Webb v Bloch. In Dougherty v Chandler [1946] NSWStRp 13; (1946) 46 SR(NSW) 370 at 375 - 376, Jordan CJ treated Webb v Bloch as an instance of vicarious liability, preferring the view that the plaintiff will fail against any defendant against whom "he is unable to sheet home express malice", a view which Brennan J also expressed in Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd [1994] HCA 45; (1994) 182 CLR 211 at 254. I think that the preferable view is that innocent members of a committee are not infected with the malice of others. Thus, if any member of the Review Committee is not guilty of malice, she will not be liable because malice has been established in another.
I turn to the question whether the members of the Review Committee are vicariously liable for the malice of Ms Anderson. For the reasons already given, Ms Anderson is plainly guilty of malice. The malice of a servant or agent may defeat the defence of qualified privilege of his or her principal where the servant or agent has published the defamatory material in the course of his or her employment. Was Ms Anderson either the servant or agent of the Review Committee?
Ms Anderson was appointed as a paid consultant to the Committee by Dr Cornwall as Minister acting on the recommendation of the Department. She was paid for her services by the South Australian Government and the Commonwealth Government contributed to that payment. She was neither engaged by nor paid by the Review Committee or any of its members. She was, however, engaged to assist the Review Committee in its work. Although she was not paid by the Review Committee, Ms Anderson was its agent. The Committee relied on her. When discharging her task to assist the Committee, one of her duties was to gather facts and fairly report the position. For its part, the Review Committee had the responsibility of seeing that she went about her work correctly. Ms Anderson's malice occurred in the course of her engagement. I think that the Review Committee is vicariously liable for malice on her part.
However, it is unnecessary to resolve these issues since the State of South Australia has agreed to indemnify the Review Committee defendants.
The plaintiff claims damages for defamation against the television stations operated respectively by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation ("the ABC") and Television Broadcasters Limited ("TVB"). On 12 August, 1987 both stations broadcast programs in which Mrs Roberts spoke about the Report so far as it related to the Christies Beach Shelter. The ABC program was called The 7.30 Report. The TVB program was called State Affair. The plaintiff alleges that she was defamed in the course of both programs. She seeks damages not only from each of the operators of the two television stations but also from Mrs Roberts for the loss and damage she suffered. I deal first with the claim against the television stations.
The television stations both admit the broadcast but deny liability on a number of grounds. The grounds of their respective defences are essentially the same, save that the ABC also pleaded justification of some of the defamatory imputations alleged by the plaintiff. The grounds which are common to both defences are:
1. that neither the imputations pleaded nor any other imputations defamatory to the plaintiff were made in the program when viewed as a whole;
2. the program did not identify the plaintiff as the subject of the alleged defamation;
3. the program was a fair and accurate report of the Report which had been tabled in the Legislative Council and, therefore, attracted the defence of qualified privilege under s 7 of the Wrongs Act, or at common law;
4. the words complained of were fair comment on a matter of a public interest;
5. the program constituted communication on a political and governmental matter and thereby attracted the defence of qualified privilege identified in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520;
6. even if the program was defamatory to the plaintiff, it did not cause the loss of which the plaintiff complains.
As the content and style of the two programs were not the same, it is necessary to deal separately with each program. I will examine each defence relied on. I will deal with the issue of causation later when examining the plaintiff's claim for damages. I deal first with the ABC program The 7.30 Report.
The 7.30 Report is and was in 1987 a well-known current affairs program. As a general rule, it is a program lasting one half hour which purports to examine in that time several current events which are perceived to be newsworthy. The program on 12 August included a segment concerning the Review Committee's Report. It was introduced by Ms Dale Sinclair, an employee of the ABC. It took the form of an exchange of questions and answers. The questions were asked by an interviewer, Ms Jacqueline Wilcox, another employee of the ABC. Questions were put respectively to Mrs Roberts and Ms McSkimming. The questions and answers were not asked while Mrs Roberts and Ms McSkimming were both present at the same time. Earlier that day, the ABC had conducted separate interviews with Mrs Roberts and with Ms McSkimming and had videotaped both. The videotape recordings of the interviews were edited to provide the question and answer format. The program was, in effect, a "scissor and paste" of portions of the interviews made earlier and recorded on videotape.
The following is the transcript of the whole of that portion of The 7.30 Report which dealt with the Christies Beach Shelter. It was introduced by Ms Sinclair. The person named as "Interviewer" is Ms Jacqueline Wilcox. The words of which the plaintiff complains are italicised.
DALE SINCLAIR: Well, there are twelve women's shelter in South Australia but following a review of their administration and management the Christies Beach Women's Shelter is to be closed. Investigations revealed inadequate financial records and there have been accusations that some staff have indulged in sexual and physical harassment of women seeking shelter. Today Jacqueline Wilcox spoke to Judith Roberts who headed the investigation and Helen McSkimming, the Christies Beach Shelter's Acting Administrator.
INTERVIEWER: The five women who run the shelter say they are numbed by the allegations which have seen them facing investigations by the Police and the Department for Community Welfare. They say they've been facing investigations by the Police and the Department for Community Welfare. They say they've been punished for defending women's rights but Judith Roberts says that's just not the case.
ROBERTS: Christies Beach Women's Shelter has a long history of not appropriately managing their funds in being publicly accountable for the funds that they're disbursing. They haven't been prepared to co-operate with the Department of Community Welfare on a number of issues, and they've not been prepared to sign the agreement with the Department and the Federal Department of Community Services for the accountability of their funds that they receive.
INTERVIEWER: When you say that they weren't prepared to be accountable, does that mean that they wouldn't provide receipts?
ROBERTS: Yes, in one instance we had an auditor say that he had 25 receipts missing and couldn't properly account for the moneys that had been disbursed during that period of time.
McSKIMMING: We have always adequately supplied the Department for Community Welfare with whatever documentation they've required. We haven't been told when these are supposed to have occurred or what was done about them at the time but we have very little information about the whole procedure.
INTERVIEWER: What sort of money are we talking about?
ROBERTS: Well we've had deficit funding in tens of thousands of dollars and when you're looking a running a shelter its probably about $200,000 a year that is needed to provide a base grade service and so we're talking about large amounts of public moneys.
INTERVIEWER: There's been mention that some of the clients of that shelter have been physically and sexually harassed. What does that mean, what happened to them?
ROBERTS: Well we've in the course of our review talked to clients who are present, former clients we've talked to current staff members, previous staff members, we've talked to the Management Committee that is there at present and members of previous Management Committees and at one stage an entire Management Committee resigned from that women's shelter. So we've talked very widely in the community and there have been various allegations made. They're being followed up by the Police.
INTERVIEWER: It does seem quite horrific doesn't it that women and children were going to a women's shelter for safety and when they were there there were allegations now that they were being physically and sexually abused.
ROBERTS: Yes. You would understand of course that women who are in crisis are at their most vulnerable. They're the people in our community who deserve the protection of well run government and non government services.
McSKIMMING: We here offer a very professional service and we have hundreds and hundreds of women who've been through the shelter who are totally satisfied with the service we offer and who at this moment are out in the community absolutely devastated at this news.
INTERVIEWER: The allegations against you though are quite varied, they deal with financial mismanagement, fraud, people collecting salaries when they're not here, sexual assault and harassment. Now it seems to be quite a lot for someone to make up.
McSKIMMING: I've really, we have very little information about where it has all come from so I'm really not in a position to comment. The women who have been through this shelter will not believe a word of it. We've had enormous communication this morning and last night from ex-residents who are just absolutely shocked.
INTERVIEWER: Regardless of where the truth lies the allegations have taken their toll with the administrator of the shelter Dawn Rowan finding the stress just too much.
McSKIMMING: Accumulated stress as part of the job. The high level of commitment and dedication that she was putting into the job just finally was too much for her to cope with.
The plaintiff not only alleges that she was defamed by the words which have been italicised but also alleges that she was identified as one of the persons to whom the defamatory statements referred.
Although the plaintiff does not, in her Statement of Claim, complain of the words preceding "women who are in crisis are at their most vulnerable", those words like all of the other words must be read in context. They, like other statements in this program, affirmed the charge of sexual abuse of women in the Shelter.
The plaintiff alleges that according to their natural and ordinary usage, the words complained of meant and were understood to mean that the staff of the Shelter and the plaintiff as a member of the management committee and an employee of the Shelter were
(d) not adequately servicing the needs of the clients of the Shelter;
(e) guilty of neglect and negligence in the running of the Shelter and in her employment in the Shelter;
(f) guilty of dishonest and dishonourable conduct; and
The words which were published were plainly defamatory. The gist of the allegations is inadequate financial records, inappropriate management of funding, a failure to account for funds for a long time, a lack of financial accountability, and sexual and physical harassment of women seeking refuge at the Shelter. The imputation of inappropriate management of funding implies a failure to account for the funds on a large scale. The lack of financial management is emphasised and given a more sinister meaning by references to fraud and "people collecting salaries when they're not there".
The allegations of sexual and physical harassment are emphasised by repeated questions on that topic with the interpolation of the epithet "horrific" when for the second time the interviewer raises the topic. Even further emphasis is given to those allegations by Mrs Roberts' remarks about the Review Committee speaking widely in the community and asserting that the allegations were being investigated by the police. The reference to speaking widely in the community implies that the allegations are widespread. All the allegations are given particular emphasis by the fact that the viewer has been informed that the Shelter will be closed.
I find that the impression created on the ordinary, reasonable viewer of the broadcast by the whole of this program was that there were very serious problems both with the financial position of the Shelter and the manner in which women were treated at the Shelter. I find that the statements made in this program contained all of the defamatory imputations alleged by the plaintiff concerning the management committee and staff of the Christies Beach Shelter. The next question is whether the plaintiff was identified by those defamatory remarks.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the words complained of identified her as a subject of the defamatory imputations. I refer to the discussion of the legal principles earlier in these reasons.
The plaintiff was not identified by name in the program until the very end. The interviewer then identified her not only by name, but also as the administrator of the Shelter. In my view, there can be no doubt that the manner in which she was named in the program clearly identified her as the administrator and as one of the persons the subject of the defamatory remarks. The ordinary and reasonable viewer would conclude that the administrator is the person responsible for the management of the Shelter, the handling of its funds, and the provision of assistance to women who seek refuge at the Shelter. Because the allegations referred to all those who worked at the Shelter or were associated with its management, the viewer would have identified her with the allegations for that reason also and believed that they related to her as well as to others associated with the Shelter.
Mr Gretsas, counsel for the ABC, contended that three features of the program had the effect of negating any identification of the plaintiff as one of the defamed persons. Those three features were
1. that the person being interviewed was Ms McSkimming as acting administrator;
3. the fact that the videotape which accompanied the words first used by the interviewer "the five women who run the Shelter say they are numbed by the allegations" did not show the plaintiff.
For the reasons which I follow, I reject the submission.
The fact that Ms McSkimming is described as the acting administrator does not negate the identification of the plaintiff as one of the persons defamed. The words at the end of the broadcast identifying the plaintiff as administrator are quite clear and unequivocal. The ordinary viewer would have no difficulty in identifying the plaintiff as one of the persons who are the subject of the remarks. That viewer may have also believed that Ms McSkimming was another person who was the subject of the remarks, particularly as the interviewer had begun by referring to the women who run the Shelter being numbed by the remarks. That does not detract from the fact that the plaintiff was especially identified as the administrator of the Shelter.
The next feature relied on by Mr Gretsas is the concluding words used by Ms McSkimming. He relies on her statement that the plaintiff was on worker's compensation because of the accumulated stress and her remarks "the high level of commitment and dedication that she was putting into the job just finally was too much for her to cope with". Far from distracting from identification of the plaintiff as one of the persons defamed, those words serve to reinforce the identification of the plaintiff. The ordinary and reasonable viewer would conclude that one of the causes of the plaintiff's stress was the allegations and the fact that the Shelter was being investigated. The fact that Ms McSkimming speaks of a high level of commitment and dedication did not diminish the identification. The plain fact is that Ms Wilcox as interviewer has introduced the plaintiff's name and clearly identified her as the administrator and thus associated her with the allegations.
The third feature on which Mr Gretsas relies must also be dismissed. The film which accompanied the introductory words of Ms Wilcox referring to the five women, shows the five women in a garden setting. It is correct that those women do not include the plaintiff. However, the camera does not linger on that group. Only a very careful and astute person would detect whether the plaintiff was one of the women. It does not detract from the fact that the plaintiff was identified not only by name but also as administrator.
In addition to all of the above reasons, the plaintiff would have been identified by a number of viewers even if she had not been mentioned by name. I repeat what has been said earlier in these reasons as to the identification of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was closely identified with the Shelter. She had established a very high public profile with both the Department and Government as well as in other shelters and in the general community. It was well-known that she was the administrator of the Christies Beach Shelter. It was widely known that she was one of those providing counselling. In short, she was the public face of the Shelter. All of the allegations as to financial mismanagement and mistreatment of women plainly pointed to all associated with the operations of the Shelter and so pointed to her and in addition to a failure by her as administrator to manage the Shelter appropriately.
For all of these reasons, I have no hesitation in finding the plaintiff was identified as one of the persons defamed in this program.
I turn to examine each of the specific defences on which the ABC relies. The first is the qualified privilege provided by the common law and by s 7 of the Wrongs Act 1936 for a fair and accurate report. At common law, it is a defence if the publication is a fair and accurate report of certain kinds of proceedings which include proceedings of either House of Parliament: Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd [1994] HCA 45; (1994) 182 CLR 211 per Brennan J at 247 and per McHugh J at 268. I assume that the common law privilege survives notwithstanding the enactment of s 7. The relevant provisions of s 7 provide:
"(1) A fair and accurate report published by newspaper, radio or television of the proceedings of-
(b) (except where neither the public nor any reporter is admitted) of any meeting of a municipal or district council, school board of advice, board of health, board or local authority formed or constituted under the provisions of any Act of Parliament, or of any committee appointed by any of the abovementioned bodies; or
(c) a meeting of any royal commission, select committee of either House of Parliament; or
(d) a meeting of shareholders in any incorporated company,
and the publication by newspaper, radio or television at the request of any Government office or department, Minister of the Crown, or Commissioner of Police, of any notice or report issued by it or him for the information of the public, shall be privileged unless it is proved that the report or publication was published or made maliciously:"
I have omitted the provisos which follow. The only relevant portion of the provisos is paragraph (c) which preserves the common law principles of qualified privilege for fair comment. The terms of sub-section (2) have no applicability to the issues in this action.
The ABC contends that the defence of fair and accurate report is available because The 7.30 Report was repeating the statements and findings made by the Review Committee in its Report which had been tabled by Dr Cornwall in the Legislative Council on 11 August, the day before the broadcast. This defence fails at the outset. The defence is available only if the publication is a report of the proceedings in the Parliament. The program did not profess to be a report of proceedings in the House. Instead, it was intended to be and was in fact a series of assertions and counter-assertions prompted by the tabling of the Report the day before. There was no reference at all to the proceedings in the Legislative Council.
The only part of the program which might constitute a fair report within the meaning of this defence were the introductory words spoken by Ms Sinclair. I do not think they constitute a fair and accurate report. They simply refer to the existence of the Report and introduce the program. Even if it is assumed that they are a fair report, the rest of the program does not on any view constitute a report. Instead, it picks out some of the allegations and focuses upon them in the question and answers. The program does not pretend to be a report, but an opportunity to ask questions of a representative of the Review Committee and to obtain a response from a representative of the Shelter. In short, while the introductory words might fall within s 7, the rest of the program does not. It would be a distortion of the principles relating to the qualified privilege of a fair report to cause those introductory words to qualify the rest of the program. Notwithstanding that the opening words might constitute a fair report, the sting of the defamation is in the rest of the program. In other words, the exclusion of the introductory remarks does not render the program any less defamatory.
For all of these reasons, this ground of defence fails both at common law and under s 7 of the Wrongs Act.
The ABC then pleaded that, to the extent that the words complained of concerned the plaintiff and were defamatory of her, they were fair comment on a matter of public interest. The whole of the report, including that section which dealt with Christies Beach, raised issues concerning the management, administration, and funding of women's shelters. This was clearly a matter of public interest involving, as it did, issues of government funding. However, for the reasons which follow, the words complained of did not constitute fair comment.
A comment is an expression of opinion on facts and so the defence of fair comment applies only to comment made upon facts stated or referred to in the publication complained of: Rocca v Manhire (1992) 57 SASR 224 per King CJ at 229. Furthermore, for the defence of fair comment to succeed, it must be indicated with reasonable clearness by the words themselves, taking them in context and the circumstances in which they were published, that they purport to be comment and not statements of fact: Goldsborough v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1934] NSWStRp 43; (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 524 per Jordan CJ at 531. Whatever might be said about this defence, it fails in this case on the ground that the defamatory statements are not comment.
An examination of the statements which the ABC says are fair comment shows that, with one possible exception, none constitute comment. The opening remarks of Ms Sinclair merely introduce the topic by referring to the review and, the fact that the Christies Beach Shelter is to be closed and the reasons for its closing. The other statements are either answers by Mrs Roberts to the interviewer's questions or questions from the interviewer, sometimes prefaced by a reference to the allegations in the Report. In her answer about the size of deficits Mrs Roberts adds that "we're talking about large amounts of public moneys." But in the context of her answer that remark does not appear to be comment but a statement of fact by her as the person in charge of the review as to the level of deficits. At best, it stated a bare inference but, as it stated that inference without the facts on which it was based, it was an allegation of fact: Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 at 356-357. Only one of the interviewer's questions might be said to constitute comment. It is the last of the italicised remarks. Ms Wilcox, the interviewer, is summarising the allegations. She refers, among other things, to "fraud" and to "people collecting salaries when they're not there". The Report did not expressly allege either fraud or that persons were improperly paid. Furthermore, the program had failed to state that the allegations were unsubstantiated. For that reason those remarks do not, I think, constitute fair comment on some aspects of the Report. However, even if I had reached the contrary conclusion, these words do not colour the rest of the program and, in particular, the defamatory statements of which the plaintiff complains. In addition, it is unrealistic in a broadcast of this kind which is essentially assertion and counter-assertion about allegations concerning the Shelter to plead that it constitutes fair comment. There will be similar programs where comment will be made from time to time but this was not one of them.
For these reasons, this defence fails on the grounds that the defamatory remarks did not, on any view, constitute comment.
The ABC then contended that the content of the program concerned government and political matters and thereby fell within the qualified privilege enunciated by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520. That case concerned the program Four Corners. At the time of the broadcast, Mr Lange was Prime Minister of New Zealand. Mr Lange alleged that the program conveyed the imputation that he was guilty of abuse of office and was unfit to hold public office. The High Court extended the content of qualified privilege at common law to include communications upon government and political matters. In doing so, it qualified views which had earlier been expressed in Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd [1994] HCA 46; (1994) 182 CLR 104 and in Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd [1994] HCA 45; (1994) 182 CLR 211. The decision in Lange has not been followed in the United Kingdom: Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [1999] UKHL 45; (1999) 4 All ER 609. However, a version of the defence exists in New Zealand: Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424. I am, of course, bound to apply the principles enunciated in Lange. The Court also held that qualified privilege was available only if the defendant had acted reasonably and without malice. I will examine those issues in a moment.
The first question is whether the ABC program constituted a communication on a government or political matter. In Lange (at 571), the expression "government and political matters" was held to include discussion of government or politics at the federal level as well as discussion of those matters at the state or territory level and at local government level, whether or not the discussion bears on matters at a federal level. A little earlier (at 570 - 571), the Court had endorsed the following remarks of McHugh J in Stephens at 264 in which His Honour had identified the varying conditions of society which required a broadening of the common law rules of qualified privilege:
"In the last decade of the twentieth century, the quality of life and the freedom of the ordinary individual in Australia are highly dependent on the exercise of functions and powers vested in public representatives and officials by a vast legal and bureaucratic apparatus funded by public moneys. How, when, why and where those functions and powers are or are not exercised are matters that are of real and legitimate interest to every member of the community. Information concerning the exercise of those functions and powers is of vital concern to the community. So is the performance of the public representatives and officials who are invested with them. It follows in my opinion that the general public has a legitimate interest in receiving information concerning matters relevant to the exercise of public functions and powers vested in public representatives and officials. Moreover, a narrow view should not be taken of the matters about which the general public has an interest in receiving information. With the increasing integration of the social, economic and political life of Australia, it is difficult to contend that the exercise or failure to exercise public functions or powers at any particular level of government or administration, or in any part of the country, is not of relevant interest to the public of Australia generally."
It is apparent, therefore, that a liberal construction is intended for the expression "government and political matters".
Although Lange refers to communications on government and political matters, it is necessary to determine what falls under that rubric. At the very least, it includes what in Theophanous Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ called "political discussion" which they defined in these terms (at 124):
"For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that "political discussion" includes discussion of the conduct, policies or fitness for office of government, political parties, public bodies, public officers and those seeking public office. The concept also includes discussion of the political views and public conduct of persons who are engaged in the activities that have become the subject of political debate, e.g., trade union leaders, Aboriginal political leaders, political and economic commentators. Indeed, in our view, the concept is not exhausted by political publications and addresses which are calculated to influence choices. Barendt states that:
"'political speech' refers to all speech relevant to the development of public opinion on the whole range of issues which an intelligent citizen should think about."
It was this idea which Mason C.J. endeavoured to capture when, in Australian Capital Television, he referred to "public affairs" as a subject protected by the freedom." (Footnotes omitted).
Later in their reasons in Theophanous (at 134), when examining the criteria to determine whether publication of political matter is not actionable, their Honours considered whether the test in New York Times Co v Sullivan [1964] USSC 40; (1964) 376 US 254 should be adopted in Australia. In rejecting it, they expressed the preliminary view that qualified privilege did not extend to government employees who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of public issues or to public figures who do not hold official or government positions. I understand those remarks to qualify that part of the definition of "political discussion" which included the public conduct of persons who have become the subject of political debate. The remarks of Deane J at 183-184 and his reference to holders of high government office suggest that His Honour held a like view.
With that background I consider whether The 7.30 Report constituted a communication on a government and political matter. Little assistance is to be gained by listing cases in which it has been held that a publication is a communication on a government or political matter and those where it was not. However, as Steytler J noted in Heytesbury Holdings Pty Ltd v City of Subiaco (1998) 19 WAR 440 at 458, the mere fact that a statement is published in the context of discussion about "government and political matters" will not necessarily give it that character. Much might depend upon the circumstances. Two instances illustrate the caution which must be exercised.
The first is Baltinos v Australian Consolidated Press (unreported, Supreme Court NSW, 21 July 1985), where Sully J held that an article tainting the plaintiff, albeit written in the context of a discussion about immigration-related issues, was a "wide ranging and sensational personal and professional denigration of the plaintiff" rather than a matter of political discussion. The plaintiff was not the holder of a political office relating to immigration.
The second is Heytesbury which concerned a publication by the City of Subiaco of a press release which defamed the plaintiff Heytesbury Holdings Pty Ltd. Under the heading "Heytesbury - not good citizen" the press release set out allegations by the Council concerning unpaid rent and rates. Steytler J (at 458) held that the press release was not a communication on a government or political matter but instead "amounted to no more than gratuitous and angry comments by the City and its Mayor disparaging the conduct of a company believed by it to be one of its tenants and ratepayers in the course of a dispute between it and that company with respect to its entitlement to the payment of rent and rates". It is plainly necessary to examine carefully the context of the communication to determine whether it truly constitutes a communication on a government and political matter.
The reasoning in Lange did not equate government and political matters with matters of public interest. The issues concerning the Christies Beach Shelter and the plaintiff might be classified as matters of public interest. However, the question to be determined is whether they constitute government and political matters. The factors which might put it in the class of government and political matter are that the Shelter was in receipt of government funding (both Commonwealth and State), that the Report raised questions as to the propriety with which those funds had been spent, that the Report had been tabled in the State Parliament, and that the funding of women's shelters had been the subject of political debate for at least fifteen months before the Report was published. However, if those factors are sufficient to render the program a communication on a government and political matter, then like programs dealing with allegations of financial and sexual misconduct concerning members of the board of either a public or private school, a hospital or arts organisation funded by government or the members of the staff a school, a public or private hospital or arts organisation are also government and political matters. Allegations of either financial or sexual misconduct are clearly a matter of public interest but they are not in themselves government or political matters. The fact that the particular public or private school, hospital or arts organization is in receipt of government funding does not elevate the allegations to a government or political matter. It remains an allegation of financial or sexual misconduct.
In this case, I rely on the persuasive remarks of Mason CJ, Gaudron and Toohey JJ in Theophanous (at 134) to the effect that the qualified privilege does not extend to persons who do not hold official or government positions. The plaintiff did not hold an official or government position. She was simply the administrator of quite a small organisation of about five persons who ran a women's shelter. The program did not, therefore, constitute a communication concerning government and political matters. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not a person whose conduct had become the subject of political debate. The plaintiff had certainly been active in political debate in 1986 and in the preceding years. But the subject of the debate was governmental policy with respect to funding for women's shelters, not her conduct. The remarks in the Report concerning the Christies Beach Shelter related to the conduct of its staff and management committee. They did not relate to women's issues or governmental policy. The contrast with Lange could not be more striking. Mr Lange was the Prime Minister of New Zealand. The Four Corners programme concerned the issue whether he was fit to hold that office. Although that part of the Report which related to the Christies Beach Shelter concerned the conduct of its staff and their fitness to work in the shelter, it was dealing with a small organization which was not a government institution and had a staff of only five. The allegations concerned private individuals associated with that shelter, not individuals holding high office who were employed in the public sector. I do not think that the High Court intended that government and political matters should extend to private individuals involved in a small organization of this kind. If I may borrow and invert the remarks in Lange at 568, to do so would impair the legitimate end of protection of personal reputation while unnecessarily and unreasonably extending the freedom of communication about government and political matters.
For these reasons, this segment in The 7.30 Report was not a communication on a government and political matter.
The qualified privilege is only available if the publisher of the defamation proves that his conduct was reasonable: Lange at 574. The privilege will also be defeated if the plaintiff proves malice in the sense that the publication was not made for the purpose of communicating government or political information or ideas, but for some improper purpose: Lange at 574. Given the above conclusion it is not necessary to consider whether the ABC acted reasonably or with malice when broadcasting the 7.30 Report. Lest others take a different view on the question whether the segment of the program was a communication on a government or political matter, I examine whether the ABC acted reasonably or with malice.
The question whether the publisher acted reasonably will, of course, depend on the facts of each case. However, in Lange (at 574), the Court provided some guidance as to the matters to be established. It said:
"Whether the making of a publication was reasonable must depend upon all the circumstances of the case. But, as a general rule, a defendant's conduct in publishing material giving rise to a defamatory imputation will not be reasonable unless the defendant had reasonable grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took proper steps, so far as they were reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the material and did not believe the imputation to be untrue. Furthermore, the defendant's conduct will not be reasonable unless the defendant has sought a response from the person defamed and published the response made (if any) except in cases where the seeking or publication of a response was not practicable or it was unnecessary to give the plaintiff an opportunity to respond (Stephen's Case [1994] HCA 45; (1994) 182 CLR 211 at 252-253)."
The television stations and Mrs Roberts fastened on that passage as if it were the terms of a statute. I do not understand that the Court intended such an approach. It had emphasised that each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances, at the same time stating what, as a general rule, constitutes reasonable conduct.
The ABC relied on the fact that the allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter had been made by a committee charged with the task of examining the administration of women's shelters and that the committee had included them in a report which had been tabled in the Legislative Council. It must be acknowledged that the allegations were of a kind which it was not possible for the ABC to verify. The viewer would have been aware that the program was broadcast shortly after the publication of the Committee's Report. The technique of speaking to a representative of the Review Committee and representative of the Shelter provided an opportunity for the Shelter to comment. Subject to what is said in the next paragraph but one, it also avoided any endorsement of the allegations by the ABC. The two persons who were called upon to comment were appropriate persons. One was the head of the Review Committee, the other was the acting administrator of the Shelter. The fact that the ABC did not seek any comment from the plaintiff is, I think, of no consequence. As the broadcast referred to the allegations against the staff of the Shelter, it was sufficient to seek a response from Ms McSkimming as the acting administrator. I do not think that the plaintiff can fairly complain that she was not asked to respond as she was then on sick leave.
I have also considered whether the ABC sought to present the allegations in a sensational light. Subject to the remarks in the next paragraph, I do not think it did. Allegations of physical and sexual misconduct frequently receive prominent, if not racy, treatment in the media. In this case, the broadcast covered both the sexual and physical misconduct and other allegations and, although there is a degree of emphasis upon the physical and sexual misconduct, I do not think that it was presented in a sensational light. The above factors point to the conclusion that the ABC had acted reasonably.
However, there are two other features of the program which suggest the contrary. The first stems from the fact that there was an emphasis in the broadcast on the allegations which were listed as unsubstantiated allegations in the Report. Ms Sinclair introduced the program by referring to the unsubstantiated allegations concerning inadequate financial records and sexual and physical misconduct. However, she did not describe them as unsubstantiated allegations. Instead, she called them "accusations". It would not be clear to the viewer whether the accusations had substance or not. As the program progressed, the impression was created that the accusations had substance, particularly in the section which begins with Ms Wilcox as interviewer saying:
"There has been mention that some of the clients of that Shelter have been physically and sexually harassed. What does that mean? What happened to them?".
The question clearly implies that the physical and sexual harassment had occurred. The exchange with Mrs Roberts which follows did nothing to suggest otherwise. Mrs Roberts speaks of those to whom she had spoken about the allegations. She then says that they are being "followed up by the police". That expression is capable of implying either investigation or prosecution or both. However, the clear implication from Mrs Roberts' next remarks is that the women had in fact been physically and sexually abused. Mr Gretsas, counsel for the ABC, referred in the course of his submissions to Kay v Cunningham (unreported, 8 September 1995, Judgment No. S5242 at p 8) and stressed that a television broadcast provides the viewer with a limited and fleeting opportunity to hear the words used and that the viewer does not have the opportunity to re-read and analyse content in the same way as is available when reading a newspaper: see also Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1985) 64 ACTR 1, 40. However, that reasoning does not assist him. It is the fleeting nature of a television broadcast that would cause the reasonable and sensible viewer to believe that the allegations had substance. All of this could have been avoided by the ABC repeating what had clearly been stated in the Report, namely, that the allegations were unsubstantiated. But the ABC did not treat the program in that way. When viewed as a whole, the program proceeded on the footing that the allegations had substance. The ABC had complete control of the content of the program. It had edited the separate videotapes. I do not think that its conduct was reasonable.
There is a related factor. The introductory remarks implied that the allegations or accusations had resulted from the review. However, it is quite clear from the Report that they had not. The Report clearly stated that the unsubstantiated allegations had been made to the Department. The ABC had had the Report for at least 24 hours. It was shown in its news program the night before. The implication that the review had uncovered these matters gave the allegations a little more weight and substance. This added to the unreasonableness of the ABC's conduct.
The second factor which suggests that the ABC did not act reasonably stems from the manner in which the program was presented. The 7.30 Report did not constitute an examination of the issues concerning Christies Beach. Instead, it was in effect, an opportunity for Mrs Roberts to repeat what had been said in the Report while Ms McSkimming, as a representative of the Shelter, could do little more than deny the allegations, a task made the more difficult by the vague manner in which the allegations were couched and the fact that they were quite devoid of particularity. It was essentially a series of assertions and counter-assertions tantamount to a series of accusations and denials. Ms McSkimming could do no more than deny the allegations and seek to add whatever she could by way of explanation. The time allowed by the ABC for the program was quite short, so short that it allowed no sufficient time for any reasonable analysis of issues and, in particular, no proper opportunity for Ms McSkimming to respond in an appropriate way. The ABC cannot gain any assistance from the short duration of the program since the duration was of its own choosing. Mr Gretsas described the program as a debate. He misuses the word. While it was in one sense an exchange between Mrs Roberts and Ms McSkimming, it was in truth an edited program put together by the ABC. It was not an argument or discussion in the usual manner of debate. Furthermore, the technique of a so-called debate between protagonists provides little or no opportunity for information to be provided to the public. In truth, all that occurred on this occasion was that allegations which had been broadcast on the ABC news program at 7.00 pm on 11 August were repeated. Those allegations had been published in The Advertiser on the morning of 12 August and Ms McSkimming had then denied them. The 7.30 Report provided no fresh information to the viewers of the ABC other than that the Shelter denied the allegations. It was not, in all the circumstances, reasonable for the ABC to put the allegations to Ms McSkimming in this way.
The ABC submitted that, because it had provided an opportunity for Ms McSkimming to respond on behalf of the shelter, it had complied with the test of reasonableness in Lange so that its conduct was reasonable. Although in Lange the High Court had said that, as a general rule, one requirement which must be established to prove reasonableness of conduct is that the defendant had sought a response from the person defamed. I do not understand those remarks to constitute a general prescription for this kind of broadcast. It is extremely difficult for the person responding to allegations of this kind to provide a satisfactory or convincing answer. There is a real potential for ambush. In this case, the allegations were vague and lacking in particularity. Many were quite old. Thus Ms McSkimming was driven to giving general answers. The broadcast therefore tends to be more in the nature of theatre, comprising a series of accusations and denials, than the provision of news or information. It tends to give the defamer a free kick at the defamed. In this particular case, it gave Mrs Roberts an opportunity to repeat the defamation, an opportunity which she fully exploited. There will be incidences when this type of broadcast is appropriate but it was not in this case.
For all these reasons I do not think that the conduct of the ABC in presenting this broadcast was reasonable.
Given the finding just made, it is strictly speaking unnecessary to deal with malice. I shortly state my conclusions. The plaintiff proved that Ms Jacqueline Wilcox was the daughter of Ms Annette Wilcox, who had been the administrator of a women's shelter called "Naomi Women's Shelter". The Shelter did not exist in 1986. Its funding had been withdrawn in early 1982. Other women's shelters, including the Christies Beach Shelter, had supported that decision. In addition, in January 1982, WSAC had resolved to exclude the Naomi Shelter from its meetings. The plaintiff had seconded the motion. The resolution had been sent to the Naomi Shelter. The evidence was that Ms Jacqueline Wilcox had tried to run the Shelter in place of her mother after funding had been withdrawn, but without success. There was a suggestion that Ms Wilcox had been guilty of malice by introducing the plaintiff's name into the program. Certainly, there was no need for Ms Wilcox to mention the plaintiff by name. However, there was no evidence which indicated why Ms Wilcox should have borne any ill-will towards Ms Rowan as distinct from any of the other members of WSAC in 1982. I do not think there is evidence that Ms Wilcox was actuated by malice. If the program was in fact a communication on a government or political matter, more must be established to prove malice, namely, that it must be proved that the publication was made, not for the purpose of communicating government or political information or ideas, but for some improper purpose: Lange (supra) at 574. There was no evidence that the ABC had any improper purpose in broadcasting this program.
The ABC also pleaded justification. It pleaded that to the extent that the words complained of are defamatory and concerned the plaintiff, they were true in substance and in fact. The particulars of justification are almost identical with those pleaded by the Review Committee. All that is missing are the particulars in paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (u) - (y) inclusive, (aa) and (bb) of the particulars given by the Review Committee. To all intents and purposes, the ABC relies on the same grounds as the Review Committee defendants to establish the truth of the defamatory statements. It is unnecessary to repeat what has already been said in these reasons in relation to the Review Committee defendants on the issue of justification. For the same reasons, I find that the ABC has failed to answer the sting of the allegations against the plaintiff. I find that the plea of justification fails and that the defamatory statements are false.
For these reasons, the ABC is guilty of defamation and liable to the plaintiff.
This program was broadcast at 6.30 p.m. on 12 August. The segment concerning the Christies Beach Shelter took the form of an interview conducted by Mr Paul Makin, an employee of TVB, who acted as the anchorman for the program. Also present at the interview were Mrs Roberts and Dr Baum, the chairperson of the management committee of the Shelter. Mr Makin asked questions respectively of Mrs Roberts and Dr Baum. The program went "live to air", that is to say, the interview was broadcast by TVB at the same time as it occurred.
The following is a transcript of the whole of that portion of State Affair which dealt with the Christies Beach Shelter. It was produced by Mr Makin, who is described in the transcript as "Interviewer". It is apparent from the introduction that that segment of the program concerning the Christies Beach Shelter occurred after an earlier segment of the program and advertisements. The statements of which the plaintiff complains are italicised.
INTERVIEWER (to camera): Welcome back. The Christies Beach Women's Shelter will be closed following a decision by the Minister for Community Welfare, John Cornwall, to withdraw funding to the Shelter from the 4th of September. Now, the move was announced yesterday in Parliament following the tabling of this particular report called "Shelters in the Storm" (holding report to camera). Now, it's a review of the management and administration of women's shelters. The report singles out the Christies Beach Shelter with allegations of sexual and physical harassment and intimidation, professional negligence, misappropriation of funds, over spending and inadequate financial records. Well, with me to discuss the allegations and the future of the Christies Beach Shelter are Mrs Judith Roberts, Chairperson of the South Australian Council of Social Services who headed the review committee, and Dr Fran Baum who heads up the management committee for the Christies Beach Shelter. Welcome, ladies, to the program.
INTERVIEWER (to J Roberts): First of all, Mrs Roberts this report is comprehensive. I've read it. There are 13 pages devoted to the Christies Beach Shelter. Every one of those pages is damaging. Just how bad is the situation down there?
ROBERTS: I think we should correct the statement you made earlier and said that we'd singled out Christies Beach. Christies Beach singled itself out. Certainly my review team was commissioned by the Minister in December last year to look at the overall management practices and administrative practices of every shelter in the State. We've done that. We've talked with the present management people at Christies Beach, with prior management committees and an entire management committee at Christies Beach at one time resigned. We've talked with present and previous clients. We've talked with organizations with whom the shelter deals and we've come to some recommendations to the Minister which the Minister accepted and read in the House yesterday.
INTERVIEWER (to J Roberts): Well you've heard what I've just mentioned - all of those allegations. Do you back all of those up?
ROBERTS: We have made a recommendation to the Minister based on fact, the facts that we've found out in our review over a period of looking at the entire process over 5 years, there have ... and we've made the recommendation to the Minister on those facts as they are.
INTERVIEWER (to F Baum): Well they're very very damaging in this particular report. Uh, Dr Baum, I guess, I guess I've got to say for goodness sake what's going on down there?
BAUM: Well, I, I guess our main concern is that as the report says time and time again all the allegations are unsubstantiated and this is the view from the management committee. We are equally as concerned as the review committee that there are these allegations that have been made. At a meeting I had with senior officials from DCW and the Department of Community Services on the 11th of June I was assured that all these allegations had been made at least 2 years ago when the management committee was different, when a number of the staff were different and we are very concerned with the approach to the decision to close the shelter because at the moment the allegations that were made from the period of 2 years ago are being investigated by the police. The police who spoke to me said that they were very surprised that allegations of this nature were not investigated at the time and the Corporate Affairs have investigated all our books which we've openly given to them and they have found nothing out of order with any of those books.
INTERVIEWER (to J Roberts): Mrs Roberts, are the allegations out of date?
ROBERTS: No, the allegations are not out of date otherwise we wouldn't have made the recommendations. I should make the point that we are not pre-judging the issue. We've made our recommendations to the Minister based on fact but there are other unsubstantiated allegations that Dr Baum is talking about that are under the process of investigation both with Corporate Affairs and with the Police Department.
INTERVIEWER (to F Baum): You're saying that all of them are unsubstantiated.
INTERVIEWER (to F Baum): Can I pick you up on the auditors for example ...
INTERVIEWER: ... they say here that auditors are changed often and on one occasion an auditor was obliged to qualify his report with the statement that 25 payments could not be accounted for, no vouchers, receipts and other documentation was presented.
BAUM: Certainly and that was rectified after the auditor pointed that out and that again was in an historical period, its not a contemporary thing. I guess what our concern is that it is an irony that a shelter that's dealing with such sensitive issues as domestic violence seems to be treated in a violent way by the government in that we would really welcome the opportunity to sit down with the officials from DCW and the Federal funders and negotiate this in a proper compromising way instead of this conflict, instead of this sudden decision yesterday that came out of the blue that the shelter is to be defunded ...
INTERVIEWER: (to J Roberts) You're not seeking conflict ...
BAUM: ... it seems an unnecessary approach because the people ... can I just say that the people who are going to suffer are the women and the children of the Christies Beach area obviously, its not, its not any bureaucrats, its not the workers ...
INTERVIEWER: Yeh, but these are, these are very serious allegations.
INTERVIEWER (to J Roberts): Mrs Roberts can I, these allegations of sexual and physical harassment, intimidation. Women who go to shelters are supposed to be getting away from this sort of thing.
INTERVIEWER (to J Roberts): What sort, what sort of thing, like sexual and physical harassment and intimidation. Just spell it out for us.
ROBERTS: I, I don't think it is appropriate for me to do that. I think that is counter productive and would give rise to further conflict in the community and I can assure those women and children who are residents of the southern area that appropriate provisions will be made for them. There will be no women and children who will not be provided for. The Department of Community Welfare has for now many months been looking at this issue and we certainly would want to make every provision and we will do and the Minister has given his commitment. He takes his responsibility for providing protection for women and children in crisis very seriously as does my review committee.
INTERVIEWER: Let's get a bottom line to this interview tonight.
(to J Roberts) You're saying that they're up to date allegations and they're fact.
(to F Baum) You're saying that they're not up to date and they are unsubstantiated.
BAUM: ... and they are unsubstantiated. When I spoke to the, Peter Bicknell who's head of a non-government welfare organization, I asked him for dates and numbers of allegations. He told me there was a maximum of 15, probably 6 allegations and they all happened before I was chair of the management committee which was 2 years ago. So either Peter's go his facts wrong or, or somebody here has.
INTERVIEWER (to J Roberts): Very quickly, very quick, we're running out of time. How can women out there who tonight are watching, they've got children, they've been abused, have confidence in the women's shelter scheme at this moment?
ROBERTS: They can't , of course, indeed, have any confidence in the present provision. They obviously are very worried about that, but you have the assurance of the Minister of Health and Community Services that we, he will provide proper protection for them. He's given that commitment, that's what my review team wants and I'm sure that's what the management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter would want.
INTERVIEWER: Right, thank you very much. Thank you very much for joining us tonight.
INTERVIEWER: You're watching State Affair. We'll be back in, with more of the program in just a moment.
The plaintiff alleges the same defamatory imputations as are alleged against the ABC.
The introduction to the program implies that the allegations as to misconduct are made in the Report by those who participated in the review. The viewer is told that Dr Cornwall has decided to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter and that decision was made following the tabling of the report which alleges sexual, personal and financial misconduct. With one exception, namely, the charge of overspending, all of the allegations which are mentioned are listed as unsubstantiated allegations on page 65 of the Report. Mr Makin as interviewer does not mention that they are unsubstantiated allegations. He simply calls them "allegations". When that is coupled with the information that the Shelter will be closed, the viewer is led to believe from the very outset that there is substance in the allegations. The impression is conveyed that they are not merely allegations but charges of actual misconduct made by those participating in the review. That impression is then reinforced by the first question Mr Makin put to Mrs Roberts when he said that every one of the thirteen pages devoted to Christies Beach is "damaging" and asked "Just how bad is the situation down there?". After Mrs Roberts had emphasised that Christies Beach had singled itself out, Mr Makin asked if Mrs Roberts could back up the allegations. Mrs Roberts then replied that the recommendation to withdraw funding was based on fact. In this way, the viewer's earlier conclusion that the Report contains charges of actual misconduct is strongly reinforced. Dr Baum's attempt to inform the viewer that the allegations are unsubstantiated and at least two years old was strongly refuted by Mrs Roberts, who repeated that the recommendation to withdraw funding was based on fact. Although Mr Makin later summarised the position by stating that Mrs Roberts had said that the allegations were based on fact and were recent and that Dr Baum had said that they were unsubstantiated, the segment closed with Mrs Roberts saying that women cannot have confidence in the Christies Beach Shelter at the moment.
The content of the broadcast has an obvious similarity with what was said in The 7.30 Report. There are some important differences. Notwithstanding those differences, the words used were defamatory for the same reasons. I find that the broadcast was defamatory of the Shelter and had the defamatory imputations alleged by the plaintiff.
The fact that reference was made to the investigation by the CAC and police does not mean that the statements were not defamatory. I refer to my earlier reasons on this topic. What added credibility to the allegations was the fact that Dr Cornwall had decided to withdraw funding from the Shelter. That was the point made by Mr Makin at the beginning of the segment, a point reinforced by comments from Mrs Roberts that Christies Beach had "singled itself out" and that the recommendation was "based on fact". Although there was reference to unsubstantiated allegations and that those unsubstantiated allegations were being investigated by the CAC and police, the ordinary viewer would not distinguish between the two forms of allegation. In this context, it is important to remind oneself that the television viewer receives a succession of spoken words and visual images which he is unable to have repeated in contrast with the reader of printed material who usually has unlimited opportunity for re-reading: Kay v Cunningham and Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
I refer again to earlier remarks on the question of identification. Whereas the plaintiff was named in The 7.30 Report, she was not named in this segment. The segment defamed the management and staff of the Christies Beach Shelter. It was a sufficiently small class of persons to be read as referring to each and every member of the management and staff. The plaintiff was well known as the administrator of the Shelter. She was closely identified with it. She had established a very high public profile with the Department and Government, with other shelters and in the general community. It was well know that she was one of those providing counselling. She was the public face of the Shelter. All of the allegations as to financial mismanagement and mistreatment of women concerned all those associated with the operations of the Shelter. They therefore pointed to her as one of those persons as well as to a failure by her as administrator to manage the Shelter properly. I find that the plaintiff was identified in this broadcast.
TVB relied on the fact that during its broadcast no reference was made to any individual and that the class of persons named in the Report were past and present members of staff and the management committee. The submissions must fail as it overlooks the fact that for some six years, the plaintiff had been prominent in the affairs of the Shelter and had been its administrator throughout that period. In addition, there was nothing in the remarks made by Mrs Roberts to suggest that allegations concerned past members of staff or the management committee. Indeed, her denial that the allegations are out of date reinforced the message that the allegations applied to the current staff and management committee.
TVB, like the ABC, seeks to invoke the common law and statutory defence of qualified privilege for a publication which is a fair and accurate report. I refer to the reasons for rejecting the ABC's reliance on this defence. For like reasons, this broadcast was not a report but a series of assertions and counter-assertions. It is a misuse of language to describe it as a report. As in the case of The 7.30 Report, the introductory words of Mr Makin might well constitute a fair and accurate report but thereafter the broadcast ceases to be a report. In this case also, the defamation is repeated in the rest of the broadcast. The reasoning which results in the ABC being unable to rely on this defence applies here also. TVB is not entitled to rely on this defence either at common law or by statute.
The invocation by TVB of this defence fails for reasons very similar to those which have been stated for dismissing the reliance by the ABC on the defence. I adopt those reasons without repeating them. There are only two instances when a comment was made in this broadcast. I exclude the introductory remarks because they were essentially a report. Mr Makin described the report as "damaging". That plainly was fair comment on a matter of public interest. The closing remarks by Mrs Roberts that women cannot have any confidence in the Shelter might also be described as comment. But they are the only observations which could be described as comment and they are merely brief interpolations in the course of a program which in essence cannot be described as comment. I repeat that the program was essentially constituted by assertion and counter-assertion. This defence must fail.
I adopt without repeating it the earlier discussion of the relevant principles. Broadly speaking, the same reasoning for denying this defence in the case of the ABC also applies to TVB. I conclude that the broadcast was not a communication on a government and political matter. In case others should reach a contrary conclusion, I deal with the questions of reasonable conduct and malice. There is no evidence of malice.
There are factors which indicate that TVB was reasonable in its conduct. These were the kind of allegations which it was not possible for TVB to verify. The broadcast made it clear that it was referring to a recently published report. As the allegations were made against the Shelter, Dr Baum, as chairperson of the management committee, was an appropriate person to speak on behalf of the Shelter. Subject to what is said in the next paragraph but one, by reason of the fact that the broadcast was presented as an interview, TVB did not in any way endorse or adopt the contents of the Report. The ordinary reader would have understood that TVB was doing no more than referring to the tabling of the Report and the recommendation to withdraw funding and inviting comment from Mrs Roberts and Dr Baum on issues mentioned in the Report.
TVB relied on the fact that the interview was subject to time constraints. I do not believe that that is a factor on which a television station may validly rely for the purpose of establishing reasonableness. If television broadcasters seek to engage in a fleeting way with issues of this kind, they must bear the consequences of their actions. Shortly stated, shortness of time with which to deal with the issue will not, generally speaking, be a ground to render the treatment of the issue reasonable.
However, I conclude that TVB did not act reasonably for very similar reasons to those in the case of the ABC. I have already described how the allegations were mentioned so that they appeared to have substance. In addition they contained the implication that it was the investigations by the Review Committee headed by Mrs Roberts which had disclosed the allegations and which in turn had caused funding to be withdrawn from the Shelter. In addition, this broadcast too was a series of assertions and counter assertions. It enabled Mrs Roberts to repeat defamatory statements in the Report which she enhanced. Dr Baum could do little more than deny them. For these reasons I am not satisfied that the conduct of TVB was reasonable.
Mrs Roberts republished some of the defamatory statements in the Report on both The 7.30 Report and State Affair. As her remarks have already been set out verbatim, I do not repeat them. Shortly stated, on The 7.30 Report Mrs Roberts repeated the defamatory imputations
• that the Shelter staff had kept inadequate financial records;
• that there was a long history of inappropriate management of funds and a lack of accountability for them; and
• that the Shelter staff had engaged in sexual and physical harassment of women at the Shelter.
Shortly stated, the defamatory imputations repeated on State Affair were
• that the Shelter staff had engaged in sexual and physical harassment and intimidation of clients;
• that the Shelter staff had been guilty of professional negligence;
• that the Shelter staff had been guilty of misappropriation of funds and over-spending; and
that the Shelter staff had kept inadequate financial records.
On State Affair, Mrs Roberts went beyond the terms of the Report and stated that the unsubstantiated allegations were fact. Although about one third of the way into the broadcast, Mrs Roberts made the point that "we are not prejudging the issue", that remark had no impact on the viewer because a few moments before she had said that the recommendation to the Minister was "based on fact", a statement she repeated immediately after she had asserted absence of pre-judgment.
When examining the claims against the TV companies, I have examined whether the statements were defamatory, whether the plaintiff was identified, and the separate defences relied on. It is unnecessary to repeat the reasoning. It applies with equal force to Mrs Roberts. In respect of the claim against her, I conclude for those same reasons that, in the case of both television broadcasts,
• the plaintiff was identified or was entitled to sue as a member of a small class of the subject of the defamatory remarks;
• the defamatory statements were neither a fair report nor fair comment on a matter of public interest.
The question remains whether Mrs Roberts is entitled to rely on the qualified privilege of communication on a government and political matter.
For the reasons already given, I conclude that Mrs Roberts' participation in both programs did not constitute involvement in a communication on a government and political matter. Even if it was, she is unable, for the reasons which follow, to rely on that defence because her conduct was not reasonable. It is possible to deal with both programs together. Mrs Roberts was in quite a different position from the television stations. She had had the opportunity to check the allegations. She had failed to state the whole truth in the Report. As a consequence, the Report misrepresented the true position. She restated what had been contained in the Report. Those are sufficient grounds to defeat the qualified privilege in respect of her remarks on the television stations. In all but exceptional cases, proof of reasonableness will fail as a matter of fact unless the publisher establishes that it was unaware of the falsity of the matter and did not act recklessly in making the publication: Lange (at 573). As noted earlier, Mrs Roberts was aware of the falsity of some of the matters in the Report and was reckless when making other allegations against the Shelter's administration.
There are further reasons for concluding that her conduct was unreasonable. She was reckless with the truth and misstated the truth in her comments on the television stations. I deal with each program separately. In The 7.30 Report, Mrs Roberts asserted that all of the allegations were fact whereas she knew they were not. She repeated the statement about the qualified audit and 25 missing receipts when she knew that that was not the whole story. Her answer to Ms Wilcox implied that the missing 25 receipts was only one instance among several failures to provide receipts. There was simply no foundation for that remark and Mrs Roberts must have known it was wrong. She wrongly stated that at one time the entire management committee of the Christies Beach Shelter had resigned. That was plainly wrong. Furthermore, the Report had not included any suggestion that an entire management committee had ever resigned.
In State Affair, Mrs Roberts was even more inclined to exaggeration and inaccuracy. She stated that the recommendation to withdraw funding and the allegations were based on fact, when she knew that the matters being discussed were the unsubstantiated allegations; she refuted Dr Baum's suggestion that most of the allegations were two years old by asserting that they were not, when, in truth, that was not the position. In addition, she stated that an entire management committee had resigned at one time.
I find that the gratuitous introduction of these inaccuracies is further evidence of a lack of reasonableness on her part. It is also evidence of malice to defeat the qualified privilege in reporting to Dr Cornwall. It is not evidence of malice in the Lange sense.
Ms Roberts is therefore guilty of defamation as a result of her participation in the two television broadcasts.
The plaintiff alleges that Dr Cornwall was guilty of misfeasance in a public office, an allegation denied by Dr Cornwall. The plaintiff asserts in par 57 that Dr Cornwall was guilty of misfeasance in that he
"(a) adopted and acted on the ultra vires recommendation of the review committee as particularised in sub-paragraph 41(b)(ii) hereof;
(b) acted contrary to the guidelines of his Department (as set out in a document dated the 15th day of October 1981) in terminating, rather than suspending, funding;
(c) acted maliciously with intent to injure the plaintiff;
(d) was actuated by an improper purpose, namely to silence the public campaign for greater government funding for women's shelters by making an example of the Shelter."
The allegation in par 41(b)(ii) mentioned in par (a) is that the Review Committee went beyond its Terms of Reference in recommending withdrawal of funding. The document referred to in par (b) was not proved. In any event, it had probably been superseded by the SAAP guidelines. The crux of the allegation is in pars (c) and (d).
The tort of misfeasance in a public office is well established: Dunlop v Woollahra Municipal Council [1982] AC 158 at 172; Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 at 345 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ (the majority opinion), per Brennan J at 355 and per Deane J at 370; and Sanders v Snell (1998) 196 CLR 329 at 346; and Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (No 3) [2000] UKHL 33; [2000] 3 All ER 1. However, the precise limits of the tort are undefined: Mengel at 345, 355 and 370. In Mengel, Deane J identified the elements of the tort noting that the summary fails to disclose some latent ambiguities and disqualifications. He said:
"Its elements are: (i) an invalid or unauthorised act; (ii) done maliciously; (iii) by a public officer; (iv) in the purported discharge of his or her public duties; (v) which causes loss or harm to the plaintiff. That summary statement of the elements of the tort inevitably fails to disclose some latent ambiguities and qualifications of which account must be taken in determining whether a particular element is present in the circumstances of a particular case. The critical element for present purposes is malice."
The rationale of the tort is that in a legal system based on the rule of law, executive or administrative power may be exercised only for the public good and not for ulterior or improper purposes: Three Rivers (supra) per Lord Steyn at 7. To like effect are the remarks of Brennan J in Mengel at 357:
"Misfeasance in public office consists of a purported exercise of some power or authority by a public officer otherwise than in an honest attempt to perform the functions of his or her office whereby loss is caused to a plaintiff."
As Brennan J emphasised in Mengel (at 358), the tort requires more than mere negligence. He said:
"But the tort of misfeasance in public office is not concerned with the imposition of duties of care. It is concerned with conduct which is properly to be characterised as an abuse of office and with the results of that conduct. Causation of damage is relevant; foreseeability of damage is not."
In Sanders v Snell the majority (at 344) emphasised the fact that the tort seeks to balance competing considerations:
"Misfeasance in public office is concerned with misuse of public power. Inappropriate imposition of liability on public officials may deter officials from exercising powers conferred on them when their exercise would be for the public good. But too narrow a definition of the ambit of liability may leave persons affected by an abuse of public power uncompensated. The tort of misfeasance in public office will seek to balance these competing considerations."
The Court went on to note that it was important therefore to identify the intention with which a public official acts in striking that balance.
There are two forms of the tort. The first is where the public officer acts with the intention to injure a person or persons. It is sometimes called acting with targeted malice: Three Rivers per Lord Steyn at 8. The second is where the public officer knowingly acts in excess of his or her power and with knowledge that it would cause or be likely to cause injury, or acts with reckless indifference to possible lack of power or invalidity and likely injury: Mengel at 347, 355, and 370 - 371; Three Rivers at 7 - 9, 34 - 40, 43, and 48 - 49. But in both instances the act must be unlawful: Mengel at 347, 356, 370.
In this case, I am satisfied that Dr Cornwall did not knowingly act unlawfully nor has it been established that he acted with reckless indifference as to whether he had power. He believed that he had power to decide to withdraw funding provided he acted with the concurrence of the Commonwealth Minister. The power to withdraw funding of course existed but Dr Cornwall did not turn his mind to the question of procedural fairness, that is to say, whether he should give the Shelter an opportunity of being heard before funding was withdrawn. Nor did he receive any advice on the question of procedural fairness. He was plainly set upon a course to close the Shelter. So fixed was his purpose that he was oblivious to the obligation to accord procedural fairness. He simply did not think of that obligation. I do not think that constitutes a reckless indifference as to the question whether he had power because, plainly, the power existed subject to the obligation to accord procedural fairness. As Brennan J noted in Mengel at 356:
"The history of the tort shows that a public officer whose action has caused loss and who has acted without power is not liable for the loss merely by reason of an error in appreciating the power available. Something further is required to render wrongful an act done in purported exercise of a power when the act is ultra vires."
Thus, if Dr Cornwall is to be held to be liable for this tort, the plaintiff has to establish that he acted with an intention to inflict harm upon her and that the decision was made unlawfully.
I turn to examine whether each of the elements of the tort are satisfied in this case. I will deal last with the question of malice.
The first element is an invalid and unauthorised act. It is sufficient if the exercise of power has miscarried by reason of some matter which warrants judicial review and the setting aside of the administrative action: Mengel per Brennan J at 356. In other words, it extends to acts which are invalid for want of procedural fairness: Sanders v Snell at 344. The necessary act must be an act which is administrative in nature: Mengel per Brennan J at 355 - 356. It must be an act done in the exercise or purported exercise by a public officer of some power or authority with which he is clothed by virtue of the office he holds: Calveley v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1989] 1 AC 1228 at 1240. Dr Cornwall was performing an administrative act in the course of his duties as the responsible State Minister under the SAAP Agreement. As already mentioned, the decision to withdraw funding was done in breach of the rules of procedural fairness and could have been set aside on that ground. The act of withdrawing funding was an invalid act in that it was an act done without according procedural fairness to the Christies Beach Shelter.
On a strict analysis, Dr Cornwall made two decisions. One was to include the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report. The other was to withdraw funding from the Shelter. It would be an unrealistic exercise to distinguish between the decision to include the unsubstantiated allegations and the decision to withdraw funding: cf. Bourgoin SA v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food [1986] QB 716 at 777H. The decision to include the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report and to rely on them as one of the grounds on which to withdraw funding was part and parcel of the decision to withdraw funding. As already mentioned, Dr Cornwall included the unsubstantiated allegations in the reasons for withdrawing funding because it was politically necessary to do so. I have already found that the inclusion of the unsubstantiated allegations was made with the intention of fulfilling two purposes. One was to single out the Shelter as being different from other shelters. The other was to silence any political protest by the management and staff of the Shelter. They are so closely related to each other that it is perhaps more accurate to describe them as two aspects of one purpose. Dr Cornwall had legitimate grounds for coming to the decision to withdraw funding. The decision to withdraw funding did not constitute misfeasance in a public office. Instead, the misfeasance lies in the reasons for including the unsubstantiated allegations in the Report. I deal with that when examining the question of malice. In other words, it is because the improper use of the unsubstantiated allegations is so closely associated with and forms part of the decision to withdraw funding that the failure to comply with the rules of procedural fairness invalidate both.
The next requirement is that the act be done by a public officer. Ministers of the Crown are public officers the purpose of this rule: Sanders v Snell and Bourgoin are both examples. As the responsible Minister administering the funding for shelters, Dr Cornwall was a public officer.
The requirement that the act be done by a public officer in the purported discharge of a public duty is clearly satisfied as Dr Cornwall was exercising his duty as the responsible Minister under the SAAP Agreement.
The next requirement is that the administrative act caused loss or harm to the plaintiff. That requirement is plainly satisfied in this case. The publication of the unsubstantiated allegations caused great damage to her reputation and, in consequence, to her health with consequent difficulties thereafter in obtaining employment. I will deal with the question of her loss and damage later in these reasons.
Malice is constituted either by engaging in the impugned conduct with an intention to inflict injury or with knowledge that there is no power to engage in that conduct and that conduct is calculated to cause injury, or there is reckless indifference to both power and likely injury: Mengel per Brennan J at 357 and per Deane J at 370 - 371. For the reasons already given, if the commission of this tort is to be established in this case, the plaintiff must prove malice in the sense of an intentional infliction of injury.
The majority in Mengel observed (at 347) that the expression "the intentional infliction of harm" included "acts which are calculated in the ordinary course to cause harm, as in Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, or which are done with reckless indifference as to the harm that is likely to ensue, as in the case where a person, having recklessly ignored the means of ascertaining the existence of a contract, acts in a way that procures its breach." In Wilkinson v Downton, it was held that a person is liable if he does an act calculated to cause harm to another and in fact causes harm. Thus, the defendant who, by way of a practical joke, had falsely stated to the plaintiff, a married woman, that her husband had met with a serious accident in which both his legs had been broken, was held to be liable for the nervous shock suffered by the plaintiff. In the course of his reasons, Wright J examined what constituted an act calculated to cause harm. He said:
"One question is whether the defendant's act was so plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was produced that an intention to produce it ought to be imputed to the defendant, regard being had to the fact that the effect was produced on a person proved to be in an ordinary state of health and mind. I think that it was. It is difficult to imagine that such a statement, made suddenly and with apparent seriousness, could fail to produce grave effects under the circumstances upon any but an exceptionally indifferent person, and therefore an intention to produce such an effect must be imputed, and it is no answer in law to say that more harm was done than was anticipated, for that is commonly the case with all wrongs."
Thus, in this context, an intention to produce a result will be imputed where the act is plainly likely to produce that result. In Bourgoin at 777H Oliver LJ made a somewhat similar observation:
"If an act is done deliberately and with knowledge of its consequences, I do not think that the actor can sensibly say that he did not "intend" the consequences or that the act was not "aimed" at the person who, it is known, will suffer them."
Thus, an intention to cause harm can be found to exist if the act is done deliberately and with knowledge of its consequences.
In this case, Dr Cornwall quite deliberately decided that the Report should include all of the allegations, unsubstantiated and otherwise, against Christies Beach. His evidence shows that he was aware that one of the consequences of publishing the Report was that the plaintiff would suffer harm to her reputation and thereby suffer loss. I find, therefore, that Dr Cornwall published the Report with intention to cause harm to the plaintiff. As is demonstrated in the earlier analysis of his reasons for the decision, Dr Cornwall intended to use the allegations for the purpose of singling out the Christies Beach Shelter and for the purpose of silencing any political criticism of his decision. He knew that there were legitimate reasons to withdraw funding but he was also aware of the political consequences of relying only on them. He knew that, if he relied only on the failure of the Christies Beach Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement, on its continued deficits, or on the allegations of financial mismanagement, there would be political difficulties in justifying his decision in that the Shelter was little different from some other shelters in these respects. The allegations, and in particular the unsubstantiated allegations, provided a means of silencing any political activity in response to his decision. It also singled out Christies Beach as being different from the other shelters. The Shelter's chief advocate was the plaintiff. In the main, the allegations concerned her. They were so extensive and so lacking in particularity that she could not respond to them. She was effectively silenced. Furthermore, he used the allegations notwithstanding that he did not know whether they were true or not. He was not even prepared to wait for the results of the police and CAC investigations that he himself had requested. At the risk of repetition, Dr Cornwall may have had legitimate grounds for withdrawing funding from the Christies Beach Shelter but he was not prepared publicly to rely on them. He and the Department believed that the decision would in all likelihood result in more political controversy with shelters and with the Christies Beach Shelter and the plaintiff in particular. He knew that it would be useful to be able to rely on other allegations which put the Shelter out in a class of its own. As an experienced politician, Dr Cornwall was no doubt accustomed to dealing with political controversy. I am quite satisfied that he knew the political advantages of these unsubstantiated allegations in dealing with the plaintiff. He also knew what the effect of the publication of the unsubstantiated allegations upon the plaintiff would be. It is clear from his conduct in May and June 1987, particularly his endorsement on the minute of 12 June, that he intended to target the plaintiff. I am satisfied that he acted in an improper way with an intention to cause her harm.
It follows that all the elements of the tort have been established. I conclude that Dr Cornwall is guilty of the tort of misfeasance in a public office because of the malicious use of the unsubstantiated allegations when making an invalid decision. He is, therefore, liable to the plaintiff in damages for the loss she suffered in consequence.
There is an interesting question whether in the case where a public officer does not knowingly act unlawfully, recklessness as to the harm which might be caused will be sufficient to attract liability. In Bennett v Commissioner of Police [1995] 1 WLR 488 at 501 it was held that recklessness is not sufficient to constitute an intention to injure the plaintiff. The observations of the majority in Mengel quoted above seem to qualify that conclusion. In criminal law, acting recklessly may be sufficient to constitute acting maliciously. The essence of the tort is an unlawful act committed maliciously which causes damage. On one view, there seems to be no reason why reckless indifference as to whether harm will be caused should not constitute malice in this context. As Lord Steyn noted in Three Rivers at 9, albeit in the context of the second limb of the tort, reckless indifference to consequences is as blameworthy as deliberately seeking such consequences. But, given the finding that Dr Cornwall intended to harm the plaintiff, it is unnecessary to decide this question. If recklessness is sufficient, Dr Cornwall is guilty of the tort of misfeasance in a public office on that ground also.
Later in these reasons, I refer to the fact that the Review Committee was probably negligent in reporting to Dr Cornwall, albeit no duty of care to the plaintiff existed. That negligence consisted of failing to report on all relevant facts available to it. However, that finding does not gainsay the conclusion that Dr Cornwall was guilty of misfeasance. That is because it is the reasons why Dr Cornwall decided to use the unsubstantiated allegations and the actual use to which they were put that establishes this wrong. He employed those allegations for the purposes which have already been mentioned and it is those purposes which were improper and constituted the wrong.
The plaintiff asserts in her Statement of Claim that Dr Cornwall, Senator Ryan, the Review Committee and Ms Anderson each acted in breach of a duty of care which each separately owed to her. I have already held that Dr Cornwall is liable to the plaintiff for misfeasance in a public office and that two members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson are liable to her in defamation. It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with the question whether they are also liable in negligence. However, out of deference to the arguments of all parties, I examine the issue of negligence on the assumption that none of those defendants is guilty of either of the torts I have mentioned. In any event, it is necessary to determine whether the remaining members of the Review Committee and Senator Ryan are liable. It is convenient to deal with the claims against Dr Cornwall and Senator Ryan first.
As Ministers of the Crown, Dr Cornwall and Senator Ryan may be liable if they were under a duty of care to the plaintiff and had acted negligently. In the case of Dr Cornwall that potential liability existed by reason of s 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1972, the Act in force at the time when the plaintiff's cause of action in negligence arose. The same liability exists by reason of s 5 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1992. Senator Ryan had a potential liability by virtue of s 64 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
Before examining whether Dr Cornwall and Senator Ryan owed the plaintiff a duty of care, it is necessary to examine the function they were performing and the terms of the legislation pursuant to which they were acting: Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 200 CLR 1 at 13, 18-19, 26, 59-62, 72, 113; Sullivan v Moody (2001) 75 ALJR 1570 at par 62. They were administering the SAAP Program. That program provided funding to shelters pursuant to the legislative scheme constituted by the SAAP Act and the SAAP Agreement. The SAAP Agreement was a Schedule to the SAAP Act and an agreement in that form had been executed by the Commonwealth and the States and the Northern Territory. The relevant provisions of the Act and of the Agreement have already been mentioned. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that funding to women's shelters under the SAAP Program was provided pursuant to the Act and the Agreement. Section 5(2) of the SAAP Act provided that grants to the States shall be made on such terms and conditions as are specified in the Agreement. Clause 8(2) of the Agreement required that the SAAP Program be administered in accordance with SAAP Guidelines. Paragraph 9 of the guidelines required that certain decisions be made jointly by the Commonwealth and the State Ministers, including a decision to open a new shelter and a decision to withdraw funding from an existing shelter. However, subject to the terms of the Agreement and the guidelines, each State was able to exercise maximum autonomy and flexibility in administering the SAAP Program: cl 8(9) of the SAAP Agreement. Thus, Dr Cornwall was responsible for the administration of the program in South Australia and, when discharging that task, could act autonomously subject to the terms of the Agreement and the guidelines.
When making a decision either to establish a new shelter or to withdraw funding, the Commonwealth and the State Ministers were exercising a power vested in them by the legislative scheme which created the SAAP Program. That power is not expressed in the SAAP Act. It came into existence because, by reason of s 5(2) of the SAAP Act and cl 8 of the SAAP Agreement, the program was to be administered in accordance with the guidelines and those guidelines required, among other things, that the Commonwealth Minister and the Minister for the relevant State should jointly make certain decisions. A decision to fund a new shelter or to withdraw funding from an existing shelter would plainly involve the exercise of discretion. At the very least, in the case of the Christies Beach Shelter, it required the exercise of a discretion either to continue funding, notwithstanding past problems, or to withdraw funding and establish a new shelter in its stead. It is relevant to add also that, although, for the reasons already expressed, the Christies Beach Shelter had a legitimate expectation that it would be given a hearing before a decision was made to withdraw funding, the Ministers did not have a duty to fund the Shelter. Dr Cornwall's duty was limited to considering whether funding should be renewed and, if not, to consult with Senator Ryan and with her decide in the exercise of the discretion vested in him whether to consent to the withdrawal of funding. Senator Ryan's duty was to consult with Dr Cornwall and decide in the exercise of her discretion whether to consent to the withdrawal of funding.
The plaintiff asserts that the Ministers both owed her a duty of care because the Shelter wholly relied on State and federal funding so that a relationship of sufficient proximity existed. She then asserts that it was reasonably foreseeable that their joint decision to withdraw funding would cause the Shelter to close and thereby cause injury and loss to her, being loss of employment, loss of reputation and psychological injury. The claim for damages is not confined to economic loss. No other grounds are relied on to establish the duty of care. It will be immediately noticed that there are some difficulties in the formulation of a duty of care on these grounds. First, the concepts of proximity and foreseeability are not, standing alone, sufficient to give rise to a duty of care: Crimmins per McHugh J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) at par 72; Sullivan v Moody at pars 42-50. Secondly, while a decision to withdraw funding would in all likelihood cause the plaintiff to lose her employment, it would not necessarily cause loss of health or loss of reputation. Furthermore, a decision to withdraw funding may be made on a number of grounds which would not lead to any actionable loss of reputation or health. Expressed another way, although the Shelter relied on government funding, the Government had the right to withdraw that funding if grounds existed. This is an instance where the doctrine of general reliance identified in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 157 CLR 424 by Mason J at 461 - 464, but rejected in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day [1998] HCA 3; (1998) 192 CLR 330, does not provide a criterion by which to determine whether a duty of care existed. Although the Shelter may have had an expectation that funding would be continued from year to year, that funding could be withdrawn if grounds existed. The fact that the Shelter had an entitlement to be heard before funding was withdrawn does not give rise to a duty of care.
The plaintiff has not identified the content of the alleged duty of care. I have examined the particulars of negligence to see if they assist in identifying the content of a duty of care. They are in these terms.
"(a) Failed to exercise due care in relation to the plaintiff concerning the said report in that he:
(i) Acted upon the recommendation of the review committee to withdraw funding from the Shelter which recommendation was clearly based on unsubstantiated allegations made against the Christies Beach Women's Shelter over a period of five years.
(ii) Acted upon such recommendation without undertaking or requiring any further investigation to be undertaken to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the allegations being made.
(iii) Acted upon such recommendation without having any or any sufficient regard to the progress or findings of the police and Corporate Affairs investigations then under way.
(iv) Failed to defer his decision on such recommendation until the results of the police and Corporate Affairs investigations were known.
(v) Acted upon such recommendations without allowing the Shelter or the plaintiff an opportunity to answer or be informed of the unsubstantiated allegations being made against them.
(vi) Acted upon such recommendation with undue haste and acted contrary to the funding arrangements already in operation.
The plaintiff as a member of the committee of management and an employee of the said Shelter was adversely affected by the above actions set out in (a) above.
(b) Failed to exercise due care to ensure that the information and allegations contained in the said report with respect to the Shelter in general and plaintiff in particular were not disseminated before there was opportunity for the allegations to be appropriately investigated and made available to the Shelter for comment."
Although the alleged duty of care is plainly related to the use made of the unsubstantiated allegations, the content of that duty continues to be elusive. The claim appears to be a claim that the two Ministers were negligent in relying on the unsubstantiated allegations when deciding to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter and in referring to them when publishing the reasons for that decision. The plaintiff also alleges a breach in failing to allow the Shelter and her an opportunity to answer the allegations.
The plaintiff's claim, therefore, is not for the breach of a statutory duty but for a failure to take care when exercising the discretion whether to grant funding to women's shelter. It is well settled that, subject to a statutory provision to the contrary, a public authority may be subject to a common law duty of care when it exercises a statutory power or performs a statutory duty: Caledonian Collieries Ltd v Speirs [1957] HCA 14; (1957) 97 CLR 202 at 219-200; Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman at 458 where Mason J said:
"It is now well settled that a public authority may be subject to a common law duty of care when it exercises a statutory power or performs a statutory duty. The principle that when statutory powers are conferred they must be exercised with reasonable care, so that if those who exercise them could by reasonable precaution have prevented an injury which has been occasioned, and was likely to be occasioned, by their exercise, damages for negligence may be recovered (Caledonian Collieries Ltd. v. Speirs; Benning v. Wong) has been applied mainly to private Acts. However, it has been frequently applied in Australia to public authorities, notably public utilities, exercising powers under public statutes: Sermon v. Commissioner of Railways; Essendon Corporation v. McSweeney; Metropolitan Gas Co. v. Melbourne Corporation; South Australian Railways Commissioner v. Barnes; Cox Bros. (Australia) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Waterworks; South Australian Railways Commissioner v. Riggs; Voli v. Inglewood Shire Council; Birch v. Central West Country District Council. While some early statements of the principle suggest that the power given by statute is conditioned upon it being exercised without negligence so that negligent exercise amounts to an excess of authority (McSweeney; Metropolitan Gas Co.), the better view has always been that the cause of action in negligence arises under the principle by virtue of a breach of a duty of care existing at common law: Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir; London and Brighton Railway Co. v. Truman; Fullarton v. North Melbourne Electric Tramway and Lighting Co. Ltd; East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent; Riggs. And at least since the decision in Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood Urban District Council and Middlesex County Council, it has been generally accepted that, unless the statute manifests a contrary intention, a public authority which enters upon an exercise of statutory power may place itself in a relationship to members of the public which imports a common law duty to take care." (Footnotes omitted).
In this context, the expression "a public authority" includes a Minister of the Crown. Nothing in either the SAAP Act or the Agreement denied the existence of a common law duty of care when the Ministers performed their respective functions under the Act or the Agreement. The plaintiff will, therefore, have a cause of action if she can establish some breach of a duty of care existing at common law. I turn to examine the question whether a duty of care exists.
While it is clear that a public authority has a duty of care when exercising its statutory powers, difficulties exist in the application of that principle. Those difficulties result in part from the tension between, on the one hand, the principle stemming from the Diceyan concept of the rule of law that the law should apply to government in the same way as it applies to the governed: M Allars, "Tort and Equity Claims Against the State" in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government (1996) and, on the other, the separation of powers and the respect for administrative independence in the formation of public policy, a respect stemming from the recognition that courts are not, generally speaking, equipped to balance competing interests and demands upon the public purse. The issues have been examined on a number of occasions: see, for example, J J Doyle QC (as he then was), "Tort Liability for the Exercise of Statutory Powers" in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Torts (1989) at 203; J J Doyle QC, "The Liability of Public Authorities" (1994) 2 Tort L Rev 189; Doyle CJ and J Redwood, "The Common Law Liability of Public Authorities: The Interface between Public and Private Law" (1999) 7 Tort L Rev 30; B Feldthusen, "Failure to Confer Discretionary Public Benefits: The Case for Complete Negligence Immunity" (1997) 5 Tort L Rev 17; and B Selway QC, "The Source and Nature of the Liability in Tort of Australian Governments" (2002) 10 Tort L Rev 14. Kirby J has collected a number of the judicial and academic comments in this field in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (supra) at 396-397.
At the outset, there is a question whether a duty of care exists in relation to the exercise of a discretion. In this case, the two Ministers have been charged with a statutory duty and performed an administrative act in the form of the exercise of the discretion not to fund the Christies Beach Shelter. To that extent, the issues in this action are unlike those in cases such as Pyrenees Shire Council v Day and Crimmins, which dealt with omissions to act. The principles in those cases nevertheless provide some guidance.
Before proceeding further, I put to one side the policy/operational dichotomy which has been mentioned in cases such as Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1977] UKHL 4; [1978] AC 728 and Heyman, a distinction which has been criticised. One difficulty with the policy/operational dichotomy is that a decision at the operational level may involve the exercise of a discretion: United States v Gaubert [1991] USSC 49; 499 US 315 (1991). The division of opinion in the High Court as to the utility of the distinction was noted by McHugh J in Crimmins at pars 79-90. A recent list of other criticisms is to be found in B Selway QC (op. cit.) at 23, fn. 68.
Even if the distinction has any utility, the decision to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter was an administrative act and, as such, operational. There are a number of reasons which point to that conclusion. One is that the decision would have been subject to an application for judicial review. As will be noted shortly, the fact that an administrative decision is set aside on an application for judicial review does not give rise to a claim for damages. Another reason is that the decision did not concern issues of policy. The policy decisions had been made. That is evidenced by the fact that the funds for distribution among women's shelters had already been decided. In addition, the number of shelters which were to operate in South Australia had already been determined. The decision which the Ministers had to make was, not whether the number of shelters was to be increased or decreased, but whether the Christies Beach Shelter should be closed and another established in its place. The decision to withdraw funding was not, therefore, an instance of the Ministers performing a legislative or quasi-legislative function: cf. Crimmins per Gaudron J at 20 - 21, McHugh J at 38 and 50, Gummow J at 62 and Hayne J at 100 - 101.
It is necessary, therefore, to examine whether an exercise of this discretion is subject to a duty of care. I acknowledge immediately that one difficulty is that almost all administrative decisions, to a greater or lesser extent, involve the exercise of a discretion. The presence of a discretion in administrative decision-making is examined by D J Galligan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion (1986) at 9-11; see also S Kneebone, Tort Liability of Public Authorities (1998) at 15-16.
In Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] UKHL 2; [1970] AC 1004 at 1031, Lord Reid held that a person who had a duty to exercise a discretion would be liable only if he unreasonably failed to carry out his duty to consider the matter or reached a conclusion so unreasonable that it was no real exercise of the discretion. Lord Morris (at 1037) and Viscount Dilhorne (at 1041) expressed the same view. Lord Diplock (at 1067 - 1068) also agreed but held that the exercise of the discretion would be actionable only if it was ultra vires. He said:
"It is, I apprehend, for practical reasons of this kind that over the past century the public law concept of ultra vires has replaced the civil law concept of negligence as the test of the legality, and consequently of the actionability, of acts or omissions of government departments or public authorities done in the exercise of a discretion conferred upon them by Parliament as to the means by which they are to achieve a particular public purpose. According to this concept Parliament has entrusted to the department or authority charged with the administration of the statute the exclusive right to determine the particular means within the limits laid down by the statute by which its purpose can best be fulfilled. It is not the function of the court, for which it would be ill-suited, to substitute its own view of the appropriate means for that of the department or authority by granting a remedy by way of a civil action at law to a private citizen adversely affected by the way in which the discretion has been exercised. Its function is confined in the first instance to deciding whether the act or omission complained of fell within the statutory limits imposed upon the department's or authority's discretion. Only if it did not would the court have jurisdiction to determine whether or not the act or omission, not being justified by the statute, constituted an actionable infringement of the plaintiff's right in civil law."
The issue was later considered by Lord Wilberforce in Anns at 754 - 758. His Lordship, with whom a majority of the House agreed, held that the exercise of a statutory discretion was not actionable if it was not ultra vires, but a public authority had a duty to give proper consideration to the question whether or not it should exercise the power vested in it and could be liable for a failure to do so. The effect of these two decisions would seem to be that a public authority has a duty to consider whether to exercise a discretion vested in it. If it has exercised the discretion, the exercise of that discretion will not be actionable unless it is so unreasonable as not to amount to an exercise of the discretion or that it was ultra vires.
The question whether the exercise of a discretion was actionable was considered in Heyman by Gibbs CJ, with whom Wilson J agreed, and by Mason J. When discussing the policy/operational dichotomy, their Honours held that an exercise of a discretion may be actionable but the exercise of a discretion may not be negligent in certain circumstances. At page 442, Gibbs CJ referred to Annsl and continued:
"There was no novelty in holding that that ordinary principles of negligence applied to public authorities exercising statutory functions - powers as well as duties. The distinction between the area of policy and the operational area is a logical and convenient one. There is no doubt that a public authority may be liable for the negligent acts of its servants or agents in carrying out their duties, or exercising their powers, within the operational area, although if the performance of their duties or the exercise of their powers involves the exercise of a discretion, an act will not be negligent if it was done in good faith in the exercise of, and within the limits of, the discretion."
Although Mason J excluded discretionary decisions from the obligation to exercise a duty of care, he did not confine the duty of care to ultra vires decisions. He said (at 457 - 458):
"There is, accordingly, no reason why a public authority should not be subject to a common law duty of care in appropriate circumstances in relation to performing, or failing to perform, its functions, except insofar as its policy-making and, perhaps, its discretionary decisions are concerned. And, despite possible indications to the contrary in Anns v Merton London Borough Council, there is no compelling reason for confining such a duty of care to situations in which a public authority or its officers are acting in excess of power or authority."
Neither Gibbs CJ nor Mason J appear to have expressly examined the question whether unreasonableness would constitute a breach of the duty of care, but I do not understand their reasons to exclude it.
That part of the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Anns which reasons that the exercise of a discretion will not be negligent if it is within the limits of a discretion was followed and applied by Lord Browne-Wilkinson with whom the other Law Lords agreed in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] UKHL 9; [1995] 2 AC 633 at 736 and by Lord Hoffmann with whom the majority of the Law Lords agreed in Stovin v Wise at [1996] UKHL 15; [1996] AC 923 at 946 - 947. In X (Minors) at 736, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said:
"Most statutes which impose a statutory duty on local authorities confer on the authority a discretion as to the extent to which, and the methods by which, such statutory duty is to be performed. It is clear both in principle and from the decided cases that the local authority cannot be liable in damages for doing that which Parliament has authorised. Therefore if the decisions complained of fall within the ambit of such statutory discretion they cannot be actionable in common law. However if the decision complained of is so unreasonable that it falls outside the ambit of the discretion conferred upon the local authority, there is no prior reason for excluding all common law liability.
That this is the law is established by the decision in the Dorset Yacht case [1970] UKHL 2; [1970] A.C. 1004 and by that part of the decision in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1977] UKHL 4; [1978] A.C. 728 which, so far as I am aware, has largely escaped criticism in later decisions. In the Dorset Yacht case Lord Reid said [1970] UKHL 2; [1970] A.C. 1004, 1031:
'Where Parliament confers a discretion the position is not the same. Then there may, and almost certainly will, be errors of judgment in exercising such a discretion and Parliament cannot have intended that members of the public should be entitled to sue in respect of such errors. But there must come a stage when the discretion is exercised so carelessly or unreasonably that there has been no real exercise of the discretion which Parliament has conferred. The person purporting to exercise his discretion has acted in abuse or excess of his power. Parliament cannot be supposed to have granted immunity to persons who do that.'"
In Stovin v Wise at 946 - 947, Lord Hoffmann expressed a like view in these terms:
"Since Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Trustees v. Gibbs (1866) L. R. 1 H.L. 93 it has been clear that in the absence of express statutory authority, a public body is in principle liable for torts in the same way as a private person. But its statutory powers or duties may restrict its liability. For example, it may be authorised to do something which necessarily involves committing what would otherwise be a tort. In such a case it will not be liable: Allen v. Gulf Oil Refining Ltd. [1980] UKHL 9; [1981] A.C. 1001. Or it may have discretionary powers which enable it to do things to achieve a statutory purpose notwithstanding that they involve a foreseeable risk of damage to others. In such a case, a bona fide exercise of the discretion will not attract liability: X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council [1995] UKHL 9; [1995] 2 A.C. 633 and Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. v. Home Office [1970] UKHL 2; [1970] A.C. 1004.
In the case of positive acts, therefore, the liability of a public authority in tort is in principle the same as that of a private person but may be restricted by its statutory powers and duties." (Original emphasis).
In Pyrenees Shire Council v Day at 346, Brennan CJ remarked that, if a decision not to exercise a statutory power is a rational decision, there can be no duty imposed at common law to exercise the power. In X (Minors) at 736, Lord Browne-Wilkinson also noted that, when determining whether a liability for negligence exists, public law concepts as to the validity of a decision are excluded: compare also Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1987] UKPC 2; [1988] AC 473. However, in this context, irrationality appears to mean unreasonableness in the Wednesbury sense: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223. To that extent, there appears to be a mingling of the concepts of public and private law.
In Crimmins McHugh J, with whom Gleeson CJ agreed, was critical of the use of public law concepts when determining whether a duty of care exists. His Honour then referred to the policy/operational dichotomy. After noting that it had been criticised, his Honour (at par 87 - 90) referred to the approach of Professor Stephen Todd who has argued that it seems preferable to accommodate the distinction between policy and operational decisions and the question whether the exercise of a discretion has discharged the duty of care at the breach stage rather than at the duty stage: Todd, "Liability in Tort of Public Bodies", in Mullaney & Linden (eds), Torts Tomorrow - A Tribute to John Fleming (1998) 36 at 46 - 47. But, it is to be noted that Professor Todd's approach itself is grounded on a test of reasonableness. In that article he said (at 47):
"Determining whether a duty has been discharged need not involve elaborate inquiry. It would seem to be sufficient for the defendant to point to the existence of relevant discretionary considerations and show that they had properly been taken into account. The question would be whether the particular exercise of discretion was reasonably open to the defendant, not whether it was in some sense right or wrong. And the degree of care expected of a public body in meeting the standard of reasonableness must be determined in the light of its obligation to carry out various statutory functions and its inability simply to desist from any exercise of its responsibilities. So the funding and other resources which are available to meet the demands which are made upon the public body are very relevant. Whether the duty has been discharged has to be determined subjectively in relation to the particular defendant being sued." (Footnotes omitted)
While I acknowledge the force of McHugh J's criticism of the use of public law concepts when determining whether a duty of care exists, there appears to be a substantial body of opinion to the effect that a public authority will be liable for the exercise of a discretion if it produces a decision so unreasonable that it falls outside the ambit of the discretion. It seems also that the authority may be liable if it has acted ultra vires but it is unnecessary to pursue that question as there is no suggestion of an ultra vires act in this case. It appears to be necessary also to determine whether a duty exists by reference to the nature of the breach.
The duty of care is not confined to a decision which is irrational or to a decision which is ultra vires. For example, different considerations will apply where there has been a negligent failure to grant funding to a shelter, for example, by oversight and where no cause existed for withdrawing funding. A decision to withdraw funding involves the exercise of a discretion as required by the legislative scheme established by the SAAP Act and Agreement. In contrast, where the negligent failure to grant funding is an oversight, the discretion has not been exercised at all. It is not inconsistent with the legislative scheme to impose a duty which required the Minister to exercise sufficient care to ensure that all shelters who had received funding in the past were again considered for funding. To impose a duty of care on the Minister to take reasonable steps to avoid overlooking a shelter which had in the past received funding does not impinge upon the exercise of the discretion whether to grant funding or not. It simply requires that the discretion be exercised. This example serves to illustrate Professor Todd's point that the question whether a duty exists may have to be considered by reference to the nature of the breach.
It cannot be said that the decision by the two Ministers to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter was unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense. Grounds did exist on which the decision to withdraw funding could reasonably be made. The recommendation to withdraw funding and the decision to do so was not based on the unsubstantiated allegations alone. That was apparent from the terms of the recommendation in the Report on which Dr Cornwall relied and the terms in which the decision was announced and was confirmed by the evidence. The decision was also grounded on the fact that the Shelter had continually incurred deficits and had failed to sign the Financial Agreement. As grounds existed for the decision to withdraw funding, it was not an unreasonable decision and so was not made negligently.
The claim in negligence alleges lack of care not only in the making of the decision but also in the publication of the reasons for it. I have held that Dr Cornwall's decision was not unreasonable. Is he liable in negligence for publishing the reasons? It is not possible, I think, to separate the decision from the publication of the grounds for that decision. As the unsubstantiated allegations were included in the reasons for the decision, it cannot be said that the Minister was negligent to publish them. The Minister was stating the grounds of his decision. This conclusion does not absolve Dr Cornwall from liability for misfeasance in a public office since that liability depends on why the unsubstantiated allegations were included and the use made of them.
At first blush, it seems odd that Dr Cornwall might be liable for misfeasance in a public office but not in negligence. However, the reason lies in the different nature of the two torts and their different purposes: see the discussion of Professor Stephen Todd, "Liability in Tort of Public Bodies", in Torts Tomorrow - A Tribute to John Fleming (1998) at 37-44.
There remains the question whether Dr Cornwall owed a duty of care to give the plaintiff an opportunity to answer the allegations. In effect, the plaintiff seeks to make Dr Cornwall liable for failure to exercise the rules of procedural fairness. But, there is no remedy in damages for breach of the rules of procedural fairness: Macksville & District Hospital v Mayze (1987) 10 NSWLR 708 and 724 to 725; Park Oh Ho v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 81 ALR 288 at 309 - 310, 317 - 318; Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1991] FCA 358; (1991) 103 ALR 499. A breach of public law by itself does not give rise to a claim for damages: X (Minors) at 730. To allow a remedy for failure to accord procedural fairness would be tantamount to allowing a remedy in damages for an ultra vires act. As Brennan J noted in Northern Territory v Mengel at 356, a purported exercise of power is not necessarily wrongful because it is ultra vires; something further is required to render wrongful an act done in a purported exercise of power when the act is ultra vires.
For all these reasons, I do not think Dr Cornwall owed a duty of care in negligence to the plaintiff.
In the case of Senator Ryan, the plaintiff asserted the same particulars of negligence as were asserted against Dr Cornwall with the addition of one further particular of negligence, namely, that she concurred in the decision without making any appropriate enquiry as to whether the decision was appropriate. Again, it is not possible to spell out from the alleged particulars the content of the alleged duty of care. I find that Senator Ryan is not liable in negligence for reasons similar to those which apply in the case of Dr Cornwall. There are, however, further reasons why she is not liable. The two Ministers exercised different functions. The Commonwealth Minister had a role in allocating the funds to the different states and had an oversight of the administration of the SAAP Program in each state. The State Minister was responsible for the day to day administration of the Program in that State. Thus, for Senator Ryan the question whether funding should be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Shelter turned on two issues. The first was whether grounds existed for that decision. The second was to ensure that a women's shelter was provided in the southern suburbs of Adelaide. She was satisfied as to both and, as proper grounds existed for the decision to withdraw funding, she is not liable. Furthermore, Senator Ryan relied on the information provided by Dr Cornwall. As he was the Minister who had the responsibility of administering the SAAP Program in South Australia, she was entitled to do so. It would be contrary to good and efficient administration if the Commonwealth Minister had to check the State Minister's action. She knew that the Christies Beach Shelter had failed to sign the Financial Agreement but she did not know that it had signed the Undertaking. It seems that fact was known only to the Department and Dr Cornwall. Her only concern was that there were proper grounds and, as far as she knew, they existed. The publication of the reasons for the decision was an aspect of the administration of the program. The manner in which the decision was to be announced and implemented were matters which Senator Ryan was entitled to leave to Dr Cornwall. Expressed another way, she was under no duty of care in respect of the administration of the program beyond the question of deciding whether funding should be withdrawn. For these reasons, Senator Ryan is not guilty of negligence.
Documents such as Exhibit P403 and Exhibits P626-626B suggest that Senator Ryan was not fully apprised to the reasons why Dr Cornwall wished to withdraw funding. It seems that, at first, she was being advised to seek further information. There was also a concern that a replacement shelter be established. However, P403 indicates that she was satisfied that grounds existed. These documents show undue haste on the Commonwealth's part. Senator Ryan did not satisfactorily explain why she acceded to Dr Cornwall's agenda and not insist on receiving all of the information she needed. However, as no duty of care existed, these are not sufficient grounds upon which to establish negligence.
I turn to the question whether the members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson owed the plaintiff a duty of care. I do not think there is any basis for distinguishing between the individual members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson in this context. For that reason, in discussing this question, a reference to the Committee is intended to mean members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson.
The plaintiff asserts the existence of a duty of care but, again, does not state the content of that duty. It is, however, possible to determine the content of the duty from the particulars of the alleged negligence. The particulars may be summarised in these terms:
1. The Review Committee reported the unsubstantiated allegations without making any inquiry to establish the veracity of the allegations;
2. The Review Committee failed to take care to ascertain the accuracy of the unsubstantiated allegations;
3. The Review Committee acted inappropriately in relying on the unsubstantiated allegations when recommending that funding be withdrawn from the Shelter;
4. The Review Committee went beyond its terms of reference in recommending that funding be withdrawn;
5. The Review Committee failed to give the Shelter and the plaintiff an opportunity to answer the allegations.
Assuming the existence of a duty of care, I do not think that the particulars in sub-pars 4 and 5 constitute a breach of that duty. It is a nice question whether the Review Committee exceeded its Terms of Reference in recommending that funding be withdrawn. As the issue turns on the proper interpretation of the Terms of Reference and as it is not clear that a recommendation to withdraw funding exceeds them, I do not think the Review Committee acted negligently in that respect. As far as the negligence alleged in sub-paragraph 5 is concerned, the Review Committee was not under an obligation to give the Shelter or the plaintiff an opportunity to answer the unsubstantiated allegations. Their task was to report to Dr Cornwall. It was for Dr Cornwall to determine whether the Shelter or the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to answer the allegations. The remaining particulars effectively allege three aspects of the duty of care to the plaintiff, namely:
• to establish the veracity of the unsubstantiated allegations; and
• not to rely on the unsubstantiated allegations.
It is apparent that, although the plaintiff does not accept the Review Committee's conclusion that funding should be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Shelter, she does not challenge that decision. Instead, she says that the Review Committee should have exercised reasonable care when preparing its Report and making its recommendations. Stated shortly, her contention is that although there may be no duty of care in relation to the judgment ultimately exercised by the Review Committee, the Committee had a duty to get its facts right.
The plaintiff again claims damages for loss of her employment, loss of reputation and for her psychological injury. Her claim is not confined to a claim for economic loss but includes damages for loss of reputation and damages for personal injury.
The question whether the Review Committee owed the plaintiff a duty of care involves different considerations from those which obtain in the case of Dr Cornwall and Senator Ryan. The Review Committee is in quite a different position from the two Ministers. They had been charged with the task of preparing a report. Plainly, the Review Committee owed a duty of care to Dr Cornwall. But, the fact that a defendant owes a duty of care to a third party does not of itself rule out the possibility that a duty of care is owed to the plaintiff: Sullivan v Moody at par 60.
Statutory provisions concerning the immunity of employees in the public service from civil suit do not assist in determining whether a duty of care exists. Although employees in the public service enjoy an immunity from civil suit for any act or omission in the exercise or purported exercise of their official powers or functions, any liability against such an employee lies against the Crown. In 1987, the relevant provision was s 78 of the Government Management and Employment Act 1985. That provision has been replaced by s 74 of the Public Sector Management Act 1995. Section 235a of the Community Welfare Act is in similar terms. Those provisions do not, however, establish that a duty of care exists nor do they assist in establishing whether a duty of care exists. The effect of the statutory provisions is that, if an employee in the public service is held to be liable, that liability is transferred to the Crown.
The plaintiff's claim arises out of what she asserts to be a negligent misstatement. However, she does not claim to have relied on it. Instead, she asserts that the negligent misstatement has caused her loss because Dr Cornwall, if not also Senator Ryan, relied on it. The claim has the indicia of a claim for defamation. In Wade v State of Victoria [1999] 1 VR 121, Harper J held that an employer owed a duty of care in respect of a foreseeable loss to a former employee when providing a reference concerning that employee. He reached that conclusion holding that the law of defamation did not cover the field so as to exclude the claim in negligence. In doing so, he followed the decision of the House of Lords in Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2 AC 296. Harper J acknowledged that extending the law of negligence in that way could be seen as flying in the face of the well-settled principle of the law of defamation that nothing less than malice would defeat the qualified privilege which applied to a statement such as a reference. There is division of judicial opinion on the question whether the principles of negligence should intrude into the law of defamation. The negative view had been expressed by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Balfour v Attorney-General [1991] 1 NZLR 519 at 529 and by Levine J in Sattin v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1996) 39 NSWLR 32 at 43. More recently, in Sullivan v Moody, the High Court noted the intersection of the claim in that case with the law of defamation and, notwithstanding the decision in Spring, disapproved the view that the law of negligence could extend in that way into the law of defamation. The issues in Sullivan v Moody were different from those in Spring and in Wade. As I read the reasons of the High Court in Sullivan v Moody, in particular, par 55, the remarks concerning Spring were obiter and the basis for the decision was the fact that the defendants had duties which were incompatible with the alleged duty of care. That is not the case here because a duty of care to the plaintiff is entirely compatible with the duty of care to Dr Cornwall.
However, in this case, principle suggests that a duty of care to the plaintiff does not exist. The Review Committee was under a duty to report to the Minister. Because it was discharging the administrative function of enquiring into and reporting on women's shelters, its Report was made on an occasion of qualified privilege, a protection enjoyed in common with other inquiries of a like nature: see the earlier section dealing with qualified privilege. Policy reasons might suggest that the Review Committee is not subject to the law of negligence as well as to the law of defamation.
There are other factors which point to that conclusion. It is important that those responsible for making decisions in public administration should be fully apprised of all information affecting that decision. It might be contended that the imposition of a duty of care on those reporting to the decision-maker might cause the reporter to state less than all the facts known lest the reporter expose himself to a claim in negligence. So, in this case, it might be contended that the Review Committee should be able to report without what Lord Keith, in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 at 63, called "a detrimentally defensive frame of mind". In addition, it might be said that the task of reporting to a Minister involves quite a different function and responsibility from the preparation of a reference.
Somewhat similar considerations were expressed in Sullivan v Moody at par 62 where the Court said:
"It would be inconsistent with the proper and effective discharge of those responsibilities that they should be subjected to a legal duty, breach of which would sound in damages, to take care to protect persons who were suspected of being the sources of that harm. The duty for which the appellants contend cannot be reconciled satisfactorily, either with the nature of the functions being exercised by the respondents, or with their statutory obligation to treat the interests of the children as paramount. As to the former, the functions of examination, and reporting, require for their effective discharge, an investigation into the facts without apprehension as to possible adverse consequences for people in the position of the appellants or legal liability to such persons. As to the latter, the interests of the children, and those suspected of causing their harm, are diverse, and irreconcilable."
But, it must be remembered that the statutory framework under consideration in Sullivan v Moody was different from the task of the Review Committee. The provisions of the Community Welfare Act 1972 which were examined in Sullivan v Moody required the reporting of suspicion based on reasonable grounds and the interests of the child were paramount. By contrast, the Review Committee was charged with the task of the review of administration and management of women's shelters. It was not charged with the reporting of suspicion held on reasonable grounds. The Review Committee's task did not involve simply reporting what it had heard. As a committee of review, it had to assess what was reported to it and then frame its own report and recommendations.
There are, however, other factors which point to the conclusion that a duty of care might exist. Clearly, substantial injustice will occur if a plainly careless statement is made but the plaintiff cannot recover because the statement was made on an occasion of qualified privilege and was not tainted by malice. Is a plaintiff to be denied a remedy for a plainly careless statement published in this way because no duty of care exists and malice has not been established? Is a plaintiff to fall between the two stools of negligence and defamation and be denied a remedy?
One factor which differentiates this case from Sullivan v Moody is that the duty for which the appellants contended in that case could not be reconciled satisfactorily with the nature of the functions being exercised by the respondent. However, as already mentioned, a duty of care to the plaintiff to report accurately is entirely consistent with the duty of care which the Review Committee owed to Dr Cornwall.
There is a further factor which suggests that a duty of care should exist. This was a widely publicised Committee. Its establishment on 22 October, 1986 had been announced with a degree of flourish in the Legislative Council as a committee which would assist ensuring financial accountability of women's shelters. That announcement was publicised in the press. On 26 November, 1986 the membership of the Committee was announced by Dr Cornwall in the Legislative Council, again with an emphasis on financial accountability. That, too, was published in the press. The Committee called for public submissions, in December 1986, by a letter to shelters and in January 1987 by a notice in the press. This was not a private or informal review but a public one. Its existence was plainly well-known in women's shelters and those associated with it. In short, a good deal of publicity surrounded the creation of this Committee and its work. Furthermore, the Review Committee knew that their Report was going to be published, not only in the Legislative Council, but to the Department and to women's shelters. They knew or ought to have known that the Report would become a public document. I think that, in circumstances such as these, there are proper grounds for the existence of a duty of care notwithstanding the law of defamation. Malice is not easily established. Carelessness and leaping to conclusions on inadequate evidence do not constitute malice. But is an individual's reputation to be denied protection when a report which is to be made public contains, on any objective view, allegations against the individual that have been very carelessly made?
The decision in Sullivan v Moody reiterated what had been said by some members of the High Court in earlier decisions, that proximity and foreseeability are not, standing alone, sufficient touchstones for determining whether a duty of care exists: see, for example, McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; (1999) 198 CLR 180 at paras 70 to 76 and in Crimmins at pars 72 to 77. Some members of the High Court have spoken of the need to proceed incrementally in novel situations where the facts do not fall within an established category of negligence: see, for example, Brennan J in Heyman at 481 and McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd at pars 94 and 95 and in Crimmins at 73 - 78. That view is stated again in Sullivan v Moody in par 51 where the Court cited with approval the following remarks of Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office at 1058:
"And the judicial development of the law of negligence rightly proceeds by seeking first to identify the relevant characteristics that are common to the kinds of conduct and relationship between the parties which are involved in the case for decision and the kinds of conduct and relationships which have been held in previous decisions of the courts to give rise to a duty of care."
Foreseeability and proximity are two tests to be applied with others. I have regard to the six steps identified by McHugh J in Crimmins. As the issues in that case involved an omission by a public authority to act, all of the steps there listed do not apply in this case where the positive conduct of the Review Committee is under scrutiny. I have also had regard to other factors identified by McHugh J in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd. In the result, I think there are five steps by which it is possible to determine that the Review Committee owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.
1. It was reasonably foreseeable that a failure to take care would cause injury to a class of persons including the plaintiff. After 12 May, 1987 the Review Committee knew that Dr Cornwall was going to rely on the unsubstantiated allegations and intended to publish them.
2. The Review Committee had the power to protect the plaintiff from the risk of loss and damage by preparing an accurate Report.
3. The plaintiff was vulnerable in that she could not take any reasonable step to protect herself from loss or damage flowing from the publication of the Report.
4. The imposition of a duty of care will not result in liability to an indeterminate class of persons in an indeterminate amount or for an indeterminate time. In other words, the liability of the Review Committee can be realistically calculated.
5. The only supervening policy reason for denying the existence of a duty of care is the intersection with the law of defamation to which I have already referred.
A body charged with a task of reviewing an area of administrative activity and reporting to a superior officer or a Minister is, generally speaking, in a position to ascertain facts and report upon them. As this case demonstrates, it will often be necessary to gather the facts, examine them and then assess them before reporting. The Review Committee was required to review administrative practices, management structures and the extent to which shelters fulfilled their objectives. The task of review involved more than merely relaying those facts which were ascertained by the Committee. Some basic assessment of those facts was required. For example, the Review Committee did that in relation to aspects of the administration of women's shelters by the Department. There was nothing to prevent it making an assessment of the force of the allegations concerning the Christies Beach Shelter. It had access to the files. It had the assistance of a paid consultant, Ms Anderson, to review those files and assess the force of the allegations. Such a review was undertaken by the Select Committee. There is no reason why Ms Anderson could not also have made such a review. The fact that the Review Committee was considering whether to recommend withdrawal of funding serves to give further emphasis to the conclusion that the Review Committee owed the plaintiff a duty of care.
Similarly, a review could have been made of the allegations of financial mismanagement. As already demonstrated, they boiled down to no more than continually being in deficit and, as Ms Wighton clearly knew, being in deficit as part of a political campaign for increased funding. In the case of other areas of financial mismanagement, such as auditing, the Review Committee had reports before it which told the whole story so that there could be no excuse for misstating facts. In addition, the Review Committee had access to the financial officers of the Department who could have provided whatever information was needed.
The task of the Review Committee was quite different from that of a police investigation which, as Lord Keith noted in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire at 63, "must necessarily involve a variety of decisions to be made on matters of policy and discretion, for example as to which particular line of enquiry is most advantageously to be pursued and what is the most advantageous way to deploy the available resources". The position of the Review Committee was more akin to a local authority which has undertaken the duty of inspecting the construction of buildings at particular stages and negligent inspection has caused loss to the owner: cf. Pyrenees Shire Council v Day.
There is a question whether the duty of care to the plaintiff required the Review Committee not to rely on the unsubstantiated allegations for the purpose of recommending withdrawal of funding. Ordinary common sense indicates that it is not possible to rely on unsubstantiated allegations because it is not known whether the allegations are true or not. Ms Anderson and the members of the Review Committee acknowledged in their evidence that they did not know whether the unsubstantiated allegations were true or not. It is even less possible to rely on them when it is not possible to investigate them. The Review Committee made a particular point, both in its Report and in the evidence of some of its members and in the evidence of Ms Anderson, that it was in no position to investigate the allegations. That only served to underline the conclusion that it was not possible to rely on the unsubstantiated allegations for the purpose of recommending that funding be withdrawn. In this respect also the Committee breached the duty of care, if the duty existed. The Committee had a duty to report the unsubstantiated allegations to Dr Cornwall but there is an obvious difference between reporting such allegations and relying on them for the purpose of recommending the withdrawal of funding. All of these factors suggest that the Review Committee and Ms Anderson owed the plaintiff a duty of care and that duty required them to state facts and allegations accurately and to analyse and assess the force of the unsubstantiated allegations.
However, I am persuaded that to conclude that a duty of care exists in this case would cut across the well established principles of the law of defamation relating to qualified privilege. This is very much a borderline case. To adopt the remarks of Lord Woolf in Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc at 351 - 352, it is obviously in accord with public policy that reports of public inquiry should fully and frankly deal with the issues the subject of the inquiry. It is also in accord with public policy they should not be based on careless examination of facts or careless reporting of facts. Factors such as the freedom of speech and the need for those charged with the task of conducting a public inquiry to be able to report frankly and without a defensive frame of mind must be balanced against an individual's right at common law to earn a livelihood in his chosen occupation and not be deprived of it or of his reputation by a careless report. The Committee and Ms Anderson were so careless that it is unjust if the plaintiff is denied a remedy in negligence. It would be fair, just and reasonable for her to recover damages for that negligence. While these are compelling considerations, it is also necessary to consider the responsibilities of those charged with undertaking public inquiries and reporting on them. Sometimes difficult questions of judgment are involved. The person undertaking the inquiry should not be subjected to an action for negligence because, as a result of an exercise of judgment, a matter has fallen on one side of the line and not the other. Further, the qualified privilege which is applied to proceedings of this kind is so well established that it should not be eroded by a potential liability in negligence. If it is said that a liability should exist if the reporting is grossly negligent, that is to create a vague and indeterminate test which also gets close to proof of malice. For all of these reasons, I conclude, on balance, that the Review Committee did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care.
If contrary to my conclusion, a duty of care does exist, I find that the Review Committee and Ms Anderson were negligent in the discharge of that duty. The Committee had a duty to state facts accurately. I have already referred to the lack of care exercised by the Review Committee, the failure to state the whole truth in the Report and the consequent misrepresentation in the Report of the true position on so many facts. Significantly, the Committee did not mention any dates to make it apparent to the reader that an overwhelming number of the allegations were at least two years old. Only one set of facts was reported with complete accuracy and with the full position correctly stated, namely, the fact that the Christies Beach Shelter was continually in deficit and sought additional funding from the Department. These factors all demonstrate that the Review Committee breached the duty of care it owed to the plaintiff. The fact that Dr Cornwall directed the Committee to include in the Report the allegations against the Christies Beach Shelter did not relieve it of the duty to state facts accurately. The Review Committee acted in breach of that duty.
The Review Committee points to the fact that it did not have the resources to investigate the unsubstantiated allegations. However, there are several reasons why that does not deny the existence of a duty of care. The first is that the duty of care only required that allegations and other facts in the Report be stated accurately. In relation to the unsubstantiated allegations, it would have been easy to have stated that most had occurred more than two years before the Report was prepared. Secondly, as already demonstrated, the Review Committee and, in particular, Ms Anderson were in a position to ascertain the facts concerning allegations of financial mismanagement at the very least. In the case of non-financial matters, it was difficult to investigate them but it was possible to make an assessment on the basis of the documentary material. The fact that they were conducting a review required the Committee to make some assessment of the force of those allegations. Had that task been done and had the Review Committee stated all relevant facts concerning the non-financial unsubstantiated allegations and in particular stated relevant dates, they would not have been relied on. The damage to the plaintiff was caused both by the failure of the Review Committee and of Ms Anderson to state accurately the facts concerning the Shelter and the inclusion of the unsubstantiated allegations. Had the position concerning the unsubstantiated allegations been more accurately stated, I find that they would not have been included in the Report. I also find that on a common sense view of the facts, negligence on the part of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson caused loss to the plaintiff. The fact that the Report was correct on the issue of deficits does not affect that conclusion.
The plaintiff's last cause of action alleges a conspiracy to injure her in her employment as Administrator of the Christies Beach Shelter and as an advocate on issues of domestic violence and women's rights. The alleged conspirators are Dr Cornwall, the members of the Review Committee, Ms Anderson, Ms Vardon, Mr Bicknell and Mr Sumner. Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell are not defendants but they are alleged to be co-conspirators.
The allegation is not well pleaded. The plaintiff alleges 45 separate acts which she says were committed by various individuals in pursuance of the conspiracy. It is not clear whether they are also intended to be evidence proving the fact of the conspiracy. Most of those 45 acts were established and have already been mentioned as facts in the narrative of events leading to the decision to withdraw funding. I will refer to them again in a moment. The plaintiff then alleges that the conspirators agreed to commit seven unlawful acts which I shall list a little later.
One instance of the tort of conspiracy is when two or more persons combine, pursuant to an agreement, to do an unlawful act and damage is caused to the plaintiff: Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 108; (1980) 32 ALR 570; Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch [1941] UKHL 2; [1942] AC 435 at 439; Lonhro Ltd v Shell Petroleum (No 2) [1982] AC 173 at 178; Lonhro Plc v Fayed (1992) 1 AC 448. Injury to the plaintiff and not the self-interest of the defendants must be the predominant cause of the agreement: the Crofter case at 443, 446; Lonhro Ltd v Shell Petroleum (No 2) at 189. Thus, four facts must be proved by the plaintiff. They are
1. that there was an agreement between two or more persons;
2. that the agreement was executed in whole or in part;
3. that the predominant purpose of the agreement was to harm the plaintiff; and
It is clear the plaintiff has suffered loss. The real issues in this case concern the remaining three elements.
I list the acts which the plaintiff alleges were performed in furtherance of the conspiracy. I state the allegation and, in a summary manner, note whether it was proved.
1. In May and June 1987, Dr Cornwall, Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson determined how the final Report of the Review Committee could best be drafted and published to support Dr Cornwall's object of withdrawing funding from the Shelter. The plaintiff proved only one meeting where all of these persons were present, namely, the meeting on 12 May. Another meeting between Dr Cornwall and Mrs Roberts on 16 June was also proved but the purpose of the meeting was not. It is clear that at the meeting on 12 May Dr Cornwall directed that the unsubstantiated allegations could be included in the Report and that it was then decided that at some future time funding would be withdrawn from the Christies Beach Shelter. In the Crofter case at 468, Lord Wright pointed to the need for those alleged to be conspirators to be independent from one another. I think that Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton and Ms Anderson lacked the required degree of independence to be acting as conspirators with Dr Cornwall.
2. In the months of May and June 1987, members of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson re-drafted their Report so that the Report referred to the Christies Beach Shelter by name and recommended that funding be withdrawn from the Shelter when it had initially contained no such reference. This allegation was proved.
3. On or about 12 May 1987, Dr Cornwall instructed Ms Wighton, who in turn instructed Mr Bicknell, to obtain legal advice as to whether the Department had enough evidence to initiate legal action against the Shelter and the plaintiff. This was proved. The instruction is contained in Exhibit P381.
4. On or about 13 May 1987, Ms Vardon and/or Ms Wighton and/or Mr Bicknell instructed staff of the Department to commence making contingency plans for the closure of the Shelter. That was proved.
5. On or about 15 May 1987, Mr Bicknell wrote to the Shelter to advise it, among other things, that Dr Cornwall would meet Shelter representatives after considering the Report of the Review Committee and that, pending those considerations, the offer to sign the Financial Agreement was withdrawn. This was proved. The letter is Exhibit P25.
6. On or about 26 May 1987, Mr Bicknell provided the Crown Solicitor with a list of allegations and concerns about the Shelter in preparation for a meeting with Dr Cornwall. This was proved. A copy of the list forms part of Exhibit P487. Another copy is Exhibit P409.
7. On or about 29 May 1987, Dr Cornwall requested the Chief Secretary to institute a police investigation of the Shelter and of the plaintiff. This was proved. The request is Exhibit P30. Strictly speaking, the request was to investigate the conduct of the staff of the Shelter. That plainly included the plaintiff. Dr Cornwall's intention that the plaintiff should be investigated was plainly evidenced by his endorsement on the minute from Mr Bicknell which is Exhibit P32.
8. On or about 29 May 1987, Dr Cornwall requested Mr Sumner to institute investigation by the Corporate Affairs Commission of the Shelter and the plaintiff. This was proved. The request is in Exhibit P29. Again, strictly speaking, the request was to investigate the staff of the Shelter.
9. On or about 29 May 1987, Ms Vardon requested the Commissioner of Police to institute an investigation of the Shelter and the plaintiff. This was proved. The request is in a letter which is Exhibit P28. Strictly speaking, the request was to investigate the staff of the Shelter.
10. On or about 29 May 1987, Ms Vardon requested the Commissioner of Corporate Affairs to institute an investigation of the Shelter and the plaintiff. This was proved. The request is in Exhibit P27. The request was to investigate the staff of the Shelter.
11. On or about 29 May 1987, Ms Vardon recommended to Dr Cornwall that funding for the Shelter be suspended as of 30 June 1987. This was proved. The recommendation was in a minute to Dr Cornwall, Exhibit P26.
12. In June 1987, Mr Sumner instructed the staff of the Corporate Affairs Commission to investigate the Shelter. This was proved.
13. On 2 June 1987, Ms Anderson, Mr Bicknell and other officers of the Department met senior officials of the Corporate Affairs Commission and the Police Department to provide information concerning the allegations against the Shelter and the plaintiff. This was proved. The minute reporting on the meeting to Dr Cornwall is Exhibit P32.
14. On 11 June, Ms Vardon, Mr Bicknell, Ms Wighton and Ms King convened a meeting with representatives of the Shelter at the conclusion of which officers of the Corporate Affairs Commission demanded production of the Shelter's financial records. Essentially, this was proved but Ms King had no part in convening the meeting.
15. On or about 12 June, after being informed that it was the view of the police, on the basis of the written material supplied, that they would not be in a position to proceed further at that stage, Dr Cornwall instructed Ms Vardon to request the police to give further consideration to the allegations against the plaintiff. The allegation is proved but reference should be made to Exhibit P32 for a fuller summary of the police view. That document reports the outcome of the meeting on 12 June with police officers and officers of the Corporate Affairs Commission.
16. On 18 June 1987, Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell met the Commissioner of Police to discuss the progress of the police investigation and thereafter reported to Dr Cornwall. This was proved. The report of the meeting to Dr Cornwall is Exhibit SA32.
17. On 26 June 1987, the Review Committee formally presented Dr Cornwall with their Report which contained the recommendation that funding be withdrawn from the Shelter. The evidence shows that the final form of the Report was presented to Dr Cornwall on about 1 July 1987. The letter transferring the Report to Dr Cornwall is dated 26 June. I refer to the narrative above and the summary of the evidence which shows that all members of the Committee could not have signed the letter on that date.
18. On or about 29 June 1987, in response to a letter from the Shelter dated 18 June 1987 seeking details of allegations against it, Ms Vardon telephoned the Shelter representative to advise that there would no negotiations until the Corporate Affairs investigation was completed. This allegation was proved but the dates are incorrect. What was proved was that arrangements had been made for Ms Vardon to attend the Shelter on 13 July but on that day she advised she would not attend the meeting. Ms McSkimming telephoned her on 14 July to express her disappointment and to state that the Shelter wanted to sign the Agreement. Ms Vardon told Ms McSkimming that she would need to write to the Minister.
19. On or about 1 July, Dr Cornwall requested the Premier to waive the 10 Day Rule so that his minute to Cabinet could be considered before he departed on his overseas trip. This was proved. The detailed facts are noted in the narrative above.
20. In about June 1987, the Review Committee and Ms Anderson destroyed or caused to be destroyed all the working papers and minutes of the Review Committee in their possession. This allegation was admitted on behalf of all defendants, but not by Ms King. Ms King handed her documents back to the Department, which later destroyed them.
21. In about July 1987, Dr Cornwall obtained Cabinet's endorsement to withdraw funding from the Shelter. This was not proved. The actual position was that on 10 August, Dr Cornwall obtained the approval of Cabinet to table the Report of the Review Committee. The decision to withdraw funding was made by him and Senator Ryan.
22. Between the months of May 1987 and 11 August 1987, the conspirators ensured that neither the plaintiff nor the Shelter had any forewarning that funding was about to be withdrawn from the Shelter. There was no warning that funding would be withdrawn, although it was not proved that the conspirators did anything to ensure that result.
23. In August 1987, Dr Cornwall asked the police to undertake further investigations of the Shelter and the plaintiff after the police had reported there was no evidence of the commission of any criminal offence by the plaintiff. This was not proved.
24. On 5 August 1987, Ms Vardon recommended to Dr Cornwall that funding be withdrawn from the Shelter on 4 September 1987. This was proved. The minute with Ms Vardon's recommendation is Exhibit P40.
25. On 6 August 1987, Ms Vardon recommended to Dr Cornwall that the Financial Agreement signed by North Adelaide Shelter on 27 July 1987 be accepted. This was proved and the minute with Ms Vardon's recommendation is Exhibit P42.
26. On 11 August 1987, Dr Cornwall sought the oral agreement of Senator Ryan with the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. This was proved.
27. On August 1987, Dr Cornwall moved that the Report "Shelters in the Storm" be tabled in the Legislative Council and announced in the Legislative Council that funding would be withdrawn from the Shelter on 4 September 1987. This was proved.
28. On various occasions between 11 August 1987 and July 1989, Dr Cornwall represented to various persons that the decision to withdraw funding was:
(a) based upon the recommendation of the independent Review Committee;
(b) a joint decision of Senator Ryan and himself;
(e) motivated by the Shelter's refusal to sign the Agreement.
29. On 12 August 1987, Dr Cornwall accepted the Financial Agreement signed by the North Adelaide Shelter. This was proved.
30. On 12 August 1987, Mrs Roberts publicly supported the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter in a television broadcast by the ABC on The 7.30 Report. This was proved.
31. From August 1987 to approximately July 1988, Ms Vardon, Ms Wighton and Mr Bicknell monitored, for the benefit of Dr Cornwall, the public reaction to the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. This was not proved.
32. In about the months of July, August and September 1987, Dr Cornwall, Ms Vardon, Ms Wighton and Mr Bicknell made arrangements for the services provided by the Shelter to be taken over by another organization when the Shelter closed on 4 September 1987. Essentially this was proved. Those arrangements were made by Ms Vardon, Ms Wighton and Mr Bicknell. Dr Cornwall may have been aware of them but had no involvement in making the arrangements.
33. In September 1987, Mr Sumner ordered or authorised the prosecution of the plaintiff, Ms McSkimming and Ms Lachlan. This was not proved. Mr Sumner did not order or authorise the prosecution. It was authorised by the Corporate Affairs Commission.
34. On various occasions between 7 October 1987 and approximately 11 April 1989, Dr Cornwall refused to account for or explain his decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter on the grounds that the prosecution was pending or the Select Committee was enquiring into the matter. This allegation was not proved in its entirety. The position has already been noted in the narrative of facts.
35. On or about 21 October 1987, Dr Cornwall procured from Senator Ryan written confirmation of her agreement with the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. It was proved that Senator Ryan confirmed her agreement by letter dated 19 October 1987 which was received by Dr Cornwall on 21 October. It would be incorrect to state that he procured the receipt of that letter.
36. On 28 October 1987, Mr Bicknell recommended, in response to a request by Senator Ryan for detailed information concerning the withdrawal of funding from the Shelter, that such information be provided by officers of the Commonwealth Department and Dr Cornwall so advised Senator Ryan on 25 November. That was proved. Dr Cornwall's response to Senator Ryan was by letter, which is Exhibit P353.
37. On 5 December 1987, Mrs Roberts publicly supported the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter in a letter published in The Advertiser. That was proved. A copy of the letter is Exhibit P299.
38. On 18 April 1988, Ms Vardon sought to assure Ms Woodman (and through her, other complainants) that the reputations of the complainants would be protected in the Select Committee proceedings. This was proved. The minute to Ms Woodman is Exhibit P394.
39. In May and July 1988, Ms Blake provided documents and information to Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell with the object of facilitating their defence of the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. It was proved that Ms Blake had provided a copy of a letter sent to her by the Select Committee on 23 May 1988. I find that she did this because she had been a member of the Review Committee and wished to keep the Department informed of what the Select Committee was doing. She may have even wished to facilitate the defence of the decision to withdraw funding. But the letter does not establish a conspiracy.
40. On 14 June 1988, Mr Sumner publicly defended his decision to institute the prosecution. This was not proved.
41. On about 26 August 1988, Ms Wighton prepared the Department's written submission to the Select Committee defending the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. This was proved. The submission to the Select Committee is Exhibit P675.
42. During the period from September 1988 to December 1988, Mrs Roberts, Ms Wighton, Ms Anderson, Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell gave oral and written evidence to the Select Committee defending the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter. This was proved.
43. On 20 September 1988, Mr Sumner declined to permit an officer of the Corporate Affairs Commission who investigated the Shelter and the plaintiff to give evidence to the Select Committee. This was proved. The refusal is contained in a letter (Exhibit P593) which explains the reasons for the decision.
44. On 31 October, Ms Vardon wrote to the Crown Solicitor seeking "consistency in response" to correspondence from the Chairman of the Select Committee to the Minister of Community Welfare and the Attorney-General. This was proved. The request is contained in a minute which is Exhibit P529.
45. On or about 29 November 1989, Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell prepared a response to the draft Report of the Ombudsman in which they sought to justify the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter and the manner in which the decision was implemented. This was proved. The relevant exhibits are P482, P483 and P484.
Thus, in substance, the plaintiff proved all but six or seven of the allegations. It will be readily apparent that all of the facts which have been proved have already been mentioned in the narrative of the facts. I am not satisfied that those acts either evidence a conspiracy or were performed in pursuance of a conspiracy. They are acts performed at different times by different individuals in the course of their dealings with the Christies Beach Shelter. There is no evidence which points to a conspiracy.
I turn to examine whether there was a conspiracy to commit each of the unlawful acts alleged by the plaintiff. I deal with each of the unlawful acts as they are particularised in the Statement of Claim. The allegation is reproduced in bold type-face. I then comment on the allegation.
1. Dr Cornwall, the members of the Review Committee, Ms Anderson, Ms Vardon and Mr Bicknell denied the plaintiff and the Shelter natural justice.
One difficulty with the plea is that it does not specify the circumstances in which natural justice was denied. I proceed on the footing that it refers to the decision to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter. The plaintiff's immediate difficulty is that the decision whether to grant the Shelter a hearing before deciding to withdraw funding was a decision for Dr Cornwall alone. The task of the Review Committee and Ms Anderson was to report to Dr Cornwall. They did not make an administrative decision which would be affecting the rights of the Shelter or of the plaintiff. That administrative decision was to be made by Dr Cornwall. Similarly, neither Ms Vardon nor Mr Bicknell made that administrative decision. The essential element of a conspiracy, namely, an agreement to do an unlawful act is therefore missing.
2. Mrs Roberts, Ms Blake, Ms Wighton, the ABC, Ms Johnson and Ms Anderson acted outside their terms of reference in redrafting and/or signing the final Report of the Review Committee to include a recommendation that funding to the Shelter be withdrawn.
This plea plainly contains an error. The reference to the ABC should plainly be a reference to Ms King. I proceed on that basis. When dealing with the question of negligence, I found it unnecessary to decide whether the Review Committee had acted outside its Terms of Reference when recommending withdrawal of funding. It is a nice question whether they did. I think they did not. There is, therefore, no unlawful act. Furthermore, I do not think that the members of the Review Committee can be guilty of conspiracy when preparing the Report as they were then discharging the task they had been charged to undertake.
3. Dr Cornwall failed to consult fully with Senator Ryan before withdrawing funding from the Shelter and thereby acted in breach of the SAAP Guidelines and Procedures.
This plea fails because it is not alleged that Dr Cornwall was acting in concert with any other person.
4. Mrs Roberts, Ms Blake and Ms Wighton, Ms King, Ms Johnson and Ms Anderson and Ms Vardon destroyed and/or failed to preserve the working papers and minutes of the Review Committee and thereby acted contrary to Public Service guidelines for the preservation of documents.
Ms Blake destroyed her documents. It is not known what Ms Wighton did with her documents. The other persons all returned their documents to the Department. It was the Department which later destroyed them. While it is certainly curious that working papers and minutes of the Committee were destroyed, the evidence falls far short of establishing a conspiracy to commit this act.
5. Dr Cornwall misrepresented to members of the public that the decision to withdraw funding from the Shelter was:
(a) based upon a recommendation of an independent committee
(b) a joint decision of Senator Ryan and himself;
(d) motivated by the Shelter's refusal to sign the Financial Agreement.
6. Mrs Roberts misrepresented to members of the public that the recommendation of the Review Committee to withdraw funding from the Shelter was based on fact.
7. Mr Sumner ordered, or alternatively, authorised the prosecution without any or any sufficient regard to the public interest.
Pleas 5, 6 and 7 fail because the plaintiff has failed to prove that Dr Cornwall, Mrs Roberts or Mr Sumner were acting in concert with others. I add in the case of Mr Sumner that the evidence falls well short of proving that he was involved in any conspiracy or that he ordered or authorised the CAC prosecution.
Thus, although the plaintiff has established that a series of acts occurred between May 1987 and November 1989, she has not proved that they were done in furtherance of a conspiracy. She has also failed to prove a combination to commit the seven unlawful acts of which she gave particulars.
The plaintiff relied on a series of letters for the purpose of seeking to establish the conspiracy. She had not given particulars of this correspondence in her statement of claim but I admitted the letters. These letters were written by one Minister or another and on one or two occasions by the Premier. They were replies to letters written in the following circumstances.
The former employees of the Shelter other than the plaintiff wrote on several occasions to the Minister seeking compensation for the termination of their employment. They first wrote soon after the announcement that funding had been withdrawn. The Government refused to pay compensation but offered to assist in finding alternative employment. The former employees continued to seek financial compensation. On 19 April 1989, several of them wrote to the Minister repeating the request for compensation. One made a request by telephone. Their request for compensation was supported by the South Australian branch of the Australian Social Welfare Union. It was also supported by people associated with other shelters. On 21 May 1989 Dr Hopgood, the then Minister for Community Welfare, responded to these requests. The reply to the former employees was in almost identical terms. The following letter dated 21 May 1989 is one example.
"Thank you for your phone inquiry of 17th May 1989, concerning the Christies Beach Women's Shelter.
I advise Cabinet has determined that no compensation be paid to persons affected by the defunding of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter and that Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) funds not be reinstated.
As you would be aware, the Department for Community Welfare established a new service, the Southern Areas Women's Shelter to replace the Christies Beach Women's Shelter. This has proven to be a very successful service which is well conducted in respect to its programs and management.
Cabinet has also approved that a senior officer of the Department for Community Welfare renew our previous offers to assist you in finding employment.
You are therefore invited to contact Ms. Jan Lowe, Director Human Resources, Department for Community Welfare, 6th Floor, CitiCentre, 11 Hindmarsh Square, phone 2266940."
Letters in somewhat similar terms were sent to those from other shelters who had written in support of the claims for compensation. The letter to the Union was in these terms. The letter is undated but appears to have been sent in June 1989.
"I am writing to you in response to your letter of 25th May 1989, concerning two separate matters namely (1) the defunding of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter and (2) recent applications made by the A.S.W.U. to cover with industrial awards employees in the Non-Government Welfare Sector.
In relation to the Christies Beach Women's Shelter I advise that I am not prepared to discuss that matter with you.
Cabinet has determined that no compensation be paid to persons affected by the defunding of the Christies Beach Women's Shelter and that Supported Accommodation Assistance Program (SAAP) funds not be reinstated.
As you would be aware the Department for Community Welfare established a new service, the Southern Areas Women's Shelter to replace the Christies Beach Women's Shelter.
This has proven to be a very successful service which is well conducted in respect of its programs and management.
In relation to the two industrial Award Applications I advise that I am being briefed regarding the Award Applications and their implications, by Mr Peter Bicknell of the Department's Non-Government Welfare Unit.
With respect, I am not entirely convinced it is necessary to discuss those applications with you at this point in time.
If however, you would still like to discuss the awards with me please contact Mr Allan Joy who will arrange for an appointment."
In late April and early May 1989, after the report of the Select Committee had been published, a number of people expressed support for the Shelter by writing to the Department, to members of Parliament and to the Minister for Community Welfare or the Premier. They included persons operating other shelters. Some of the people writing asked if financial compensation would be paid to the former employees of the Shelter. These letters were usually answered by Dr Hopgood who was then Minister for Community Welfare. The Premier responded to letters addressed to him. The responses were all in very similar terms. The response was to the effect that no compensation would be paid to persons affected by a withdrawal of funding from the Shelter and that the Department had established a new shelter to replace the Christies Beach Women's Shelter. The letters also stated that the Department had offered to assist certain of the former employees of the Shelter to find employment.
The plaintiff relied on the fact that all of the letters to which I have referred are written in very similar terms, in some cases almost identical terms. However, this does not evidence a conspiracy nor assist in proving one. It is a not uncommon bureaucratic practice to make considerable use of a pro-forma letter. I find that these letters are no more than evidence of that practice.
The plaintiff also relied on correspondence in late 1988 between the chairman of the Select Committee on the one hand and on the other, Mr Sumner and Ms Lenehan, who was then Minister of Community Welfare. In that correspondence, the chairman sought access to documents and witnesses but, on advice, some of those requests were denied. I do not think the denials constitute evidence of a conspiracy. Instead, they represent examples of the Executive resisting what it perceived to be unnecessary intrusion by a parliamentary committee.
One can sympathise with the plaintiff's belief that a conspiracy existed. The destruction of the Review Committee's documents and the destruction and loss in several departments of files relating to this matter, in some cases after the institution of this action, is at least curious. The fact that the CAC prosecuted the plaintiff and two other members of the Shelter's staff for trifling offences, when coupled with the fact that these were probably the first and only prosecutions under the Associations Incorporation Act for a very long time, raises questions as to why the prosecution was pursued. But the fact remains that persuasive evidence of a conspiracy is lacking. The tort of conspiracy is notoriously difficult to establish. The plaintiff has failed to prove it in this action. This aspect of her claim, therefore, fails.
The plaintiff's claim for damages includes a claim for loss of earning capacity in consequence of her ill-health following the publication of the Report. The claim has a number of aspects. First, the plaintiff claims damages for being unable to work in the period following the publication of the Report until October 1989, when she returned to full employment. Next, she claims damages for the lower level of income she received in the period October to December 1989. Finally, she claims that she had no security of employment in the public sector and had to establish a private business with the consequence that she earned a lower income. I examine each of these claims and her employment history. When doing so, I also examine the effect upon the plaintiff of the publication of the Report.
In addition to her salary as Administrator of the Christies Beach Shelter, the plaintiff had earned a very small amount as fees for casual lecturing. In the financial years ending 30 June 1985, 1986, 1987 her income was as follows:
Income for the period 30 June 1987 included worker's compensation.
When the Report was published on 11 August 1987, the plaintiff was on sick leave. She was suffering from stress and had been absent from work since 26 November 1986. The effect of her claim is that the publication of the Report exacerbated and prolonged her existing condition. On 26 November 1986, on learning of the composition of the membership of the Review Committee, the plaintiff broke down. She believed that the Committee had been stacked against her and would deny what she had been trying to achieve for women's shelters. She felt frustrated, angry and hurt and cried excessively. I find that she then suffered a nervous breakdown. It had been caused by a number of factors including the demanding nature of her work, the stress of dealing with clients of the Shelter and with Government, and her political agitation on behalf of shelters. In addition, about one month before, her only brother had been killed in a motor vehicle accident. The announcement of the composition of the Review Committee was the last straw and triggered the breakdown.
In January 1987 the plaintiff was examined by Dr Donsworth, a psychiatrist employed by the worker's compensation insurer. Dr Donsworth believed that the plaintiff was then capable of returning to work on a part-time basis for a period of about two months and thereafter on a full-time basis. That opinion was not shared by the plaintiff's general practitioner, Dr Padman. I find that the plaintiff was not then capable of returning to work.
The plaintiff's condition gradually improved. She saw Dr Padman on 10 August, who gave her a medical certificate that she was not fit to return to work before 30 December because of work related stress. An appointment had been made by the plaintiff to see her psychiatrist, Dr Gauvin. I find that the plaintiff would have been fit to return to work by early January 1988. She had been discussing various alternative forms of employment with Dr Gauvin in mid 1987. The defendants other than the two television stations questioned whether in 1987 the plaintiff intended to return to her employment as Administrator. I think this was a false issue. The plaintiff had on two earlier occasions applied for employment in other occupations. She had been unsuccessful. In 1987 she was still considering other occupations. However, no realistic employment opportunity had emerged. I find that she was then engaging in the not unusual activity for employees of considering alternative employment situations. I also find that, although the Shelter was a factor contributing to the stress from which she was suffering, she would not have terminated her employment as Administrator unless she had secured other remunerative employment. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that two of her colleagues in the Shelter, both close friends, believed that she intended to return to work at the Shelter. In addition, the plaintiff said she had a passion to return to her work at the Shelter, evidence which I accept despite her long absence in 1987. It is also borne out by the plaintiff's subsequent employment history. She took positions of employment until she decided to leave the public sector and commence her own business. I, therefore, find that the plaintiff would have returned to work in early January 1988, either as Administrator or in some equally or more remunerative employment.
Although the plaintiff was more likely to be affected by the defamatory statements in the Report than she would have been had she not been recovering from the breakdown, it has no consequence other than determining from which date the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for her economic loss in being unable to earn income: Watts v Rake [1960] HCA 58; (1960) 108 CLR 158 at 160 and at 164. Furthermore, I have already found that the plaintiff made a substantial recovery. I do not think the plaintiff had any greater susceptibility to distress than other ordinary members of the community.
The plaintiff was paid worker's compensation for the period 11 August 1987 to 14 January 1988 under the Worker's Compensation Act 1971. She had a potential liability to repay that sum under s 84(6) of that Act. However, as I do not award her any damages for the period before January 1988, there is no need to assess damages on the basis noted in Fox v Wood [1981] HCA 41; (1987) 148 CLR 438.
The public announcement of the contents of the Report and the decision to withdraw funding from the Christies Beach Shelter was a devastating and crushing blow to the plaintiff. To the ordinary and sensible reader, it was a damning indictment of her. For her, it represented a denial of all that she had worked for since joining the Christies Beach Shelter in 1981. I find that she felt publicly humiliated and disgraced. She was quite demoralised and subject to considerable stress. She was angry and bitter. She believed that she had been subjected to a vicious and unfair attack. That is easy to accept. The charges against her were grave and extensive. She also believed that the nature of the charges against her were such that she could not defend herself. She was so humiliated and devastated that she was psychologically unable to defend herself. Again, that is very easy to accept given the breadth of the charges made against her and the lack of particularity. She felt ashamed and was conscious of the shame experienced by her parents.
The plaintiff's sense of humiliation was so great that in October, 1987 she left South Australia to live in Victoria. She believed she could not face former friends and colleagues or others who worked for women's shelters in South Australia. She lived on a farm to the east of Melbourne with another woman, not associated with the Christies Beach Shelter, with whom she had been having a relationship since late 1986. She remained living at the farm with this woman until 1989. In October 1990, the plaintiff purchased a house at St Andrews, a suburb some distance east from Melbourne.
In February, 1988 the plaintiff was referred by her general practitioner in Victoria to Dr Valent, a psychiatrist, for treatment. I accept Dr Valent's assessment that the plaintiff was suffering from an acute stress disorder. Dr Valent saw her on a weekly basis. As her condition improved, he saw her on a monthly basis until June 1991.
In May and in August 1988 the plaintiff was examined respectively by Dr Donsworth and Dr Valent. Both believed that she was capable of returning to work at some future time but that her psychological condition was then so poor that she was disabled from returning to work for some time. The plaintiff was then suffering from severe headaches, insomnia and depression. She was taking an anti-depressant drug. Her concentration was very poor. She had manifested suicidal tendencies. Dr Donsworth had examined her again in November 1988. Her opinion was that the plaintiff would not return to work for about two years.
The plaintiff continued to be treated by Dr Gauvin. I find that Dr Gauvin overstated the position when he said in his evidence that the plaintiff was not able to return to work. He said that he had advised her not to work again. The plaintiff has returned to work. I accept that she is unable to do all that she would wish. I find that she was able to return to work, albeit with a good deal of difficulty and, because of the residual depression, unable to work in all fields in which she would wish to act as a counsellor.
On 25 January 1989 a claim by the plaintiff for worker's compensation was settled. An order was made by consent in the Industrial Court that she recover $31,000.
In about August 1989, the plaintiff had sufficiently recovered to consider seeking other employment. She then began to apply for positions. She applied for the position of Co-ordinator of the Domestic and Social Violence Service at St Kilda but did not succeed. Instead, she was offered a contract position for three months as project officer with that organisation. She accepted the position and was employed from 17 October to 23 December 1989. The duties involved less responsibility than her duties as Administrator at the Christies Beach Shelter. I find that the plaintiff took this position as a stop-gap while she was seeking more remunerative employment. She is entitled to be compensated for the lower level of income then received because her skills entitled her to a higher level of remuneration.
In the latter part of 1989, the plaintiff continued to seek more satisfying and more challenging employment, initially without success. The plaintiff gave evidence that she disclosed her experiences at the Christies Beach Shelter and the Report. She believed that that operated against her. She applied for the position of Co-ordinator of the North East Centre Against Sexual Assault in Ringwood, Victoria. That application was unsuccessful. She applied for the position of Training and Development Officer with the YWCA in Melbourne. The plaintiff said that she had been invited to apply for the position but that application also failed. The plaintiff said that she was informed by the relevant employee at the YWCA that her experience at the Christies Beach Shelter had caused the YWCA not to appoint her. In all, the plaintiff applied unsuccessfully to four organizations including the two just included.
In early 1990, she was successful in obtaining employment as the Co-ordinator of the Outer East Women's Health Service at Ringwood, Victoria. Her duties were, broadly speaking, equivalent to those of her former position as Administrator of the Christies Beach Shelter. She remained in that position until she resigned on 26 April 1991. The plaintiff's income in that position was approximately $29,200 gross. The plaintiff said that she had resigned because an inquiry had been conducted into the Shelter. That inquiry had recommended a restructuring of the administrative arrangements. She perceived that they would curtail and downgrade the responsibility and discretion of her duties as Co-ordinator. I find that her perception was, in all the circumstances, reasonable. On learning of the review's recommendations, she had begun to consider other forms of employment. In February, she gave six week's notice and resigned and left the employment on 26 April 1991.
In May 1991 the plaintiff commenced her own business as a counsellor, psychotherapist, lecturer and training consultant. She conducted that practice in part of her dwelling at St Andrews. It was submitted that she resigned her employment because she intended to commence business on her own account. I do not accept that contention. I find the plaintiff decided to resign in about February, 1991 because of the recommendations to be made by the review. At that time, she also decided she could no longer be employed in the public sector. She also had a perception that the inquiry concerning the service was politically motivated. I find that she was wrong in that perception. Her faulty perception was caused by the stress of the events associated with the Report which, I find, caused her to be unduly sensitive and suspicious of political interference with her work. It was one of the effects of her depression. She was therefore prone to read too much into events and to see political motivation for events which did not exist.
The plaintiff has continued to be self-employed since 1991. The following is a table of her income for the years ending 30 June 1990 to 30 June 2000. In 1990 and 1991, her income was predominantly the salary she received from paid employment. In the following years, gross income represents the total income earned by her business. In 1994, the plaintiff restructured the business, entering into partnership with Ms Williams, a woman with whom she had been living since 1992. The business is conducted from the plaintiff's home at St Andrews, which is in the outer eastern suburbs of Melbourne.
I have already held that, but for the events of August 1987, the plaintiff would have returned to full-time employment in January 1988. The events of August 1987 exacerbated her existing condition so that she was unable to work in 1988 and for the first nine months of 1989. She is entitled to be compensated for lack of earning capacity in the period 1 January 1988 to 16 October 1989. In addition, she is entitled to be compensated for the lower level of income for the period October to December 1989. I will assess these losses in a moment. I will also examine whether the plaintiff suffered loss after 1991 and whether she will suffer any future economic loss.
The plaintiff is entitled to be compensated in damages on her claims for misfeasance in a public office and for defamation. I deal first with the claim in defamation.
The plaintiff was defamed on three separate occasions, in the Report, and on the two broadcasts by TVB and the ABC. The plaintiff is entitled to recover in respect of each publication. As Mrs Roberts participated in the defamations broadcast on each of the television stations, she and each of the televisions stations are respectively liable, jointly and severally, to the plaintiff as joint tort feasors: Thompson v Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd [1996] HCA 38; (1996) 186 CLR 574 at 580 - 581, 599 - 602. Each set of defendants is liable only for the damage that each has caused by its defamatory publication. When assessing damages, it is immaterial that others may have also caused injury: Dingle v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1961] 2 QB 162, approved on appeal [1964] AC 371. In this case the defamatory statements in the Report and on the two television stations were published within the space of two days. The television broadcasts were made within about one hour of each other. The effect of all three was substantially the same. Each contained the three defamatory imputations of financial mismanagement, criminal conduct and sexual and professional misconduct. In other words the defamatory effect of each was substantially the same. I do not think that any distinction should be made between the fact that the Report was more detailed. It is the sting of the defamation which is relevant, not its length. On some occasions the shorter libel may be the more effective and therefore more damaging.
Both the ABC and TVB sought to limit their respective liability for damages on the ground that the plaintiff's reputation had been significantly damaged before each made its broadcast. That is to ignore the principles expressed in Dingle. In that decision Sellers LJ said [1961] 2 QB at 171:
"It has not been the law that a man pays less for his defamatory remarks which he cannot justify merely because someone else has published previously or concurrently the same libel."
In the House of Lords Lord Radcliffe said [1964] AC at 396:
"A libel action is fundamentally an action to vindicate a man's reputation awarded have to be regarded as the demonstrative mark of that vindication. If they could be whittled away by a defendant calling attention to the fact that other people had already been saying the same thing as he had said, and a pleading that for this reason alone the plaintiff had the less reputation to lose, the libelled man would never get his full vindication. It is, I think, a on some point as to which he has been falsely defamed, and the damages well understood rule of law that the defendant who has not justified his defamatory statements cannot mitigate the damages for which he is liable by producing evidence of other publications of the same effect as his; it seems to me that it would involve an impossible conflict between this rule and the suggested proof of tarnished reputation to admit into consideration other contemporary publications about the same incident. A defamed man would only qualify for his full damages if he managed to sue the first defamer who set the ball rolling; and that, I think, is not and ought not to be the law."
Each publication caused loss. It was as if the plaintiff was receiving a series of successive blows to her reputation. The ABC and TVB exacerbated the damage to the plaintiff's reputation and her feelings of distress. However, the plaintiff is not entitled to be compensated in full by each set of defendants for the same damage to her reputation: s 11 of the Wrongs Act. Given the proximity in time between each publication and the similarity of the defamatory statements, the appropriate course is to apportion those damages equally between the three sets of defendants.
As noted in Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th ed) par 9.1, the purpose of an award of general damages for defamation is to compensate the plaintiff for the effects of the defamatory statement. Damages are at large. Compensatory damages may include actual pecuniary loss and anticipated pecuniary loss or any social disadvantages which result, or may be felt likely to result, from the harm which may have been done; they may also include the material injury to the plaintiff's feelings - the natural grief and distress which the plaintiff may have felt at having been spoken of in derogatory terms: per Pearson LJ in McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1965] 2 QB 86 at 104-105. The principles were summarised by the majority in Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1993] HCA 31; (1993) 178 CLR 44 at 60-61 in these terms:
"As the appellant made no claim for particular economic loss as a result of either publication, the Court of Appeal was right in concluding that the jury's verdicts could not be supported by reference to specific economic loss. Specific economic loss and exemplary or punitive damages aside, there are three purposes to be served by damages awarded for defamation. The three purposes no doubt overlap considerably in reality and ensure that "the amount of a verdict is the product of a mixture of inextricable considerations". The three purposes are consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the appellant by the publication, reparation for the harm done to the appellant's personal and (if relevant) business reputation and vindication of the appellant's reputation. The first two purposes are frequently considered together and constitute consolation for the wrong done to the appellant. Vindication looks to the attitude of others to the appellant: the sum awarded must be at least the minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the appellant's reputation. "The gravity of the libel, the social standing of the parties and the availability of alternative remedies" are all relevant to assessing the quantum of damages necessary to vindicate the appellant." (Footnotes omitted).
The principle that damages include lost earning capacity was confirmed in Chakravarti v Advertiser Newspapers Ltd (1998) 193 CLR 519 at 559-560.
The plaintiff's claim for damages includes damages for loss of earning capacity. Shortly stated, the effect of her claim is that because of the stress she suffered she was disabled from working for a period of two years and, thereafter, her capacity to earn income was diminished. She could not earn income because she was suffering from the stress occasioned by the publication of the Report. The question is whether her claim for loss of earning capacity is too remote.
If the publication of a defamatory statement injures the reputation of a plaintiff so that his or her business or employment is adversely affected, damages are recoverable for that loss: Chakravarti; Andrews v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 225 at 234, 252, 259. In principle, the position is no different if the publication of the defamation causes such a deterioration in health that the plaintiff is unable to work. The plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for injury to health caused by the publication of the defamatory statement: Rigby v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (1963) 64 SR (NSW) 34 at 36 - 37; Brook v Flinders University of SA (1987) 47 SASR 119. If that injury to the plaintiff's health means also that the plaintiff cannot work, there appears to be no reason in principle why damages should not be recovered for that further loss. I do not think that the loss is too remote. If the plaintiff is not able to recover for loss of income, she is at a disadvantage when compared to a plaintiff who is able to prove a loss of income caused by damage to his reputation. For those reasons, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the loss of earning capacity. I will assess that loss in a moment.
The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to recover compensation for the personal distress and hurt caused to her, reparation for the harm done to her personal and professional reputation and vindication of her reputation. She is also entitled to recover compensation for the deterioration to her health and her consequent inability to work. I acknowledge that there is a degree of overlap between these separate heads of compensation and care must be taken to avoid compensating the plaintiff twice for the same loss.
There is an obvious link between the impairment of the plaintiff's earning capacity and damages for injury to her reputation. In one sense, it is not possible to draw a clear line between them since the allegations published in the Report related directly to the field in which the plaintiff was employed. However, such was the nature and breadth of the defamatory imputations that they would have had a profound effect upon her general reputation as well as upon her reputation in the area in which she was employed. One example is the unsubstantiated allegation of misappropriating funds. For these reasons, when assessing damages for loss of reputation and loss of earning capacity, it is necessary to take care to ensure that the plaintiff does not receive double compensation.
The ABC and TVB submitted that the broadcasts were not a significant cause of the plaintiff moving to Victoria. I do not accept that submission. It was the accumulated effect of the adverse publicity that resulted the defamatory publications which caused the plaintiff to move and, as both the ABC and TVB had contributed to it both are liable for that loss: SGIC v Medlin [1995] HCA 5; (1995) 182 CLR 1.
The ABC and TVB also submitted that they are not liable for any economic loss incurred by the plaintiff in being unable to find employment. They rely on the fact that their respective programs had not been broadcast in Victoria. They also submit that the effective cause for economic loss was the decision to withdraw funding which caused the Shelter to terminate the plaintiff's employment. I accept the submission but not entirely for the reasons they advanced. Although the plaintiff's employment was terminated in consequences of the withdrawal of funding from the Shelter, the plaintiff would have been able to obtain other employment. She was frustrated in that endeavour by the stress which the publication of the defamatory statements in the Report had caused her and the effect they had on her capacity to obtain employment. In other words, her loss was caused by the inclusion of the defamatory statements in the report and not by what had been broadcast by the ABC or TVB. For that reason I do not think that either television station is liable for the economic loss which had been incurred by the plaintiff other than for the cost of relocating in Victoria. In respect of the latter loss that should be apportioned equally between the three sets of defendants for the claim of defamation.
These were serious libels. They charged the plaintiff and others at the Christies Beach Shelter with conduct quite inappropriate in any field of employment but the more so in a women's shelter. The allegation of misappropriation of funds was, in effect, an accusation of theft. The allegations of sexual misconduct, intimidation, physical harassment and unprofessional conduct went to the very essence of the plaintiff's employment as Administrator of a women's shelter. When these allegations are viewed as a whole, it is difficult to think of a more serious defamation, particularly of a woman employed in a women's shelter.
The Report received substantial publicity. It was also published among women's shelters. The extent of the publicity must have added to the plaintiff's distress and the damage to her reputation.
It is clear that the plaintiff suffered considerable distress. It seriously affected her health. It still distresses her. She was obviously distressed on two or three occasions in the course of her evidence when recounting particular events. When assessing the effect of the publication of the Report upon the plaintiff's health, I have had regard to the fact that she was recovering from the work-related stress which caused her to be absent on worker's compensation from 26 November, 1986. However, while the plaintiff was vulnerable to any additional stress, the force of these libels was so great that the plaintiff experienced a fresh, substantial, and devastating blow. It caused her to be unfit for work for almost two years. I am satisfied that she is still suffering from the psychiatric effects of the publication, albeit to a lesser extent, and is likely to continue to suffer it for some time. That will diminish in consequence of the completion of this action.
I accept the plaintiff's evidence that she felt that she had been publicly humiliated. The allegations were extensive. These libels charged the plaintiff with conduct which struck directly at the work in which she was engaged. They not only went to the core attributes of the plaintiff's personality and professional competence and as such are very serious allegations: John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586 at 607, but they also attacked her morality and integrity. They were so extensive and lacking in particularity that the plaintiff had no reasonable means of answering them. Her reputation must have been severely affected. For all of those reasons, it was entirely reasonable for the plaintiff to leave South Australia and reside in Victoria. That meant that she lived apart from family and friends who could have provided the emotional and other support she needed at this time.
I find that the plaintiff is an intelligent and resourceful woman and, in every respect, before these events was a person of normal fortitude. She had a belief, engendered by her father, that through political activity she could bring about a just society. That belief was shattered by the events of 11 August, 1987. I find also that she threw herself into her work and was totally committed to the cause of women's shelters. She worked long hours. Before the publication of the Report, the plaintiff had been an outgoing person who enjoyed social interaction. She used to play in a folk band. However, as a result of the publication of the Report, she had become quite reclusive, ashamed to see others apart from close friends and family.
The publication of the Report was a devastating blow and caused her to suffer severe depression. It has left a psychological and an emotional scar. I have carefully scrutinised her account of the emotional and psychological damage to see if it has been exaggerated. I do not think it has. Although she had earlier suffered stress, the major cause of her psychological condition in late 1987 and subsequent years was the publication of the allegations concerning her in the Report.
I am satisfied that the emotional stress caused by the Report still exists, albeit a good deal less debilitating than it was in 1987 and 1988. She stopped seeing Dr Valent in 1991 shortly before she went into business on her own account as a counsellor.
From time to time, the plaintiff returned to Adelaide to see her parents or to attend to business associated with the decision to withdraw funding. That included instructing solicitors in relation to the CAC prosecution, appearing in court in respect of that prosecution, and appearing before the Select Committee. Those visits, which were associated with the Report, reactivated her feelings of depression. After events such as the publication of the Report of the Select Committee, the plaintiff was particularly active for a short time responding to those events. However, she remained depressed.
When assessing the plaintiff's loss, I have had regard to the fact that, had the Report simply recommended withdrawal of funding from the Shelter, say, because of its failure to sign the Financial Agreement, the plaintiff would also have been distressed. However, she would have perceived that as a political battle fought and lost. The distress would have been of quite different kind from the distress suffered by the serious nature of the unsubstantiated allegations and quite minor compared with it.
In my view, the publication of the unsubstantiated allegations was a gross calumny upon the reputation of the plaintiff. She has had to endure it for some 15 years. It calls for a substantial award of damages. I assess damages in the sum of $225,000 for the injury to and vindication of her reputation, for her personal distress and hurt, and for the effect upon her health. It is appropriate to measure separately her economic loss. The plaintiff has lost income while at the same time having to bear the odium of attack upon her reputation. I repeat that, in doing so, I am not twice compensating for loss of reputation.
I am satisfied that the plaintiff would have found it extremely difficult to obtain suitable employment in South Australia. This is an instance where the unfortunate impression left by a libel may last a lifetime: Hill v Church of Scientology (1995) 126 DLR (4th) 129 at 176; see also Ley v Hamilton (1935) 153 LT 384 at 386, where Lord Atkin said "it is impossible to track the scandal, to know what quarters the poison may reach."
For the reasons given earlier, the plaintiff would have returned to work in January 1988. She did not work again until 17 October 1989. She is entitled to be compensated for the loss of earnings in that period. As already mentioned, it was reasonable for the plaintiff to leave South Australia. The most appropriate measure of the plaintiff's loss is, therefore, the salary which the plaintiff received as Co-ordinator of the Outer East Women's Health Service. The only direct evidence of that salary is contained in the plaintiff's group certificates attached to her income tax returns for the years ending 30 June 1990 and 1991. Her salary in 1990 was approximately $678 per week, which increased to about $790 per week in 1991. For the purpose of assessing loss of income in 1988 and 1989, it is appropriate to take the lower of those two figures. The plaintiff's group certificate shows that she was paying approximately $195 per week as income tax. The net income of the plaintiff would therefore have been $483 per week. I allow the plaintiff damages at the rate of $483 per week for 93 weeks, a total of $44,919.
The plaintiff is also entitled to be compensated for the lower level of remuneration she received when employed by the Domestic and Social Violence Service in the ten week period from 17 October to 23 December 1989. Her skills warranted a higher level of remuneration. The Service paid a salary of $495 per week. A fair measure of that loss is the difference between that salary and the salary she received as Co-ordinator of the Outer East Women's Health Service. The plaintiff's group certificate shows that the net income from the Domestic and Social Violence Service was about $393 per week. The difference is therefore $90 per week, producing a loss of $900 for the ten week period.
There are difficulties in assessing the plaintiff's claim for any further economic loss. I think the plaintiff did not understand the manner in which she should present her claim for damages. The evidence shows that she works 25-30 hours per week. Her fees are at a level below the list of fees published by the Australian Association of Social Workers. The plaintiff's fees are $80 per hour. The Association's schedule of fees ranges from $95 per hour for individual work and supervision to $120 for family therapy and $130 per hour for consultancy, education consultancy and group work. There is evidence which suggests the plaintiff only works 25-30 hours per week because her mental resources, affected by the stress she has suffered, do not allow her to work any longer hours in this stressful occupation. Her disability prevents her for undertaking work in the more remunerative area of group counselling. It may be that the plaintiff has a claim for diminished earning capacity based on her mental disability. But she does not make such a claim. Instead, she claims that her experiences in South Australia and the effect of the Report were so widely known that she could not hold down a position in the public sector anywhere in Australia and that she would have received a higher level of remuneration in the public sector.
While I accept that the plaintiff had a perception that she could not obtain, or retain, employment in the public sector, I am not satisfied that in fact she could not have been employed in that sector. The plaintiff was able to obtain employment at the Outer East Women's Service at a senior level. It indicates that she was capable of securing employment at that kind of level. Her perception that there was a political motivation for the review of that Service was not established. I find that it was a false perception on her part but, nevertheless, a perception caused by her mental condition and her extreme sensitivity in consequence of the publication of the Report.
However, her decision to establish her own private practice was caused by her perception as to her inability to be employed. As that false perception was caused by her mental condition, she is entitled to be compensated for a reduction in income. In other words, her mental depression has caused these false perceptions and that in turn has caused her to seek to establish a private practice. The plaintiff's taxable income fell during the first year while she was establishing the practice. It is reasonable to award her compensation for that loss of income. I award $10,000 for that loss.
There are difficulties in assessing the plaintiff's loss thereafter. The plaintiff has structured her financial arrangements to reduce her liability to income tax. She is not to be criticised for that. However, the restructuring of her financial expenses makes it difficult to determine whether the plaintiff has earned less in private practice than she would had she been employed in the public sector. Another difficulty stems from the fact that the plaintiff only works 25-30 hours per week. She has not explained why that is so. She does not claim that her disability prevents her from working longer hours. Those difficulties are further compounded by the evidence of Ms Brennan that the plaintiff has skills which make her employable as a consultant or counsellor in re-training programs, work which could be undertaken by the plaintiff in private practice and which the plaintiff intends to undertake. The plaintiff holds the degree of Bachelor of Social Administration. She is a qualified teacher and has a great deal of experience in social work, predominantly in the field of counselling women who have suffered domestic violence. These skills are equally suitable for employment in the private as well as public sectors. These factors all add to the difficulty of assessing the plaintiff's loss. The absence of evidence on these issues may reflect the plaintiff's difficulties as a layperson in proving all aspects of her claim. However, I cannot proceed in the absence of evidence. For these reasons, it is not possible to identify any further loss in the years 1992 to 1998.
The plaintiff proved the Australian Services Union Crisis Assistance Supported Housing (SA) Award as at 14 June 2001 but that did not carry the position much further. I find that this Award would represent the level of salary paid to employees in a women's shelter. It has six levels of remuneration, the highest being $47,947 per annum. However, there is no evidence whether the highest level represents the salary paid to an Administrator. There is no evidence of the award in earlier years. That fact, combined with the plaintiff's structuring of her financial arrangements, makes it difficult to determine whether the plaintiff earned less than the highest level under the award at least until 1998.
It is apparent that the plaintiff's earning capacity diminished in 1999 and 2000 because of the time she has had to devote to preparing for this trial. In addition, she was unable to conduct her practice whilst engaged in this litigation. That is effectively a period of at least six months. However, I think those losses are too remote to entitle her to be compensated in damages.
The plaintiff tendered a report from Morgan Banks Limited, an executive recruitment agency now called TMP Worldwide Resourcing. That report noted levels of salary which could be earned in fields in which the plaintiff might seek to gain employment. The evidentiary value of the report is very limited. Although it showed that the plaintiff might have been able to earn between $49,000 per annum and $69,000 per annum if employed in a government health service, it did not specify the nature of the position. The report also noted that private practitioners in areas of counselling and psychotherapy holding the plaintiff's qualifications charge between $100 per hour and $150 per hour, a level of fees broadly consistent with those listed in the schedule published by the Australian Association of Social Workers. In the result, the report did not assist.
For the above reasons, it is not possible to assess any future loss of earning capacity.
The plaintiff claims aggravated damages. The defendants who are liable for damages for defamation are liable also for aggravated damages only if it has been established that their conduct was improper, unjustifiable, or lacking in bona fides: Triggell v Pheeney [1951] HCA 23; (1951) 82 CLR 497 at 514; Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd [1991] HCA 10; (1991) 172 CLR 211 per Toohey J at 237 - 238, and has caused harm to the plaintiff. I refer to the comments earlier in these reasons on the issue of malice. The failure of the Review Committee to state all of the relevant facts so that the reader was apprised of the true position and its failure to make any realistic assessment of the unsubstantiated allegations, when the means to do so were available, indicates improper conduct. However, I do not believe it caused any additional loss to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had anticipated that the Report by the Review Committee would be critical of her. In a sense, her expectations were fulfilled. I do not think her extensive suffering as a result of the Report was any greater by reason of the conduct of the Review Committee defendants.
I have also considered whether the plaintiff should be awarded aggravated damages by reason of the plea of justification by the Review Committee defendants other than Ms King. Two particulars were abandoned very early in the trial. The particulars concerning the auditors and the Shelter being inoperative for a protracted period when it shifted premises were persisted in notwithstanding the evidence concerning each, which has already been noted and which was well known to the defendants. However, other particulars were established but they were, in broad terms, limited to the failure of the Shelter to sign the Financial Agreement and the continual deficits of the Shelter. With a good deal of hesitation, I find that the plaintiff is not entitled to aggravated damages on this ground because the compensatory damages have been assessed in regard to the continuing harm of the damage to the plaintiff's reputation: cf Coyne v Citizen Finance Ltd at 237 - 238. A further reason for this conclusion is that aggravated damages are intended to compensate the plaintiff, not punish a defendant.
The plaintiff also claims exemplary damages for the defamation. There is a good deal which suggests that the conduct of the Review Committee defendants was so reprehensible that exemplary damages should be awarded, particularly as grounds existed on which to withdraw funding without descending to a personal attack on the plaintiff and other members of the staff and management committee of the Shelter. However, as Lord Devlin noted in Rookes v Barnard, exemplary damages will only be awarded if the award of compensatory damages is inadequate to punish the defendant for his or her outrageous conduct. The award in this case is adequate punishment for the outrageous conduct of the defendants.
For these reasons, I do not award either aggravated or exemplary damages for the defamation.
The plaintiff is also entitled to be compensation by Dr Cornwall for the loss she incurred in consequence of his misfeasance in a public office. The injury to her reputation and her economic loss and consequence of that wrong has been compensated by the award of damages in defamation. There is no other identifiable loss for which she should be compensated for this wrong. In the circumstances, I think the appropriate course is to require that Dr Cornwall be jointly liable for the damages and defamation. It is possible also to make an award of either aggravated or exemplary damages: Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulatory [2001] UKHL 29; [2001] 3 All ER 193. It is not appropriate to award aggravated damages but I think an award of exemplary damages should be made to mark the disapproval of Dr Cornwall's abuse of his position, to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter others from like conduct: Rookes v Barnard [1964] UKHL 1; [1964] AC 1129 per Lord Devlin at 1228. Awards of exemplary damages ought to be moderate: Rookes v Barnard per Lord Devlin at 1227 - 1228. I think an award of $25,000.00 is appropriate.
In addition, the plaintiff has suffered other pecuniary loss which I call special damages, not in the sense of that expression in the law of slander, but in the sense of that expression when contrasted with general damages.
The plaintiff consulted a number of medical practitioners and chiropractors. She claims the cost of those consultations. However, her claim includes costs which are either too remote or not caused by the stress she suffered. The medical, paramedical and pharmaceutical expenses listed below are those which I find were caused by the stress.
The plaintiff also incurred substantial expense in fees to counsellors and psychotherapists. She was also consulting psychiatrists at the same time. In addition, some of the fees for counselling seemed to have been incurred after 1991. I think by then she had made a substantial recovery as is evidenced by the fact that she had resumed employment. Another difficulty with the fees for counselling is that the accounts have not been produced. I do not in any sense discount the fact that the plaintiff may have suffered considerably and for that reason was seeking whatever assistance was available to her. Nevertheless, I do not think that the fees to counsellors can be allowed in the absence of proof as to the need for them and proof of the amount. Neither was forthcoming. I have no alternative but to discount the claims for fees to counsellors and psychotherapists. On the same basis, I do not allow fees for attending a retreat organised by a church.
The medical and paramedical fees which are allowed are as follows.
In addition, I allow $650.00 for pharmaceutical expenses.
After deciding to leave South Australia and reside in Victoria, the plaintiff sold her house in Adelaide and purchased the house in which she now resides at St Andrews. I find that the costs of selling the house in South Australia and acquiring another and the associated removal costs were caused by the events of August, 1987 and are not too remote. It is quite reasonable for a person who has been publicly humiliated to reside in another place. Some of the costs were not formally proved but the amounts claimed are plainly reasonable and I allow them. Those which were not strictly proved are marked "(est.)", meaning estimated. I allow the costs of relocation as follows.
The plaintiff claims the cost of airfares between Adelaide and Melbourne. She estimates that she travelled to and from Melbourne on 44 occasions. She claims one-half of $300 per trip. There are no details of when these flights were made. There is no detailed proof of the cost. A good number of those trips would have been associated with the prosecution of this action. They are more properly recoverable on a taxation of costs. Some would have been associated with the CAC prosecution and the appearances before the Select Committee. They are either not caused by the Report or are too remote. For these reasons, I do not allow the claim for airfares.
The plaintiff also claims for telephone, stationery and office expenses. These are costs associated with a prosecution of her claim and are more properly to be recovered on a taxation of costs.
The total award of damages payable to the plaintiff is
- Compensation for reduced earnings Oct - Dec 1989
- Loss of income while establishing private practice
The plaintiff is also entitled to interest. I will hear the parties on that question and on the terms of the order.
ROWAN
CORNWALL & ORS
- Bill of Rights, 1689 Article IX;
- Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 56 s 64;
- Supported Accommodation Assistance Act 1995 (Cth) ;
- Associations Incorporation Act 1956 (SA) ;
- Associations Incorporation Act 1985 (SA) s 35, s 57;
- Community Welfare Act 1972 (SA) s 11, s 12, s 13, s 235a;
- Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 38;
- Crown Proceedings Act 1972 (SA) s 5, s 10;
- Government Management and Employment Act 1985 (SA) s 78;
- Ombudsman Act 1972 (SA) s 18;
- Public Sector Management Act 1985 (SA) s 74;
- Workers Compensation Act 1971 ;
- Wrongs Act 1936 s 7, s 11, referred to.
- Adam v Ward [1917] AC 309;
- Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Comalco Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 510;
- Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren [1966] HCA 37; ;
(1986) 12 FCR 510
(1966) 117 CLR 185
(1968) 119 CLR 222
(1996) 185 CLR 183
(1987) 47 SASR 119
(1993) 178 CLR 44
(1998) 193 CLR 519
(1991) 103 ALR 499
(1983) 49 ALR 123
(1983) 78 FLR 449
(1991) 172 CLR 211
(1918) 25 CLR 234
(1982) 151 CLR 342
(1970) 16 FLR 174
(1910) 12 CLR 84
(1928) 41 CLR 254
(1910) 11 CLR 361
(1985) 159 CLR 550
(1986) 4 NSWLR 536
(1997) 189 CLR 520
(1992) 38 FCR 400
(1979) 141 CLR 632
(1995) 185 CLR 307
(1988) 81 ALR 288
(1976) 16 SASR 284
(1982) 150 CLR 500
(1992) 57 SASR 224
(1998) 196 CLR 329
(1995) 182 CLR 1
(1986) 5 NSWLR 425
(1908) 6 CLR 1
(2001) 75 ALJR 1570
(1975) 134 CLR 1
(1985) 157 CLR 424
(1994) 182 CLR 104
(1960) 108 CLR 158
(1993) 113 FLR 254
(1988) 19 FCR 223
(1957) 97 CLR 202
(1999) 200 CLR 1
(1982) 30 SASR 50
(1998) 195 CLR 424
(1978) 148 CLR 438
(1904) 2 CLR 78
(1982) 150 CLR 113
(1997) 69 SASR 440
(1991) 24 NSWLR 305
(1987) 10 NSWLR 708
(1989) 16 NSWLR 485
(1990) 20 NSWLR 42
(1982) 149 CLR 293
(1992) 26 NSWLR 114
(1999) 198 CLR 180
(1998) 192 CLR 330
(2000) 76 SASR 450
(1978) 142 CLR 1
(1996) 39 NSWLR 32
(1996) 186 CLR 574
(1980) 32 ALR 570
(1951) 82 CLR 497
(1994) 182 CLR 211
(1986) 5 NSWLR 18
(1987) 8 NSWLR 116
(1928) 41 CLR 331
(1998) 19 WAR 440
(1987) 148 CLR 438