//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[1904] HCA 37
High Court of Australia
1904-07-01
Original judgment source is linked above.
GODHARD ; . ' 'i A APPEL! PLAINTIFF, AND JAMES INGLIS & Co. Lrp.. 3 2 . RESPONDED DEFENDANTS.
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES.
H.C. oF A. Defamation - Libel - Attack upon a class of persons - Action by a member of 1904, class, unknown to the defendants - Intention of defendants to refer to the pla
cain i The writer of matter defamatory of a class of persons, personally unkn
Nov, 28,20. him, but so described that their identity is apparent to everybody knows them and is familiar with the circumstances, is liable in an action"
'The defendants published a defamatory article, directed against companies, known as coupon companies, and the persons responsible for management, but making no direct reference to the plaintiff, who sole director and principal shareholder in one of the largest of these At the trial the defendants' manager, the writer of the article, stated article was intended to be a criticism of the system followed by the compan
those who were carrying on the business, He went on to say that, wrote the article, he was not aware that the plaintiff was in any way ted with coupon companies, though he knew of the existence of the partiet company to which the plaintiff belonged, 'The Judge directed the jury
the plaintiff must prove that the writer of the libel had the plaintiff in inind when he wrote the article, and intended it to refer to the plain that if the writer knew nothing of the plaintiff, and had no intentio
applying the article to him, they must find for the defendants.
Held, that this was a misdirection, as it was immaterial in such whether or not the defendant, when he published the libel, had in his the individuality of the plaintiff.
Where there has been an erroneous direction which may have been the H. ©. or A.
foundation of the jury's verdict, and it is impossible to say whether the verdict proceeded upon the erroneous direction, or upon the ground that, under all the circumstances, the libel was justified, there must be a new trial,
Semble, where the words of an alleged libel do not unambiguously refer to James INGris the plaintiff, the defendant may call witnesses to prove that they read the & Co. Lip.
libel, and did not understand it to refer to the plaintiff. Decision of the Supreme Court, (1904) 4 S.R. (N.S. W.), 327, reversed,
AppEAL from a decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1).
This was an action for written defamation published in a trade newspaper or pamphlet. The appellant, who was plaintiff in the action, was the sole director and principal shareholder in a joint stock company, called the Co-operative Coupon Company, the business of which appears to have consisted of issuing to retail shopkeepers coupons for which they paid the company at the rate of twenty-five shillings per thousand. The retailer gave one coupon to the customer for every sixpence worth of goods bought, and the customer, when he had collected a certain number of coupons, took them to the premises of the Coupon Company, where they were exchanged for goods of the retail value of 2s. 6d. for each hundred coupons. There were several companies of the kind in New South Wales, besides that of which the appellant was the manager, and there were some differences in the ways in which the various companies carried on the business. The libel referred to those companies which carried on the business on the system followed by the Co-operative Com- pany, which was apparently the principal company of the kind in the State.
The defendants were a firm of tea merchants, of which James Inglis, the writer of the libel, was the manager. The libel con- sisted of an article in the following words : -
" As long ago as September, 1901, Mr. Waddell, the treasurer, in reply to an influential deputation representative in the fullest sense of both the retail and wholesale grocery trade, and in- cluding leading men from Neweastle and other centres, promised faithfully to have a bill brought in within a few weeks to
give relief to honest traders, and remove the pernicious ineul of the coupon system, as has been done in Victoria, Tasman and many other States in America and elsewhere. So far Gover ment has done nothing. Now the evil is rapidly spreading, coupon system is now encroaching on butchers' shops and oth retail trades. No doubt it is an ingenious, clever system. Ii so plausible, so specious, So Jamblike, and so innocent, until th inevitable and inescapable pinching and squeezing begins. appeals to the ineradicable love of a bargain, of getting somethin for nothing, which is so dear to the female mind. It is an al solute truth that the coupon manipulators, the erafty crew, be th Yank or Dago, Pagan, Philistine, Gentile or Jew, who pull wires, make enormous profits. Now where do these profits con from? Who is responsible for them? Ask yourselves. Pond facts. It is an incontrovertible fact that the storekeeper isa lo We know of both butchers and grocers who pay from £30 to monthly to the coupon task-master, and have nothing tangibl show for it in return. The values of the so-called free gifts ot prizes are unspeakably incommensurate with the prices paid fi coupons. The whole thing is one-sided, unjust, and an impud tax on honest, struggling traders, and on gullible, compla people. Powerful vested interests are springing up around thi unwholesome traftic. It is time traders as a body roused selves, and, in spite of tiddley-winkin' commissions, subsidies advertisement, or more open palm-greasing, insist on Parliam sweeping the evil out of existence."
The declaration alleged, by innuendo, that the libel referred the plaintiff, and that it charged him with dishonest and di reputable practices, with obtaining money from retail traders b extortion and oppression, with tricking and deceiving person who were entitled to receive goods from the Coupon Company and with bribery and corruption. The defendant compam pleaded not guilty.
At the trial before Darley C.J., a great number of wit gave evidence on both sides. The learned Chief Justice directed the jury that they ought to find for the defendants, if Inglis, the time he wrote the alleged libel, had not the plaintiff in h mind, nor any intention of applying it to him. The jury foun a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff then moved the Full Court consisting of Darley ° CJ., Owen J., and Pring J., for a rule nisi for a new trial on
The material parts of the defendant's evidence sufficiently
Wise K.C., and Brissenden (with them, Want K.C.), for the appellant. The direction of the Judge referred to in the first ground was erroneous, and a rule nisi should have been granted on 'that ground. The only material question for the jury was 'whether the libel was capable of referring to the plaintiff and
was taken to refer to him. It was altogether immaterial that "the writer of the libel did not know the plaintiff to be the "manager of the company, or that he did not intend it to refer "to the plaintiff personally. The libel was admittedly directed
a man into hatred, ridicule, or contempt is actionable. It is answer to say that the writer did not intend to do any injury the writing is taken Ly everybody who reads it to refer to t plaintiff.
It isa question for the jury whether the words have b reasonably taken to refer to the plaintiff. Words may be acti able though not intended to injure. Malice is implied from ¢ doing of the wrongful act: Bromage v. Prosser (1); Hai Wilson (2); Fisker v. Clement (3). The words of the libel m be looked at, and the intention of the writer gathered from Wakley v. Healey (4); Folkard on Libel and Slander, 6th ed, 464; American Encyclopedia of Law, vol. 13, p. 385; Capi and Counties Bank v. Henty (5). Every person is presumed intend the natural consequence of his acts. The natural con quence of this libel was to injure the plaintiff in the minds of the who knew him to belong to the class of persons attacked. Le v. Maleolmson (6), wpon which Darley C.J.,and the Full C relied, is not in point. In that case the libel referred only some persons of a particular class, and therefore it was neces to establish by evidence that the plaintiffs, who belonged to class, were amongst those referred to. That question could | arise here, because the writer of the libel admitted that he inten to attack the whole of the class to which the plaintiff belong
Evidence should not have been admitted that some persons read the article did not understand it to refer to the plaintiff. is not a contradiction of the evidence of the witnesses call prove that they understood the article to refer to the plaintiff
[O'Connor J - No. But is it not material evidence on question whether the plaintiff's witnesses should be believed that point, and also as to the reasonableness of the infere which they drew from the words of the libel 7]
No case is to be found in the reports in which such evi has been given, nor do the text-book writers anywhere me it as open to a defendant.
Pilcher K.C. and Blacket (with Gannon) for the respond
(1) 4B. &C., 2 (4) 7 C.B., 591. (2) 9B. &C. (5) 7 App. Cas., 741. (3) 10B. & C, (6) 1 HLL.C., 687.
If the Court is of opinion, considering all the evidence, that the H. ©. or A. case, if tried again, must have the same result, a new trial should 1904. not be granted. PETS. [Grirrirx C.J. - If the direction was wrong, there must be a jiiesd tae new trial, unless we are satisfied that the direction was altogether & Co. Lrv. immaterial, and could not have affected the jury's verdict.] The article dealt with a matter of public interest, and, there- fore may be justifiable as comment, even though unnecessarily severe. It was a criticism upon the system, and must inevitably reflect upon those who are responsible for the system. If it is _ fair comment, or bond fide opinion, those who suffer cannot complain: E£astwood vy. Holmes (1); Lutimer v. Western Morn- ing News Co. {2). The defendants are entitled to assume that the jury found the question of fair comment in their favour. [O'Connor J. - The difficulty is that we are not in a position to say whether they did so or not, because, in arriving at their verdict, they may have been influenced by the ruling that is objected to. ] The direction was not wrong, in view of the particular cireum- stances of the case. The libel, though capable of referring to the plaintiff, did not do so in terms, and therefore evidence of identity was necessary. To rebut the plaintiff's evidence, the defendant may give evidence that the plaintiff was not in fact intended, and that persons reading the article did not take it to refer to him. It is then a question for the jury, whether in fact the plaintiff was one of the persons against whom the attack was directed; Le Fanw vy. Maleolmson (3); Lawrence v. New- berry (4); Odgers, Libel and Slander, 3rd ed., p. 137. (Grirrita C.J. - In Le Fanw vy. Malecolmson the words were "some factories," but here it is clear that the words used refer generally to the persons who carry on the system. That being so, must not all such persons be the persons " intended ?" O'Coynor J. - Does not the article refer on the face of it to all these persons 7] That was left to the jury, and they have found for the defend- ants. The whole summing up should be looked at, and, if the
(1) 1 F. & £., 347. (3) 1 HLL.C., 637, at p. 664. (2) 5 L.T., NS., 44. (4) 64 L.T., N.S, 797.
H.C. or A. general substance is a proper direction, it does not matter that 1904. isolated passage may seem to inaccurately state the question
haa the jury: Merivale v. Carson (1). The Judge is not bound to 4 Tages tentnn Oey direction that he is asked to give. In the present
&Co. Lrv. refused to give the direction asked for, because he had alre properly directed the jury in the terms of the judgment in Fanu v. Malcolmson (2). The system was shown at the to be as bad as it was alleged to be in the libel, and there personal attack upon individuals, except in so far as they part of the system attacked. The defendants have therefo justified their comment, and on that ground no reasonable j could give more than nominal damages. A new trial sho therefore be refused because a verdict for anything more th nominal damages would be set aside as excessive; Vidal Temperley (3), Griffith v. Johnson and others (4), Taba Tipper (5), South Hetton Coal Company v. North Eastern Nei Association Limited (6). Even if the damages are not nomi they must be small, under £300, at any rate, and in such a case plaintiff would not be entitled to appeal without special
(GrirritH C.J. How can we say that the damages must less than £300? We do not know what the jury thought of tl defence of fair comment.]
Wise K.C. in reply, dealt with the evidence, and referred Latimer v. Western Morning News (7). This is not a case fo nominal damages. The verdict should be either for the defen ant on the ground of fair comment, or for the plaintiff with t stantial damages.
If the Court is of opinion that the direction was wrong, th : must be a new trial: Bray v. Ford (8).
Edmonds (9).) Cur. adv. ay 200.8 5, at p. 281. a) 1804) 1 QB, 133. é A 5 L.T. (N.S.), 44. (3) 20 N.S.W., LR, (L.) 293, 4) (1896) ee 2 (4) 20 N.S.W., W.N. 40. (9) 2 App. Cas., 487, at p. 507.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by H.C or A.
GrirritH C.J. This was an action for written defamation | published in a trade newspaper or pamphlet. Gouameto
[His Honor then stated the facts as set out above and pro- yi. tous ceeded :] & Co. Lrp.
The plea of not guilty put in issue the questions whether the is Pesenbes matter was defamatory, whether it applied to the plaintiff, and whether its publication was justifiable under the circumstances, as fair comment upon a matter of public interest.
As to the first question, whether the matter was defamatory, no question arises, but as to the third, that is, whether the publi- cation was justified under the circumstances, a great deal of evidence was given, upon which, it was conceded by counsel, a verdict might have been given either way. But the difficulty that arises before us is as to the question whether the libel applied to the plaintiff or not, that is to say, whether it was published of and concerning him. Upon that it will be convenient first to refer briefly to the language of the libel itself. The article complained of is a criticism of the system upon which what are called coupon companies are managed. [His Honor then read the greater part of the article, which is set out above, and proceeded :]
Bearing in mind that this was a business carried on by a joint stock company, and that the business of such a company can only be carried on by individuals, it is clear that the article was capable of referring to the persons who were engaged in the business of carrying on this particular company. Even if there were any doubt whether it did as a matter of fact apply to those persons, it would be quite sufficient that it was capable of apply- ing to them, because it would be for the jury to say whether it did refer to them, in the sense of being directed at the individuals who managed the business, as well as at the company under whose name the business was carried on. As to what the article was intended by the defendants to mean, no question can arise, because the defendant Inglis, in his own evidence, in cross- examination, admitted that he knew of the existence of the company ; indeed that was not disputed. He said: "When I said ' tiddley-winkin' commissions I meant commissions unfair
H.C. or A. and not straightforward. By 'palm-greasing' I mean givi presents to persons to make them hold their tongues. I me that the company itself was doing this, and its servi employés, and others. I mean the same thing when I spe . the manipulators - the promoters of the business - those who carrying it on." The defendant therefore says, what the jury mig have inferred without his admission, that this article was inte to apply to the persons who carried on the business. That distinct admission by the manager of the defendant company, says that he was the writerofthe article. There can be no q therefore who were the persons to whom he intended to that is to say, the owners or promoters of the business, those were carrying iton. The matter was therefore, as the jury mig have found, defamatory, and defamatory of the persons engag the business. The defendant Inglis went on to say that he did know anything about the plaintiff being connected with the eo pany, that his attack was upon the persons who carried ont business, but that he was not personally aware that the plaintiff w
were not responsible to the plaintiff for the publication of libel, that is to say, that it could not be said to have been publi of and concerning the plaintiff, inasmuch as the writer knowledge that the plaintiff personally was one of the perst concerned in what he describes as a nefarious business. learned Chief Justice purported to direct the jury in accord with the decision in the case of Le Fanu v. Malcolmson (1), he read to the jury portion of the judgment in that case as of his summing up. According to His Honor's notes of whatt place at the trial, the learned counsel for the plaintiff asked h to tell the jury that it was immaterial whether the defenda Inglis intended to refer to the plaintiff or not, if the article ¥ in fact capable of being, and was, understood by persons readi it, to refer to him. "I refused," he says, "to do this, as Ih directed the jury that the plaintiff must prove that the words written and published by the defendant company of and cone ing the plaintiff, and were intended by the defendants to to the plaintiff" In one sense that direction is, I think, (1) 1 H.L.C., 637.
free from objection. It was contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that it does not matter who is the person to whom the writer of a defamatory article intends it to refer, pro- vided that the words he uses are capable of referring to the plaintiff, and witnesses are called to prove that they understood them to refer to him. On that point he referred us to the case of Bromage v. Prosser (1) and other cases, but in those cases it was held that, it being conceded that the plaintiff was the person spoken of, the de- fendant could not say that he did not intend to defame him, or do him any injury, when he used the words complained of. But it does not by any means follow, when the question is, who is the person spoken of, that the defendant can say that he did not mean to refer to the plaintiff at all. During the argument I gave this illustration. A defendant publishes defamatory matter concern- inga man A. B., which might or might not be justified. Some other person named A. B., or friends of his, mistakenly think that the publication refers to him, and he brings an action. As at present advised, I am disposed to think that an action would not lie. The apparent reference to the second A. B., would in that case be an accident. If a man is doing a lawful act in speaking of A. B., that is to say, publishes defamatory matter of him which he is justified in publishing, it would be a very strange thing if his act should become unlawful because one of his hearers or readers misunderstood his reference. The direction which the learned Judge was asked by counsel to give, was therefore erron- eous, and the direction given to the jury "that the plaintiff must prove that the words were written of and concerning him, and were intended by the defendant company to apply to the plain- tiff," is in one sense perfectly correct. If the person defamed in the article was not the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot complain. But that applies only where the question is, was it the plaintiff or somebody else of whom the defamatory matter was published. For the purpose of that inquiry it may be conceded that the matter in question is defamatory,and that the question is/who was the person defamed, was it the plaintiff or somebody else? For that purpose the identity of the plaintiff may be proved in the same way as in other cases, as for instance in criminal cases. But, though the words of the learned Judge's direction are in one sense perfectly (1) 4B. & C., 247.
H.C. oF A. correct, it is clear, when the whole summing up is read, and 1904. taken in conjunction with the circumstances of the case as diselo es in the evidence, that his words were not used in that sense, n Tames ixerzs 2 the sense that it was necessary, before the plaintiff would I &Co. Lzp. entitled to a verdict, to prove that the writer of the article hs the plaintiff personally in his mind, not merely as some unknoy person who came within the category of manipulators, &e., bu as an individual member of society, the man, Godhard. It i quite clear from the passages read to us from the summing up the learned Judge, and it is not indeed disputed, that he state amongst other things, that the defendant must be shown to hay had the plaintiff in his mind when he wrote the article, the plaintiff could recover. He says: "If he had not him in hi mind when he wrote it, . . . the question is whether he kne that the plaintiff was connected withthe company . . . if yo think Inglis says truly that he knew nothing of Godhard, am had no intention of applying it to him, you must find for defendants . . . if you think that the defendant on the oth hand, intended a personal attack upon Godhard, the latter i entitled to a verdict," and His Honor adds, "I directed the jur that the defendant must have had Godhard in his mind when h wrote the article." The question raised, therefore, is whether th writer of matter defamatory of persons who are unknown t him, but are so described in the article that their identity is apparent to everybody familiar with the circumstances, is entitle to go free. For that position the learned Chief Justice relied o the case of Le Fanu vy. Maleolmson (1). That was an action for brought in Ireland. There were several counts in the declaration of which the second count alleged a libel beginning thus: " person, unless one who is perfectly acquainted with the worki of the Irish factories, can form the slightest idea of cruelties and miseries to which the Irish factory hands are subj I know some factories in this country, and the cruelty which the operatives in them are used is really incredible The plaintiffs, who were the owners of a factory in Ireland, alleg by innuendo that by the words "gome factories" the defend intended to refer to them. There were five counts, and the j
gave a general verdict in favour of plaintiff, so that, if any count H.C. oF a. was bad, the whole verdict fell and error was brought on the Be ground that the second count was demurrable. The question that Gopuarp was argued before the House of Lords was whether the charge, 5.4. Ixeus that in some factories "the cruelty with which operatives were & Co. Lr. treated was incredible" could by innuendo be made to apply to the plaintiffs. A number of ancient cases and authorities were cited, in which defamatory words had been published that were ambiguous in their terms. For instance one was an action on the words "my enemy," and it was held that it could not be proved what was meant by "my enemy." In another case the words were "I know one near about J. S. that is a notorious thief," as to which it was held that it could not be established by innuendo who was referred to. In another case, in 1 Ro. Ab., 81, the words were "one of my brothers," in which it was said that no particular brother could bring an action. Whether these cases should now be treated as good law it is not material for us to consider, but the point raised was, as I have stated, that, the words "some factories" hav- ing been used, the plaintiffs, as owners of a factory, could not prove that theirs was one of the factories meant by that term. Tt was not disputed, or questioned in any way, that if the plain- tiffs' factory was one of the class referred to, the plaintiffs, as the owners of the factory could maintain the action. It did
. the Irish factory hands are subject. I know some factories -
perfectly acquainted with the working of the Zrish factories e form any, the slightest, idea of the cruelties and miseries to whi
this country ; and the cruelty with which the operatives in are used is really incredible. The cruelties of the slave trade o the Bastille are not equal to those practised in some of the In
Now, pausing there, the question for the jury in the prese case, if the opinion of Lord Cottenham is followed, would be, * Di the defendants in the defamatory publication allude to the p tiff's company ?" That was all the jury found in that were asked to find; but in this case that matter is not in ¢ troversy at all, because the defendant Inglis admitted in evidence that he did intend to refer to the plaintiff's comp and its owners and managers. The Lord Chancellor then w on, after referring to the finding of the jury (1): "In state the question arose below, and arises here, whether'the jud ment founded upon that verdict can be maintained on such declaration ; that is to say, where terms are used which must h reference to some one (for the term 'some of the Irish fa must evidently apply to some Zrish factories); and the inn is that the words do apply to the plaintiff's factory ; and jurors have found that that innuendo is true, and that plaintiffs, who are the proprietors and owners of a facto
Ireland, were the persons meant. If a party can pul libel so framed as to describe individuals, though not n them, and not specifically describing them by any exp form of words, but still so describing them that it is who they are, as the jurors have found it to be here, those who must be acquainted with the circumstances con with the party described may also come to the same conelus and may have no doubt that the writer of the libel intended mean those individuals, it would be opening a very wide di defamation, if parties suffering all the inconvenience of b libelled were not permitted to have that protection which the}
affords. If they are so described that they are known to all their neighbours as being the parties alluded to, and if they are able to prove to the satisfaction of a jury that the party writing the libel did intend to allude to them, it would be unfortunate to find the law in a state which would prevent the party being protected against such libels." Again, after referring to the authorities, and, in particular to the case of Solomon y. Lawson (1), which had been referred to in the argument as containing the existing law on the subject, he says (2) "that being the only case in support of the argument, that the individual libelled must be expressly named, or unmistakably referred to, and, there being, I believe, a very general practice to the contrary, I cannot think the proposition is at all established, that under the circumstances of this case the innuendo found to be proved by the jury is not sufficient to entitle the party to the remedy he asks." Lord Campbell said (3): "The first objection which has been relied on by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, who certainly has argued the case with his usual ability, and has brought forward all the arguments that learning and talent could supply; the first objection is that this libel applies to a class of persons, and that therefore an individual cannot apply it to himself.
"Now, I am of opinion that this is contrary to all reason, and is not supported by-any authority. It may well happen that the singular number is used; and where a class is described, it may very well be that the slander refers to a particular individual. That is a matter of which evidence is to be laid before the jury, and the jurors are to determine whether, whena class is referred to, the individual who complains that the slander applied to him, is, in point of fact, justified in making such complaint. That is clearly a reasonable principle, because whether a man is called by one name, or whether he is called by another, or whether he is described by a pretended description of a class to which he is known to belong, if those who look on, know well who is aimed at, the very same injury is inflicted, the very same thing is in fact done as would be done if his name and christian name were ten times repeated."
(1) 8 Q.B., 823. (2) 1 H.L.C., 637, at p. 666. (3) 1 H.L.C., 637, at p. 667.
H.C. or A. These are parts of the judgment from which the learned ( 1904. Justice read a passage to the jury, but he appears to have Wekckecs preted it to mean that a person who publishes defamatory mi rv _ is not liable unless he has the individual plaintiff in his mind "eee. neds zi the object of his attack. But the injury, as was pointed out. Lord Campbell, is done if a man is pointed out in such a way t any reader of the article may know who it is that is being attack The injury is done just as much as if he had been named, and: fact that the defendant does not know who is the person to his designation applies, can make no difference. A man makes an attack upon an individual by a description which distinctly to that individual, is not entitled to excuse himself saying: "I did not know that he was the man." Some busi are carried on anonymously, and if a person carrying on such business were attacked unwarrantably, it would surely be excuse for the defendant to say, when sued, "I did not know plaintiff, I never saw him before." To apply the lang Lord Cottenham again, " There being, I believe, a very gen practice to the contrary, and common sense being entirely to th contrary," I cannot see that there is any necessity for the in vidual libelled to be expressly named in order to entitle him the remedy he asks. It seems to us, therefore, in the pre case, to be quite immaterial that no person is mentioned by nam since, if the person who has been defamed can be identified the words used, in such a manner that nobody can have any in fact that he is meant, an action will lie. Here there can b doubt who are the persons meant. The defendants meant t attack those who carried on the business of the Coupon Compan of whom the plaintiff was the chief. How then can it be mate whether the writer knew his name, or had him personally in |} mind? The point seems to have been altogether irrelevant, an as it is possible that the verdict of the jury went on that g we are, we think, bound to grant a new trial. It may be that tl verdict went on the ground that the publication of the libel justifiable under all the circumstances, but it is impossible for u to say whether that was so or not. Where there has been 4 erroneous direction, which may have been the foundation of th verdict, there is no alternative but to grant a new trial.
GopHarp Appeal allowed with costs. Rule absolute Were
for a new trial with costs. Costs of the © Co. Lap. first trial to abide the event.
Solicitors, for appellant, R. W. Thompson & Ash. Solicitors, for respondents, Parish & Ebsworth.
Ex parte MATTHEWS. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES.
Turiadiction of High Court to entertain appeals from decisions of Supreme Cowts WO, oF A. pronounced before establishment of Commonwealth.
'The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from a decision < - - ~ of the Supreme Court of a State pronounced before the establishment of the parc 17 Commonwealth.
Griffith C.J., Motion for special leave to appeal from a decision of the Supreme Connor Jv.
Court of New South Wales pronounced on 27th May, 1887.
Per Curiam. The High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain
appeals from decisions of the Supreme Courts pronounced before