11 (The quantities specified in the schedule and, unless the contrary is stated, in these reasons, are "pure" quantities.)
12 The severity of the penalties prescribed speaks with unmistakable clarity of the seriousness with which Parliament views importation of the drugs mentioned. Sitting as a judge in this Court and at first instance, and seeing the lives wrecked by addiction to drugs and, in the case of victims, wrecked or lost because of the desperate or irrational actions of persons addicted, one can readily appreciate Parliament's concerns.
13 It is also appropriate to recognise that an increase in the (pure) quantity of a particular drug is calculated, by increasing the number or strength of street deals into which it can be cut, to increase the damage done by it. An increase in quantity is calculated to increase also the profits made by those importing.
14 On 16 November 2006, the Respondent to this Crown appeal was convicted on a charge of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the importation of a number of tablets incorporating 34.8 kgs. of methylamphetamine on or about 12 October 2005. The wholesale value of the drugs was at least $5,000,000. On 2 February 2007 he was sentenced by Judge Woods to imprisonment for 17 years including a non-parole period of 10½ years.
15 The drugs arrived in Australia concealed in a speedboat contained in a 40ft shipping container. From October or November 2005 until 6 February when he succeeded, the Respondent engaged in efforts to secure the release of the speedboat from the Customs, shipping and other bodies into whose control such objects fall on importation. Hall J has set out most of the details of the Respondent's actions and I need not repeat most of what his Honour has said. I would, however, add that that the Respondent's actions and conversations revealed him to be an enthusiastic supporter of the enterprise which, according to him, he understood to involve stolen gold and jewellery. Those actions included urging a co-offender Bui to obtain funds with which to pay various charges in terms which included: "We can't just let go at this stage, come on", "It will be big trouble if the husband of the other woman found out we're not collecting it", "You know many people, brother. Can you ask around and see?", "If we let go, we'll get nothing.", and "Why don't you … borrow it from someone?", and engaging others to undertake some of the work involved in receipt of the boat and the removal of the drugs therefrom.
16 Some other features stand out. The Respondent's evidence and pre-sentence report reveal that his sole motivation was the money or reward he could derive from his efforts. A second is Judge Woods' finding that the Respondent played the principal role in Australia, albeit Bui was a more highly placed principal.
17 In Wong and Leung v R [2001] 207 CLR 584 at [31] and [69] it was pointed out that the extent of an offender's knowledge of the quantity or purity of the drugs the subject of the importation may well be relevant. As commonly occurs in the case of offenders who deny liability and whose offending is only discovered after the drugs are intercepted by Customs Authorities, the evidence as to this is limited. Consistently with the Respondent's version that he understood what was being imported was gold and diamonds he gave no evidence on this topic. However, while there is no direct evidence to the effect the Respondent knew the precise quantity or purity involved, he did know the following:-
That the boat had been imported in a 40 feet container. The Respondent said that he thought the boat was big enough to sleep in.
That the drugs were concealed in three places which were sketched for him. One of these places is on the centreline aft of what appears to be depicted as the windscreen or front of a cabin and appears to occupy a rough square the sides of which are something of the order of one-fifth of the depicted beam of the boat. The other 2 areas are to port and starboard and largely aft of this. In length, each equals about 40% of the depicted length of the boat.
18 Even allowing for inaccuracies in the sketch, the Respondent thus knew that whatever was being imported occupied a substantial amount of space. There is no evidence that the Respondent knew the purity of the drug. However, in light of the knowledge of the Respondent to which I have just referred, the appropriate inference is that the Respondent either did have a fair idea of what was involved or alternatively he did not care, being content to assist whatever the quantity and purity was.
19 I turn to the question of what the appropriate sentence range of sentences within which the Respondent's should have fallen. The commencing point in any consideration of an appropriate sentence for a statutory offence is the statute itself. "In determining the proper penalty … the fundamental consideration is rather the degree by which, having regard to the maximum penalties provided by the Act in question, the Respondent's conduct would offend against the legislative objective of suppressing the illicit traffic in the prohibited drug" - R v Peel (1971) 1 NSWLR 247 at 262.
20 That degree in this case was very substantial. The Respondent was a major cog in the enterprise. The quantity 34.8 kilograms, almost 50 times the quantity Parliament selected as taking an offence outside the trafficable and into the commercial range was, relative to the statutory proscription, huge. In so characterising the matter, I do not ignore the fact that there have been, and may be again, importations much larger. Given the open ended nature of the measurement of commercial quantities, that is hardly surprising. However, it is necessary to measure the Respondent's offending primarily against the statutory provision rather than the offending of others that might be worse. As the High Court said in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1987-1988) 164 CLR 465 at 478:-
"… The maximum penalty prescribed for an offence is intended for cases falling within the worst category of cases for which that penalty is prescribed: Ibbs v R (1987) 163 CLR 477 at p451-2. That does not mean that a lesser penalty must be imposed if it is possible to envisage a worst case; ingenuity can always conjure up a case of greater heinousness. A sentence which imposes the maximum penalty offends this principal only if the case is recognisably outside the worst category."
21 In R v Wong (1999) 48 NSWLR 340 a five member bench of this Court reviewed a very large number of prior decisions dealing with drug importation and sought to specify guidelines for the benefit of sentencing judges in the future. To the extent to which the Court undertook that latter task, its decision was overruled - see Wong and Leung v R [2001] 207 CLR 584. Nevertheless, this Court's decision is still instructive for the summary it provides of the result of previous decisions (as is, if I may say so, an earlier and in some respects more detailed review I had conducted in R v Spiteri (1999) NSWCCA 3).
22 Most of the cases tabulated at pages 375 - 377 of the report of R v Wong support the proposition, suggested by the Chief Justice at page 366 that in the circumstances of which the Chief Justice was speaking, sentences for persons involved in the importation of 1.5 - 3.5kgs of heroin or 2 - 3.5kgs of cocaine have tended to fall within a range of 8 - 12 years, and for those involved in the importation of 3.5 - 10kgs of those drugs, tended to fall within a range of 10 - 15 years.
23 The circumstances under consideration involved offenders who were couriers or otherwise low in the hierarchy of an importing organisation - see at [142]. Generally, perhaps in about 80% of cases - see at [106], [141] - the offenders had pleaded guilty. In most of the New South Wales cases, express mention was made of s16G of the Commonwealth Crimes Act and, given the date when that section came into force, 17 July 1990, and the dates of the sentences imposed, it may be inferred a discount under that section is reflected in all of the sentences. That section has now, of course, been repealed.
24 Most of the cases referred to were before R v Thomson and Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383, since when discounts for pleas of guilty have tended to become more standardised but it is clear that the sentences generally reflect some allowance on account of such pleas. It is also appropriate to record that the usual discount pursuant to s16G was about one-third and, when stated, was of that order in the cases mentioned.
25 In R v Schofield [2003] NSWCCA 3 and in R v Kevenaar & Ors [2004] NSWCCA 210 I had occasion to consider in detail the range of penalties imposed in a substantial number of importation cases involving 3,4 - Methylinedioxy-methamphetamine (ecstasy), many of which post-dated R v Wong and R v Thomson and Houlton. In R v Kevenaar & Ors at [104] I concluded:-
"… there is in the decisions of Budiman, McGregor, Bowers and Amran Efendi strong support for the view that in the case of the offenders who had pleaded guilty a head sentence of 8-10 years imprisonment is appropriate in the case of quantities appreciably above 500grs but under 1kg and a clear indication in Bowers that the sentences should not be less than 8 years. Fifthly, Behar provides support for this view."
26 All of the cases mentioned in that passage involved persons who were, or had been treated as, couriers and with the exception of Budiman who received a discount for assistance, had pleaded guilty. Again the application of s16G was expressly mentioned or to be inferred.
27 During the appeal in this case, the Court was referred to a number of additional cases. Some arise out of the importation in 2001 of some 480,000 ecstasy tablets with a pure weight of 34.4 kgs. The tablets were concealed in components of an industrial freezer, landed in Brisbane where Customs authorities discovered them, removed most and substituted others. The freezer was then delivered in Brisbane, unpacked and trucked to Sydney where those parts of the freezer containing the tablets were opened. Various of the participants in this importation have been dealt with in R v Shepherd [2003] NSWCCA 287, R v El-Hani [2004] NSWCCA 162, Prasad (2004) 147 A Crim R 385, R v Steven Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54, R v Louis Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 55, R v Joseph Sukkar [2006] NSWCCA 62 and R v Choi [2007] NSWCCA 150.
28 Shepherd ran an importing and exporting business and, at the instigation of a friend and business associate Prasad, agreed to assist with the importation in return for an amount of $25,000. Shepherd's activities are described in the judgment of Howie J at [13] as follows:-
"The applicant's criminality arises from the fact that he was prepared, for whatever gain or other motive, to play a significant role in the importation of what he must have known to be a very substantial quantity of drugs. He had agreed to become involved in the importation in March 2001. He was an active participant from August until December 2001 by taking steps to facilitate the clearance of the container through the shipping company and customs. He had permitted premises that he had leased to be used to receive the container and to store some of its contents. The applicant was there when the container was delivered. He assisted in the removal of some of the contents, clearly believing that they contained drugs, and the loading of them onto a truck to commence their distribution."
29 Shepherd was 44 in November 2002 when sentenced, had no relevant criminal history and was described as an intelligent and industrious person. He appealed against a sentence of 14 years including a non-parole period of 9 years. Holding that the sentence was excessive, this Court reduced it to one of 11 years 6 months with a non-parole period of 7 years 4 months. Of significance for present purposes is the fact that the ground relied on by this Court for interfering was the discount for assistance which the Court held should, when combined with that for pleading guilty, be 45%. Working backwards, this indicates a period, prior to that discount of about 21 years. That figure was arrived at after a discount, allowed by the judge at first instance, of approximately 30% by reason of s16G of the Crimes Act. Although recording a concession by the Crown that the starting sentence, which seems to have been treated as about 32 years, was at the very top of the range, this Court made no criticism of it.
30 El-Hani was described as a ''senior person in the organisation who played an important managerial role when the drugs had been substituted''. He had been present in an early meeting overseas when the importation was arranged, been involved in discussions with the Australian and overseas principals and travelled to or from a variety of countries in response to problems that those involved perceived after the authorities had substituted an innocuous substance for most of the drugs. After receiving a discount of 25% for his plea and assistance, El-Hani was sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years including a non-parole period of 10 years. The sentencing judge's starting point had been 30 years, from which one may infer a s16G discount had been deducted prior to the 25% discount. Again there was no criticism of the starting point and El-Hani's appeal was dismissed.
31 Because he also sought financial benefit in paying off a debt of $100,000 owed to Choi, one of those involved, and receiving a further $50,000 he proposed to share with Shepherd, Prasad introduced Shepherd to the venture and thereafter acted as a cut-out between Shepherd and Choi on the one hand and Shepherd and the Sukkars on the other. He was regarded as not as involved as Shepherd and having more compelling subjective features. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years including a non-parole period of 8 years and 8 months, the sentencing judge's starting point being 21 years prior to applying a s16G discount. Prasad had pleaded not guilty. Although this Court dismissed a Crown appeal in the exercise of its discretion, Wood CJ at CL, with the concurrence of Hidden J and Smart AJ, said that the sentence fell outside the legitimate sentencing range and should have been of the order of 17 years including a non-parole period of 11 years and 2 months. Implicit in this is the statement that a proper starting point should have been of the order of 25 years.
32 Steven Sukkar, who also was found guilty after a trial, had been sentenced to imprisonment for 14 years, including a non-parole period of 9 years. Reference to the remarks on sentence at first instance make it clear that the starting point prior to a s16G discount had been 21 years. Appeals by the offender and the Crown against the sentence imposed were, by majority, dismissed. The evidence did not indicate that Steven Sukkar had any involvement in the importation until after the drugs had been delivered to premises owned by him but which were occupied by a brother Louis and others. His knowing involvement commenced on that day during which he helped unload the truck in which the freezer parts were contained, permitted the freezer parts and tablets to remain on his premises, helped sort through the tablets to separate those containing drugs from those substituted, and then undertook the task of ascertaining what had happened to the drugs after their arrival in Australia and whether there were any "gaps" during which the substitution could have occurred. This latter activity was with a view to recovery of the drugs or compensation for their loss. In the course of this exercise he studied documents and spoke to other offenders. He was described as a knowing assistant to his brothers during this period and his motivation to help them.
33 Steven Sukkar was a solicitor, aged 31 at the time of his offending and of good character. Smart AJ, who would have imposed a lesser sentence, observed that the destruction of the offender's career was itself a punishment.
34 Louis Sukkar was regarded as a co-principal of Joseph Sukkar in the importation, although the latter's activities were more prominent. He had no prior convictions. The sentencing judge's starting point had been 36 years, reduced by one third on account of s16G and then by a further 25% on account of his plea and assistance. The sentence imposed was of 18 years imprisonment including a non-parole period of 12 years.
35 Joseph Sukkar was regarded as, at the very least, a co-principal in the importation. He had a prior record which the included the importation of hashish oil. Allowing a Crown appeal, this Court said that a starting point of 45 years was appropriate, reducing this on account of s16G and by a further 35% on account of a plea and assistance. The sentence imposed was one of 20 years imprisonment including a non-parole period of 12 years.
36 Choi, who was convicted after a trial, was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years including a non-parole period of 13 years. The sentence had been arrived at after a discount of one third on account of s16G. Choi who had engaged Prasad and another helper, become involved in the overseas paperwork, had travelled to Brisbane with Louis to be nearby at the time of delivery, was regarded as senior to Steven Sukkar, Prasad, Shepherd and El-Hani but subordinate to Louis and Joseph Sukkar and the sentencing judge was not satisfied that Choi was to share in the profits as opposed to receiving some other reward. An appeal to this Court was dismissed.
37 The quantity involved in these offences, some 69 times the minimum commercial quantity of MDMA, was relatively greater than in the Respondent's offence where, as has been said, against a minimum commercial quantity of amphetamines of 0.75kg the amount imported was 34.6 kg, something less than 50 times as much. Otherwise I see no relevant difference in the base offences. The Respondent's primary function was very similar to that of Shepherd even though - and I would give this no weight - Shepherd's involvement was over a longer period. Shepherd did not, as the Respondent did, become involved in discussions involving the financing of the operation and the engagement of others. El-Hani's involvement was clearly greater than that of the Respondent and Choi's probably was. Prasad's was appreciably less.
38 Given that most aspects of the importation were completed prior to his involvement and to a lesser extent his motivation, Steven Sukkar's involvement and criminality were appreciably less than those of the Respondent. Louis and Joseph Sukkar were in a radically different situation compared with the Respondent and also provide no useful comparison.
39 In R v Moore [2005] NSWCCA 212 the offender had pleaded guilty to being in possession of prohibited imports namely not less the commercial quantity of MDMA. The quantity involved was 92.442kg (pure). The report is short but it seems clear that the offender had been involved in discussions prior to the importation and it was conceded that both the quantity of the drug and the level of the offender's involvement reflected great criminality. At first instance he was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years including a 15 year non-parole period. In arriving at this sentence, an allowance approximating 25% had been made on account of the offender's plea remorse and contrition. The offender was aged 50 at the time of sentence. Latham J, with the concurrence of Studdert and Howie JJ, observed that "this was an offence approaching the worst category of an offence of this nature. In my view the head sentence of 20 years was well within his Honour's sentencing discretion".
40 There was no discussion by Latham J of the sentences imposed in other cases and, given that the issue before the Court was whether the sentence was excessive, I do not regard her Honour's reference to the sentence being "well within his Honour's sentencing discretion" as a considered endorsement of its sufficiency.
41 In R v Neale [2004] NSWCCA 311 the offender was a principal in effecting detailed planning for, and the importation of, 271,000 tablets containing a pure weight of 52.33kgs of MDMA with a wholesale value estimated to be between $2.7M and $5.4M. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life including a non-parole period of 21 years. This court rejected a challenge to the head sentence but solely upon the ground that the Appellant was aged 57 at the time of sentence and was liable to die in prison during the non-parole period reduced the non-parole period to 15 years. Given the differences, I regard this case as of limited assistance in the determination of the result of this appeal.
42 R v Nguyen and Ors (2005) 157 A Crim R 80 involved four offenders and a number of offences. It is sufficient for present purposes to consider only one offence involving the importation of 420,000 tablets containing 52.702kgs of pure MDMA. One offender, Pham had been sentenced to life imprisonment including a non-parole period of 23 years on a charge of importing the MDMA. He was found to be a principal in the offence though entitled to consideration for pleading guilty and an offer of assistance. Grove J observed that it was a matter of fine balance whether this court should intervene. It in fact set aside the sentence and imposed one of 27 years imprisonment. The sentence of 27 years was made cumulative to the extent of one year on the sentence for another offence and a non-parole period of 18 years was specified.
43 A second offender Nguyen had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment including a non-parole period of 16 years and this was reduced to imprisonment for 21 years. This sentence also was cumulative to the extent of one year on the sentence for another offence. The non-parole period specified was 15 years 6 months.
44 A third offender To had been sentenced to imprisonment for life including a non-parole period of 20 years for being in possession of a prohibited import in the form of the MDMA - he seems to have been engaged by an overseas principal to watch over the drugs. This was reduced to imprisonment for 22 years including a non-parole period of 16½ years.
45 The reasons for allowing the appeal by Nguyen are not clear. There is no doubt that parity played a significant part in the Court's decision so far as Pham and To are concerned and Nguyen certainly had a parity argument.
46 Reference was also made to the sentencing by Judge Norrish of "XYZ" , who was dealt with on the basis that after one unsuccessful attempt to deliver the boat, XYZ had assisted with finding premises large enough for storing the boat and in the removal of the drugs from the vessel and with tasks incidental thereto. He was arrested shortly thereafter and his involvement was limited to only a matter of days. His subjective circumstances included some positives and some negatives. He was given "the maximum discount" for pleading guilty and a 40% discount for co-operation with the authorities. The sentence imposed was one of 9 years including a non-parole period of 5 years. In light of the decisions to which I have already referred, I do not find it necessary to deal with "XYZ" beyond remarking that, when the discounts XYZ received are added back, and the difference in roles recognised, the sentence imposed on XYZ also argues for that imposed on the Respondent being too light.
47 Before turning to the issue of the conclusions to be drawn from the above, there are 4 further matters to which I should refer. The first is the way in which Judge Woods arrived at the sentence he imposed. His Honour said:-
"It seems to me that taking into account all of the considerations which I have mentioned, an appropriate overall starting point for calculating a sentence, having regard to comparable sentences and the objective facts in this case would be a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. I have taken into account various considerations, particularly the relative youth of the offender, his prior good character (to some limited extent) and a limited but real degree of assistance to the administration of justice in the conduct of the trial. I regard an appropriate head sentence as being 17 years imprisonment."
48 His Honour's use of the expression "starting point" was unusual. Normally, and in cases such as Shepherd and Prasad it encompasses all of the considerations relevant to sentence except discounts for s16G, a plea and/or assistance. Thus in the comparison to which I am about to turn, it is his Honour's final figure of 17 years that it is appropriate to use.
49 The second matter is to acknowledge that in considering cases involving different drugs it is necessary to recognise that, to the extent to which the severity of offending is to be judged by quantity, it is necessary to have regard to the quantities stipulated in the legislation for those drugs - see R v Nai Poon (2003) 56 NSWLR 284.
50 The third matter to which reference should be made are the Respondent's subjective circumstances and the general sentencing considerations referred to in the sentencing of Commonwealth offenders. There are no matters falling within the latter category which merit specific mention but it is desirable to refer to the former. The Respondent was aged 25 at the time of offending and had no criminal record. He had a somewhat dysfunctional upbringing although he maintained a close relationship with his mother. He left school prior to completing year 12. Thereafter he remained fully employed, during the last 3½ years being manager of a coffee shop. To the author of the Pre-sentence Report he maintained that he had never used illicit drugs.
51 The fourth matter concerns the Respondent's "assistance to the administration of justice" to which Judge Woods referred. During the trial the Respondent made a number of formal admissions. His Honour expressed the view that "there is no doubt that the length of the trial was cut down by more than a month, probably six weeks or so, by the admissions made in exhibit …It is not to be compared with a full plea of guilty but, nonetheless, it is of some significance and I take it into account". That it is appropriate to take such an approach to evidentiary admissions has been confirmed in R v Choi [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [149] et seq.
52 The patterns of sentences referred to in R v Wong argue for a much higher sentence than was imposed on the Respondent. Allowance has to be made for the fact that the sentences in both of the ranges referred to there reflected both allowance for a plea of guilty and a discount of about one third pursuant to s16G. A sequential allowance of discounts of, say, 10% for the former and 33⅓ % for the latter results in an overall discount of 40%. The 10 to 15 years indicated in the range most favourable to the Respondent thus equates to 16⅔ to 25 years in a case where there is no occasion for either discount. Furthermore the Respondent's role was much higher than that of a mere courier and the quantity here was 46 times the minimum commercial quantity, not about 5 to 7 times the minimum commercial quantity that 10 kilograms of cocaine or heroin represent.
53 My analysis in R v Kevenaar argues in the same direction. Dealing with the discounts in the way referred to in the immediately preceding paragraph, the 8 to 10 year range mentioned equates to 13⅓ to 16⅔ years. The quantities contemplated in R v Kevenaar were only 1 to 2 times the minimum commercial quantity of ecstasy and the offenders were, or were treated as, couriers.
54 Putting aside the question of quantity, the starting point in Shepherd of 30 years argues for the 17 years here being much too low. So does the statement by Wood CJ at CL in Prasad to the effect that the head sentence should have been of the order of 17 years, once one recognises that that period was after a s16G discount and that the Respondent's role was greater than that of Prasad. It must be acknowledged that when quantity is taken into account the strength of the argument based on the sentences imposed on Shepherd and Prasad is attenuated but, given that sentences in this area are not proportional to quantity, (even adjusted to take account of the statutory stipulations) those sentences still argue significantly for that imposed on the Respondent being too low.
55 I incline to the view that the sentence imposed in El Hani also argues in favour of the Crown appeal succeeding although the difference in role and quantity somewhat diminishes the strength of this. Given the extent of the differences I do not find the sentences imposed on the co-offenders of these three persons of use either for or against the contentions of the parties here.
56 Moore argues against the Crown's contention although, for reasons I have indicated, I do not regard the sentence in that case as having any relevant endorsement by this Court. Neale, I have indicated, I regard as of no assistance. In that the decisions in Nguyen were based on parity, I regard those similarly.
57 In the result, I am of the opinion that the sentence of 17 years imposed on the Respondent was manifestly inadequate. Uninstructed by the authorities and by reference only to the statute I would have so concluded. At 34.8kgs, almost 50 times the minimum commercial quantity, and worth at least $5,000,000, the quantity and the value of the drug were high. It is notorious that so also is the potential profitability of drug importation and dealing. Given the severely damaging nature of the drug, the potential damage to the community was also substantial.
58 Having eschewed damaging his own life by drug use and solely for the reward doing so would bring, the Respondent elected to provide substantial assistance in the importation. Whether or not he knew the quantity involved, or simply did not care, and making full allowance for his subjective factors and admissions, his deliberate criminality requires a sentence substantially higher than one of 17 years with a non-parole period of only 10½ years. The reviews of cases conducted in R v Wong and R v Kevenaar lead inevitably to the same conclusion.
59 Although, this being a Crown appeal, there are the constraints common to all such appeals on the Court interfering, there are no particular factors in this case which argue against allowing the appeal. However, the extent of the inadequacy in the sentence under appeal and thus the increase which would be necessary to impose even the minimum sentence that should have been imposed at first instance do provide additional grounds for restraint and lead me to the view that the Court, in the exercise of the discretion it has in Crown appeals, should impose a sentence less, both in its overall length and in the proportion of it that constitutes the non-parole period, than the minimum that should have been imposed. Accordingly, I am of the view that the Court should make the following orders:-
1. Allow the Crown appeal;
2. Quash the sentence imposed on the Respondent on 2 February 2007;
3. Sentence the Respondent to imprisonment for a term of 25 years, including a non-parole period of 15 years.
4. Direct the legal advisers for the Respondent to provide to the Respondent an explanation of the above orders in accordance with the requirements of s16F of the Crimes Act (C'th).
60 HALL J: On 15 February 2007, the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Commonwealth of Australia gave notice that he desired to appeal to this Court against the sentence pronounced by the District Court of New South Wales on 2 February 2007. On that date, the respondent appeared for sentence on a charge against s.11.2(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and s.233B(1)(a)(iii) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) of aid, abet, counsel or procure the importation of a commercial quantity of methylamphetamine. In respect of that charge, he was convicted and sentenced to 17 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 years and six months.
61 The ground relied upon in support of the application was that the sentence is said to have been manifestly inadequate.
62 On 30 October 2006, the respondent entered a plea of not guilty to the indictment charging him with the abovementioned offence.
63 The maximum penalty for the offence is life imprisonment and/or a fine not exceeding $825,000. It is noted that the Customs Amendment Act 2004, Schedule 1, item 68, created a commercial quantity for methylamphetamine, commencing 9 December 2004. This amendment is discussed below in paragraph [32].
64 On 16 November 2006 following a trial by jury, the respondent was found guilty of the offence. Both the head sentence and the minimum term referred to in paragraph [1] were stated to date from 8 February 2006, being the date that the respondent was taken into custody.