• the applicant's efforts at rehabilitation to end decades of cannabis use.
31 It was the last mentioned matter which appears to have led his Honour to the conclusion that a departure from the sentencing formula imposed by the legislation was appropriate in terms of special circumstances. One complaint made in the applicant's submissions (ground 5) is that the sentencing judge failed to make any positive finding in the applicant's favour as to his rehabilitation, merely noting "…the prisoner's efforts of rehabilitation include his decision to end decades of cannabis use". It was submitted that it was appropriate for his Honour to have regard to the prospects of the "cross roads" as referred to in the judgment of the Chief Justice of South Australia in Regina v. Osenkowski (1982) 5 A. Crim. R. 394 and that the applicant did not have a bad record and that there must be a risk that imprisonment would destroy reform.
32 In Regina v. Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168, Spigelman, CJ. in particular at [103] to [107] when addressing the factors to be taken into account when sentencing referred to the provisions in the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 which indicated that existing statutory and common law factors may still be properly taken into account in determining a sentence, even though they are not listed in s.21A(2) or (3). The Chief Justice went on to provide examples:-
"… they may include, for example, hardship to the family where that qualifies as exceptional hardship ( Regina v. T (NSWCCA, 15 March 1990)), or the fact that the serving of the sentence will be unduly onerous by reason of illness ( Regina v. L (NSWCAA, 17 June 1996), or by reason of the fact that it will be served on strict protection: Regina v. Totten [2003] NSWCCA 207."
33 Before the effect of personal factors on the sentencing discretion are considered, the primary question is whether the apparently excessive sentence in this case is explicable by the presence of a matter or matters of such gravity as to warrant the sentence imposed. The additional question then is whether or not the sentencing judge failed to give proper weight to personal or subjective factors which together with the answer to the first question might also explain the apparently excessive sentence.
34 An examination of the reasons for sentence does not, I believe, reveal any particular or additional factor which would justify a sentence of the severity imposed. Beyond the number of plants involved, the sophistication of the cultivation of the cannabis plants and the intended use for them, I do not believe that there is any other additional matter of such seriousness as to warrant the level of the sentence in this case. Whilst there is some support for the proposition that there was inadequate consideration of the evidence relevant to rehabilitation, I do not consider it is necessary to endeavour to assess the extent to which this may have been responsible for a sentence of such severity.
35 When the sentencing decisions to which I earlier referred are taken into account along with the content of the remarks on sentence, I am of the opinion that a conclusion that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive is inescapable.
Ground Two: Failing to consider alternatives to service of a custodial sentence.
36 On the hearing of this application, the court raised a question as to the accuracy of a statement made by the sentencing judge in his remarks on sentence. It appeared, having regard to oral submissions made by counsel for the applicant during the sentencing hearing, that the statement may have been incorrect. The sentencing judge stated:-
" It is common ground between counsel, in line with the authorities such as Regina v. Clark (CCA, 15 March 1990) and Regina v. Dopson (CCA, unreported 10 April 2003), that a sentence of full-time custody would be required for such a substantial involvement in cultivation unless there were exceptional circumstances." (see p.3 of the remarks on sentence, 10 June 2004). (Emphasis added)
37 It was contended by the applicant that this statement was erroneous for there was no common ground as to the need for a full-time custodial sentence. The Crown conceded that the trial judge's statement was in fact "overstatement".
38 The references to Regina v. Clark (CCA, unreported 15 March 1990) and Regina v. Dopson (CCA, unreported 10 April 2003) do not appear to be cases of any assistance. Clark (supra) involved the imposition of gaol sentences for trafficking (two charges of supplying amphetamine contrary to s.25 of the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act 1985) and did not involve a cultivation offence. Dopson (supra) was a case in which the respondent pleaded guilty to a single count on indictment charging him with the cultivation of a prohibited plant, cannabis, in an amount no less than the commercial quantity (501 plants). The appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions pursuant to s.5D of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 against a sentence of two years imprisonment imposed by Graham, DCJ., the sentence being wholly suspended. On appeal, Bell, J. (with whom Hidden and Buddin, JJ. agreed) did not consider that the decision to suspend the execution of the sentence produced a result so manifestly disproportionate to the circumstances of the offence. The appeal was dismissed.
39 Based on the premise that a term of full-time custody was a matter of common understanding and that the decisions in Clark (supra) and Dopson (supra) were "authorities" , the sentencing judge erroneously approached the matter on the basis that a sentence of full-time custody was required as a matter of agreement supported by reference to authorities that were not relevant to the point. However, the question is whether or not that provides a sufficient base to warrant intervention by this Court. Given his Honour's finding that the cultivation of cannabis plants was not intended solely for the applicant's own consumption, a term of imprisonment was clearly the appropriate sentencing option. Accordingly, the erroneous statement by the judge as to the common understanding is not one which undermined or relevantly affected the sentencing process.
Ground Three: Over-estimation of criminality
Ground Four: Failure to take into account remorse
Ground Five: Failure to take into account successful rehabilitation.
40 I have indicated in relation to the first ground that the trial judge's finding that the cultivation was a highly professional one was open on the evidence. I do not consider that there is any substance to ground 3.
41 As to grounds 4 and 5, these are incorporated in the discussion on personal or subjective factors in relation to ground 1, and accordingly do not need to be separately considered.
42 I am of the opinion that the sentence should be set aside and the applicant should be re-sentenced. I am in agreement with the sentencing judge's finding of special circumstances. I take into account the offence on the Form 1, being possession of 28 grams of cannabis leaf. I propose a term of imprisonment of a total sentence of two years and two months commencing on 10 June 2004 and expiring on 9 August 2006 with a non-parole period of one year and three months expiring on 9 September 2005.
43 Accordingly I propose the following orders:-
1. Application for leave to appeal against sentence granted.
2. Appeal allowed and sentence imposed in the District Court quashed.
3. In lieu thereof the applicant be sentenced, taking into account the offence on the Form 1, to imprisonment for two years and two months commencing on 10 June 2004 and expiring on 9 August 2006 with a non-parole period of one year and three months commencing on 10 June 2004 and expiring on 9 September 2005.
4. The appellant ordered released to parole on 9 September 2005.
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