Conclusions
45 Section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act requires that a number of matters which, if they exist, have a tendency to aggravate or mitigate an offence be taken into account. I have referred to those which, in this case, seem to me to be of any appreciable significance. I record that I am satisfied, as required by s5, of that Act that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate.
46 The limitation in the indictment to conduct within a period ending on 23 November means that the criminality for which the Prisoner stands to be sentenced does not include any conduct that occurred thereafter, including what I regard as the lies contained in her second ERISP concerning sighting the deceased and, notwithstanding the incrimination of Mr Reid in her statement of 22 January, the deficiencies, omissions and lies in that statement - evidenced by what she said later.
47 In relation to earlier events, it is only conduct which "helps the principal offender to evade justice" - see R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345 and the authority there cited - which falls within her offending. Although one must have the gravest suspicion about it, I am not satisfied that the Prisoner's permitting of Mr Reid to stay from time to time at her home between 7 August and 22 November was done with this purpose. However it is clear that she offended in many other ways. Her cleaning of the premises where the deceased apparently met her death, her lying about the reasons for, or circumstances of, the deceased's absence and of seeing the deceased, her allowing Mr Reid to store incriminating items in her premises, and what I infer was her assistance to Mr Reid to hide from police on 22 November fall within this category. So do many of her answers in the interview of 23 November 2002. Although the deceased was wrapped in a coat belonging to the Prisoner, there is no evidence how this came about and I am not persuaded to the requisite standard that the Prisoner was involved in the wrapping of the body or in the placing of it in the boot. Nor am I satisfied that when she drove the vehicle to "Greg Greg" that the body was in the boot or, if it was, the Prisoner knew that.
48 Considered objectively, the Prisoner's actions to which I have referred argue in favour of the conclusion that her offending was of a high order. It was many faceted and extended over a lengthy period. Furthermore Mr Reid's offence, on the Prisoner's description of it and its consequences, was a very serious example of its type. The Prisoner's opportunities to desist and inform the authorities were not infrequent. With the possible exception of the cleaning, which occurred at a very early stage and which may to some extent have been sprung on her, her conduct must have been deliberately and consciously intended to avoid or make more difficult appropriate investigation into the deceased's disappearance. It was certainly calculated to do so.
49 Undoubtedly, insofar as her actions were the result of threats by, and fear of Craig Reid, her subjective criminality is lessened. However it is not avoided. Very commonly if not almost universally, participation in offending by accessories after the fact is inspired by some emotional relationship with a principal offender, e.g. love, affection, loyalty or fear. Such offending commonly represents a choice to place the interests of the principal offender ahead of those of the victim and/or the public generally.
50 It did so in this case. It is implicit in the Prisoner's actions that she preferred to help Mr Reid, who she knew had bashed one woman with a hammer and slit her throat, to avoid detection and to remain in the community where he could do the same again, as he, to her knowledge, seemed willing to contemplate, than to either tell the truth when asked or remain silent. (I do not of, course suggest that, at least so far as the offence of being an accessory after the fact is concerned, the Prisoner was obliged to speak, either to the relatives or friends of the deceased or the police.)
51 And in that such emotions are liable to induce conduct which renders the perpetrator an accessory after the fact, society has an interest in providing a substantial disincentive to those tempted to so offend. General deterrence has a substantial part to play in the determination of any punishment. Retribution is also not without appreciable significance.
52 It seems likely that the Prisoner's past experiences of violence predisposed her to acquiesce in Mr Reid's demands. Her inherent or acquired nature as revealed by her willingness, however reluctantly, to continue relationships in which she was subjected to violence was probably a reinforcement in that regard.
53 On the other hand, on no rational basis could the Prisoner's experience with Mr Trunk be equated with the circumstances involving Mr Reid. Mr Trunk was allowed to remain at large and, one may infer, the Prisoner remained in a relationship with him. The Prisoner's knowledge of Mr Reid's offence meant that she could not rationally have believed that he would be allowed to remain at large. And even if she had any doubts, there were obvious enquiries she could have made. There is no suggestion she made any.
54 Nevertheless, there remains the fact that, on the evidence before me, the prisoner had no reason to clean up the murder scene unless it be the threats she said were made by Mr Reid. Once implicated of course, that provided a reason for lying in the interview of 23 November although the probability is that at that time and at the time of her second interview, both those threats and the decision to help Mr Reid, were still operative.
55 Her ability and failure to inform the authorities prior to and on 23 November argues in 2 directions. On the one hand it may indicate the force on her of Mr Reid's threats. On the other, it argues for her willingness not to do the right thing. And even when, in her statement of 22 January she did implicate Mr Reid, her lies on that occasion mean that that statement could by no means be regarded as an unequivocal attempt to redeem herself.
56 Reference should also be made to some telephone conversations in which the Prisoner participated and which were the subject of interception. The Prisoner was heard on 2 December 2002 to say to one person "…… ask Reidy what he said". On the following day she said to another person that she was moving around having a bit of a holiday before the police caught her. On 4 December 2002 she said to her son that she was looking at about 15 years but would have to give Reid up. She was thus both very conscious of her criminality and content to remain unhelpful to the police and society.
57 I regard the case as one where protection of the community against the Prisoner is of no significance. Her record - no prior convictions - would suggest that personal deterrence is of limited significance and the Prisoner's prospects of rehabilitation are good although the matters to which I have just referred mean that any such conclusions must be appreciably qualified. The intercepted conversations and a number of matters in her statement of 22 January 2003 indicate to me that at those times there was little or no remorse for her wrongdoing. Despite her evidence, in light of the totality of what she has said since Mr Reid's arrest, I am not persuaded that situation has changed.