R v Di Cianni and Pintabona

Judgment 1On 6 May 2009, Mario Frisoli was stabbed to death in or immediately adjacent to the lounge room of the house in which he and his brother Albert resided at 17 Goodsir St, Rozelle. He suffered some 35 injuries including some 8 wounds described by a pathologist as defence type injuries to the hands. Some 21 injuries were cuts or incisions and 5 were stab wounds - 3 to the left front or side of the chest, one which finished in the right side of the neck and another to the left back of the neck. I am satisfied that the attack upon Mario occurred at or about 5.20 in the afternoon. 2Albert Frisoli arrived home at about 7.15pm. Almost immediately thereafter he also was attacked in or immediately adjacent to the lounge room and he suffered 35 wounds and blunt force injuries, from a combination of which he died. Nine of the wounds were stab wounds, including 3 to the back of the chest or neck, 3 to the front of the chest or abdomen and 2 to the left arm. I have no doubt that virtually all of the injuries to Mario and Albert were inflicted during the attacks on them. 3On 24 June of this year, a jury convicted Mr Di Cianni of the murder of Mario and Albert Frisoli and convicted Ms Pintabona of being an accessory after the fact to those murders. It now falls to me to sentence them. I instruct myself that any findings of fact I make must be consistent with the jury's verdicts and in so far as they are adverse to the prisoners, I must be satisfied of them beyond reasonable doubt. In so far as I make findings favourable to the prisoners it is sufficient that I be satisfied of them on the balance of probabilities. 4The maximum penalties provided by the legislature for the offences are, in the case of accessory after the fact to murder, imprisonment for 25 years and in the case of murder, imprisonment for life. Sections 54A et seq. of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provide, subject to the qualifications in those sections, a standard non-parole period of 20 years for the offence of murder. Section 54A provides that that period represents the non-parole period for an offence in the middle of the range of objective seriousness for such offences. 5However while these are some of the statutory provisions to which regard must be had, it is important to recognise that the maximum sentences are imposed only for offences that can be regarded as falling within a category of worst cases for which the penalty is prescribed - Ibbs v R (1987) 163 CLR 447; Veen v R (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 478. I do not agree with a submission of the Crown that Mr Di Cianni's offences fall into this category and I must therefore address where, on the imprecise scale of criminality of offences falling within each category, the Prisoners' offences lie. To the lay person this may seem strange, particularly in the case of murder where, by definition, the offence has resulted in a death but experience over many years has demonstrated to the courts and to Parliament that in assessing the objective seriousness of an offence there are other matters to be also taken into account. So also must be the subjective circumstances of an offender. As the High Court made clear in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39 at [26] and [27], all factors relevant to sentence must be taken into account. 6Albert Frisoli and Mr Di Cianni had since about 1998 been in business together in companies involved in construction, formwork and steel fixing. In about 2000 Mr Di Cianni was found to be suffering from bowel cancer and although that was successfully operated on, he thereafter ceased any active physical work, limiting his involvement to periodic attendances at the premises from where the businesses were conducted. From about 2002 he began to suspect that Mr Albert Frisoli was defrauding him. The relationship between the two deteriorated. There were arguments and in about May 2006 Mr Frisoli moved to other premises. 7Between about March 2006 and May 2008 a series of apprehended violence orders were taken out Albert Frisoli and his girlfriend Natasha Kourea against Mr Di Cianni who did not always obey them. In 2008, I have no doubt at the instigation of Mr Di Cianni, police instituted criminal proceedings against Mr Albert Frisoli alleging that he had forged Mr Di Cianni's signature on one or more documents. Mr Di Cianni also instituted civil proceedings in the Supreme Court founded on a similar complaint. 8On 27 April 2009, the criminal proceedings were due to be heard. On that day, police, a handwriting expert and Mr Di Cianni attended the Downing Centre Local Court. Police informed Mr Di Cianni that the proceedings had a low prospect of success, in part because of further information provided by Mr Di Cianni, and the proceedings were then withdrawn. Shortly afterwards, as Mr Di Cianni conceded, there was some discussion between him and Mr Moio, a solicitor who acted for him, concerning the civil proceedings. Although Mr Moio's evidence was somewhat vague, he probably informed Mr Di Cianni that the civil proceedings were unlikely to be won. In any event it is inherently likely and I find that Mr Di Cianni realised their fate would follow that of the criminal proceedings. Mr Di Cianni had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars pursuing his claim. 9There was evidence in the case from Ms Kourea to the effect that some years earlier she had been informed by Albert Frisoli that Mr Di Cianni had threatened him with a syringe accompanied by words consistent with an intent to kill Mr Frisoli. This evidence derived support from some by a Mr Aloisi. However, while I accept this threat was made, I am by no means satisfied that at the time it was intended seriously. 10In the result, I am satisfied that Mr Di Cianni's motivation in killing Albert Frisoli were the feelings of antipathy which had arisen over the years. It seems likely that the abandonment of the criminal proceedings on 27 April 2009 was a straw which broke the camel's back. 11Some 5 minutes before the attack on Mario, a neighbour had observed someone who looked like an elderly lady walking up the front path of 17 Goodsir Street. The person's face was covered or substantially covered by a cloak or the like. Relevant in that connection was the fact that the premises at 17 Goodsir Street had mounted on them a number of what appeared to be CCTV cameras, but which were in fact inoperative. I am satisfied that this "lady" was Mr Di Cianni. Arguing for this conclusion is the closeness in time between the appearance of this "lady" and the attack on Mario together with a scarf which was found draped on and around the body of Albert Frisoli. The scarf was found to contain DNA consistent with that of the 2 Prisoners. Evidence, not seriously challenged, of a Ms Friedman was to the effect that it was more than 1 billion times more likely that mixtures of DNA in some areas of the scarf originated from Albert Frisoli, Giuseppe Di Cianni and Josephine Pintabona than if those mixtures originated from Albert Frisoli and two unknown, unrelated individuals. 12A deal of evidence, particularly from the Prisoners, and which I found unpersuasive, was directed to showing that the scarf belonged to Mr Albert Frisoli but other evidence, particularly from Ms Kourea who was a very impressive witness, leaves me in no doubt that the scarf was not Mr Frisoli's. I have no doubt that the scarf belonged to Ms Pintabona and was taken to 17 Goodsir St by Mr Di Cianni. 13There is no evidence of any antipathy between Mr Di Cianni and Mario Frisoli, indeed in evidence Mr Di Cianni said that he had never met Mario. Forensic examination of the scene indicated that glass fragments from a picture frame in what might be called the entrance hall had been swept or scraped together and placed out of sight of the front door. The glass was shown to have blood containing a DNA profile consistent with that of Mario Frisoli. There was also evidence to the effect that Mario's body had been moved to an area where it was, at least to some degree, less obvious from at or adjacent to the front door of the premises. It is impossible to think of a reason why these events would have occurred after the killing of Albert. I infer that these activities were done by the killer to reduce the prospect of Albert becoming alarmed at a time when he might have escaped via the door through which he entered. I also infer that Mario was killed so that the way would be clear for Mr Di Cianni to kill Albert. 14One matter which should be noted is that fingerprint examination of the downstairs area of 17 Goodsir Street revealed no fingerprints of Mr Di Cianni. That fact, the disguise used prior to gaining entry to the premises and what in my view is the strong probability that the killer would have stayed in the premises between the deaths of Mario and Albert argue for the conclusion that there was an appreciable degree of preparation and planning. A knife was found on the floor of the lounge room. It had similarities with some of the knives in a kitchen drawer of the premises but after a close examination of the knife photographs before the jury, commented on in my summing-up, I do not feel able to come to any conclusion whether it came from that drawer or was brought to the premises by Mr Di Cianni. In so concluding I am conscious of the fact that blood consistent with Mr Mario Frisoli was found in that drawer. 15There also can be no doubt that Mr Di Cianni's intention was to kill Albert Frisoli and that the offence was premeditated. The nature of the attack on Mario makes it clear also that it was Mr Di Cianni's intention to kill him. 16The issue of premeditation in the case of Mario is not so clear because any conclusion on the topic can only be a matter of inference. There was evidence of a vehicle owned by Mr Di Cianni's son being parked near 17 Goodsir St for some 2 days shortly before 9 May 2009 and the combination of apparent CCTV cameras and the disguise worn by Mr Di Cianni would suggest that he must have conducted some surveillance of the premises prior to the late afternoon of 6 May. Mr Sinclair, a resident of the street, said that Mario went walking past his place nearly every day with a haversack on his back. Mr Di Cianni may well have known Mr Albert Frisoli's vehicle, that it was not parked in the street at about 5.20 on 6 May and the time Mr Albert Frisole commonly arrived home. However there was insufficient evidence as to the extent of surveillance and of Mario Frisoli's movements to conclude that Mr Di Cianni must have known Mr Mario Frisoli would be at 17 Goodsir St and would or might need to be "got out of the way" to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that Mario's killing was premeditated. 17The bodies of Mario and Albert Frisoli were found the following morning and police were called. Crime scene investigators found a trail of bloody footprints extending from the front door of 17 Goodsir Street along that street through a park and driveway and along George Street Rozelle. The footprints ended on the kerb of George Street pointing strongly to the person responsible for them having entered a vehicle at that place. 18Although up to a few days after the death of Albert and Mario Frisoli Mr Di Cianni remained living with his wife, Ms Pintabona and he had established a close relationship. It was the Crown case that the vehicle Mr Di Cianni entered was Ms Pintabona's. She sold it in July 2009 but police examination of the vehicle on or 6 August 2009 revealed the probable presence of blood on the trim on the sill of the front passenger side doorway. Subsequent examination of that blood disclosed the presence of DNA consistent with that of Albert Frisoli (and his children) and one person in 20 of the general population. In the way the case was put to the jury, their guilty verdicts against her carry with them the conclusion that Ms Pintabona did pick up Mr Di Cianni. 19A second basis upon which the Crown alleged that Ms Pintabona was an accessory was that she had, when questioned by detectives on 17 June 2009, informed them that on 6 May 2009 at about 6.30 pm, Mr Di Cianni was at his home. I accept that she did so inform them and because of her involvement with Mr Di Cianni on 6 May, when talking to the detectives knew that what she was saying was false. In this connection it is relevant that the evidence showed that there were no phone calls to or from Ms Pintabona's phone from or to Mr Di Cianni during the late afternoon of the day of the murders. Her picking him up was not the result of a late request to do so. 20One question that arises is whether Ms Pintabona's activity as an accessory after the fact was pursuant to some previous arrangement whereby she had foreknowledge of at least the killing of Albert Frisoli. That she and Mr Di Cianni met where they did - in a suburb both denied visiting for years prior to the killings - and in the absence of late telephone communication strongly suggests pre-arrangement and that the meeting place was somewhat remote from 17 Goodsir Street suggests that at least one of the Prisoners chose the spot for that reason. 21However, whatever suspicions one may have it seems to me that the issue is foreclosed by a decision I made during the trial. The Crown had also charged Ms Pintabona with murder. During the trial I acceded to an application to direct a verdict of not guilty on those counts upon the ground that the evidence was not sufficient to permit of the conclusion that Ms Pintabona was a party to the murders as distinct from being an accessory. Had she been waiting nearby by pre-arrangement to drive Mr Di Cianni from the scene, and in circumstances where she had prior knowledge Mr Di Cianni was engaged in an attempt to kill Albert, authorities such as R v Howell (1839) 9 C & P 437 at 449-450 and R v Vanderstein, Harris and Somerville (1865) 10 Cox CC 177 at 183 indicate that she would have been a principal. See also Russell on Crime, 12th ed (1964), vol 1, p 139 22The jury's verdicts against Ms Pintabona carry the implication that by 17 June 2009 she knew that Mr Di Cianni had killed both Mario and Albert Frisoli but the question arises whether she had any of this knowledge on 6 May at the time she was assisting Mr Di Cianni. I am unable to conclude that she did. Given the nature of the killings it seems not unlikely that Mr Di Cianni was spattered with blood when he entered Ms Pintabona's vehicle but the Crown called no evidence on that topic and it does not seem to me that, based on evidence I have heard in other cases, I should conclude that he was. The bloodied footprints to and on the gutter where they ended clearly indicate that there was blood on his shoes and the relative absence of blood in and adjacent to the front passenger seat of Ms Pintabona's car certainly raises the question whether some plastic sheeting or the like covered that area. However, as I have said, I am not satisfied that the evidence goes far enough to meet the high standard required for a finding against Ms Pintabona on this topic. 23In that connection I should refer to one other matter. It was argued on behalf of the Crown that the presence of Ms Pintabona's scarf at the scene provided evidence that she had some knowledge of what was to occur. I do not agree. There is simply no evidence of how Mr Di Cianni came to be in possession of the scarf or when indeed he came to such possession. 24On 12 May 2009, Mr Di Cianni and Ms Pintabona left Australia for Italy. Ms Pintabona returned on a couple of occasions but ultimately both were extradited. In the case of Mr Di Cianni he was arrested on 18 August 2010 and has been in custody ever since. In the case of Ms Pintabona she was arrested on 26 July 2012 but was on bail between 25 October 2012 and the date of the jury's verdict. 25It was common ground during the sentencing submissions on 16 August 2013, that Mr Di Cianni had then been in custody for 1095 days or 2 years 11 months and 30 days and that Ms Pintabona had been in custody for 146 days or 4 months and 26 days. In accordance with s 47(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act and the usual practice, this custody will be taken into account when I fix the commencement dates of their sentences. 26Turning to the subjective circumstances of the prisoners, Mr Di Cianni was born in October 1946 and is thus 66 years of age. He was convicted of assault in 1991 and in 2007 of contravening an apprehended violence order. I regard both of these as immaterial, in the case of the second because it pales into insignificance beside the enormity of Mr Di Cianni's crimes with which I am concerned. 27Mr Di Cianni is married and has one son. Prior to his developing cancer he would seem to have had a productive life. Evidence he gave as to his assets might suggest that, in a different way, at least some productivity continued. 28Ms Pintabona was born in May 1959 and is thus 54. She has never been convicted of any offence. Ms Pintabona separated from her husband and has 2 children. She seems to have worked for a deal of her adult life. 29On Ms Pintabona's behalf a report from Mindcare Psychological Services was tendered. The report records that Ms Pintabona's initial consultation was on 27 March 2013 at which stage she reported difficulty in sleeping, increased appetite, reduced energy, motivation and interests and deterioration in short term memory, attention and concentration. Tests administered on that occasion indicated that she was suffering extremely severe depression and severe anxiety and distress. Further tests on 12 August 2013 indicated that her depression, anxiety and stress were then all extremely severe. The report also indicates that previously the only depression that Ms Pintabona suffered was possibly some after the birth of her children. 30To appreciate the significance of these matters it is necessary to bear in mind Ms Pintabona's situation at the times mentioned. In March she was due to shortly face trial on charges of both being an accessory after the fact and of murder itself. By August she had been acquitted of the murder charges but convicted of 2 counts of being an accessory. An application for bail pending her sentencing hearing had been refused and she was obviously facing the possibility of, for the first time, being sentenced to some years in prison. In these circumstances most people would be somewhat depressed and although Ms Pintabona's depression, anxiety and stress levels may well have been greater than many other people would have suffered, I do not regard the matters referred to in the report as arguing for leniency with any great force. 31The Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act requires that in the course of sentencing attention be given to a number of specified matters. I do not regard it as necessary to proceed seriatim through the sections of that Act or the extensive lists of matters referred to, many of which are obviously relevant in any case of murder. Others are apparent from my description of the offences and of the offenders' pasts and, except for one, need no specific mention here. The one is the aggravating circumstance mentioned in s 21A (2)(eb) that the offences occurred in the home of the victims. 32I am satisfied that no sentence other than one of imprisonment is appropriate to the case of both Prisoners. Although at least the murder of Albert Frisoli was planned, I do not regard it as part of a "planned or organised criminal activity" within the terms of s 21 A of the Act mentioned. Having regard to the past history of both Prisoners, the particular motivations and in the case of Mr Di Cianni his age, I am satisfied that both are unlikely to re-offend and have good prospects of rehabilitation. Consistently with their pleas of not guilty neither Prisoner has shown remorse. Subject to the qualification that in the past Mr Di Cianni seems to have allowed his dispute with Albert Frisoli to cloud his judgment, I regard both Prisoners as having been of good character. 33I return to the circumstances of the offences and their impact. In the latter connection there were read during the sentencing proceedings Victim Impact Statements by Ms Kourea, Ms White a sister of the deceased, 2 daughters of Mario and one of Albert Frisoli. Although the use to which such statements can be put is, as has been pointed out in the decision of R v Previtera (1997) 94 A Crim R 76 limited, the terms of the 11 statements and the obvious emotion of those who read them do help to bring home the loss and damage that offences such as those committed by Mr Di Cianni cause. 34The nature and number of the injuries on both deceased make it impossible to avoid the conclusion that the attacks on both were frenzied. The injuries together with the distribution of blood and damage within the premises indicate that both victims must have put up some resistance. But Mr Di Cianni persisted. It is a necessary inference that the attack on each victim must have been subjectively traumatic. 35I am unable to conclude that the attack on Mario Frisoli was premeditated. However in the circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is of small, if any, moment: Given the absence of any other motive it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that Mr Di Cianni had so little regard for human life that Mario was killed simply to facilitate, or at least remove an impediment to, the killing of Albert Frisoli. In the result, it seems to me appropriate that the length of the sentences to be imposed on Mr Di Cianni should be the same. 36Of course, those sentences should not simply be added together. Considerations of totality have to be taken into account and it is well recognised that the severity of a sentence or accumulated sentences is not simply proportional to its or their length - see R v Sciberras [2006] NSWCA 268 at [50]; R v Mahmood [2010] NSWCCA 219 at [69]. 37So far as objective seriousness is concerned, I would assess both of the murder offences as marginally above mid-range. Relevant although not determinative in that regard are the remarks of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 180 A Crim R 267; [2007] NSWCCA 363 at 143 to the effect that an intention to kill and premeditation are usual elements in a murder of mid-range objective seriousness. In this case there are the additional features of the offences occurring in the victims' home, the persistence and subjectively traumatic nature of the attacks and, in the case of the murder of Mario, the absence of any motive that, even in this discrete area of human activity, could be regarded as reasonable. 38Having regard to the age Mr Di Cianni will be when he is released from prison, three of the purposes of punishment, viz. personal deterrence, protection of the community and probably rehabilitation do not have anything like the same weight they have in the case of most murders. However, even by the standards prevailing in this field of human activity there was no reasonable basis for Mr Di Cianni's offences, particularly against Mario and general deterrence and retribution are entitled to weight. 39One argument that was advanced on Mr Di Cianni's behalf was that the sentence otherwise appropriate should be reduced on account of his age. It was submitted that the sentence should be limited so that there remained the prospect that he would be released from custody prior to his death. I do not find the argument as so advanced persuasive. While I accept that there are cases where such an approach has been taken and the prospect of dying in custody is calculated to increase the weight of a sentence, an offender who suffers that fate does not have the continuing disadvantage that someone who emerges after a very lengthy sentence does. The ramifications of such a sentence, e.g. its impact on the prospects of, or relationship with, a family, or on the likelihood of a person suffering it obtaining the capital to acquire a home or valuable or satisfying employment, continue long after release from custody. 40I of course accept that it would be proper to take into account any particular circumstances that lead to the view that Mr Di Cianni's sentence would weigh more heavily upon him than is usually the case and this principle clearly invites attention to his age. However, one really has no idea whether he will become a frail old man or, at the other extreme, die relatively young and suddenly from a heart attack or stroke. In the result I see no occasion, on account of the matters referred to in this or the immediately preceding paragraph, to reduce Mr Di Cianni's sentence from that otherwise appropriate. 41I turn to the situation of Ms Pintabona. Although the authorities demonstrate conduct by accessories after the fact much more significant than was Ms Pintabona's, so much an assault on society is murder that assisting a perpetrator of such an offence to avoid the consequences of such offending cannot be regarded as other than serious and one which society has an interest in actively discouraging. Indeed that is made plain by the maximum penalty of imprisonment for 25 years. 42Furthermore, as was said by Thomas J in R v Hawken (1986) 27 A Crim R 32 and endorsed by Wood CJ at CL in R v Faulkner [2000] NSWSC 944 at [40] and [41]:- "An important aspect of being accessory after the fact to any offence is that the offender stands between criminals and the law." and "But there is something special in the offence of being an accessory after the fact of murder. Section 307 recognises this by providing a penalty of life imprisonment for such an offence. It is in the interests of the community that murderers should be completely isolated from support and deprived of assistance and that such crimes be not covered up. The severe penalty available against accessories after the fact is a way in which the community protects itself and it is an aspect of the law's general deterrence against homicide." 43The reference to s 307 was a reference to the Queensland Criminal Code but the 25 years maximum provided for in New South Wales remains a very high penalty. In R v Wells [2008] NSWSC 206 Grove J, and in R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104 Buddin J, accepted the tenor of Thomas J's remarks. 44I accept that Ms Pintabona's conduct would have been deserving of greater punishment if I had found that at the time of driving Mr Di Cianni away from Rozelle she had known of his offending. I accept also that the probabilities favour the view that her motivation was her affection for Mr Di Cianni. However, family or other personal relationships are a common feature of offences such as hers and having regard to the evil against which the relevant legislation is directed are entitled in my view to but limited weight. In that connection it is relevant to bear in mind that there is nothing to suggest that Ms Pintabona had an upbringing or life which would have impeded her judgment concerning the seriousness of murder or made her unduly susceptible to the influence of Mr Di Cianni. Indeed there is nothing to suggest that she was pressured by him in any way. 45Furthermore, Ms Pintabona had had fair warning that the police wished to speak to her and had had plenty of time between the time she drove Mr Cianni from the scene on 6 May 2009 and when she spoke to the police on 17 June to reflect on what she would say. I have no doubt that her accessorial assistance to Mr Di Cianni on that latter occasion was deliberate. Furthermore, what she said was important. If her statement had been accepted, or not able to be disproved, Mr Di Cianni might well have not been charged or been acquitted. 46Given the features of her offending to which I have referred and against the statutory provision and the sort of factors to which Thomas J referred, considerations of general deterrence and retribution justify, if they do not require, that the term of imprisonment to be imposed on Ms Pintabona be substantial. After time for reflection, she consciously decided to help a murderer, indeed a double murderer, to go free. 47In the course of deciding what penalty should be imposed I have had reference to the Judicial Commission statistics, to a summary of some 37 cases provided by the Crown Prosecutor and to a substantial number of decisions wherein penalties for the offence of being an accessory after the fact to murder have been imposed. The cases demonstrate that, as was said by Gleeson CJ in R v Farroukh (Court of Criminal Appeal, 29 March 1996, unreported), there is a wide variation in the possible degrees of moral culpability of persons convicted of the offence. There is also a wide variation in the circumstances of offending, in the subjective circumstances bearing on the sentences imposed and in those sentences. In the result, I do not think that there is anything to be gained by detailing here the facts of, and sentences imposed in, those prior cases. I have found none which do not have significant differences from the facts here. Nevertheless, I have sought to be informed by the totality of the material to which I have referred. 48I have previously - see R v Ward [2004] NSWSC 420 - expressed doubts whether the penalties in fact imposed in the past for the offence of being an accessory after the fact to murder have given sufficient weight to the statutory provision. However, given that my remarks seem not to have been taken up in subsequent cases, I have proceeded upon the assumption that those remarks were not warranted. 49Before I proceed to the sentences themselves, 4 other matters should be mentioned. Each murder was a separate offence and it would be wrong for the sentences imposed on Mr Di Cianni to be concurrent. Indeed the circumstances of the murder of Mario make it important that there be a substantial, perhaps very substantial, period of accumulation. And although Ms Pintabona's offending was committed by the one statement to the police, her offending was worse for the fact that she was aware that Mr Di Cianni had committed 2 murders. It is appropriate therefore for the sentences to be imposed on her to also be partially accumulated. To the extent to which there was commonality in the ingredients of her 2 offences, that will be sufficiently accommodated by the degree of concurrency in the sentences I intend to impose upon her. 50Given the remarks I have made concerning Mr Di Cianni, and notwithstanding the total non-parole period to be imposed, it is appropriate to reduce the balance of term of the second sentence he must serve. The balance of term of the first sentence is somewhat academic and as a matter of convenience I propose to reduce that too. These matters provide no grounds for reducing the non-parole period of either sentence. 51As indicated above it was common ground during the sentence proceedings that, as at 16 August last Ms Pintabona had been in custody for 146 days or 4 months and 26 days. She has now been in custody for almost a further month. Adopting a limited degree of rounding, I propose to backdate the commencing point of her sentence to 13 March 2013. 52In the case of Ms Pintabona, I find special circumstances in the accumulation of sentence and have adjusted the non-parole and balance of term components of the second sentence so the result accords with the common proportions of 3 to 1 and what I regard as the appropriate total non-parole and head sentences in her case. 53Mr Di Cianni for the murder of Mario Frisoli I sentence you to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 20 years commencing on 18 August 2010 and a further term of 4 years. 54For the murder of Albert Frisoli I sentence you to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 20 years commencing on 18 August 2020 and a further term of 4 years. 55I record as the date upon which it appears to the Court that you shall be eligible for parole 18 August 2040. 56Ms Pintabona, for the offence of being an accessory after the fact to the murder of Mario Frisoli I sentence you to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months commencing on 13 March 2013 together with a further term of 9 months. 57For the offence of being an accessory after the fact to the murder of Albert Frisoli I sentence you to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 2 years commencing on 13 March 2014 together with a further term of 1 year. 58I record as the date upon which it appears to the Court that you shall be eligible for parole 13 March 2016.