R v Andrew Iskandar & R v Nita Iskandar

(1) Andrew Iskandar 43Andrew Iskandar was examined by Dr Olav Nielssen, a psychiatrist, on 20 October 2011 during the course of his trial. He was examined by Mr Sam Borenstein, a clinical psychologist, on 31 January 2012. Andrew told both the psychiatrist and the psychologist that both his parents disciplined him physically. Hazairin appears to have been a controlling, demanding and strict father. Andrew claimed to be fearful of him and fearful of not complying with his father's demands because a failure to comply led to verbal and, at times, physical abuse. 44Both of these professionals make reference to Andrew suffering from depression although Dr Neilssen thought it was in partial remission. Mr Borenstein considered that Andrew Iskandar was depressed when he saw him. Of course, by that time, Andrew had been convicted of murder. 45To the extent that the history given by Andrew to each of these professionals was the basis for their conclusions, I have some concerns because of the inconsistencies in those histories. He told Dr Neilssen that he had witnessed violence between his parents but said the police and child welfare agencies were never called. On the other hand he told Mr Borenstein that his parents frequently fought and there were occasions when police were called to the house as a result of the fighting. 46He told both Dr Nielssen and Mr Borenstein of a suicide attempt he made in gaol which was prevented by his cellmate. He also described a suicide attempt at the age of 16 to Mr Borenstein but said nothing at all about this to Dr Nielssen. 47He told Dr Nielssen that his parents were sociable and were involved in the Indonesian community in Sydney but he told Mr Borenstein that he and his family had few social outlets. 48He told Dr Nielssen that he had never had a girlfriend because his father, who was a strict Muslim, did not permit him to socialise with girls. He told Mr Borenstein that it was his mother who told him he was not permitted to have a girlfriend and was not permitted to socialise with the opposite sex. 49What is consistent in these reports is that Andrew was brought up by two strict parents both of whom inflicted physical punishments on him when they considered it appropriate. If he is to be believed, those physical punishments went beyond what ordinary people would consider appropriate discipline. Further, it is apparent that his parents' marriage was not a happy one, and his father was a very controlling individual as far as Andrew was concerned. 50Andrew also recounted to the professionals intrusive behaviour on his mother's part when he was aged between 10 and 18, where she would regularly examine his genitals to see that they were in working order, and she would make enquiries about his bodily functions. It was difficult to reconcile this with the obvious strong rapport between Andrew and his mother throughout the trial and the way he spoke about her in his evidence. Whilst I note this matter in relation to Andrew, the professionals do not draw any conclusions from it. Nor can I. I do not have any regard to it as far as Nita is concerned. 51What he told the professionals about his mother generally does not sit easily with the evidence he gave in Court where he described his mother as a good mother who just encouraged him to do well in his schooling. He told the professionals that she made him study all of the time, indeed watching over him for hours whilst he studied, and that he was expected to undergo a considerable amount of extra tutoring. He also told Mr Borenstein that once when he fell asleep whilst studying she hit him with a broomstick which left bruises. He also recounted an incident where he said she punched him in the head without explanation when he was purchasing fish and chips for lunch. I note these matters when considering Andrew's background but I do not use them against Nita who has had no ability to respond to them. 52Despite the inconsistencies in the histories I accept the conclusion of Dr Nielssen and Mr Borenstein that Andrew has suffered from a depressive illness for which he is still being treated. Mr Borenstein attributes this largely to the verbal and physical abuse he was subjected to as a child. 53The significant conclusion to which Dr Nielssen came was that, based on the account provided by Andrew: It seems likely that he committed the offence in part because he was obliged to his father and afraid of him. Mr Borenstein said that he concurred with this observation. 54The difficulty about this conclusion is that it was not consistent, for the large part, with the evidence that Andrew gave during the trial. Certainly he was in the car with his father at Cromwell Street, Leichhardt, although, on his account of things, that was by a mutual arrangement for a driving lesson, at least up until the time his father commenced driving after dinner. Thereafter the only evidence he gave of doing anything at his father's behest was hitting the Deceased with the hammer after he (Andrew) had voluntarily come to his father's assistance, and ringing Victor Lau to arrange a false alibi. He gave no evidence that his father required him to take part in the killing of the Deceased nor to do other than strike him the one blow with the hammer. He did not suggest in any way to Mr Lau nor Mr Maiava that he had acted at his father's behest when he described to them what had happened. Indeed, what I conclude from their evidence is that he (Andrew) wanted to deal with the Deceased because he could not handle the idea of his mother having an affair with the Deceased. 55I can accept, however, that his father is likely to have been the moving influence in what was arranged and perpetrated. On all of the psychiatric and psychological evidence his father was a dominant and controlling man, and Andrew was to some extent scared of him, and certainly scared of incurring his displeasure. On the balance of probabilities I find that Andrew followed his father's lead in what was done by reason of the unequal relationship. Nevertheless, I find beyond reasonable doubt that Andrew's own motive in acting as he did coincided with his father's motive. 56Nothing that appears in the reports of Dr Nielssen and Mr Borenstein justifies the conclusion that they reach. The conclusion is contrary to all of the evidence in the case. I find beyond reasonable doubt that Andrew's involvement in the murder was not as a result of any direction, order or pressure from his father or any feeling of obligation to him. 57Andrew is the only son of his parents. He was born in Sydney and attended Croydon Park Public School, Sydney Technical High School in Bexley and then Ashfield Boys High School. He left high school in year 11 but returned to finish his Higher School Certificate over 3 years at TAFE with an ATAR of 69. He completed his HSC in 2009. He had enrolled in a Bachelor of Business and Commerce degree at the University of Western Sydney which was to commence on 9 February 2010. By reason of his flight to Singapore and his subsequent arrest he did not commence that course. 58I was informed at the sentencing hearing that he has enrolled in a university degree in prison which I assume he is doing through distance education. No more details were provided. 59But for one answer he gave in cross-examination at the trial I cannot find that Andrew has shown any remorse for what he did. He was asked by the Crown Prosecutor if he regretted that the Deceased died, and he said "I wish he was still alive". 60It is noteworthy that, although Mr Borenstein expresses agreement with Dr Nielssen's observation that it seems likely Andrew committed the offence in part because he was obliged to his father and afraid of him, there is no mention in Mr Borenstein's reports of the offence itself or any response of Andrew to the killing. (Dr Nielssen's examination of Andrew took place during the trial, so I would not have expected any comment on the facts of the case in his report.) Andrew did not give evidence at the sentencing hearing. The account of the night in question he gave at the trial did not contain any acknowledgement of his involvement in the offence apart from the one blow he struck with the hammer which he said was in self defence. 61At the sentencing hearing a Statement by Detective Sergeant Munro, the Investigating Officer in relation to the Deceased's murder, was tendered in evidence. The Statement recorded an incident that Sergeant Munro said occurred on 16 November 2011 during the course of the trial. He was sitting in the public area of the Court with Janese Campbell, the ex-wife of the Deceased. 62The Statement went on to say: [4] The jury retired for their luncheon break at the usual time of 1pm at the direction of His Honour Justice Davies. The accused was escorted back to the dock area and stood beside his mother. As the Jury members were still walking out of the Courtroom, the accused turned and looked at Janese Campbell and I. The last of the jury members were almost out of the Court and as such had their backs towards those remaining in the Courtroom. We were the only two people sitting at the rear of the Court, there were no other persons between Andrew Iskandar and us. When he turned and looked at us, he smirked, then laughed in an evil unremorseful way whilst still looking at us. Janese Campbell appeared shocked, as did I at his attitude towards the murder of Mohd Shah Saemin. Janese Campbell then mouthed the words "You liar" towards Andrew Iskandar. He then turned back, and was shortly after escorted out of the Courtroom by Corrective Services Officers. During the luncheon break I made notes in my diary on the A4 page allocated to the date of 16th November. 63Sergeant Munro said on that day that Andrew Iskandar was giving evidence. Sergeant Munro was cross-examined about this statement and he said that he relayed the matter to the solicitor instructing the Crown Prosecutor on the day it happened. The solicitor gave evidence also that Sergeant Munro had spoken to her and related the events recorded in his Statement. 64Sergeant Munro was cross-examined about his memory of this event. It was apparent from an examination of the transcript that he was mistaken about the fact that Andrew Iskandar was giving evidence on 16 November. On that day the transcript discloses that the Crown Prosecutor was giving her closing address to the jury. 65Sergeant Munro is undoubtedly mistaken about what happened in Court on that day in terms of whether Andrew Iskandar gave evidence. However, the contemporaneous note made by Sergeant Munro in his diary for 16 November of the matters in his Statement together with the evidence of the instructing solicitor from the DPP satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt that Sergeant Munro saw Andrew Iskandar doing what Sergeant Munro described as laughing and smirking at him and Ms Campbell on that day. 66The question is what impact this behaviour should be regarded as having on any question of remorse. 67In my opinion I should not attach any significance to this event. Drawing particular conclusions from the fact that somebody laughed is always fraught with danger. Concluding that a laugh is a smirk is a subjective matter. A statement that someone laughed in an "evil, unremorseful way" itself bespeaks a very subjective inference. Some people laugh when they are nervous and not for any malicious purpose. What is a smirk to one person might be a wry, ironic smile to another. Although Sergeant Munro honestly believed Andrew was behaving in a malicious fashion by his facial expression, I do not think that I can draw any such conclusion, at least beyond reasonable doubt. Had I seen it for myself it would have been inappropriate for me to draw such a conclusion, a fortiori, when I am hearing it from someone else. 68The fact nevertheless remains that, apart from the one answer by Andrew in his evidence, I have no evidence upon which I can find that Andrew Iskandar has demonstrated any remorse. I note that Mr O'Sullivan of counsel for Andrew Iskandar informed me at the sentencing hearing that Andrew maintains that he is not guilty and is not expressing any remorse.

(2) Nita Iskandar 69Nita was born on 20 March 1963 in Indonesia. She is now aged almost 49 years. I have noted earlier her marriage and their coming to live in Australia. She had obtained a Bachelor of Teaching in Indonesia but she did not teach after settling in Australia. She worked in a factory here and undertook an advanced certificate of Accounting at TAFE. She commenced working at the Malaysian Consulate in Sydney as a clerk/typist in August 2001. She subsequently became Accounts Clerk at the Consulate. 70Nita was examined by Terry Smith, a clinical psychologist, on 30 January 2012. What is apparent from the history taken by Mr Smith is that Nita appears to be in denial about a number of matters including Andrew's knowledge of her affair with the Deceased at the time he left for Indonesia after the killing and Andrew's involvement in the death of the Deceased. She denied that Andrew disclosed anything about his involvement in the Deceased's death before leaving for Indonesia, and she said that he went there only because Hazairin requested him to do so. She said that her husband got the money to pay for his departure, and she let Andrew go because he did not know about the affair and did not want him to find out about it from the media. She still maintained that Andrew was sleeping in the house when she left to go over to Leichhardt having heard the Deceased's cries for help on the telephone. 71Her evidence to Mr Smith about her relationship with her husband did not sit easily in all respects with what she told the police in her ERISP. She told Mr Smith that there was no violence or trauma in the marriage but that her husband was very controlling. She told the police that he had hit her and that he spat at her. 72She made clear to Mr Smith that the important thing in her life was to be there for Andrew. She also said: I did not lie: I believed my son was asleep at home when it happened, and that is what I believe to this day and I will believe it forever ... he did not know about my relationship with this man; all he knew we worked together ... I am very sorry a man has lost his life because of the jealousy of my husband: my heart grieves for his family and I have lost the man I love ... my sin to have a relationship has punished my family too much: I just want my son home. 73Since the murder she said her life had been very bad. It led her to consult a psychiatrist and she has been prescribed with the antidepressant Mirtazapine. Mr Smith considered that she suffered a range of depressive and anxiety symptoms in relation to the anticipated difficulties about the refusal of her husband to grant a divorce and of her pursuing a highly desired relationship and marriage with the Deceased. He said, however, that these symptoms did not impair her capacity to function in her personal or vocational life. 74Mr Smith said that Nita remains mortified that her son is apart from her care, and that she expressed suicidal intention if he is not returned to her care. She believes that her world will return to normal when her son is released from custody. Mr Smith expressed the opinion that if Andrew was incarcerated there might be a period of risk of self harm but once this passes it is expected she will steel herself and work to maintain the family home waiting for his return. 75Mr Smith says the prognosis of Mrs Iskander appears to be based in the protective behaviours she can and will exhibit for the need of her son. He said her offending relates to protecting her son rather than to any positive criminal intent to breach any law. Her distorted logic and myopic emotional constriction about the needs of her son dominates her perceptions, and she could perhaps be convinced by him to say or do irregular things for him. This is a relevant matter for what sentence should be imposed. 76Nita was also assessed by the Probation and Parole Service on 2 February 2012. The brief history she provided to them was consistent with what was provided to Mr Smith. She reiterated that she was certain that Andrew had been unaware of her extramarital affair. She said also that she did not believe that he had been involved in the death of the Deceased and, therefore, she did not believe that she was committing an offence by assisting him to leave the country. 77The report disclosed that Nita has been under the care of a psychiatrist and also an occupational therapist. No reports were tendered on the sentencing hearing from these persons. The Probation and Parole report made telephone contact with the psychiatrist who reported that Nita presented depressive disorder and symptoms of post-traumatic stressors for which she has been prescribed Mirtazapine (as Mr Smith had noted). The dosage of this has been increased from 30mg to 45mg. 78The report indicated that Nita was assessed as unlikely to require or benefit from supervision by the Probation and Parole Service because she was seeking psychological intervention of her own volition. It was said that there was little the Service could offer her beyond monitoring her attendance and compliance with its intervention. 79Nita has no prior criminal record. Legal Principles (1) Nita Iskandar 80Cases involving accessories after the fact to murder embrace a wide range of offending. Buddin J conveniently collected extracts from the relevant cases in R v Cowen [2008] NSWSC 104 at [15] - [26]. It is not necessary to set out all of those paragraphs. I draw attention, however, to what was said in R v Dileski [2002] NSWCCA 345 where Hidden J (with whom Adams J agreed) said: In many cases of this kind the offender's conduct is the product of emotional attachment or dependence, or a misguided sense of loyalty. No doubt, that accounts for most, if not all, of the cases in the Judicial Commission statistics which were disposed of otherwise than by fulltime custodial sentences. 81Buddin J went on to point out that those remarks should not be taken to suggest that an offence which is committed out of a misguided sense of loyalty will inevitably lead to the imposition of a lenient penalty, and he referred to R v Ward [2004] NSWSC 420 at [49] - [51]. The reason for this is that, as Thomas JA observed in R v Hawken (1986) 27 A Crim R 42 at 38: ... it is in the interests of the community that murderers should be completely isolated from support and deprived of assistance and that such crimes be not covered up. In that regard I cannot ignore the fact that the maximum penalty for this offence is 25 years imprisonment. 82What Nita did in this case was a serious act of assistance by enabling Andrew Iskandar to flee the jurisdiction. The result was that the authorities were put to the trouble and expense of having to fly to Singapore and to bring him back to Australia. It was assistance of the clearest kind with at least one of her intentions being to enable Andrew to evade or escape justice. 83Nevertheless, as wrong as they were, her actions are understandable, if not excusable, as the actions of a mother to assist her only child. That must also be seen in the context of a loveless marriage. The impression I have from the reports of the professionals is that she lived only for her son. I cannot overlook the mixed emotions that must have influenced her actions. Her lover had been brutally slain even while she was on the telephone to him. She found out, relatively quickly, that her husband was one of the perpetrators. Her concern at that point was only for her son and how the events would impact upon him. He was due to start University that very week. When she came to realise that Andrew had some involvement her continuing thought was how she can protect him. If he was taken from her (by being imprisoned) she would have nothing to live for, as the report of Mr Smith makes clear. 84In my opinion, the offending was low on the scale of objective seriousness. 85I note s 5 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 which provides the Court must not sentence an offender to imprisonment unless it is satisfied, having considered all possible alternatives, that no penalty other than imprisonment is appropriate. Because of the nature of the offending, its success in enabling his (temporary) escape (see R v Mackett [2012] NSWSC 166 at [22]), and in the light of the fact that Nita Iskandar shows no evidence of remorse for the acts she committed (because she appears to be in denial about her son's involvement in the murder), I do not consider that any other sentence other than a period of imprisonment is appropriate. I consider that the appropriate period of imprisonment is for two years but that that sentence should be wholly suspended. I take that course for these reasons. First, Nita Iskandar has no prior criminal record. Secondly, subject to one matter she is unlikely ever to offend again. Thirdly, she has already undertaken treatment and counselling to deal with her emotional needs which might be thought to have brought about the offending in the first place. 86The one matter concerning reoffending is the conclusion of Mr Smith that she could be convinced by Andrew to do irregular things for him. One consequence of the suspended sentence is that Nita will be subject to a bond for the period of the sentence. In my opinion, that period will be sufficient to enable Nita to adjust to Andrew's incarceration (as Mr Smith said), so that by the conclusion of the sentence her chances of reoffending will be very unlikely. 87I note that Nita spent 15 days in custody after her arrest until her release on bail, such bail having been continued up to the present time. She is entitled to a credit of 15 days on the sentence which would otherwise have been imposed. (2) Andrew Iskandar 88The starting point is that the death of a human being by any unlawful killing is one of the gravest offences against an ordered society: R v Bolt [2001] NSWCCA 487; (2001) 126 A Crim R 284 at 293. It is the responsibility of the Courts to protect and preserve human life and to punish those who unlawfully take it: R v Dawes [2004] NSWCCA 363 at [31]. 89The maximum penalty for murder is life imprisonment. There is a standard non-parole period in the present case of 20 years. I note what was said in Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39 at [17], [20], [25] - [27] and [29] of the way the standard non-parole period is to be dealt with. What remains unclear from Muldrock is whether any assessment should be made of where in the range of objective seriousness the offence lies: R v Koloamatangi [2011] NSWCCA 288 at [19]. Nevertheless, since the High Court discussed how the objective seriousness of an offence is to be assessed, that is without reference to matters personal to a particular offender or class of offenders (see at [27]), it may reasonably be inferred that what appears to be a general proscription at [25] is more particularly directed to the two-stage approach to sentencing criticised in the judgment. 90In assessing its objective seriousness wholly by reference to the nature of the offending, the murder in the present case must be regarded as a serious and brutal one aggravated by the weapons used, the fact that it was committed in company, and the extended period of the assault. 91If one adds into the synthesis the motive for the murder its overall seriousness is increased. This murder has been described as an honour killing. So to describe it invests with it a degree of legitimacy that it does not, and can never, have. No society or culture that regards itself as civilised can tolerate to any extent, or make any allowance for, the killing of another person for such an amorphous concept as honour. Further, the whole basis and origin of honour killings is the notion that a woman is the chattel or possession of a man, whether her father, her husband, or some other patriarchal figure. Such a notion has no place in this country. 92The motive for this murder means that general deterrence assumes some importance in the determination of the sentence. 93Matters which I take into account as mitigating factors are Andrew's age at the commission of the offence, his relationship with his father, and the fact that he does not have any prior criminal record. 94As to the first of these, in KT v R [2008] NSWCCA 51 McClellan CJ at CL reviewed the authorities relating to sentencing juveniles. He said: [24] Although accepted to be of less significance than when sentencing adults, considerations of general deterrence and retribution cannot be completely ignored when sentencing young offenders. There remains a significant public interest in deterring antisocial conduct. In R v Pham & Ly (1991) 55 A Crim R 128 Lee CJ at CL said (at 135): "It is true that courts must refrain from sending young persons to prison, unless that course is necessary, but the gravity of the crime and the fact that it is a crime of violence frequently committed by persons even in their teens must be kept steadfastly in mind otherwise the protective aspect of the criminal court's function will cease to operate. In short, deterrence and retribution do not cease to be significant merely because persons in their late teens are the persons committing grave crimes , particularly crimes involving physical violence to persons in their own homes... [25] The emphasis given to rehabilitation rather than general deterrence and retribution when sentencing young offenders, may be moderated when the young person has conducted him or herself in the way an adult might conduct him or herself and has committed a crime of violence or considerable gravity ( R v Bus, unreported, NSWCCA, 3 November 1995, Hunt CJ at CL; R v Tran [1999] NSWCCA 109 at [9]-[10]; R v TJP [1999] NSWCCA 408 at [23]; R v LC [2001] NSWCCA 175 at [48]; R v AEM Snr, KEM and MM [2002] NSWCCA 58 at [96]-[98]; R v Adamson (2002) 132 A Crim R 511 at [31]; R v Voss [2003] NSWCCA 182 at [16]). In determining whether a young offender has engaged in "adult behaviour" ( Voss at [14]), the court will look to various matters including the use of weapons, planning or pre-meditation, the existence of an extensive criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offence ( Adamson at [31]-[32]). Where some or all of these factors are present the need for rehabilitation of the offender may be diminished by the need to protect society. [26] The weight to be given to considerations relevant to a person's youth diminishes the closer the offender approaches the age of maturity ( R v Hoang [2003] NSWCCA 380 at [45]). A 'child-offender' of almost eighteen years of age cannot expect to be treated substantially differently from an offender who is just over eighteen years of age ( R v Bus, unreported, NSWCCA, 3 November 1995; R v Voss [2003] NSWCCA 182 at [15]). However, the younger the offender, the greater the weight to be afforded to the element of youth ( Hearne at [27]). 95Mr O'Sullivan has provided me with a summary of a number of cases involving young offenders aged between 15 and 20 sentenced for murder. I have had regard to this summary and noted the sentences, but ultimately every case must be judged on its own facts. 96This was a grave crime committed with pre-planning and considerable violence, with weapons, and in company when Andrew was 19 years of age. His relative youth entitles him to some, but not great consideration, for the purposes of rehabilitation. 97As far as his relationship with his father is concerned, I have discussed this earlier. It is, to a small degree, a matter of mitigation. 98Mr O'Sullivan submitted that Andrew's involvement was such that I should see his conduct as less culpable than that of Hazairin, and that that was particularly so because it was Hazairin who was responsible for his death by stabbing him. Reference was made to R v JW [2010] NSWCCA 49, and I note what is said there at [158] - [167]. In the light of the facts that I have found, including the repeated blows that were struck by Andrew with the hammer, I do not consider that there was less culpability simply because it was Hazairin's action that ultimately killed the Deceased. That may have been serendipitous. 99Mr O'Sullivan also drew attention to the assessment of the psychiatrist and the psychologist that Andrew suffered and continues to suffer from a depressive illness. He submitted that general deterrence had a lesser role to play by reason of that illness. Those professionals do not, however, make any link between his depression and his involvement in the killing. Indeed, their only partial explanation of his involvement is the influence of his father that I have earlier discussed. 100Mr O'Sullivan has urged upon me that I should find special circumstances because of Andrew's age, lack of criminal record and his prospects for rehabilitation. In R v Simpson [2001] NSWCCA 534; (2001) 53 NSWLR 704 Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P, Grove J, Newman A-J agreed, and Sully J in substance agreed in a short additional judgment) said: [59] ... The sentencing context in which [ the words "special circumstances"] appear in the present legislation must be understood against the background of a long-standing line of decisions in the High Court, commencing with Power, [ Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623] which emphasises that the non-parole period is to be determined by what the sentencing judge concludes that all of the circumstances of the case, including the need for rehabilitation, indicate ought be the minimum period of actual incarceration. The proposition that the fixing of a non-parole period is a matter that is to be determined solely, or primarily, by reason of considerations of rehabilitation has long since been rejected. 101I consider that there should be some small adjustment to the statutory ratio by reason of the special circumstances including Andrew's age, his lack of a criminal record and his prospects of rehabilitation. 102Taking all of these matters into account I consider that the appropriate non-parole period is a period of 18 years with an additional term of 7 years. He has been in custody since his arrest in Singapore on 21 May 2010. His sentence will commence on that day. Sentence 103Andrew Iskandar for the murder of Mohd Shah Saemin I sentence you to a minimum term of 18 years imprisonment commencing 21 May 2010 and expiring 20 May 2028 with an additional term of 7 years expiring 20 May 2035. 104Nita Iskandar for being an accessory after the fact to the murder of Mohd Shah Saemin I sentence you to imprisonment for 1 year 11 months and 15 days commencing 16 March 2012 and expiring 28 February 2014, such sentence to be wholly suspended. You are to enter into a bond to be of good behaviour for a period of 1 year 11 months and 15 days commencing 16 March 2012 and expiring 28 February 2013. The bond is to contain conditions: (a) that you will be of good behaviour during the term of the bond; (b) that you are to appear before the Court if called upon to do so at any time during the term of the bond; (c) that you are to accept the supervision of the Probation and Parole Service and to obey all reasonable directions for counselling and to report to the Burwood Probation office within 7 days.

Amendments 13 December 2019 - Publication restriction removed from coversheet. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 13 December 2019