Assessment of Sentences
63 The Crown submitted that the sentences imposed by Adams J were appropriate and that no good reason existed for imposing any lesser sentence for the murders committed by the Offender. As I have mentioned, Mr Dalton SC acknowledged that the sentences imposed by Adams J were not inappropriate for the person who committed these crimes, although fundamental to this submission was the Offender's continuing denial that he had killed either man or was involved, in any way, in their murders.
64 The maximum penalty for murder is imprisonment for life: s.19A Crimes Act 1900. A standard non-parole period of 20 years applies for the crime of murder: s.54A Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999.
65 Section 61 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides for a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment where a person is convicted of murder, and the Court is satisfied that the level of culpability and the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met through the imposition of that sentence.
66 The Crown submitted that a determinate sentence ought be fixed for the murder of Mr Tay, but a life sentence ought be fixed for the murder of Mr Tan.
67 I accept that features which bear upon the objective seriousness of the murder of Mr Tay include the fact that the Offender was someone whom Mr Tay trusted, the fact that Mr Tay was murdered in his own home, that extreme force was used with the softball bat to Mr Tay's head, that the Offender did not seek any medical help or intervene in any way on behalf of Mr Tay, but left him dying on the lounge room floor, that the Offender stabbed Mr Tay a considerable time (up to two hours) after the initial attack with the softball bat and that the likely motive for it was a financial benefit or, at least, the avoidance of a financial detriment.
68 Factors bearing upon the objective seriousness of the murder of Mr Tan include the fact that the Offender was a person whom Mr Tan trusted, that the Offender's motive for the murder was to silence Mr Tan as a potential witness adverse to him with respect to the murder of Mr Tay, the extreme force used in the attack upon Mr Tan in the lounge room and hallway culminating in a savage and lethal attack using a combination of the softball bat and then the knife.
69 There was a significant time gap between the two murders, and a link between the two, in that the murder of Mr Tan was carried out with the Offender perceiving that it would assist and advance his position in explaining his murder of Mr Tay.
70 The Offender has shown no contrition or remorse for either crime.
71 The Offender's subjective case, involving prior good character and the other positive features to which reference has been made, is entirely secondary to the grave objective seriousness of the crimes for which he has been convicted.
72 It is necessary for the Court to consider the question of the appropriate sentence for each crime separately.
73 For the murder of Mr Tay, Adams J imposed a sentence of imprisonment for 25 years and did not set a non-parole period. No doubt, his Honour took this course because of the life sentence imposed for the second murder.
74 The Crown acknowledged that the principles in R v Gilmore (1979) 1 A Crim R 416 would apply here so that, following a second trial, the Offender should ordinarily not receive a longer sentence or non-parole period than those imposed in the first trial. I accept that this principle has application.
75 In my view, the murder of Mr Tay lies close to the middle of the range of objective seriousness. I see no foundation for a finding of "special circumstances" so that the ratio in s.44 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 ought stand. I propose to fix a sentence of imprisonment of 25 years, commencing on 28 May 2004 for the murder of Mr Tay, with a non-parole period of 18 years and three months to date from 28 May 2004.
76 I turn to the sentence to be passed for the murder of Mr Tan.
77 The burden of proving that a case falls within s.61(1) rests on the Crown, and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt: R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557 at 567 [35]. The primary focus of the legislation is directed towards an assessment of extreme culpability.
78 A life sentence is required if the culpability is so extreme that the community interest (in the combined effect of such of the factors of retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence as are applicable) could only be met by a life sentence: R v Merritt at 568 [42], 570 [54].
79 If a life sentence is imposed in this State, it means a sentence for the term of the person's natural life: s.19A(2). It is not open to the Court to set a non-parole period and there is no prospect of release, save for the prerogative of mercy: R v Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409 at 429 [122]-[125].
80 I am conscious that it is an incorrect approach to sentencing to compare the facts of the case at hand with other cases in order to determine whether it does, or does not, fall within the worst case category, deserving of the maximum sentence: R v Merritt at 575 [65].
81 However, I have considered other sentencing cases in this State where a person has been sentenced for multiple murders. I have taken this course to identify the application of relevant sentencing principles in those cases, rather than by way of a factual comparison to inform a decision as to whether the murder of Mr Tan falls within s.61 of the Act.
82 In R v Mehta [2009] NSWSC 814, Grove J imposed a sentence of 30 years' imprisonment for the first murder and life imprisonment for the second murder, where an offender had pleaded guilty to the two crimes. The offender had murdered his partner, and then a nine-year old child who had witnessed him strangling the child's mother. His Honour found that the mother had been killed for a financial motive and an entirely different and subsequently formed motive, namely to silence a possible witness to murder, inspired the offender to kill the child. There was nothing mitigating in the closeness in time between the two murders. Grove J found at [41]-[42] that the murder of the child fell into the worst category of that crime, and that a sentence of life imprisonment was appropriate given its heinousness. His Honour observed at [49] that the requirements of s.61 Crimes (Sentencing Proceedings)1999 had been demonstrated with respect to the murder of the child.
83 In Ta'ala v R [2008] NSWCCA 132, the Court of Criminal Appeal considered a sentence appeal where an offender had pleaded guilty to two counts of murder committed on the same day, where the second killing was designed to prevent the report to the police of the first murder. Determinate sentences were imposed, giving rise to a total overall sentence of imprisonment for 47 years with a non-parole period of 38 years and six months. Although the sentencing Judge had assessed the second murder as falling within s.61, a determinate sentence was fixed for it, in the exercise of discretion. There was no Crown appeal in that case. The appeal was allowed in part to cure a mathematical error which had occurred in the sentencing process. The total effective sentence was one of 47 years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 35 years.
84 I have considered other cases in which an offender has been given determinate sentences for multiple killings, including De Gruchy v The Queen, above, and R v Hill [2003] NSWCCA 128.
85 I am faced with the position in this case where the Crown submits that a finding of Adams J that the murder of Mr Tan was in the worst-case category ought be adopted, and where Mr Dalton SC acknowledges that this approach is not inappropriate for the murder of Mr Tan.
86 It remains a matter for me to make a finding as to whether I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that s.61 applies, so that the maximum penalty should be imposed for the murder of Mr Tan.
87 An assessment of the heinousness of the murder of Mr Tan involves consideration of the following matters, arising from the verdicts of the jury: