Re-sentencing by this Court : Balancing Objective Criminality and Subjective Considerations
46 It is useful, in the present case, to commence with the following extract from the judgment of this Court, (Gleeson CJ, Lee CJ at CL, Hunt J), in Reg v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 349 at 354:
"As Jordan CJ pointed out in Geddes at 556, making due allowance for all relevant considerations, there ought to be a reasonable proportionality between a sentence and the circumstances of the crime, and we consider that it is always important in seeking to determine the sentence appropriate to a particular crime to have regard to the gravity of the offence viewed objectively, for without this assessment the other factors requiring consideration in order to arrive at the proper sentence to be imposed cannot properly be given their place. Each crime, as Veen (No. 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 472; 33 A Crim R 230 at 234 stresses, has its own objective gravity meriting at the most a sentence proportionate to that gravity, the maximum sentence fixed by the legislature defining the limits of sentence for cases in the most grave category. The relative importance of the objective facts and subjective features of a case will vary: see, for example, the passage from the judgment of Street CJ in Todd [1982] 2 NSWLR 517 quoted in Mill (1988) 166 CLR 59 at 64; 36 A Crim R 468. Even so, there is sometimes a risk that attention to persuasive subjective considerations may cause inadequate weight to be given to the objective circumstances of the case: Rushby [1977] 1 NSWLR 594. We consider that to have happened here. In our view the requirement of a reasonable proportionality with the circumstances of crime called for a significant full-time custodial sentence."
47 It will be apparent from what I have said earlier herein that, were it not for what I take from the decision in Twala, I would have dealt with the two murders committed by the applicant as worst case examples. Because of what I believe to be the essential reasoning in Twala, I do not believe that the correctly principled striking of a balance of objective criminality with subjective mitigating circumstances can properly result in a head sentence of life imprisonment.
48 That said, however, I have no doubt that the applicant's case is one in which determinate sentences must reflect in a real way, and particularly in connection with the two murders, the sheer, chilling enormity of those crimes. The murder of Mr. Watson, in particular, was in my opinion so brutal and callous a crime as to call for a sentence of exemplary severity.
49 When proper account is taken of the true objective culpability of, in particular, the two murders, then the properly principled weighting of the subjective features of the case cannot have anything other than minimal effect. To approach this case by setting a determinate sentence, and by then cutting it by figures in the order of 20 - 25 per cent for the pleas of guilty; and by then cutting further to allow for other subjective matters, could not be thought sensibly as being likely to cement public confidence in, and public respect and support for, the rule of law. If anything, such an approach would be much more likely to subvert all of those objectives.
50 I have come, accordingly, to the conclusion that a proper head sentence for the murder of Mr. Watson would be one of imprisonment for 30 years. I would not find special circumstances; not because there are no matters capable in law of amounting to special circumstances, but because to give normal effect to them would entail, in my opinion, a non-parole period that was wholly inadequate to denounce, to punish and to deter two truly dreadful crimes. I would set a non-parole period for this offence of 25 years.
51 For the murder of Mr. O'Shea, I would fix a head sentence of 28 years, with a non-parole period of 23 years.
52 I would see no reason to interfere with the remaining two sentences passed upon the applicant by O'Keefe J. Those two offences, also, were in my opinion, if not worst case examples, then at the very top of the next-most serious level of offences of that kind.
53 As to whether the sentences thus set should be wholly cumulative, wholly concurrent, or partly cumulative and partly concurrent, I think that justice would be served by making all four sentences concurrent. A total effective penalty of imprisonment for 30 years with a non-parole period of 25 years, passed upon a man who is at present aged almost 47 years, would seem to me to meet, with practical justice, the proper requirements of the principles of totality and of proportionality.