R v Stenzel

Sequence 1

1. There are Agreed Facts before the Court. There was one noted exception, with which I will deal shortly. Although subject to an Apprehended Violence Order with conditions that he not assault, threaten, stalk, or intimidate or approach the complainant, they did meet up after a family funeral on 23 October 2020.
2. At that time the complainant was looking after Stenzel's sister's children, as she had to go to the funeral. She stayed overnight at the house in Koonawarra. On the morning of 23 October 2020, the complainant awoke to hear an argument. She went outside to check and ask what was going on. The offender punched her to the head with a closed fist, partly dislodging one of her teeth.
3. She went back inside to get her daughter, who was also staying overnight. She asked a man at the house to take her home. He agreed. She put her child's car seat into the car, and then her child into that seat.
4. Stenzel came out of the house. He stopped the other man from getting into the vehicle. Instead, he got into the driver's seat. He told the complainant to get in the car and she did, believing she would be hurt either way and because her daughter was already strapped in. She did not say anything.
5. The offender then drove from Koonawarra to Mount Kembla. The drive lasted about 30 minutes. During the drive, Mr Stenzel assaulted the complainant by punching her and backhand slapping her to the face and head. He abused her and called her a slut. It was his view that she had been sleeping with people in the house. She had pleaded with him to stop hitting her as it was hurting her. He told her it was all her fault. She remined him their daughter was in the back seat. Their daughter became distressed and tried to free herself from the baby seat. Stenzel continued to hit his victim, as their daughter continued to scream for her mother.
6. The complainant was screaming at Stenzel to stop; he did not. She tried to kick at him so she could escape, but this made him angrier. He slammed the brakes on, leant over and again attacked the complainant. She opened the passenger door . As he started to drive off, he pushed her from the car. She landed on her left shoulder and head before rolling and hitting her knee. He drove off with their daughter in the car. She ran into nearby bushland and hid.
7. Eventually, she flagged down another vehicle and was taken to the police station. She was treated at the Wollongong Hospital. Her injuries included; facial pain, swelling, pain in her left shoulder, partially dislodged front tooth, cuts to her lips, and grazes.

Factual dispute

1. There is a factual dispute. The prosecution case is the detention commenced once Stenzel ordered the complainant into the car and drove off.
2. Mr Booker, counsel for Stenzel, submitted; the detention was not thought out, it was spontaneous recklessness, rather than deliberate. He submitted, I could not on the Agreed Facts find the detention started until sometime into the journey, at about the time the arguments and assault began, when Stenzel changed his initial intention and decided not to take the complainant home.
3. Where a matter is put forward in sentencing proceedings and is contested, notwithstanding the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) generally does not apply, it may not be acted on unless it is established. The proof of such a fact must occur in the context of the proceedings. As the High Court made clear in Olbrich v R (1999) 199 CLR 270; [1999] HCA 54, matters of mitigation must be established on the balance of probabilities; matters in aggravation of penalty must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court also recognised that sometimes a sentencing court must sentence according to what is known or agreed. The Court made the point specifically that a Judge, who is not satisfied of some matter urged in plea on behalf of the offender, does not have to sentence the offender on the basis of that contention unless the prosecution prove the contrary beyond reasonable doubt.
4. Reviewing the objectively established evidence, and noting that Stenzel did not give evidence, what I am left with is this.
5. An offence of this type pursuant to s 86, is committed once the offender prevents his victim from leaving, should she wish to do so. There must be some interference with that person's liberty. In this matter, the complainant was told to get into the car. She had only recently been assaulted by him. At that point, she had no realistic or real choice. She had already strapped her daughter into the child seat and Stenzel had already stopped the person she thought was going to drive her home from doing so.
6. Her will was overborne at that point. This was his intention. There is no evidence before me that he was just going to give her a lift home, despite the assertions by counsel and some vague references in some of the material before me. The offence started at Koonawarra when he drove off having ordered her into the car. It ended when he pushed her out of the car at Mount Kembla about 15 or so kilometres away.

Related matters

1. Stenzel had been previously disqualified from driving, but he drove that day and, of course, these actions breached the Apprehended Violence Order that was then in place.
2. Police were made aware of his actions. On 25 October 2020, a police car saw the offender in the car that he had driven away in, and they saw him in Gallop Street Berkeley. They followed the car. Stenzel's vehicle accelerated away harshly, travelling well in excess of the 60 Kilometre speed limit. The vehicle was observed to turn into Northcliffe Drive on the wrong side of the road after failing to negotiate a roundabout. Given the nature of the offender's driving, the police terminated their pursuit.
3. It was overcast, raining, and there was a medium amount of traffic present, and the offender well exceeded the speed limit. That is, the drive while disqualified and the pursuit matters. He was arrested on 28 October 2020; and he has been in custody ever since.

The detain offence

1. The decision in R v Newell [2004] NSWCCA 183, gives guidance and sets out to factors that should influence a finding of objective seriousness in matters such as this.
2. Here I take into account that: 1. The period of detention was about half an hour; 2. The advantage sought was to intimidate, that is: cause a reasonable apprehension of injury or violence; 3. Stenzel's actions appeared spontaneous; 4. His actions involved an exercise of coercive power and control over the victim; 5. There was both the threat of violence and actual violence; 6. His actions caused the complainant anguish, not the least because her child was present; 7. As this is a specifically aggravated offence, I must take into account the element of the offence that Actual Bodily Harm was occasioned to her; 8. The complainant was targeted, it would appear, because of their prior domestic relationship; 9. Their child was present; 10. I cannot take into account the fact that Stenzel was intoxicated, s 21A(5)(A), but to the contrary, his unpredictability due to his intoxication and the fact that the offence occurred as he was driving, made the risk to the complainant greater; 11. It occurred in breach of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order; 12. The offence occurred against the history of domestic violence.
3. The courts recognise the special dynamics of domestic violence. Here, the complainant was personally targeted, and the offence occurred as part of a larger picture of physical and mental violence, including offences committed against her while he was in custody. It was an exercise in power and control over another. As is often the case, Stenzel still appears to believe what he did was somehow justified or can be excused.
4. There was even a hint that he believes he was the true victim. Such beliefs carry with them a continued threat to the complainant. As a consequence, victims may never feel truly safe. Proper recognition given to the real harm crimes such as this do to their victims, and the Court has to take into account the impact on the children, the victims, and the community in general.

The breach offence

1. The offences committed by the applicant were in breach of an Apprehended Domestic Violence Order, put in place to protect her from him. The breach of that particular condition of liberty, designed to protect the complaint, is a matter that must be taken into account and generally requires independent punishment: Browning v R [2015] NSWCCA 147 at [4] to [9]; Cherry v R [2017] NSWCCA 150.
2. He was driving while disqualified, he had been disqualified until 2030. His actions showed no regard for court orders designed with community protection in mind.

The police pursuit

1. Police officers take substantial risks in the execution of their duty. They also have to moderate their behaviour because of the potential risk to others. Where a driver blatantly ignores police and seeks to flee, they put police and just as importantly, other road users at risk. Here the extent of the culpability can be considered by the distance covered, the nature of the driving, and the speed relative to posted speed limits and the conditions, the time of day, there was a risk to others, such that the police felt that they needed to discontinue.

Form 1

1. There is a matter on the Form 1 that will be taken into account when I sentence for the principal offence. I increase the sentence because of the need to recognise personal deterrence and retribution for the matter for sentence, in accordance with the guideline judgment: Attorney General's Application under s 37 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 No 1 of 2002 [2002] NSWCCA 518; (2002) 56 NSWLR 146.

Maximum penalties and standard non-parole periods

1. The maximum penalties, to which I have already referred, are one guide to the exercise of my discretion, but only one of many guides.

Criminal history

1. The offender has an extensive criminal record. He was dealt with by Judge O'Brien at this Court in July 2020. He was on parole when he committed this offence. His balance of parole continued until 3 January 2022. These matters breach that parole. His history goes back to the Children's Court. His Local Court matters involve crimes of violence, including domestic violence, an escape, which may interfere with his future classifications in gaol, and driving matters, including the matter that I have also had reference to, the carriage service offence involving this victim.
2. He has committed offences in Queensland and the ACT. Except for 18 months in the community in 2011 and 2012, as I said at the beginning, his time in the community can be measured in months since he was first gaoled in 2009.
3. His criminal history is relevant to determine the proper sentence. It indicates that this offence, or this offending, was not an uncharacteristic aberration. There is a history of continuing disobedience towards the law. His prior criminal history cannot result in a sentence which is disproportionate to the seriousness of what he did, but here it justifies the more serious penalty. Additional focus has to be placed on retribution, deterrence, and the protection of the community: Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465; [1988] HCA 14 at [477].
4. Another factor is that he has been effectively institutionalised, not that gaol is a comfort to him or not that he is doing gaol easily, to the contrary. He must be returned however to the community. This requires some focus on ensuring that there is a sufficient period of conditional and supervised liberty to ensure protection of the community and minimise the chance of recidivism.

Victim impact statement

1. I have received a victim's impact statement. The complainant says this: "This incident has affected me in the following ways: - I have nightmares. I'm triggered easily by sounds, smells and surroundings. I find it hard to be around successful people because my life is turned upside down and I've had to start again from rock bottom. I struggle with self-confidence due to my obvious injuries. I struggle socially since losing a lot of other relationships. I now suffer from PTSD and severe social anxiety which my GP has said there is no medication for my issues. Physically The damage to my teeth is permanent, I can never bite into anything such as an apple ever again. I must always be very careful when eating. I struggle to lift and play with my three young children under six, due to the damage to my left shoulder. To reduce the pain and strengthen that shoulder I must do [physiotherapy] four times a week and have regular physiotherapy. Even then I still have bad days and severe pain."
2. She notes the thousands of dollars she has paid in dental procedures, physio and to pay for a home gym.

Subjective case - contested issues

1. In some of the reports tendered Stenzel gave his version of events. Which was then repeated in the report. Mr Booker said that that repetition showed consistency, giving rise to the conclusion that what he said was truthful. I am against him in that regard.
2. Most sentencing proceedings do not involve some general joinder of issue between prosecution and the offender. Calling and testing evidence is required whenever an asserted fact is controverted or if the Judge is not prepared to act on the assertion. Most often this comes up in three areas: 1. When a matter not on oath is repeated second hand and put forward as evidence going to the assessment of objective seriousness: R v Qutami [2001] NSWCCA 353; Lai v R [2021] NSW 217 at [79]. 2. So-called expert psychological reports which uncritically parrot claims by an offender who does not give evidence. In such circumstances expression of good intentions, by an offender who is not willing to be tested in the witness box, carries little weight: R v JDX; JDX v R [2017] NSWCCA 9. 3. Expressions of remorse or contrition that are not reflected by the offender's actions or other evidence.
3. Reasonable minds will differ when assessing the weight that must be given to matters raised in the proceedings, particularly those to which the Evidence Act 1995 do not apply. Here I cannot accept the hearsay accounts going to objective facts that are not supported by the agreed facts or other material before me.
4. There was, however, no attempt by the psychologist, or other experts, to uncritically parrot matters. There is no evidence here of second-hand evidence of remorse or contrition; to the contrary. There is no reason to lessen the effect of the opinions of the professional psychiatrist who gave evidence. His opinion was based on the history admitted and without cross-examination, in compliance with the District Court Criminal Practice Note 20, cl 15.
5. I can also take into account the considered opinions of the social worker who prepared the psychosocial history and I do so when assessing the significance of their reports and all the matters before me. While some of the opinions offered by the social worker may have been beyond her expertise, they were to a large extent consistent with Dr Furst's admittedly expert opinion: Lloyd v R [2022] NSWCCA 18; Devaney v R [2012] NSWCCA 285 at [88]; Luque v R [2017] NSWCCA 226 at [116]; Pym v R [2014] NSWCCA 182 at [79].

Subjective case

1. A powerful subjective case was presented by Stenzel.
2. There must be a proper appreciation of the impact of the deprivation Stenzel suffered as a child: R v Millwood [2012] NSWCCA 2; Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37.
3. Common humanity dictates that a person with his history will have fewer emotional resources to guide his behavioural decisions. His start in life means he cannot expect to bear equal moral responsibility with a person who had, what might be termed, a normal or advantaged upbringing. His childhood deprivation and subsequent experiences, including in gaol, have diminished his capacity to guide his own behavioural decisions: Lloyd v R [2022] NSWCCA 18.
4. Briefly, Stenzel was born in 1988. He is an Aboriginal Australian. The history of propound deprivation goes back to his exposure to drugs before birth, and the fact that he suffered withdrawal as a neonate.
5. Drugs and violence were normalised in his home. His father was gaoled for stabbing his mother, and it appears, took him to Queensland where he subjected him to very harsh discipline. Neglect was reported to the authorities. He then went back for a period with his mother in New South Wales, but she had her own problems, including addiction to methylamphetamine. It is clear that drugs, first heroin, cannabis, and then methylamphetamine, have loomed large in his life, larger than almost any other interest.
6. He was able to work for a brief period in 2008, but since 2009, gaol and crime have been the overwhelming factors in his life. He has been the victim of serious assaults while in gaol. He has seven children but has never had time in the community to properly care for them.
7. The Sentence Assessment Report (SAR) is frank. It would appear that Stenzel is jealous, and still believes his violence can somehow be justified. He has a significant substance abuse problem. When using methylamphetamine, he does not appear to think about consequences and cannot control his emotions. Given his history, and all he has suffered, this is perhaps understandable even though it does not excuse what he did.
8. He professes to be open to interventions, but what interventions can be made available to him in custody may be limited because of his classification and, of course, the current COVID-19 restrictions.
9. Stenzel is at a high risk of reoffending. There is a plan both in the SAR and Dr Furst's report. The implementation of that plan will be up to the State Parole Authority to consider prior to his release to parole. There are programs, available, including when he is released to the community. They include engaging in Explore, Question, Understand, Investigate, Practice, Succeed (EQUIPS). He will need r referral to agencies such as the Illawarra Drug and Alcohol Service. He will need to engage with a GP so that a Mental Health Plan can be put in place. This which would include ongoing psychological intervention. A number of interventional tools have to be put in place in an attempt to equip him for life in the community.

Remorse

1. There was an acceptance of responsibility here, but no real insight has been shown. I accept the evidence that shows that taking up drugs was a response to his childhood upbringing. While Stenzel cannot use that as an excuse, it does help me understand his state of mind and his incapacity to exercise sound judgment, the impulsivity of the offence, and the lack of planning for it.

Psychiatric reports

1. I am indebted, as always, to the comprehensive report of Dr Furst. I have the benefit of two of his reports, one prepared for Judge O'Brien and one prepared for these proceedings.
2. The background report prepared by Mary Jelen, a social worker from Legal Aid, also has informed the conclusions I have reached. She notes that Stenzel has displayed resistance to engaging in social supports. I hope as he ages and thinks about his future, he will put that resistance aside and take up whatever help that can be made available to him, both in custody and the community.
3. Dr Furst notes three psychiatric conditions and possible treatments - Substance Use Disorder, Depressive Disorder and Anti-social Personality Disorder.
4. In Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v De La Rosa (2010) 79 NSWLR 1; [2010] NSWCCA 194 at [177] it is noted by reference to R v Lawrence (2005) NSWCCA 91 (Spigelman CJ) at [23] to [24] that, an Anti-social Personality Disorder can be a matter that is taken into account when assessing community protection. It is clear that each of the disorders diagnosed have foundations in Stenzel's background.
5. It is also clear, as Dr Furst notes, that the long history of problems, particularly emotional instability, have not been able to be addressed, particularly as he has an E1 classification. Dr Furst is cautious. At page 12 of his report, Dr Furst sets out his opinion that Stenzel's childhood trauma and related emotional dysregulation contributed towards criminal associations and a pattern of drug related offending in his adult years. He concludes: "However, I believe it would be misleading to characterise his reactions towards [the complainant] as 'fearful' at the time of the offending when he was the perpetrator of domestic violence towards [her] on the night in question. I would regard his primary emotions and thought patterns to be related to the effects of his drug intoxication, anger about [the complainant]'s real or perceived lies, jealousy and the perceived need to control the victim, coupled with his emotional dysregulation as a product of his deficient personality / temperament."
6. He then recommends a structured program in custody, including the Violent Offender Treatment Program (VOTP) and programs outside, including medical treatment. He notes that Buvidal treatment , would likely minimise the risk of Stenzel sharing needles in custody.
7. Dr Furst recommends, as does the SAR, the EQUIPS programs and Intensive Drug and Alcohol Treatment programs.
8. I have briefly referred to Stenzels' history of profound deprivation. As the Court of Criminal Appeal has made quite clear, that qualifier does not restrict the application of what are called the Bugmy principles. Here that qualifier is well and truly justified, given the material before me. A background such as this leaves a mark, and it has compromised Stenzel's capacity to mature and learn from experience. It remains relevant, even when there has been, as here, a history of offending. That history should be given "full weight". But, as Dr Furst makes clear from the passage I have just related, these factors can go both ways.
9. As a consequence of his background, Stenzel is more of a danger particularly to future partners than a person who did not have the conditions that have been diagnosed; unless and until he deals with his underlying problems, ,
10. Sentencing Court should be wary about downplaying the principle of protection of the community, because of a person's history, A court should never say, just because of a person's background, the victims of crime are not to be deprived of the equal protection that the law is meant to give to everyone: Hoskins v R [2021] NSWCCA 169; Munda v State of Western Australia (2013) 249 CLR 600; [2013] HCA 38; [2013] HCA 38 at [134]; Fernando v R (1992) A Crim R 59.
11. But it must be recognised that incarceration has not proved an effective deterrent of Stenzels anti-social behaviour. In fact, its deterrent effect is compromised by the lack of insight, a common feature of the circumstances which here lessen his moral culpability.
12. These conflicting considerations placer a Judge in a difficult position. Their acknowledgment, as was made clear by Basten J in Hoskins, provides little practical assistance in determining an appropriate sentence. His Honour said, "The solution to social problems does not lie in the criminal Courts, and best course may be to err on the side of leniency": Hoskins at [1].

Assault in gaol

1. I have regard to the fact Stenzel was assaulted in gaol. It is a relevant factor on sentence. There is no suggestion here that it was extra-curial or should attract the reductions often given for extra-curial punishment. But a judge must consider the impact of custody on a person, and where a person is assaulted in custody, even after the wounds healed, there will be continual anxiety and concerns. Prisoners have no control over whom they associate with and no control over their immediate safety. A sentencing court does not ignore the lived experience of gaol.

Submissions

1. Mr Coulten's principal submission was, adequate punishment is required to reflect what was done, no matter what Stenzel's background. Mr Booker put reasons why his release is critical to his rehabilitation. He submitted he should not be warehoused, and that a crushing sentence should be avoided. He submitted that all the material shows that Stenzel is at a crossroads in his life.
2. In discussion during the sentencing proceedings, we noted this simple fact; that proper punishment involves more than retribution and warehousing. Warehousing occurs when someone is gaoled because there is no other facility that can better look after them and provide needed community protection. Nor, sadly, is Stenzel at the crossroads. He may be, when he has completed his non-parole period, but at the moment, the best that can be said is his acceptance that he needs intervention: SAR, p 4.
3. Given his understandable lack of trust in authority figures and given that he has had so little opportunity to engage in mentoring and other programs in the community, he does not present as someone who has made a choice and should be given every opportunity to demonstrate progress towards rehabilitation already underway.
4. Mr Booker provided me with a table of other cases. The guidance offered by such decisions of other Courts is always welcome. Consistent application of principle must always be considered. But while they help guide my discretion, every case and every individual is different, and no one factor or factors will ever be precisely the same in past cases. He also urged me not to impose a crushing sentence, that is one that would not crush all hopes for a productive life on release or cause Stenzel to abandon hope and not cooperate with gaol authorities, reducing his chance of rehabilitation. What is proportionate or what might be seen as crushing can really depend on the perspective of the observer, whether they be victim, community, Appeal Court, or the offender.

Structure of the sentence

1. There will be an aggregate sentence here. There must be some independent punishment for the separate offences, but there should considerable concurrence.
2. Mr Booker submitted that this sentence should date from when he first went into custody. Mr Coulton, Crown Prosecutor, who appeared for the Director of Public Prosecutions, submitted that there should be some independent time for the balance of parole.
3. I have to ultimately synthesise this matter and avoid double counting. Given the extraordinary amount of time Stenzel has spent in custody, given the short period between release and the breach, given that I have taken into account as a circumstance of aggravation, the commission of the offence, I will date this sentence from when he first went into custody.
4. I will allow a period on parole by a finding of special circumstances, but the decision to release Stenzel to parole will remain with the State Parole Authority. Whether or not he is released at the expiry of what I believe is the minimum time the purposes of sentencing require, will depend on his willingness and capacity to engage in the programs he sorely needs both in and out of custody. They are set out in the reports.

COVID-19

1. Stenzel has served his time to date subject to the COVID-19 restrictions. He appears today in protective gear. I have, as best I can by; evidence given in other proceedings, the Community Corrections website, and material made available by the Judicial Commission, sought to find out what is going on in gaols and the impact of custody on prisoners.
2. Clearly programs, particularly those provided by external providers, are limited. Clearly, prisoners are, more often than not, locked down, quarantined, segregated, treated if they catch COVID-19 with minimal pain killers, despite the fact that the Parliament said that there could be early release to parole if COVID-19 got into the gaols. No one has ever been released to COVID-19 related parole. It has to be accepted that prisoners subject to the pandemic, cannot protect themselves, are totally reliant upon Community Corrections. A degree of leniency is required because of the additional hardships occasioned by serving a sentence subject to COVID-19.

Synthesis

1. I am required to synthesise all these matters. What was done to the complainant here cannot be excused. It was serious criminal behaviour.
2. I do not believe Stenzel actually understands how serious an offence he committed. The principal mater today is an offence that carries a potential maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Punishment is required to denounce what he did and recognise the harm done.
3. Hash punishment can create a dilemma. Community protection supported by a growing community perception about the seriousness of domestic violence offences demand that men who offend against women, as he did, must be punished severely. The courts recognise that violence in a domestic context should never be treated as of little moment. Each victim of crime be entitled to equal protection of the law.
4. Crime against former partners by taking away their liberty cannot be excused. Women should not be forced to bear an unfair burden. For communities to remain communities they need economic, social and physical security for their members.
5. But gaol can only provide some temporary protection and victim vindication. By removing someone from the community and placing them in gaol, as Stenzel's history has shown, does not improve them. It does not protect the community except for the period they are removed from it. Gaol has been ineffective. It has broken bonds with others who hold pro-social values, It has encouraged links with other criminals.
6. Stenzel's terrible start in life means he cannot bear equal moral responsibility with a person who has a normal or advantaged upbringing. His background has left a mark and compromised his capacity, therefore considerable leniency is required to recognise the impacts of that developmental trauma.
7. This sentence must be tempered because of those matters, which were noted by Dr Furst.
8. There is some glimmer of hope that Stenzel might be able to engage with agencies that provide intensive drug treatment and the Aboriginal Medical Service He had some initial contact the Aboriginal Medical Service. It is hoped that, when the gaols open up, outside providers from the Aboriginal community can come into gaol to provide some mentoring. If Stenzel can; learn to trust others, if he can engage with people from his community, if he can engage in sorely needed drug rehabilitation or relapse prevention, he may reach a crossroads, and with help, turn his life around.
9. At the moment, a lot more needs to be done and there are, sadly, little positive signs.
10. I will extend what leniency I can to him. This is not a matter where we have to throw away the key. I hope not to crush his hopes, because he has to learn to trust and cooperate. At the same time, there must be more time in custody. I will indicate individual sentences. I will make a finding of special circumstances. The indicated sentences reflect the 25% reduction for the utilitarian value of the plea required by s 25D of the Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act 1999 (NSW). There must be some accumulation.

Orders

1. Indicated sentences: 1. Sequence 1 - the Detain - there will be an indicative sentence of 3 years and 9 months. The matter on the Form 1 is taken into account. 2. Sequence 3 - the Contravene - there will be an indicative sentence of 9 months. 3. Sequence 5 and 7 - the Drive while Disqualified - there will be an indicative sentence of 3 months and driving licence disqualification for the automatic period of 12 months. 4. Sequence 6 - the Police Pursuit - a sentence of 4 months. 5. Sequence 7 - Drive while Disqualified - there will be an indicative sentence of 3 months and the automatic licence disqualification of 12 months.
2. The aggregate sentence is 4 years and 3 months. There will be a non-parole period of 2 years and 9 months. The balance of term of 1 year and 6 months. The sentence will commence on 28 October 2020.
3. You will be eligible for consideration for parole on 27 July 2023. There will be a further parole period of 1 year and 6 months. But as I have said, whether you are released to parole or not, depends on the State Parole Authority. The total sentence will expire on 27 January 2025. To recap - 4 years, 3 months, minimum 2 years, 9 months, parole period 1 year, 6 months.
4. The licence disqualifications will be suspending as a matter of law while you are in custody, so when you are out, you will be subject to a lengthy period of driving disqualification. Any driving will breach your parole.
5. A copy of Dr Furst's report and the psychosocial report should accompany the warrant.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 19 September 2023