As his Honour proceeded to explain[21], that clearly was not a correct statement of the law, nor, it might be said, was it ever a correct statement of any legal principle which historically lay behind allowing the Crown to lead evidence of recent complaint. It is clear that his Honour had doubted at first that it would lead to any miscarriage of justice, but in the end, he saw[22] the vice in the particular statement of the judge in Matthews as being that they were told what the "legal theory" was, which he thought was very similar to the use of the expression "the law says" which the President had thought undesirable in the charge considered in R. v. Stoupas[23]. In other words the clear connotation of the direction (in Matthews) was that the law required the jury to take one course if there had been a complaint and another course if there had been no complaint. The judge's authority had been added to a proposition which on any basis could not be justified. Probably the principal vice lay in the second, negative, part of the sentence, but there remained a difficulty in any event that the jury were being led to believe that the fact of complaint (or its absence) had a legal consequence, whereas the only consequence of a prompt complaint in law is to assist the jury to reach a conclusion as to the consistency of the complainant's evidence, if they think it appropriate to do so.