any promise of favour, and nothing to fear from any threat, which may have been held out to you to induce you to make any admission or confession of your guilt; but that whatever you now say may be given in evidence upon your trial, notwithstanding any such promise or threat.". (2) Upon the trial of the defendant, any evidence given or statement made in pursuance of this section may be given in evidence. (3) Omitted (4) Nothing herein contained shall prevent the prosecutor in any case from giving in evidence any admission or confession or other statement of the defendant made at any time, which by law would be admissible as evidence against him. 111. DEFENDANT MAY CALL WITNESSES (1) When the defendant has given evidence or made his statement, or has declined to do so, the Justice, before he commits the defendant for trial or admits him to bail, shall ask the defendant whether he desires to call any witness. (2) Any witness whom the defendant desires to call shall then be called, and the statement of any such witness who knows anything relating to the facts and circumstances of the case, or any evidence tending to prove the innocence of the defendant, shall be taken." 6. The transcript of the committal proceedings show that the magistrate did not observe those statutory provisions and it is agreed that upon listening to the tape recording of the proceedings the transcript is, for these purposes, an accurate record of what transpired. 7. Counsel appeared before that Court both for the informant and Mungaribi. Neither of them drew the magistrate's attention to those provisions of the Act. Transcripts of other committal proceedings, which come to this Court regularly, show that the procedure is followed. 8. The proceedings before the magistrate were somewhat confused, in that it appears that there were a number of separate charges against Mungaribi. Those, the subject of these proceedings, were dealt with by way of the procedure permitted under s. 105A and 105B of the Act. Having tendered the documents, counsel for the informant informed the Court that "that is the case for the informant in the matter". Counsel for Mungaribi then said "I make no submissions, sir". Discussion then took place regarding the disposition of the other charges. The magistrate then said "All right, well in relation to the other five matters, as I said, there's sufficient evidence to put the defendant on his trial. I direct he be committed for trial As I have said no one adverted to sections 110 and 111 of the Act. 9. The questions to be answered now are whether or not the requirements of the Act are mandatory or directory? Does failure to follow those provisions vitiate the committal proceedings? Can counsel for an accused person, by his conduct, dispense with compliance with those requirements? 10. In Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 at 211, Lord Penzance said, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only, "I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each cas you must look to the subject matter, consider the importance of the provision and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act, and upon a review of the case in that aspect decide whether the enactment is what is called imperative or only directory ..." 11. The two provisions of the Act find their place in Part V dealing with indictable offences. When all the evidence offered by the prosecution has been taken, the Justice shall consider whether it is sufficient to put the defendant upon his trial for any indictable offence (s. 109(1)). The power of the Justice extends to consideration of whether there is sufficient evidence to put the defendant upon his trial, not only for the offence charged but some other indictable offence. If some other such offence, he should see that the defendan is charged with the offence which he considers the evidence supports. (Hannon's Summary Procedure of Justices - 4th Edition - p 142). 12. Section 109(3) then provides that if the Justice is of the opinion that the evidence is so sufficient he may - (a) "if the charge is one of a minor indictable offence, proceed in the manner directed and under the provisions in that behalf contained in Division 2; (b) unless the defendant is charged with a capital offence, or with manslaughter, ask the defendant whether he wishes to plead to the charge as provided in Division 3, and proceed as thereby directed; or (c) proceed with the examination as provided in the next succeeding sections." 13. There is no question here that the charges were for minor indictable offences. Taken with s. 134, it is clear that the magistrate has a discretion a to whether he asks the defendant whether he wishes to plead to the charge under 109 (3)(b). That not being done the only course then open to the Justice to proceed with the examination as provided in the next succeeding sections. 14. The provision of sections 110 and 111 are set out above. They have a purpose. Section 112 provides that when the examination is completed, that is after proceeding with the examination, and completing it, the Justice is to again consider whether the evidence, that is all the evidence including any put forward pursuant to the provisions in s. 110 and s. 111, is sufficient to put th defendant upon his trial for any indictable offence. Again, it seems to me the Justice must then consider whether to put the defendant on his trial for the offence charged or any other offence. Evidence given by or on behalf of the defendant may have an effect on that consideration by leading the magistrate not to put the defendant upon his trial at all, or for some offence other than that with which he is charged. 15. To fail to advise a defendant of his rights is to deny him the opportunity, if he wishes to avail himself of it, to bring evidence which may effect the magistrate's considerations. 16. Committal proceedings constitute an important element in the protection which the criminal process gives to an accused person (per Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J. Barton v The Queen [1980] HCA 48; (1980) 147 CLR 75 at p 99). After referring to Lord Devlin's description of committal proceedings as "an essential safeguard against wanton or misconceived prosecution", their Honours went on "This comment reflects the nature of committal proceedings and the protection which they give the accused viz. the need for the Crown witnesses to give their evidence on oath, the opportunity to cross-examine, to present a case and the possibility the magistrate will not commit" (emphasis added). The deprivation of the opportunity of a defendant to call evidence in rebuttal is "a serious departure from the ordinary course of criminal justice" (p 100). 17. This case and many others referred to by counsel relate to the stay of an ex officio indictment (see also the judgment of Asche C.J. in R v Haslett [1987] NTSC 68; 50 NTR 17), but the observations as to the place of committal proceedings in the criminal justice system are apt for the purpose of this case. If committal proceedings are embarked upon then those purposes must be forever kept firmly in mind, (see O'Leary J. in Ngalken 12 A Crim R 29 esp pp 34 - 36), notwithstanding that in many or even most cases defendants do not wish to avail themselves of the opportunity to go into evidence. Notwithstanding the modern approach evidenced by ss. 105A and 105B, committal proceedings are not just a formality, and the Territory Parliament has not yet seen fit to dispense with the requirements of ss. 110 and 111 if the defendant is represented by counsel or a solicitor (see R. 7, Magistrates Court Rules set out in Archbold - 41st Edition para. 4 - 197 at p 304). 18. In R v Gee (1936) 2 KB 442 and R v Phillips (1929) 1 KB 63, it was held that irregularities in the prescribed manner of taking depositions at committal proceedings rendered committals for trial thereon invalid. 19. Kelly J. in Ex parte Sloane (1983) 8 A Crim R 424 at 439, referring to equivalent provisions in the Court of Petty Sessions Ordinance (ACT.), said th after finding there was a prima facie case in committal proceedings, the magistrate "should thereupon have .... said to her the words set out in s. 92 (i)(ii) of the Ordinance. In my opinion the procedure set out in s. 92 of the Ordinance is required to be followed at the close of the prosecution evidence .. His Honour certainly indicates that, in his view, the requirements are mandatory. They were in fact met in the committal proceedings, but in an irregular way. His Honour declined to grant relief in all the circumstances of that case which have no parallel here. 20. On a reading of the provisions in question here, they are mandatory and given the purpose for which they are provided, I am not prepared to construe them as directory. They have stood for many years, and from a time when legal representation may not have been always available to persons in all parts of the Territory where committal proceedings could be conducted. That position may now have changed but the statutory requirements remain, and I do not consider that there is any reason to construe the words in any way other than the plain language employed. 21. The object of the provisions is one of general policy relating to all persons charged with indictable offences and for their benefit. Public interests are involved. The requirements are indispensable. The duties imposed are imposed upon the Justice conducting the examination and a failure to observe them cannot be rectified or made good by acquiescence, even by experienced legal practitioners. 22. I have said enough to show that the committal proceedings were void. Essential steps, required by statute to be undertaken, to ground the magistrate' jurisdiction to commit Mungaribi for trial were not taken. The question now is what orders should be made? There appears to be some doubt as to the power of a superior Court to make an order in the nature of certiorari to quash in relation to committal proceedings and the issue was not argued before me. The time available has not allowed detailed research to be undertaken and to review the authorities and consider the conclusion arrived at by Aronson and Franklin "Review of Administrative Actions" at pp 586 and 587. 23. In those circumstances I consider that the better course is to make a declaration that the order for committal of Mungaribi for trial was a nullity. From that it follows that proceedings upon the indictment be permanently stayed.