is alleged to flow from the exercise by an Attorney-General of a power which is granted him by statute. As I have said I am unable to perceive how it can be an abuse of process to wish to proceed to trial on an ex officio indictment merely because the accused person is thereby denied the opportunity of a preliminary hearing." 41. In Barron v Attorney-General for NSW (unrep) 18/8/87 Samuels J.A. was expressly of the view that in that case it was for the claimant to show that the Attorney-General's present intention to proceed on an ex officio indictment was likely in all the circumstances to deprive him of a fair trial. See also R v Mummery (1984) 29 NTR 51 at 55 when O'Leary J. as he then was, said:- "On an application to stay proceedings on an indictment on the ground of absence of, or of some deficiency in, a preliminary examination, I think it must be shown that, by reason thereof, the accused person has been substantially deprived of the benefits and advantages that he is entitled to have from a proper preliminary examination, and that a stay is necessary to ensure a fair trial for him." 42. To the above observations one should add that, at least so far as any application under s. 339 of the Code is concerned, it must necessarily be for the accused to establish one or more of the grounds therein expressly required to be established before the indictment may be quashed or stayed. Onus probandi est ei qui affirmat non qui negat. 43. I conclude therefore that where the Crown files an ex officio indictment without preliminary examination, and the accused applies to have that indictment quashed or stayed, it is for the accused to establish one of the statutory grounds set out in s. 339; or to establish that some unfairness or disadvantage has occurred to the accused which, balancing the interests of the accused against that of the Crown representing the community, makes it unjust for the indictment to proceed to trial at that stage or in that form. 44. However the question of onus of proof may not often be a factor of great importance; for even among the judges who disagree with the strong statements of Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J. there are those who concede that loss of the right to committal proceedings is a serious matter for the court to consider. Stephen J. in Barton's case (p 105) remarks that the absence of committal proceedings will "always call for a careful evaluation by the trial court of all the circumstances, lest the consequent prejudice to the accused should be such as to have deprived him of a fair trial". Mahoney J.A. in Barron's case, after discussing and agreeing with the view that committal proceedings may be sometimes misused, concludes:- "But in my opinion these matters go to cases of abuse. They do not lessen the importance, in cases where committal proceedings are appropriate, of the advantages which, in a particular case, are to be derived by an accused from such proceedings." 45. Where, therefore, an ex officio indictment has been filed without preliminary inquiry, it should not be sufficient for an accused to rely only upon that fact to have the indictment quashed or stayed. Otherwise the "unexaminable power" of the Crown is put at naught. But once an accused establishes prima facie some prospect of unfairness in a particular case the court should investigate the matter fully, bearing in mind that deprivation of committal proceedings may be a serious interference with the rights of the accused. 46. The Crown may be silent when nothing more appears than that the accused has been presented on an ex officio indictment. But once some element of unfairness or injustice to the accused is shown it behoves the Crown to support its position, or by remaining silent, concede. For the investigation is then no longer the prohibited investigation into the power of the Crown to issue the indictment; it has become the legitimate and necessary inquiry by the court as to whether its processes are being abused or injustice or unfairness occurring by deprivation of process. 47. Herein, if I may respectfully say so, lies the force of the remarks of Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J. in Barton at p 101:- "It is for the courts, not the Attorney-General, to decide in the last resort whether the justice of the case requires that a trial should proceed in the absence of committal proceedings. It is not for the courts to abdicate that function to the Attorney-General, let alone to Crown Prosecutors whom he may appoint. We need to recall that the commencement of prosecutions is in very many cases left to Crown Prosecutors. It is quite impossible for an Attorney-General to deal personally with the question except in a minority of cases and then in accordance with advice tendered to him by officers who are acquainted with the materials. If the courts were to abdicate the function, there is the distinct possibility that the ex officio indictment, so recently awakened from its long slumber, would become an active instrument, even in cases in which it has not been employed in the past, notwithstanding the vigorous criticism which has been directed to it and the assertions of commentators that it was appropriate for use only in a very limited category of cases." 48. Mr Barbaro for the first accused supported by Mr Tippett for the second accused puts forward the following reasons why the ex officio indictments here should be quashed or stayed:-

1. That the accused have been denied the basic right to be presented by the Crown with the evidence against them and to test that evidence in cross-examination.
2. That there is an additional and special reason why this procedure is unfair to the accused in this case because by s. 98 of the Code a person cannot be convicted of perjury on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness. This makes it particularly important for the accused to determine in committal proceedings just what is the nature of the corroboration upon which the Crown relies.
3. The accused lose their right to call evidence in rebuttal.
4. There is a possibility which is now denied the accused that the Magistrate could hold that there was no prima facie case. This has more than a little importance because of the

provisions of s. 98. 5. That so far as the charges relate to attempt to to pervert or defeat the course of justice such a charge could be heard summarily (s. 121A Justices Act) unless pursuant to s. 122A of the Justices Act the Magistrate refused to do so. The accused loses at least that chance, where the indictment is ex officio. 6. The Crown also lose the opportunity of seeing whether its witnesses come up to proof and of amending the indictment if the evidence indicates that necessity. 49. I reject the last two submissions. As to the fifth submission in the circumstances of this case I would think it highly unlikely that a magistrate would be prepared to deal with the charges summarily. As to the last submission, Mr Barbaro's solicitude for the interests of the Crown is highly commendable but, one would think, really a matter for the Crown. I suspect Mr Barbaro had his tongue rather firmly in his cheek in making this submission. However I consider that the first four submissions in combination require careful examination, particularly in the light of Barton's case and the recent decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal Barron v Attorney-General for NSW (unrep) 18/8/87. 50. In Barron's case their Honours of the New South Wales Court of Appeal were faced with a case where the claimant Barron appealed from a decision of a District Court Judge refusing to stay an ex officio indictment presented against him. In addition Barron sought a declaration from that court that he was "entitled to full and proper committal proceedings before he is tried on an indictment charge of conspiracy to cheat and defraud." One Lepik had already been committed for trial on 16 counts alleging he had dishonestly obtained a financial advantage, and a count of conspiracy. Barron was charged on the same counts either as principal or as aiding the abetting of the conspiracy with Lepik, and he was charged with 17 similar alternative counts. Barron had been out of the country for some years and he was extradited from the United States to face these charges. A few days before his return to Australia the Attorney-General directed that an ex officio indictment be filed against Barron and Lepik jointly. It was conceded on behalf of Barron that a prima facie case against him had been demonstrated in the committal proceedings against Lepik. Barron contended that by the filing of the ex officio indictment he had lost the opportunity of demonstrating in cross-examination that the oral representations he was alleged to have made were substantially different from those upon which the Crown relied; that he would have led evidence on the committal proceedings to establish a different picture than that portrayed by the Crown; and that in the light of that cross-examination and of that evidence led by him the magistrate would have discharged him. Hunt A.J.A. with whom Samuels J.A. substantially agreed, took the view that the court could not be satisfied, on the material before it, that the prejudice claimed by Barron by reason of his absence from the committal proceedings outweighed a number of prejudices suffered by the Crown, (including expense and delay). Mahoney J.A. agreed in dismissing the application but on the narrower ground that he was not satisfied that the assessment of the trial judge had been shown to be wrong to the extent that or in respects such that the Court of Appeal should intervene. 51. Their Honours of the Court of Appeal took the view that no binding principle had been created by three judges of the High Court since it had not been adopted by the other three. 52. Samuels J.A. said:- "I am also of the view that the joint judgment of Gibbs A.C.J. (as he then was) and Mason J. (as he then was) in which Aickin J. agreed does not yield a majority opinion which is binding on us; although it is, of course, entitled to the greatest respect." 53. Mahoney J.A. observed that the views of their Honours were "not congruent" and, "Assuming as I think to be the case that the difference

between their Honours was a matter of principle, I do not think this Court should treat the matter as tabula rasa." 54. Hunt A.J.A. said: "Obviously enough, the judgments in Barton's case produced no clear ratio in relation to the approach to be adopted in an application to stay proceedings upon an ex officio indictment in the absence of prior committal proceedings." 55. In Barton's case Murphy J. was critical of the committal process generally; so for somewhat different reasons were Samuel J.A. and Hunt A.J.A.; for their complaint was rather to the fact that it is so very often misused. Both judges referred to the remarks of O'Brien C.J. of the Criminal Division of New South Wales in Carlin v Thawat Chidkhunthod and Anor (1985) 4 NSWLR 182 at 190 in which His Honour made some trenchant criticisms of the use of committal proceedings in New South Wales. 56. However the fact of misuse should not suggest that a proper and valuable weapon in the armoury of the accused should be rejected; nor do I read their Honours Samuel J.A. and Hunt A.J.A. as going so far. I would adopt with respect the remarks of Mahoney J.A. "I am conscious that, in committal proceedings, accused sometimes use the proceedings available for purposes for which, in principle, they were not intended. But that, in my opinion, should not lead to the conclusion that the absence of committal proceedings should be seen as of less significance in assessing the prospective fairness of the trial of accused persons generally. The argument from abuse to lack of use involves error." 57. In considering the remarks of Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J. (already quoted) Mahoney J.A. had this to say:- "A trial court should, in my opinion, prudently treat the words " ... unless justified on strong and powerful grounds, must necessarily be considered unfair" as the appropriate guide in arriving at its assessment of the accused's position. If

and insofar as it be relevant my view is that the emphasis conveyed by that approach is the appropriate one." 58. While I do not take their Honours Samuel J.A. or Hunt A.J.A. to disagree with this principle they tend rather to emphasise the balancing process between the rights of the accused and the rights of the Crown as representing the community. Samuel J.A. speaks of the court determining whether the disadvantage the accused will suffer is unacceptable to the extent that the trial would be unfair. Hunt A.J.A. treats the issue as being whether the prejudice suffered by the accused outweighs the detriments suffered by the Crown. 59. While therefore there is obviously a divergence in judicial view as to the importance in principle of committal proceedings there is a sufficient majority to establish at least this approach that, once the accused establishes a prima facie case of unfairness, the lack of committal proceedings becomes an important matter for the court to examine. In doing this the loss of opportunity to the accused to cross-examine, to know the case put against him, to submit no case, to give evidence himself and call witnesses, may all be factors to be taken into account to a greater or less degree depending on all the circumstances. In addition any detriment to the accused must be weighed against any detriment to the Crown representing the community. 60. Furthermore, once an accused has raised some element of unfairness or injustice to him the court is thereby put upon enquiry, and is then entitled to ask the Crown why it is proceeding in this way. It seems to me that one of the things which the Crown must then explain is why it has taken a course which is not usual. To the warnings conveyed by Gibbs A.C.J. and Mason J. in the passages quoted above I add those of Muirhead J., a judge of immense experience in criminal law, in R v Siugzdinis (1984) 32 NTR 1 at 11 that "the practice of laying ex officio indictments should be restricted to cases where for good reason (and generally by agreement) it is decided as necessary in the interests of justice to proceed without committal proceedings." 61. Although His Honour was there dealing with a case where additional indictments had been filed after committal proceedings I take His Honour as laying down a general principle and I note also his remarks that the governing principle is that of fairness. 62. I turn therefore to the circumstances of the cases presently before me. 63. I must say candidly that the actions of the Crown have given me some concern. I hasten to say that I do not lay any blame for that on Mr Karczewski the learned Crown Prosecutor who appeared before me and has had to defend the actions of others. But the position is plain that these proceedings commenced in the usual and accepted manner i.e. by committal proceedings. Upon the accused enquiring for particulars before the hearing the Crown in the letter of 28 April 1987 which I have already set out made no suggestion that it contemplated ex officio indictments. Instead it used the reason that committal proceedings were to go ahead as the very basis for refusing to provide particulars because, "that is one of the main purposes of the committal proceedings." 64. When the Magistrate then adjourned the matter to enable the Crown to provide particulars as requested, the Crown, as I understand it, did not then suggest that the particulars would not be provided or that the committal would not proceed on the adjourned date. Eight days later the Crown issued the ex officio indictments thereby effectively preventing any further proceedings before the Magistrate save for formal orders. 65. No particulars were supplied as to attempting to pervert or defeat the course of justice. As to the particulars ultimately supplied as to perjury they were supplied in a most unsatisfactory manner. 66. In these circumstances I consider that the accused make out a prima facie case of unfairness. The accused were led into a belief that they would be able to and indeed expected to adduce from the evidence presented at the committal the particulars they sought and then denied that very opportunity which the Crown in the letter of 28 April had said would be open to them. 67. That being the case, and according to the principles I have already stated an explanation seems called for by the Crown. Mr Karczewski relies on these matters:-

1. The first accused was present throughout the original trial from which the present charges arise and the Crown would be proving much the same matters as in the previous trial.
2. Two additional witnesses were to be called; but a summary of their evidence had been provided to the accused in the affidavit of Mr Wallace filed in these proceedings and their statements would be provided before the trial.
3. The Crown had supplied both particulars and evidence i.e. by supplying the particulars requested and the transcript and it could do no more.
4. The credibility of both accused as witnesses at the trial was "hotly contested" so that both well know what is alleged against them. The contest in credibility was

also remarked on by the trial judge in sentencing. 5. The first accused was already serving a prison sentence and it was in his interest to have a speedy trial. 68. These arguments are I fear, unconvincing. The fact that the first accused was present at the original trial means nothing in this context. Obviously the same could be said about many persons charged with perjury in earlier proceedings. What the learned trial judge said cannot be said to take the matter further other than perhaps foreshadowing to the first accused that further proceedings could occur. In any event, as Mr Tippett on behalf of his client points out, the second accused was not present during the whole of the trial. The evidence of the two additional witnesses may well prove important if, as I understand to be the case, their evidence is to be relied upon as corroboration for the perjury charges; and it is just such evidence which the accused may wish to test in committal proceedings. The purported particulars to my mind are totally unsatisfactory; and a combination of transcript and unsatisfactory particulars does not add up to a case which the accused know they are to meet. The argument that the Crown could do no more than provide transcript and particulars seems feeble unless the Crown is embarking on a policy of ex officio indictments in all cases of perjury; in which case it sounds sinister. The fact that the credibility of the accused was a factor in the earlier trial is no argument against committal proceedings for the present charges where the issues are different. I appreciate the need for dispatch of the case where one accused in in prison, but not if that is to be to the disadvantage of that accused. 69. What is quite obvious is that the present counts of the indictment as they stand are general. So far as the count relating to attempting to pervert or defeat the course of justice is concerned no particulars of any sort are given. Yet this is obviously a count where particulars must be given. There seems to be reliance on a number of acts done by the two accused jointly which might be interpreted as attempting to pervert or defeat the course of justice. Is the Crown proposing to call a body of evidence and invite the jury to sort out those parts which relate to the charge and invite them to convict if they find all, any or one of those parts proved? Surely as a matter of fairness the accused must know just where the attack is to come from. If the Crown wishes to rely upon more than one act it has a right in the interests of orderly presentation and clarity for the jury and it has a correlative duty to the accused to file separate counts and particularise each. Furthermore if a jury were to find an accused guilty on one generalised charge, how is the judge to sentence? Is he to presume that the jury have accepted the whole series of acts alleged by the Crown? Or does he give the accused the benefit of the doubt and sentence on the basis that the jury may have been satisfied that only one of several attempts to pervert justice may have been proved? Whichever view he takes may result in either too heavy or too light a sentence with a consequent injustice either to the accused or to the community. 70. S. 305 of the Code is in clear terms:- "S305 (1) An indictment shall contain a statement of the offence charged together with such particulars as may be necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge. (2) If more than one offence is charged each offence shall be set out in a separate paragraph and numbered consecutively." 71. The same observations apply to the charge of perjury. In a real sense the mischief is compounded because one can only conclude from the presentation of transcript and the marking of various passages in the transcript that the Crown really does propose to present to the jury a series of allegedly false statements made by the accused and invite the jury to come to one verdict on all of them. 72. In Traino v The Queen (unrep 21/5/87) a decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia the appellant had been charged that he, being a witness at the hearing of an action in the Supreme Court, "knowingly falsely swore that injuries he received in a vehicular collision prevented him from carrying out specific physical tasks". 73. The solicitor for the appellant sought particulars as to the physical tasks referred to in the charge and the passage of the evidence in which the alleged perjury was committed. There was no reply in writing to that request. However the prosecution informed the solicitor for the defendant that the Crown was presenting its case on the combined effect of the statements, rather than any individual statement, in relation to his ability to bend his back, bend his neck, lift his arms and perform tasks of a domestic nature. 74. The prosecution opened the case to the jury by reading out a number of passages in the appellant's evidence in the earlier case in which he had made specific complaints of restrictions of various bodily movements and restrictions on work and recreational capacity caused by pain and weakness. 75. King C.J. set out the situation above and commented:- "The crime of perjury consists in giving upon oath, in a judicial proceedings, before a competent tribunal, evidence which was material to some question in the proceeding and was false to the knowledge of the deponent, or was not believed by him to be true, Russell on Crime, 12th edition Vol. 1 p 291. The crime consists in the making of a deliberately false statement in the postulated circumstances. It follows that if more than one false statement is made in the course of the evidence of a witness in a particular case, each such false statement is a separate crime of perjury. Thus in R v Sweet-Escott (1971) 55 Cr App Rep 316 the accused was charged with five counts of perjury in respect of the denial in evidence of five prior convictions. Each statement to which perjury is assigned is a separate crime and must therefore be made the subject of a separate count. It is not always easy to know when a number of answers in evidence amount to a single false statement or when they constitute separate false

statements." 76. His Honour went on to discuss circumstances in which the cumulative effect of a number of false statements may amount to a single compendious lie chargeable as such in a single count. His Honour was of the view that Traino's case did not come within that category. "It seems to me that in alleging false statements in relation to 'specific physical tasks', the information charged the appellant with several false statements, that is to say several crimes of perjury in the one count. It is not possible to say what particular statement or statements were the subject of the verdict and therefore what crime or crimes he has been found guilty of." 77. Jacobs and Milhouse JJ. concurred with the reasons of the Chief Justice on this point. 78. It seems plain to me that in the present case the general count against each accused that each "knowingly gave evidence ... touching matters which were material to a question then pending in proceedings between the Queen and Richard Gordon Haslett" is bad for lack of particulars under s. 305: and if the answers of the accused as marked by the Crown in the transcript supplied to the accused are relied upon by the Crown then the counts are bad for duplicity and - although this may not be a recognised legal category of objection

• for obfuscation. Any perusal of the transcript of the evidence of the first accused will show that a number of specific statements are made by him; and if the Crown wishes to allege that they were knowingly falsely made it will need to particularise separate counts.

79. I totally reject the suggestion that the Crown can do no more than it has done. I see no reason whatever why a number of counts each relating to a specific allegation of perjury, cannot be framed. Mr Barbaro has referred me to the precedents contained in Archbold

• 42nd Edition. I refer to the precedent at p 2108:- " STATEMENT OF OFFENCE Perjury contrary to s. 1(1) of the Perjury Act 1911 Particulars of Offence AB on the day of having been lawfully sworn as a witness in a judicial proceeding wilfully made a statement in that proceeding which he knew to be false namely that .......".

80. Naturally the indictment under the Code is not framed in precisely that manner, but the principle is the same, namely that the general offence is charged and then the particulars given which are alleged to sustain it.
81. Furthermore Count 1 charges both accused jointly. It should be clear that in a joint charge the need to give particulars would be of special importance. For it may well be that one of the two accused may be able to show that he or she was not involved in whatever joint enterprise is alleged. It creates a peculiar difficulty if that enterprise is not set out.
82. Ground 5 of the Notice of Motion seeks that the indictment be quashed as being formally defective. The formal defect alleged can be stated in the terms of s. 305(1) of the Code that the counts do not contain "such particulars as may be necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge."
83. Under s. 564 of the Queensland Criminal Code the requirement is that the indictment must "set forth the offence with which the accused person is charged in such manner and with such particulars as to the alleged time and place of committing the offence, as to the person, if any, alleged to be aggrieved, and as to the property, if any, in question, as may be necessary to inform the accused person of the nature of the charge."
84. In R v Phil Maria (1957) St R Qd 512 at 523 Stanley J. commented on this section:- "In my opinion the Code aims at continuing the common law practice - one charge known to the accused, with particulars if needed, giving every fair opportunity to prepare his defence to what is charged and particularised against him."
85. These remarks have, if anything, greater weight in the Territory because the provisions of s. 305(1) are broader than the Queensland provisions.
86. In my view the indictment here does not give that reasonable information as to the nature of the charges alleged which is necessary both as a matter of fairness to the accused and as a matter of precision to be expected from those who have the carriage of these matters on behalf of the community.
87. It follows that pursuant to s. 339(1)(a) I would have either quashed the indictment on this ground alone or, at least, pursuant to s. 339(3) have stayed the indictment until properly amended. I am satisfied on both bases of s. 339(1)(a) that the indictments as they stand and because of their lack of particularisation are calculated to prejudice or embarrass both accused in their defence; and for the same reason, i.e. lack of particularity, they are formally defective. I take the meaning of the expressions "calculated" in this context to be "of a nature or character likely to" prejudice or embarrass the accused in their defence. (See O.E.D.).
88. But in the circumstances of this case I consider I should take a broader view of the whole case and quash or stay the proceedings either pursuant to s. 339(1)(b) and (2) or within the inherent powers of the court to prevent unfairness or injustice.
89. So far as s. 339 is concerned it is relevant to note that it is directed to two separate matters although the court is given general powers under s. 339(3).
90. Hence under s. 339(1) the applicant applies to quash the indictment. However once he makes that application the court, as well as having power to quash, is given the power in s. 339(3) to make less drastic orders i.e. to order amendment, or to stay; or of course, to refuse the motion.
91. Under s. 339(2) the applicant applies to stay the proceedings. But under subsection (3) the court may on that application go further and quash the indictment or it may stay it or order amendments or refuse the motion.
92. After careful thought I have come to the conclusion that I should not act under s. 339(1)(b) and quash or stay the proceedings on the ground that they are vexatious or harassing. Although the conduct of the case on the part of the Crown has given me some disquiet I cannot describe the "proceedings" as either vexatious or harassing. I take the word "proceedings" to mean the actual prosecution itself as commenced by the filing and presenting of the indictment, and the subsection speaks only of the proceedings not the subsequent conduct of them. In that sense the proceedings are soundly enough based as the circumstances I have related indicate. There is nothing in the facts to suggest that the accused are being prosecuted or that the prosecution is being persisted in on no reasonable ground. That does not mean that I come to any conclusion as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. It merely means that I cannot think it unreasonable or vexatious or harassing to the accused that a prosecution has been launched. R v Siugzdinis (1984) 32 NTR 1 is a case where the section was, if I may say so with respect, properly applied because an unnecessary multiplicity of counts was laid, so that the "proceedings" themselves became vexatious or harassing. I should add, lest I be misunderstood, that I would not consider the filing of additional counts in the present indictment to be vexatious or harassing provided they specifically clarified the offences charged and providing they did not go to the sort of excess which Muirhead J. criticised in the case referred to.

I am however satisfied that the circumstances here have created a distinctly unfair situation for the accused. Without any real cause they have been deprived of committal proceedings which they had a reasonable expectation would continue. They have not been supplied with proper particulars to enable them to prepare their defence adequately and it appears no adequate particulars are forthcoming. On serious charges they are prevented from cross-examining witnesses and particularly on the charges of perjury and having regard to s. 98 of the Code they are deprived of the opportunity to see what corroboration is relied on and what is its strength. Without suggesting anything intentionally improper on the part of those advising the Crown it is sufficient to say that having regard both to the interests of the accused and to the interests of the Crown as representing the community there is now a significant element of unfairness to the accused if these proceedings continue. That element of unfairness appears not only in the matters I have specifically set out but in the unsatisfactory explanations adduced on behalf of the Crown for filing ex officio indictments in this case and in the rather peremptory or "take it or leave it" attitude evinced by the letter of 15 September; particularly when that action was taken and that letter written after a specific order made by a Magistrate. I do not wish to be unduly censorious and I appreciate that one episode does not suggest a general philosophy. But it may be well to remember that at various stages of our constitutional history either parliament or the courts have felt bound to warn that "the power of the Crown has increased, is increasing and ought to be diminished". 94. It seems to me therefore that in all the circumstances the better course is to quash the indictments rather than stay them until appropriate amendments are made and particulars given if then necessary. 95. That, of course, does not mean that fresh indictments may not be launched. The Crown has its duty to the community and there is nothing to my mind wrong on the facts as I have been given them for the Crown to proceed on other indictments with appropriate particulars. In such proceedings however I would expect there to be a preliminary examination; unless, of course, those representing the accused consent to the procedures under s. 105A of the Justices Act. 96. Acting therefore under the inherent power of the court to see that no shadow of unfairness or injustice should taint these proceedings I quash the indictments.