42 I turn to the second aspect of the submission. Two points should be made. First, the fact that the judge imposed a term of imprisonment and fixed a non-parole period does not mean that he did not consider the option of imposing a wholly or partly suspended sentence. It is inconceivable, having regard to the matters urged on him for the appellant, that he did not do so. Second, had it been argued on the plea that a sentence of imprisonment partly suspended would offer an opportunity for rehabilitation that would - or might - otherwise be denied the appellant, it may be that his Honour would have been persuaded to impose a sentence of such a kind. But that was not necessarily the case. He might have concluded that the appellant's rehabilitation would best be achieved by supervision in a familiar environment and with her family's support. He might well have been unimpressed, from the standpoint of the appellant's prospective rehabilitation, by the evidence pertaining to her employment in London from time to time. None of the employments had been of long duration. Again, the appellant's submission assumed that there would have been no inhibition on a person under sentence travelling to, and living in, London. If the assumption had been shown before the judge to be well-founded, it might still be that he would have regarded the sentencing alternatives as being neutral in effect. In all, the sentencing course which the judge might have taken - had a pertinent submission been made - was quite uncertain. So I would not conclude that his Honour was bound, uninvited, to conjecture what the submission might have been, and to pass upon it. Neither would I conclude that, had he conjectured its content correctly, it was reasonably likely to have altered the sentence which he in fact imposed.